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Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances 
 
Brian Dylan Blankenship 
 
Great power patrons frequently reassure allies of their protection, whether by stationing 
troops abroad, visiting allied countries, or making public statements. In the case of the 
United States, observers and practitioners alike have emphasized the need to instill 
confidence in U.S. allies. However, allied reassurance is fundamentally puzzling because 
it gives away a key source of bargaining leverage: the threat of abandonment. Patrons 
should ideally strive to limit the extent to which they are perceived as committed to allies, 
lest they encourage allies to free-ride on their protection and contribute little to the 
common defense. Existing literature tends to either treat reassurance as a secondary effect 
of deterrence, or to focus on understanding how patrons can reassure their allies rather 
than why. Studies that do provide explanations for reassurance, for their part, often regard 
reassurance as strategically suboptimal, and emphasize domestic political factors that 
drive reassurance. The causes of reassurance are thus poorly understood.  
 
I argue that although reassurance can have adverse consequences, patrons have incentives 
to reassure to the extent that allies have the capacity to exit the alliance. The more 
credible an ally’s threat to pursue outside options, and the more costs that doing so would 
impose on the patron, the more reassurance it will receive. Patrons thus face a dilemma, 
trading off between withholding reassurance to drive hard bargains with allies and 
reassuring allies to dissuade them from exiting the alliance. This dilemma may be 




sharing by combining its assurances with threats of abandonment. These threats are more 
potent to the extent that a patron faces domestic pressure to retrench from its foreign 
commitments, and that allies face severe threat environments. I test the theory using a 
mixed-method approach that combines statistical analysis of an original dataset on 
American reassurance and allied burden-sharing between 1950 and 2010 with qualitative 
historical case studies. 
 
In Chapters 1 and 2, I introduce the concepts of alliance reassurance and burden-sharing 
and review the literature on both concepts. I argue that reassurance is puzzling in light of 
existing theories of alliance bargaining which stress the threat of abandonment as a 
source of leverage. The “reassurance dilemma” that patrons face, however, is that 
withholding reassurance may encourage allies to distance themselves from the alliance 
and seek outside options. 
 
In Chapter 3, I present a theory of bargaining leverage in asymmetric alliances in order to 
identify the conditions under which this dilemma is most severe—and thus to explain 
variation in patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing. I posit that reassurance serves 
the purpose of discouraging allies from leaving the alliance; the more credible allies’ 
threats of exit, the more reassurance they will receive. However, patrons can make their 
assurances conditional on allies’ burden-sharing efforts if their own threat of exiting the 
alliance is credible as well. I present a simple formal model illustrating both the tradeoffs 




are more likely to reassure and allies are more likely to increase their contributions to the 
alliance. I then introduce hypotheses for testing the theory’s observable implications. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the quantitative analysis on the determinants of patron reassurance and 
allied burden-sharing. First, using an original dataset of U.S. reassurance collected and 
analyzed with automated text analysis, I use statistical models to identify correlates of 
U.S. willingness to offer reassurances. Second, I study allied burden-sharing using data 
on allies’ military spending, support for U.S. military bases, and participation in U.S. 
foreign military interventions.  
 
In Chapters 5-8, I conduct case studies on U.S. reassurance and burden-sharing pressure 
toward West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom during the 1960s 
and 1970s. Process-tracing of these cases shows that the United States saw reassurance as 
a way of discouraging its allies from pursuing outside options—in particular nuclear 
weapons and rapprochement with the Soviet Union. However, the United States was 
simultaneously able to extract significant burden-sharing efforts, especially from West 
Germany and South Korea owing to their geographic vulnerability, and during the early 
1970s due to doubts about U.S. reliability in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. 
 
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes with a summary of the analysis, as well as a discussion of 
implications and avenues for future research. My findings suggest that by withholding 
reassurance and deliberately casting doubt on its protection, a patron makes its allies 
prone to reconsidering their reliance on it and to instead pursue outside options. 
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Introduction
“The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress, and in the
American body politic writ large, to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are
apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources...to be serious and capable partners in their own
defense.”
—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates1
“Free riders aggravate me.”
—Barack Obama2
“[Hillary Clinton] comes out and said, we love our allies, we think our allies are great. Well, it’s
awfully hard to get them to pay up when you have somebody saying we think how great they are.”
—Donald Trump3
1.1 The Puzzle of Reassurance
In a May 2017 visit to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters, U.S. President
Donald Trump declined to affirm his support of NATO’s Article 5, which obligates its members
to come to each others’ defense.4 Indeed, this was no accident; in his speech, Trump deliberately
1Michael Birnbaum, “Gates rebukes European allies in farewell speech,” Washington Post, June 10, 2011.
2Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine: The U.S. President Talks Through His Hardest Decisions about America’s
Role in the World,” The Atlantic, March 10, 2016.
3Aaron Blake, “The Final Trump-Clinton Debate Transcript, Annotated,” Washington Post, October 19, 2016.
4Michael D. Shear, Mark Landler, and James Kanter, “In NATO Speech, Trump Is Vague About Mutual De-
fense Pledge,” New York Times, May 25, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/25/world/europe/donald-trump-
eu-nato.html?mcubz=2 (accessed June 8, 2017).
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removed a passage expressing his support for Article 5.5 U.S. allies – as well as members of
Trump’s own administration – were taken aback, with German Chancellor Angela Merkel arguing
that it was time for Europeans to “really take our fate into our own hands.”6
In the wake of the uproar surrounding Trump’s speech – and his treatment of allies more gener-
ally – one question that has largely been neglected is why one should even expect the United States
to reassure its allies in the first place. Indeed, reassurance is fundamentally puzzling because it sur-
renders a key source of bargaining power: the threat of abandonment. Bargaining leverage within
an alliance depends on the credibility of states’ threats to abandon their partners, and thus great
power patrons should limit the extent to which they are perceived as committed to their allies (Sny-
der, 1997; Jervis, 1997: ch. 5; Crawford, 2003).7 Reassurance measures, however, are intended
to have exactly the opposite effect. Why, then, would a patron deliberately weaken its bargaining
position?
Other stands of literature similarly suggest that reassurance can have undesirable consequences.
Theories on defense burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances stress that as long as a great power’s
protection is relatively assured, allies have little incentive to increase their military contributions
(Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Oneal, 1990; Palmer, 1990a,b; Sandler, 1993). By reassuring them,
the patron effectively encourages its allies to free-ride. Furthermore, reassuring allies can run the
risk of moral hazard. Allies confident in their patron’s support may be prone to take risks such as
confronting their adversaries because they expect that the patron will bail them out, thus increas-
ing the probability that the patron will be entrapped or entangled in allies’ conflicts (Christensen
and Snyder, 1990; Fearon, 1997; Posen, 2014). In the years leading up to World War I, for ex-
5Susan B. Glasser, “Trump National Security Team Blindsided by NATO Speech,” Politico, June 5,
2017, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/05/trump-nato-speech-national-security-team-215227 (ac-
cessed November 15, 2017).
6Alison Smale and Steven Erlanger, “Merkel, After Discordant G7 Meeting, Is Looking Past Trump,” New York Times,
May 28, 2017.
7Macdonald (1992) also shows that the United States has used the threat of abandonment to pressure allies into do-
mestic political reform.
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ample, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov cautioned against reassuring Serbia of Russia’s
support too strongly, lest the Serbian government be encouraged to take a more intransigent stance
vis-à-vis its territorial disputes with Austria-Hungary. He lamented that this was rendered more
challenging by the attitudes of other senior Russian officials – including the ambassador to Ser-
bia – whose support for Serbia’s pan-Slavic ambitions in the Balkans ran the risk of encouraging
Serbian adventurism (Jelavich, 1991: 244-245, 250).
The puzzle of reassurance is only magnified in asymmetric alliances. In his seminal book,
Waltz (1979) argues that unlike in symmetric alliances between great powers, where each ally
is a crucial component of the overall balance of power, in asymmetric alliances weak states are
comparatively much less important, as their allegiance is less likely to influence the course of a war.
Recent scholarship suggests that great powers can shape their alliance treaties and withhold support
from their allies as a means of reducing the risks of moral hazard (Kim, 2011a; Benson, 2012;
Mattes, 2012). Beckley (2015: 19), for one, claims that the United States “is unlikely to incur major
costs to display loyalty to allies that depend on U.S. protection and patronage for their survival,”
as none of its allies are inherently important for its own security.This asymmetry becomes even
more pronounced in bipolar and unipolar systems, where the gap between the capabilities of the
superpowers and other states is even wider and small states have even fewer patrons to choose
from (Snyder, 1997; Kim, 2016). It may be understandable, then, that Walt (2005: 242) would
conclude: “the credibility of U.S. commitments is not [the United States’] problem”; rather, it is
“a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help.”
Yet Trump’s treatment of allies has come as such a surprise because reassuring allies has, in
fact, been historically common in U.S. foreign policy. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger, for one, argued that “both the size and the specific elements of [American] forces
are driven more by the need to reassure those that we protect under the nuclear umbrella than by
U.S. requirements alone” (Murdock et al., 2009: 9). Since 1945, the United States has stationed
hundreds of thousands of troops on allied soil, and U.S. officials make countless foreign visits
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and public statements to demonstrate interest in and support for American partners (Lebovic and
Saunders, 2016). Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, for example, made such an effort to com-
municate U.S. commitment through numerous overseas trips that the New York Times dubbed him
the “secretary of reassurance” in the summer of 2015.8
Indeed, the historical record is replete with examples of weaker allies extracting support despite
their patron’s reluctance. U.S. policymakers during the early years of the Cold War, for example,
did not envision the U.S. troop presence in Europe as permanent, with Dwight Eisenhower arguing
that “If in ten years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes have
not been returned to the United States, then this whole project will have failed” (Sheetz, 1999:
32). Nevertheless, allies resisted American withdrawal, leading to what Zimmermann (2009) calls
the “improbable permanence” of the U.S. troop presence. Similarly, East Germany was able to
pressure a reluctant Soviet Union into building the Berlin Wall by threatening to align itself more
closely with China (Harrison, 2005; Crump, 2015).
However, reassurance remains understudied in the scholarly literature. Academic studies of-
ten treat great power patrons’ use of reassurance as a byproduct of deterrence, where the primary
intended audiences are adversaries (Schelling, 1966; Morgan, 1983; Benson, Meirowitz, and Ram-
say, 2014; McManus, 2017). To the extent that the academic literature has considered reassurance,
it has largely been in the context of how states reassure their allies rather than why. Policy pre-
scriptions, for their part, tend to either deny the importance of reassurance (e.g., Posen, 2014) or
assume its importance and focus on how to reassure allies (e.g., Flournoy and Davidson, 2012).9
As a result, existing literature has not offered a theory of reassurance.
8Helene Cooper, “Pentagon Chief Ashton Carter Adds ‘Secretary of Reassurance’ to His Portfolio,” New York Times,
August 3, 2015.




In this dissertation, I address the following questions: What explains variation in great powers’
use of reassurance measures toward allies? And under what conditions can patrons make their
protection conditional on allied burden-sharing? Here, I define reassurance as acts made by a
patron that are intended to convince an ally that its assistance will be forthcoming in the event
of an attack from another state. In other words, assurances are intended to reduce allies’ fears of
patron abandonment.10 The theory I present here is intended to be generalizeable; however, for
reasons discussed below I focus on American alliances. Thus I use the terms “patron” and “United
States” interchangeably.
Although reassurance can have adverse consequences, patrons have incentives to reassure to
the extent that allies can credibly threaten to exit the alliance. By exit, I refer to attempts by states
in an alliance to loosen themselves from the partnership by pursuing outside options. In its most
extreme form, alliance exit can take the form of treaty abrogation, allying with a hostile third party,
or a refusal to provide support in wartime. More commonly, patrons fear that their allies will take
more incremental steps that allow them to distance themselves from the alliance by exploiting
outside options. The more credible an ally’s threat to pursue outside options, and the more costs
that doing so would impose on the patron, the more incentive patrons have to reassure allies.
Patrons face a dilemma, trading off between withholding reassurance to drive hard bargains and
reduce free-riding, on the one hand, and reassuring allies to discourage them from pursuing outside
options, on the other. This dilemma can be mitigated, however, if a patron can make its assurances
conditional on allied burden-sharing by combining its assurances with threats of abandonment.
Like those of its allies, the patron’s threats are more potent to the extent that they are both credible
and salient to its allies.
Thus, reassurance and burden-sharing are the product of bargaining, where each side’s leverage
10Notably, this definition excludes measures taken to support allies who are already under attack.
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is shaped by its threat of exit. Studying the effects of exit, however, is difficult owing to the issue
of endogeneity. An ally’s desire for outside options may be a function of its patron’s behavior –
including its use of reassurance (or lack thereof) – and states are also likely to anticipate the risk
of exit and tailor their actions accordingly. As such, I look at factors affecting the propensity of
patrons and allies to exit.
I focus on four factors that shape the costs and credibility of patrons’ and allies’ threats of exit.
First, the credibility of allies’ outside options is shaped by their latent military and nuclear power,
as well as the availability of alternative allies. Allies with more military power, nuclear latency,
and a larger number of partners to choose from are better able to ensure their security unilaterally
by undergoing conventional military arming, obtaining nuclear weapons, or forging partnerships
with third parties. The patron will thus have greater incentive to reassure them. Second, allies’
strategic value shapes both how potent their threats of exit are, as well as how easily the patron can
afford to abandon them. Allies which have intrinsic value to the patron – such as those with larger
economies and latent military power – will be able to evade burden-sharing pressure.
Both of these propositions make distinctive predictions from the economic theory of alliances
proposed by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), which is the dominant explanation for alliance burden-
sharing. Based on the logic of collective goods, the economic theory of alliance suggests that larger
partners in an alliance will pay a disproportionate share of the alliance’s defense burden, as these
states’ contributions will be the most crucial to the attainment of the collective good. However,
when one puts reassurance and burden-sharing into a bargaining framework, a central challenge
for the patron is that allies which can contribute more may also have more credible outside options,
while the patron’s own threat of abandonment may lack credibility owing to their strategic value.
Thus, powerful allies may be able to extract significant assurance measures and may not be as
likely to shoulder as disproportionately great a portion of the alliance’s burdens as the logic of
collective goods might otherwise suggest.
Third, when the patron faces constraints on its resources due to costly foreign wars or economic
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hardship, its threat of abandonment is inherently more credible. This also creates uncertainty about
its reliability, however, which reduces allies’ expected benefits of continuing to rely upon it. As
a result, when the patron faces resource constraints, it must reassure allies to discourage them
from exiting, but it will also be better able to extract burden-sharing efforts from them. In effect,
the patron will be able to use a “good cop-bad cop routine” in which it reassures allies while
simultaneously using the threat of “involuntary defection” due to domestic pressure in order to put
burden-sharing pressure on allies (Putnam, 1988).
Fourth is the alliance’s threat environment. The effect of external threat on bargaining power
within the alliance depends on which partners perceive the threat more severely. When the patron’s
perception of threat is higher, its threat of exit will be less credible, thus inhibiting its ability to
make its protection conditional on allied burden-sharing. When allies’ threat perception is more
acute, however, patrons will better able to effectively coerce allies into increasing their burden-
sharing contributions, as the costs allies would incur from being abandoned are higher.
I test the theory by studying the behavior of the United States toward its allies, using an original
dataset of U.S. reassurance that includes public statements, diplomatic visits, foreign troop deploy-
ments, and joint military exercises from 1950-2010, as well as a dataset of allied burden-sharing
that includes allied military spending, support for U.S. bases, and participation in U.S. military
interventions. Second, I conduct detailed historical case studies on U.S. reassurance and burden-
sharing pressure toward West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom during the
1960s and 1970s.
1.3 Contributions
This study makes four contributions. The first is to the literature on alliance bargaining. A number
of studies have discussed tactics smaller allies can use to influence their patrons – including lobby-
ing in the patron’s domestic politics (Keohane, 1971) and ingratiating themselves (Handel, 1981:
139-146). Yet there has been comparatively less emphasis devoted to the conditions under which
7
allies can influence patrons – and vice-versa. Moreover, existing work is often descriptive (Park,
1975; Bar-Siman-Tov, 1980; Handel, 1981) or mono-causal (Macdonald, 1992).
While the threat of exit has been invoked by scholars seeking to understand bargaining leverage
between allies, empirical testing is limited and almost entirely qualitative (Jervis, 1997; Harrison,
2005; Fang and Ramsay, 2010; Urpelainen, 2012). Snyder (1984, 1997), for his part, focuses on
bargaining in symmetric alliances among great powers in multipolarity, while Dittmer (1981) and
Schweller (1998) focus on situations with three actors, arguing that there is great advantage in
playing the role of the “pivot” that has better relations with the other parties than they do with each
other. Crawford (2003) builds upon these to argue that states attempting to play the pivot between
two adversaries have an easier task in doing so when their targets have no other options for support.
Moreover, existing studies have not attempted to identify the conditions under which the threat
of exit is systematically more or less potent, or to understand why some allies have outside options
while others do not. Looking for which allies are pursuing an outside option – whether in the form
of nuclear weapons, an alternative patron, or something else – risks conflating cause with effect,
as allies may seek to exploit an outside option because they do not feel reassured. This raises the
problem of endogeneity. One exception is Kim (2016), who also provides the only quantitative ev-
idence on the relationship between outside options and alliance bargaining outcomes. However, he
focuses primarily on the polarity of the system as the crucial determinant of allies’ outside options
– a very coarse measure, which not only cannot explain variation within a given distribution of
power, but which also makes the assumption that all great powers are credible alternative security
providers.11
Second, I contribute to the literature on alliance design. A number of scholars have argued that
the formal design of an alliance pact – for example, whether it contains provisions for economic
linkage or joint military coordination – can greatly affect its ability to deter adversaries and dis-
11Additionally, Lake (1999) and Cooley and Spruyt (2009) argue that partners with “specific assets” have more potent
threats of exit.
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courage defection (Morrow, 1994; Leeds and Anac, 2005; Long and Leeds, 2006; Poast, 2013).
Yet work seeking to explain variation in alliance commitments is surprisingly rare; moreover, few
studies focus on how bargaining leverage can shape alliance design, and those that do implicitly
assume that great powers can have their way when dealing with smaller allies. Kim (2011a) argues
that patrons can reduce their risk of entrapment and entanglement by increasing the precision of
the language in their alliance pacts, while Benson (2012) claims that ambiguity can have the same
effect. Beckley (2015) similarly argues that patrons can generally distance themselves from their
commitments enough to avoid being undesirably entangled in allies’ conflicts. Finally, Mattes
(2012) finds that allies’ reputations for honoring their commitments shape whether their partners
insist on design choices that increase the barriers to defection.12 However, the assumption running
throughout these studies is that, in Mattes’s words, “minor powers. . . might be unable to force
more costly alliance designs given their limited bargaining power” (Mattes, 2012: 680). In explic-
itly focusing on how bargaining shapes alliance commitments outside the context of explicit treaty
provisions, this study suggests avenues for further research on how bargaining might also shape
formal alliance design.
I also contribute more broadly to scholarly understanding of the role – and shortcomings – of
alliance treaties in international relations. Formalizing an alliance is itself a form of dyadic reas-
surance, given the costs entailed in breaking a commitment (Morrow, 1994, 2000; Leeds, 2003a;
Miller, 2003) and the increased transparency and mechanisms for dispute resolution that alliances
bring (Weitsman, 2004; Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros, 2006). However, formal changes in alliance
pacts are quite rare, while reassurance, burden-sharing, and fears of defection are much more vari-
able. Moreover, a state’s likelihood of actually following through on its pledge is always in doubt
given the anarchic nature of the international system and states’ incentives for avoiding the costs of
war, and even if allies are confident in the present, there is no guarantee that the patron’s commit-
12Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds (2015) also argue that democracies will favor flexible commitments in order to avoid po-
tential future domestic punishment for violating the alliance’s terms, while Kuo (2014) studies the systemic diffusion
of “dominant” alliance features.
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ment will remain steadfast indefinitely. Informal signaling and hands-tying mechanisms are thus a
necessary and common means for patrons to shore up partners’ faith in their commitments.
Third, I inform the literature on nuclear nonproliferation. Studies here have long focused on
the correlates of proliferation, and until recently have often used alliances with a great power or
nuclear-armed state as a dichotomous explanatory variable (Meyer, 1984; Sagan, 1996; Singh and
Way, 2004; Jo and Gartzke, 2007; Bleek, 2010). Recent scholarship, however, has focused at-
tention on security guarantees as a constraint on proliferation behavior (Bleek and Lorber, 2014;
Reiter, 2014), and has begun to explore the conditions under which alliances with great powers
have discouraged states from pursuing nuclear weapons (Knopf, 2012; Lanoszka, 2014). In par-
ticular, the extent to which the United States has coupled its promises of protection with threats
of abandonment to keep its allies from obtaining nuclear weapons has been the subject of growing
interest (Miller, 2014a,b; Gavin, 2015; Gerzhoy, 2015). I contribute to this scholarship by placing
nuclear nonproliferation in the broader context of alliance politics, emphasizing that while allies
may be able to leverage the threat of obtaining nuclear weapons to extract assurances, the patron’s
efforts to keep its allies from acquiring nuclear weapons only compose one bargaining dimension
among many.
Finally, the literature on free-riding and burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances has almost
exclusively focused on three questions: first, whether smaller allies free-ride more than larger al-
lies (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Palmer, 1990a; Sandler, 1993; Plümper and Neumayer, 2015);
second, whether alliance benefits such as deterrence and defense are truly “public” goods (San-
dler, 1977; Murdoch and Sandler, 1984; Oneal and Elrod, 1989; Palmer, 1990b; Goldstein, 1995;
Lanoszka, 2015); and third, how factors outside the context of the alliance itself may influence
allies’ defense efforts (Russett, 1970; Oneal, 1990; Palmer, 1990a,b). However, with few excep-
tions, the literature has not emphasized the conditions under which great power patrons pressure
their allies to pick up the burden. Rather, studies generally adopt at most a tacit bargaining frame-
work in which allies’ military expenditures are assumed to be responsive to changes in the military
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expenditures of the largest member (e.g., Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Palmer, 1990a,b; Sandler,
1993; Plümper and Neumayer, 2015).13 This dissertation, by contrast, explicitly focuses on why
and when patrons have bargaining leverage for extracting burden-sharing.
1.4 Scope Conditions
In this dissertation I am interested in asymmetric alliances between great powers and non-great
powers. In practice, I limit the analysis to the United States and its allies. Ideally, I would include
the Soviet Union’s alliances in addition to American alliances. However, there are arguably at
least two differences between their blocs that render comparisons problematic. First, participation
in the American alliance system was voluntary rather than coerced. Second, Soviet allies were
comparatively more concerned with internal threats than external ones (Harrison, 2005). (This
is to say nothing of data availability issues, which are more prominent for the Soviet Union and
its allies.) However, although I do not explicitly study Soviet alliances, Nelson (1986) presents
evidence suggesting that Soviet allies which were more dependent on the Soviet Union shared more
of the defense burden, and that the period of increased Soviet-American cooperation during détente
in the early 1970s featured comparatively more equitable allied burden-sharing in the Warsaw Pact.
These findings are consistent with my argument that allied contributions are influenced by the costs
and probability of patron abandonment. Similarly, Crump (2015) shows that some Soviet allies
were at times able to exploit the Sino-Soviet split beginning in the 1960s in order to put pressure
on the Soviets by using the “China option.”
Focusing on the United States presents a few problems that may limit my ability to generalize
from these findings. First, as a democracy, domestic lobbying and interest group politics may play
a unique role in U.S. foreign policy, especially given the diffuse nature of the U.S. political system.
Moreover, the literature on democratic alliance credibility stresses that democratic allies may be
13Exceptions are Lake (2009), who argues that great powers can leverage allies’ dependence as a means of extracting
burden-sharing but does not explore the conditions under which allies’ vulnerability to abandonment is more severe;
Lee and Heo (2002), who focus on American burden-sharing pressure on South Korea; and Lanoszka (2015), who
argues that patrons may refrain from burden-sharing pressure in order to maintain allies’ loyalty.
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uniquely trustworthy given their transparency and checks and balances (Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds,
Mattes, and Vogel, 2009) – though others claim that the large array of domestic actors, frequent
leadership turnover, and the fickle nature of public opinion may actually make them uniquely
untrustworthy (Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004). Thus, as a democratic ally the United States’ need
to reassure may be distinctive.
Second, the fact that the U.S. alliance system is largely an alliance of democracies raises the
question of whether its intra-alliance politics are largely a function of the democratic peace. This
could potentially mean that reassurance is much more driven by normative considerations than in
other alliances (Doyle, 1986; Dixon, 1994; Russett, 1994; Owen, 1997). However, this is far from
clear, as many argue that the democratic peace can be attributed more to democracies’ transparency
and ability to signal their intentions (Fearon, 1994; Kydd, 1997; Schultz, 1998), or to democratic
toughness (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; Reiter and Stam, 2002), rather than to shared norms
and values. However, the fact remains that there has been substantial variation in the United States’
willingness to reassure and threaten, as well as to demand contributions from, its allies. Moreover,
I test my argument against alternative explanations emphasizing the role of domestic politics in
driving reassurance.
Third, the United States is geographically remote from the vast majority of its allies (and ad-
versaries), and thus its ability to directly dominate or conquer and control wayward allies is much
less than that of a contiguous, continental power such as the Soviet Union (Levy and Thompson,
2010). Thus, reassurance and threats of abandonment likely play a greater role in U.S. alliances
than in alliances of coercion. Moreover, having local partners may be especially important for the
United States given the expenses that a geographically remote power must incur to project power,
burden-sharing may be more important in U.S. alliances (Mearsheimer, 2001).
Finally, I focus on formal alliances. In addition to creating a tractable sample that is not ad hoc,
limiting the universe of cases to formal allies allows me to impose a number of scope conditions.
First, it establishes a baseline of prior commitment, as treaty allies can most reasonably expect
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to be reassured in the first place. Moreover, formal allies are likely to share common defense
interests and threat perceptions, which is not necessarily the case among informal allies, or “allies
of convenience” (Resnick, 2010). Second, it limits the sample to relationships in which allies
receive guarantees of protection, rather than solely material benefits such as aid and arms.14
1.5 Road Map
In the next chapter, I further develop the concepts of reassurance and burden-sharing, and describe
the trade-off that exists between the two. This trade-off produces what I call the “reassurance
dilemma,” wherein the actions patrons use to maintain the loyalty of its allies (reassurance) dis-
courage allies from investing in the alliance (burden-sharing). In Chapter 3, I lay out a theory of
great power reassurance and allied burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances, including a discussion
of alternative explanations and research design. Chapter 4 contains quantitative tests of my hy-
potheses using data on American statements, diplomatic visits, and troop levels as well as allied
burden-sharing from 1950-2010 while in Chapters 5-8 I conduct my case studies of U.S. reassur-
ance and burden-sharing pressure toward West Germany, the United Kingdom, South Korea, and
Japan. Finally, I conclude with a summary of the findings, as well as a discussion of implications
and avenues for future research, in Chapter 9.
14See Pettyjohn (2012: 100-105) and Pettyjohn and Vick (2013: 50-57) on “transactional” relationships.
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Chapter 2
Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Alliances
In the previous chapter, I introduced the concept of reassurance and argued that existing theories
suggest great power patrons should seek to limit their level of commitment to allies to discourage
free-riding, minimize moral hazard, and make allies more willing to concede on other issues. In
this chapter, I further develop the concept of reassurance and discuss its relationship to the distri-
bution of costs and burdens in an alliance, and review the existing literature on reassurance and
burden-sharing. I then proceed to describe the trade-offs inherent in what I call the “reassurance
dilemma” – namely, that patrons face a choice between reassuring allies in order to sustain alliance
cohesion, and withholding reassurance in order to spread the burden of the alliance more equally.
2.1 Existing Literature on Reassurance and Burden-Sharing
2.1.1 Reassurance
Reassurance is largely absent from the literature on alliances. Instead, most research studies the
causes and consequences of alliance formation. Here, the alliance itself is treated as the assurance
(Morrow, 1994, 2000), with scholars then seeking to identify whether the existence and institu-
tional design of an alliance affect a number of outcomes of interest, including conflict initiation
(Leeds, 2003b; Leeds and Anac, 2005; Long and Leeds, 2006; Benson, 2011), nuclear prolifer-
ation (Singh and Way, 2004; Jo and Gartzke, 2007; Bleek and Lorber, 2014; Reiter, 2014), and
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balancing or bandwagoning behavior (Walt, 1987; Jervis, 1991; Labs, 1992). By contrast, there is
little research on reassurance after an alliance is formed.1
Deterrence theory, for its part, treats commitment signals not as targeted at allies, but rather as
ways to deter adversaries (e.g., Morgan, 1983). This is because many of the same measures that
are used to credibly show commitment to allies also have the effect of signaling the patron’s com-
mitment to adversary countries (Snyder, 1997). In this view, reassurance is effectively a byproduct
of deterrence rather than an objective in its own right. Indeed, Benson, Meirowitz, and Ramsay
(2014) argue that the risk of moral hazard may even be desirable, as it increases the alliance’s
deterrent value.
To the extent that existing literature has studied reassurance, it has largely fallen into one of two
discordant camps: those that treat it as suboptimal, and those that assume its importance. Some
claim that lobbying by domestic political constituencies and foreign actors can pressure policymak-
ers to undertake policies that benefit a particular ally, including reassurance measures (Keohane,
1971; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007). This line of scholarship is closely related to claims that reas-
surance is essentially irrational (e.g., Walt, 2005; Posen, 2014), as it suggests that reassurance does
not follow its own strategic logic. Fearon (1997), for one, argues that one potential explanation for
why states may elect not to tie their hands in crises is that doing so can lead to moral hazard prob-
lems in the alliance. Other scholars, for their part, focus on explaining which tools great powers
use to signal support to allies (McManus and Yarhi-Milo, 2017). Little research exists, however,
which focuses on explaining the use or non-use of reassurance.
2.1.2 Burden-Sharing
The existing literature is largely pessimistic on the prospects for burden-sharing. For one, scholars
have argued that alliances between great powers and weaker states feature an asymmetric exchange
of goods. In such partnerships, the great power provides security for the alliance, while the weaker
1One recent exception is Lanoszka (2014), who argues that perceptions of alliance unreliability can lead states to
pursue nuclear weapons.
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power provides “autonomy” to the great power. This autonomy can take a number of forms,
from hosting the great power’s military bases to general support for its foreign policy (Morrow,
1991). In this perspective, burden-sharing in asymmetric is limited almost by definition; the great
power tacitly agrees to accept the costs of providing security in exchange for weaker states’ loyalty
(Lake, 2009). Lanoszka (2015), for his part, similarly argues that allied “free-riding” may in some
cases be the result of a “nuclear bargain,” in which the patron acquiesces to low levels of allied
contributions in exchange for allies’ willingness to not pursue nuclear weapons.
A second strand of literature more directly focuses on explaining variation in burden-sharing
outcomes, and draws on the logic of collective goods (e.g., Olson, 1965). In a seminal article, Olson
and Zeckhauser (1966) argued that smaller countries tend to under-contribute to public goods –
such as collective defense in an alliance – because their contributions are unlikely to be pivotal in
order for the good to be provided (Plümper and Neumayer, 2015). In other words, smaller allies
do not contribute as much because their contributions are less likely to matter. Other scholars
have built upon this insight to discuss conditions under which the logic of collective goods is more
or less applicable to describing an alliance. The first of these are situations in which security
ceases to be a public good from which all members benefit and instead becomes a good from
which some countries benefit more than others, or from which some can be excluded altogether. In
particular, some scholars argued that NATO’s shift toward a strategy of “Flexible Response” during
the 1960s and 1970s, in which the alliance would rely more on conventional defenses against an
attack by the Warsaw Pact, and away from a “Massive Retaliation” approach that relied heavily on
the threat of nuclear attack, meant that the strength of each ally’s military forces would be more
important as a deterrent since they could not count on an overwhelming, automatic response from
the alliance (Murdoch and Sandler, 1984). Second, allies may spend more on defense than the
logic of collective goods would predict because they are pursuing their own “private” goods from
which their other partners do not benefit – such as maintaining colonial empires or competing with
rivals that they do not share with their allies (Oneal and Elrod, 1989; Oneal, 1990).
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There is an alternative explanation, however, which has been largely understudied in the ex-
isting literature on burden-sharing and which suggests less pessimistic conclusions for burden-
sharing: coercive bargaining. Patrons need not simply accept the level of effort their allies provide;
rather, they may attempt to pressure them to do more. Indeed, Snidal (1985: 587) noted that pow-
erful states can coerce their weaker allies such that the latter do not free-ride. But the conditions
under which coercion is more or less effective remain under-theorized and under-tested. Perhaps
the most notable exception to this is the study by Fang and Ramsay (2010), who argue that a patron
can drive a harder bargain with its partners when it can more easily find alternative partners. They
claim that such circumstances are most likely during periods of détente with adversaries, as here
it is easier for a patron to cooperate with states outside of its existing allies. Similarly, Lee and
Heo (2002) focus on factors that have shaped bargaining leverage in the U.S.-South Korea alliance,
such as threat and domestic politics, but they focus only on this one case.
2.1.3 Reassurance and Burden-Sharing
Existing theories on the relationship between reassurance and burden-sharing, in turn, lead to con-
tradictory expectations. On the one hand are scholars who subscribe to the free-riding model,
which holds that alliances reduce weaker allies’ incentives to provide for their own security (Posen,
2014). Much of the literature on burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances – which by-and-large fo-
cuses on NATO – falls into this camp, with scholars arguing that larger allies tend to be exploited
by smaller allies (e.g., Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Plümper and Neumayer, 2015). Indeed, some
scholars emphasize that because alliances between great powers and non-great powers involve an
asymmetric exchange of goods, with the former providing security so the latter do not have to, re-
assurance and burden-sharing have a negative relationship by design (Morrow, 1991, 1993; Lake,
2007, 2009).
Others claim that reassurance is an inducement for burden-sharing. This argument can take
one of two forms: the first is that allies are unlikely to step up and do more for themselves unless
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their patron leads the way (e.g., Flournoy and Davidson, 2012), and the second is that the patron
can use conditional assurances to exchange protection for burden-sharing (e.g., Lake, 1999). The
former view essentially denies that there is a reassurance and burden-sharing trade-off, while the
latter suggests that outcomes are subject to bargaining.
The empirical evidence for a straightforward, purely negative relationship between reassurance
and burden-sharing is mixed at best. Machain and Morgan (2013) find that countries hosting U.S.
troop deployments have fewer military personnel and Lake (2007) finds that countries dependent
on U.S. protection spend less on defense. By contrast, Allen, VanDusky-Allen, and Flynn (2016)
find that the presence of U.S. troops is associated with higher military expenditures among NATO
allies, while Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger (1994) find that U.S. troop presence was associated with
contributions to the 1991 Gulf War. Indeed, while there are cases in which U.S. protection almost
certainly discouraged its allies from making significant efforts toward self-defense – perhaps most
famously Japan, whose constitution imposes numerous restrictions on its military arming, and
Iceland, whose membership in NATO came with the assurance that it would not need to have a
military – there are yet other cases in which allies hosting tens or hundreds of thousands of U.S.
troops still contributed a great deal to their own security, such as West Germany and South Korea.
The theory I present runs counter both to the view that reassurance and burden-sharing are
always at odds and to the view that there is no trade-off. Instead, I build upon arguments that
focus on burden-sharing as a bargaining outcome. Existing studies on burden-sharing note that
the fear of abandonment may make burden-sharing more likely, yet they do not systematically
identify the conditions under which this fear is more or less intense (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger,
1994; Fang and Ramsay, 2010). This dissertation offers a unified theory both of the conditions
under which patrons reassure and those under which their assurances can be made conditional
upon allied burden-sharing.
18
2.2 Reassurance in Military Alliances
2.2.1 The Functions of Alliances
The international politics literature largely treats alliances as means for states to bolster their secu-
rity or gain influence over partners. In terms of security, alliances represent a means of “capability-
aggregation” with which states maximize their relative power vis-à-vis adversaries (Waltz, 1979;
Snyder, 1984, 1997; Walt, 1987; Schweller, 1994).2 Alternatively, alliances can provide states with
other benefits, including side payments such as basing access (Morrow, 1991) or opportunities to
restrain their partners (Schroeder, 1976; Weitsman, 2004). This is most common in asymmetric
alliances between great powers and non-great powers, where each party provides and receives a
different good. Morrow (1991) famously argued that asymmetric alliances provide security to
weak states and autonomy to strong states. Weak states need security but can do little to improve
the security of a great power, so great powers act as patrons and provide them with protection in
exchange for other foreign policy concessions. These can take the form of loyalty and support for
the patron’s foreign policy ventures, the granting of military bases, and a refusal to cooperate with
the patron’s adversaries.
Alliances, in these views, form when they are needed and dissolve when they are not. Others
have contested this point, arguing that alliances, like other institutions, can change their functions
over time (Wallander, 2000). But whether an alliance changes over time or not, it is unlikely that all
members will ever be fully confident in it. In an anarchic international system, no higher authority
can force partners to cooperate, and parties to an alliance are likely to be concerned about both
whether or not their partners will actually assist them and the amount of assistance they will bring
to bear.
2Even scholars emphasizing the importance of ideology as a cause of alliance formation invoke mutual interest and
common threat perception as causal mechanisms (Barnett, 1996; Owen, 1997; Haas, 2005).
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2.2.2 The Need for Reassurance
In principle, alliance treaties bind their signatories to support each other, and are often considered
the strongest means by which partners can assure each other about their commitments to do so
(Morrow, 1994, 2000). In practice, however, alliance treaties are an imperfect means of assurance.
First, the terms of an alliance are rarely, if ever, so unambiguous as to remove all doubt about
whether a patron would be obligated to act, or whether it could instead justify non-intervention
by appealing to the situation’s extenuating or unique circumstances (Leeds et al., 2002; Benson,
2012; Mattes, 2012).3 Even if patrons do follow through, the timing and amount of their support is
subject to their own discretion (Beckley, 2015). The language in U.S. alliance treaties is universally
vague, and leaves loopholes such that policymakers can avoid being forced to intervene. Even
NATO’s Article 5, for example, only obligates each member to undertake “such action as it deems
necessary” in the event that one of its partners comes under attack. Similarly, other U.S. alliance
treaties only ask that signatories act in ways consistent with their “constitutional processes” (Rapp-
Hooper, 2015: 27-31).
Second, alliances’ terms tend to be quite static, while concerns about alliance reliability are
dynamic. Out of the 207 alliances listed between 1945 and 2003 in the Alliance Treaty Obliga-
tions and Provisions (ATOP) dataset, only 19 of them entered into a “second phase” with altered
provisions (Leeds et al., 2002) – and only two of these were alliances in which United States was
a member.4 Moreover, alliances can be abrogated, and the patron’s interests, capabilities, and in-
tentions can change over time, and may be difficult to observe (Leeds, 2003a; Leeds and Savun,
2007; McManus, 2017). Indeed, Siverson and King (1980) find that alliances are less likely to be
honored the longer they last, while other studies show that leadership turnover can reduce alliance
3As Harlan Cleveland (U.S. Ambassador to NATO, 1965-1969) put it: “There is nothing automatic or mechanical
[about the NATO security guarantee]...Like the United States Constitution, the Treaty does not try to legislative what
will happen...that is left to whatever political men are in charge when the questions arise” (Cleveland, 1970: 78).
4These were the Helsinki Accord in 1975, which became the Paris Charter in 1990; and NATO between 1949 and
1951.
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reliability (Leeds, 2003a; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, 2009). Finally,
the primary obligation of an alliance – support during wartime – is not an ongoing process where
compliance can be verified. A patron’s willingness to carry out its promise can only be determined
once it has been tested, at which point it is too late for the partner that has been cheated.
As such, allies are likely to require frequent reaffirmation of their patron’s continued commit-
ment. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, for example, described France as having “an almost
hysterical fear that we and the British will one day pull out of Western Europe” (Sloan, 2016: 39).
Continual reassurance thus serves a similar function as verification mechanisms do for other kinds
of international treaties – namely, for a state to convince its partners that it is committed to hon-
oring its obligations. Reassurance can take the form of public promises of commitment, military
forces deployed on allied soil, or high-profile diplomatic visits, to name just a few. These serve
to bolster allies’ confidence by indicating the patron’s continued commitment to defending them,
whether by demonstrating its willingness to incur costs on their behalf or by putting its reputation
among international and domestic observers on the line (Schelling, 1966; Fearon, 1997).
2.2.3 Forms of Reassurance
Since there are many forms that assurances can take, and because I present a general theory on
the sources of reassurance, I look at reassurance more broadly rather than focusing on any one
form. As a number of studies have noted, when one action can be substituted for another in foreign
policy, testing for the determinants of any one of them is incomplete, and can potentially produce
misleading inferences if one does not account for the possibility of substitution (Most and Starr,
1984; Starr, 2000; Clark, Nordstrom, and Reed, 2008). In particular, in this study I focus on three
forms of reassurance: symbolic assurances such as verbal promises and diplomatic visits; joint
military exercises; and troop deployments. When they are used, the three are likely to be used in
similar ways and thus follow similar patterns.
Symbolic assurances such as verbal reaffirmations of the patron’s commitment or diplomatic
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visits to the ally are in some sense “cheap talk.” However, they are not totally cost-free, especially
if done in public, since they can have the effect of tying the patron’s hands by creating reputational
costs if it does not follow through (Guisinger and Smith, 2002; Sartori, 2002, 2005).5 While the
patron already has a very public commitment in the form of its alliance treaties, rhetorical rein-
forcement of that commitment serves to renew it over time, and also signals that the patron intends
to maintain its alliance treaties (McManus, 2014; Lebovic and Saunders, 2016). Moreover, assur-
ances related to (for example) the patron’s troop deployments – such as promises not to withdraw
troops or to consult the ally before any movement of the patron’s troops in the future – create new
reputational costs in addition to those that exist alongside the commitment to protect. Finally, even
if allies are reasonably confident in their patron’s commitment – whether owing to high perceived
ex ante probability of honoring its commitment, or to the effects of other forms of reassurances
(such as troop deployments or inter-operable military forces) – continual, even ritualized promises
are necessary if only because they are likely to be expected, and thus their absence would be
noticeable (Jervis, 1970: e.g., 81-82).
Second, joint military exercises (JMEs) are potentially reassuring insofar as they help bind the
patron’s and the ally’s fighting ability together. The alliance literature has argued that the more
coordinated and institutionalized an alliance is, the more durable and credible it will be (Morrow,
1994, 2000; Leeds, 2003a; Leeds and Anac, 2005). Moreover, JMEs are risky because they carry
the potential to provoke adversaries, who may see the patron’s and ally’s military exercises as
designed to bolster their ability to go on the offensive – and even as a means of concealing an
imminent attack (Blackwill and Legro, 1989; D’Orazio, 2012). This risk sends a costly signal of
the patron’s resolve to allies (Fearon, 1997).
Third, troop deployments are powerful signals of reassurance. For one, they act as a “tripwire”
device that automatically entangles the patron’s forces in an attack on the ally (Schelling, 1966:
47). Having its own forces on allies’ territory gives the patron “skin in the game,” and puts its
5On the costliness of private promises, see Yarhi-Milo (2013).
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own forces at similar amount of risk as those of its ally (Lanoszka and Hunzeker, 2016). Once it
has suffered casualties, the patron is likely to face domestic pressure to intervene. Moreover, the
patrons military forces represent scarce resources; by tying them down in any one location, the
patron cannot use them in another area.
Fourth, the patron can give allies input into its policies by establishing mechanisms for allied
consultation. By doing so, the patron can assuage allies’ fears of abandonment by conveying
information about its intentions and allow allies a voice in alliance policies (Rapp-Hooper, 2015:
ch. 5). Perhaps the most notable example in recent decades has been NATO’s Nuclear Planning
Group (NPG), which provided information to allies about U.S. nuclear strategy while also giving
them a seat at the table in targeting and strategy (Buteux, 1983; Rapp-Hooper, 2015: 236-259). At
the very least, such schemes aim to provide allies with insight – if not necessarily input – into the
patron’s decision-making and strategy.
Finally, while I do not consider them in this study, material assistance such as aid and arms
sales can, in principle, represent a form of reassurance. Aid and arms can represent costly sig-
nals of the patron’s willingness to protect its allies insofar as they increase allies’ military power
relative to third parties, which in turn raises the risk of entrapment by enabling allies to operate
more independently (Sullivan, Tessman, and Li, 2011; Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, and Cooper, 2016).
Spindel (2017) similarly argues that arms transfers send a signal of reassurance to the extent that
they are prestigious weapons. Moreover, a number of studies show that once, institutionalized,
military assistance can be difficult to cut off promptly (Lai, 2003; Krause, 2004; Borghard, 2014),
thus diminishing the patron’s leverage over allies. At the same time, however, it is not clear that
arms sales and military aid actually represent reassurance. Instead, it is just as likely – if not more
so – that military assistance represents a means of “buck-passing.” Providing allies with the means
to defend themselves serves as a means of allowing the patron to do less, which is opposite from a
signal of reassurance.
23
2.3 Alliance Reassurance vs. Adversary Deterrence
The requirements for alliance reassurance and its more widely studied counterpart, adversary de-
terrence, are not necessarily identical and indeed may even be at odds. At first glance, one might
expect that rational allies would be reassured to the extent that the adversary is deterred – no
more, no less. However, British Secretary of State for Defence Denis Healey famously claimed
that it “takes only five percent credibility...to deter...but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure”
(Healey, 1989: 243), and while the “Healey Theorem” remains empirically unverified, a number
of international relations theories and historical examples suggest that reassurance and deterrence
operate differently. For one, allies and adversaries may perceive signals differently; a longstanding
body of political psychology literature shows that actors’ interpretations of signals may not always
– or even often – overlap, and may not correspond to the sender’s intended meaning (Jervis, 1970,
1976, 2002a; Quek, 2016). Writing most directly on the differences between allied and adversary
perceptions, Mercer (1996) argues that the difficulty of reassurance can be explained by attribu-
tion error, wherein allies tend to ascribe beneficial patron behavior to the dictates of the situation
while at the same time attributing actions by the patron which run counter to their interests to the
patron’s fundamentally flawed character. Thus allies are always ready to assume the worst about
their patrons. Similarly, prospect theory suggests that people are far more willing to accept risks
to avoid losses than they are to make gains, which may explain why adversaries are easier to deter
from seeking gains but allies are difficult to reassure that they will not incur losses (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). More generally, allies must consider not only whether adversaries are likely to be
deterred, but also what is likely to happen if deterrence fails. Even if an ally knew exactly how
credible an adversary considered the patron’s commitment to be, it may have a different assessment
of that credibility, and it could also be concerned about the timing and amount of patron assistance
in wartime (Howard, 1982).
The evidence is clear that patrons often put great emphasis on reassuring allies even when they
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perceive little-to-no deterrence benefit. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, American
President John F. Kennedy made a secret arrangement to withdraw U.S. nuclear missiles from
Turkey in exchange for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. In doing so, Kennedy sought
to save face among allies but notably not in the eyes of the United States’ primary adversary, thus
deliberately reassuring allies without any corresponding deterrence benefit (Jervis, 2015: esp. p.
26). More recently, in 2014 the United States launched its “European Reassurance Initiative” (ERI)
designed to assuage potential concerns about the U.S. commitment among NATO members in the
wake of Russia’s involvement in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. It was only in subsequent
years that the United States began to shift toward a more deterrence-oriented posture, symbolized
in the ERI’s being renamed the “European Deterrence Initiative.” Initially, its focus was on get-
ting any equipment, personnel, and supplies it could onto the territory of allies in Eastern Europe
in order to signal U.S. commitment – even if these forces were militarily ineffective and highly
vulnerable to Russian anti-access area-denial capabilities.6 Thus, while the actions patrons take to
reassure allies may be the same as those used to deter adversaries, the motivation for those actions
can vary significantly across cases.
2.4 Burden-Sharing in Alliances
In much the same way that allies will seek to ensure that their patron remains invested in their
defense, the patron will seek to ensure that its allies invest in their own defense, as well as in
the alliance’s common goals. Failing this, the patron runs the risk of having to over-invest in the
alliance in order to maintain the alliance’s capability for adequate deterrence and defense.
Walter Lippmann famously argued that foreign policy “consists in bringing into balance, with
a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s commitments and the nation’s power”
(Lippmann, 1943: 9). Yet the path to this balance is not straightforward. The resources necessary
6Interview with National Security Council official, September 6, 2016. See also Mark Landler and Helene Cooper,
“U.S. Fortifying Europe’s East to Deter Putin,” New York Times, February 1, 2016; and Thomas Gibbons-Neff,
“NATO Considering Thousands of Troops Near Russia’s Border,” Washington Post, May 2, 2016.
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for filling the “gap” between capabilities are not always available, whether because commitments
have outpaced capabilities or because domestic conditions have sapped the state’s ability to invest
in its capabilities.
One means by which the gap can be bridged is through forming alliances. When compared to
building up one’s own armaments, relying on the capabilities of other countries represents an inex-
pensive means of strengthening deterrence and defense (Morrow, 1993). The utility of alliances,
however, depends on the extent to which allies actually contribute to the common defense. This
points to both the importance and the challenges of “burden-sharing.” Every member of an alliance
reaps some reward from its partners’ contributions to the common defense, but investments into the
alliance are costly. Allies have incentives to free-ride, insofar as they can devote those resources
toward domestic consumption and other priorities.
A lack of burden-sharing can carry risks for the patron. These include the potential of over-
extension and economic decline if the patron is forced to overspend in order to make up for the
shortfall (Gilpin, 1981; Kennedy, 1987). Free-riding can even cause the alliance to fail to achieve
its objective(s) if the patron is unable to contribute enough by itself (Christensen, 2011: 11). Thus,
partners engage in frequent negotiation over who pays for the alliance.
2.4.1 Burden-Sharing in U.S. Foreign Policy
Disagreements over burden-sharing have been a part of most U.S. alliances since their creation.
Once allies in Europe and East Asia had recovered from World War II, U.S. officials hoped to pass
many of the costs of deterring Communist expansion onto them. Dwight Eisenhower, for one,
sought to economize on defense spending as part of his “New Look” policy, and allied burden-
sharing was one of the crucial means to this end.
During the 1960s, the most prominent item on the burden-sharing agenda was the cost of
stationing U.S. troops in the Federal Republic of Germany. The costs of local procurement for
supplies exacerbated the U.S. trade deficit and contributed to the outflow of gold from the United
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States throughout the 1960s. As a result, beginning in 1961 the United States and the Federal
Republic of Germany entered into a series of biannual arrangements in which the West Germans
purchased hundreds of millions (in some cases billions) of dollars of U.S. weapons in order to
offset American costs. Once President Nixon took the U.S. dollar off the gold standard in 1971,
the necessity for these “offset” arrangements decreased. But the desire for burden-sharing did not;
if anything, it increased. Congressional efforts to reduce the level of U.S. forces from abroad –
both from Europe and East Asia – provided new impetus for burden-sharing.
After the Cold War, there was a brief flurry of Congressional interest in burden-sharing and
cost reduction in the early part of the 1990s. By-and-large, however, interest in burden-sharing
was periodic, coinciding with major U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.
This began to change during the 2010s, particularly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Subsequently, burden-sharing rose near the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda in the wake
of Donald Trump’s election as president. Trump referred to NATO as “obsolete,” cast doubt on
whether U.S. forces should remain in Japan and South Korea, and indicated that the United States
should only defend allies that pay their “fair share.”7
2.5 The Relationship between Reassurance and Burden-Sharing
There is an inherent tension between reassurance and burden-sharing. Alliances represent an ex-
change of goods, wherein both partners decide that relying in part on each others’ (albeit uncertain)
support is preferable to pure self-reliance (Morrow, 1993). In the case of asymmetric alliances,
where a patron provides security for its allies so that they can then provide less of it for them-
selves, this tension is ever starker. Reassuring allies thus diminishes their incentives to provide for
their own defense.
7“Trump worries Nato with ’obsolete’ comment,” BBC News, January 16, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-
canada-38635181; David E. Sanger and Jim Yardley, “In Donald Trump’s Rise, Allies See New American Approach,”
New York Times, May 5, 2016; Ben Jacobs, “Donald Trump reiterates he will only help Nato countries that pay
‘fair share,”’ The Guardian, July 27, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/27/donald-trump-nato-
isolationist.
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It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Donald Trump – both as a candidate and as President –
proved reluctant to reassure U.S. allies. Trump argued in July 2016 that the United States should
be prepared “to walk” away from its commitments in order to put pressure on its partners, and
during his third presidential debate with Hillary Clinton claimed that “it’s awfully hard to get [the
allies] to pay up when you have somebody saying we think how great they are.”8 His preoccupa-
tion with burden-sharing among U.S. allies, and his corresponding attempts to cast doubt on U.S.
protection, reflect the tension between reassurance and burden-sharing. But this is only the most
recent manifestation of the problem. Historically, other policymakers in the United States have
also recognized this tension and taken steps to limit reassurance as a means of encouraging allied
burden-sharing. In the case of West Germany, for example, the United States frequently threatened
troop withdrawals as a means of putting pressure on the Germans to offset the costs of the U.S.
deployments in the early 1960s. Similarly, the United States withdrew one-third of its forces from
South Korea in the early 1970s while coupling its withdrawals with demands for burden-sharing.
2.5.1 The Reassurance Dilemma
One might thus conclude that reassurance is suboptimal, and that patrons are best served by casting
their protection into doubt. The reality is not so simple, however. Because the patron’s side of the
bargain entails providing protection to its allies, if that protection comes into doubt then allies
have less reason to honor their end of the bargain: namely, to remain loyal to the patron by siding
with it against its adversaries, providing basing access, and supporting its other foreign policy
priorities (Morrow, 1991; Lake, 2009). The patron thus faces a dilemma. It must choose between
withholding reassurance to maximize burden-sharing, on the one hand, and providing reassurance
to ensure that allies have incentives to remain loyal to it, on the other.
Directly studying the relationship between reassurance and burden-sharing is difficult, how-
8Esme Cribb, “Trump Doubles Down On NATO Comments: ‘We Have To Walk,”’ Talking Points Memo, July 25,
2016, http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/trump-nato-we-have-to-walk (accessed May 18, 2017); Aaron Blake,
“The Final Trump-Clinton Debate Transcript, Annotated,” Washington Post, October 19, 2016.
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ever. The first two problems are methodological. Any relationship that exists between patron
reassurance and allied burden-sharing may be spurious. For example, U.S. troop presence is likely
to be correlated with threat, which may have an independent effect on allied military spending.
Second, the relationship between reassurance and burden-sharing may be endogenous; patrons
may withhold reassurance from allies which are under-contributing and then reward them with
assurances of protection once they have increased their efforts.
The third problem is theoretical – even if troops are present, allies may fear (and, indeed, the
patron may threaten) that they will be withdrawn. It is difficult to know, for example, whether a
large U.S. troop presence in a country indicates that the host is highly dependent on the United
States, or whether it is instead the United States that is dependent upon the host. Indeed, while
Lake (2007, 2009) and Machain and Morgan (2013) find that states which host U.S. troops have
lower defense contributions, Allen, VanDusky-Allen, and Flynn (2016) show that NATO allies’
defense efforts are positively related to U.S. military presence. Moreover, Bennett, Lepgold, and
Unger (1994) find that states with a large U.S. military presence – which they treat as a proxy for
partners’ dependence on the United States – were more likely to contribute to the 1990-91 Persian
Gulf War.
As such, rather than directing studying the effect of reassurance on burden-sharing, I instead
seek to establish conditions under which they are likely to vary in the same or opposite direc-
tions. Indeed, as I discuss in greater detail, many of the same factors that make reassurance more
necessary also make burden-sharing more possible, allowing the patron to more easily couple its
assurances with threats of abandonment in order to effectively make reassurance conditional on
burden-sharing.
In the following chapter, I delve more deeply into the reassurance dilemma, identifying both
the conditions under which it is most severe – and, by extension, the conditions under which
patrons have greatest need to reassure allies – as well as conditions under which the dilemma can
be mitigated by combining reassurance with threats of abandonment to encourage burden-sharing
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while simultaneously discouraging allies from seeking outside options.
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Chapter 3
The Strategic Logic of Reassurance and Burden-Sharing
In this chapter, I lay out a theory of bargaining leverage in asymmetric alliances, which I argue can
explain variation both in allies’ ability to extract assurance measures and patrons’ ability to make
their protection conditional upon allied burden-sharing. To preview the argument, I claim that each
state will be to extract its desired behavior from its partner – which for the ally is reassurance and
for the patron is burden-sharing – to the extent that it can both credibly threaten to exit the alliance
and impose high costs on its partner by exiting. Thus, allies with credible threats of exit will be able
to demand maximal reassurance, while the patron will be able to demand maximal burden-sharing
when its own threat of exit is credible and from allies that are in greatest need of its protection.
3.1 Bargaining in Military Alliances
3.1.1 Commitment, Dependence, and Leverage
Alliances are mutually beneficial to their partners, but the distribution of benefits and costs is rarely
even and is subject to bargaining. In asymmetric alliances where the partner gives up autonomy
to the patron in exchange for protection, this bargaining – whether done tacitly or explicitly –
often involves smaller states using the threat of reclaiming autonomy in order to extract credible
reaffirmations of their patron’s protection, or reassurance. Similarly, patrons can attempt to use the
threat of reducing the protection they provide in order attain maximum burden-sharing from allies.
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In the existing literature, bargaining power within an alliance is said to depend on the partners’
relative degrees of dependence upon and commitment to the alliance. Dependence refers to how
badly each side needs its partner’s help, and hinges upon: “(1) a state’s need for military assistance,
(2) the degree to which the ally fills that need, and (3) alternative ways of meeting the need”
(Snyder, 1997: 167). States which are more dependent on the alliance have less bargaining power,
as their opportunity costs to leaving the alliance are higher. An ally’s degree of commitment,
in turn, refers to the extent to which it is inclined to fulfill its promises to support or assist its
partner.1 Greater degrees of commitment reduce a state’s leverage over its allies by reducing its
ability to threaten defection as a means of driving a hard bargain. Snyder (1997) distinguishes two
general sources of commitment: incentives to uphold a reputation for reliability, and incentives
for protecting the partner that would exist even in the absence of an alliance agreement (such as
keeping an ally’s resources out of the hands of an adversary). Additionally, domestic political
pressure and ideological affinity can shape commitment to an alliance. If leaders will be badly
punished for defecting, or if the ally has a compatible governing ideology while the adversary has
an antithetical one, then the partners are more likely to be committed to each other (Haas, 2005;
Resnick, 2010).
Allies that seek to maximize their bargaining leverage should avoid seeming totally committed
to their partner and keep their options open, as they can then use the threat of defection to drive a
harder bargain. Britain, for example, felt compelled to support France and Russia in the years im-
mediately before and during World War I out of fear that its partners might defect from the alliance
and make a separate understanding with Germany (Jervis, 1997: 193-194; Rapp-Hooper, 2014).
Similarly, by attaching strict conditions on its support, the United States was able to promote
democratic reform in the Philippines during the early 1950s (Macdonald, 1992). More generally, a
country which is able to maneuver into the role of the “pivot” between two states whose relations
1As Snyder (1997: 169) puts it: “Dependence stems from the benefits provided by the partner; commitment, from
promises made to the partner.”
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are more adversarial with each other than with itself is often able to extract concessions from one
or both sides – whether in the form of side payments such as territory or in the form of the non-use
of force (Crawford, 2003, 2011; Izumikawa, 2013). Finally, the literature on entrapment suggests
that patrons can mitigate the problem of moral hazard to the extent that they are able to make
their commitments vague and distance themselves from their allies (Kim, 2011a; Benson, 2012;
Beckley, 2015).
In asymmetric alliances, the stronger patron will seek to ensure that its weaker allies remain
dependent upon it, while at the same time limiting its commitment in order to maximize its bar-
gaining leverage. Allies, for their part, will seek to ensure that their patron remains committed
to them while simultaneously trying to avoid becoming too dependent on the patron’s protection
(Cha, 2016: 20-28). When one applies this logic to reassurance and burden-sharing, this means
that too much reassurance reduces allies’ incentives for burden-sharing. The patron will, in the ab-
sence of coercive pressure, be forced to pay a disproportionate amount of the burden, since allies
may have little reason to contribute more than what is demanded from them, as their compara-
tive weakness means that their burden-sharing efforts are unlikely to be decisive to the alliance’s
overall military power (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966). Thus, the patron has incentives to limit its
assurances in order to avoid being taken advantage of.2
The countervailing challenge that creates a dilemma for the patron, however, is that allies are
free agents which can choose to leave the alliance if the patron’s commitment is too weak, or if
it attempts to shift too much of the defense burden onto them. The patron is thus forced to trade-
off between withholding reassurance to encourage burden-sharing and providing reassurance to
encourage dependence – and, in turn, loyalty. In the following sections of this chapter I explore
this dilemma by presenting a theory which explains both variation in allies’ ability to extract re-
assurance as well as variation in patrons’ ability to make their assurances conditional on allied
2As Handel (1981: 122) puts it: “From the point of view of the stronger ally, it is an advantage to leave its commitment
somewhat ambiguous in order to avoid manipulation by the weaker state.”
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burden-sharing.
3.2 Theory: Exit, Reassurance, and Coercive Burden-Sharing
The stronger and weaker partners of an asymmetric alliance thus face unique problems. The pa-
tron’s challenge is to avoid seeming overly committed, lest it encourage free-riding, while also
discouraging allies from leaving the alliance. For the ally, however, its challenge is to avoid being
overly dependent on its patron for support while also trying to remain protected. Thus, a great deal
of the bargaining in asymmetric alliances – whether done tacitly or explicitly – involves smaller
states seeking reassurance from their patron, and the patron seeking to maintain the loyalty of its
allies while simultaneously discouraging free-riding.
In much of international politics, bargaining takes place in the shadow of force (Fearon, 1995;
Powell, 1999). However, the threat of force is less credible as a coercive tool in alliance politics,
as war is likely to only fracture the partnership and weaken both partners, thus working against
burden-sharing and undermining deterrence. Moreover, in asymmetric alliances, the weaker pro-
tégé can by definition hardly hope to defeat its patron in war. Instead, alliance bargaining takes
place in the shadow of “exit.” States which can more credibly threaten to leave the alliance or
pursue outside options hold a bargaining advantage over their partners.
In a bargaining perspective, allies’ ability to extract reassurance, and patrons’ ability to extract
burden-sharing, will depend on the credibility of their threats to exit the alliance, as well as on the
costs that exit would impose on their partners. The economics literature on bargaining stresses that
actors trying to strike a favorable bargain benefit from being able to credibly threaten to walk away
from the deal (e.g., Hirschman, 1970; Rubinstein, 1982; Chikte and Deshmukh, 1987). When
a state can threaten to leave an alliance upon which its partner relies heavily, that state has the
leverage to extract compensation from its partner in exchange for continued loyalty.
The credibility of a patron’s threat of abandonment is shaped by far more than just the level of
reassurance it provides. As a result, the extent to which reassurance and burden-sharing are posi-
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tively or negatively correlated depends in large part on whether the patron can couple its assurances
with threats. When a patron’s threat to abandon allies is credible ex ante, it can afford to reassure
its allies without worrying as much about free-riding. Indeed, the literature on coercion shows that
reassurance is equally as important as threats in making for effective coercion, although it is much
less studied (Davis, 2000; Sechser, 2007; Carnegie, 2015; Gerzhoy, 2015). The target of coercive
bargaining needs to know that if it gives in, its partner will simply punish it anyway (Schelling,
1966). Thus, reassurance can actually be a positive tool that is used to increase burden-sharing,
though only if it is backed up by threats. These threats do not necessarily need to be explicit, and
indeed may be most effective if they are not. Allies are likely to consider how likely patron aban-
donment is, and thus their burden-sharing efforts will in no small part be a reaction to the patron’s
latent threat of abandonment.
3.2.1 What is Exit?
By exit, I refer to attempts by states in an alliance to loosen themselves from the partnership and
reduce the benefits they provide to their partners. For allies, exit takes the form of efforts to reclaim
their autonomy and pursue a foreign policy more independent of the patron, while for patrons exit
takes the form of efforts to reduce the security it provides. Exiting the alliance is more credible
to the extent that a state has attractive outside options for meeting their security and/or autonomy
needs.
Violation or abrogation of the alliance treaty are only the most extreme forms of exit; a party
to an alliance need not expect that its partner will outright terminate the partnership. Rather, exit
is a spectrum, and states may fear the consequences of the more moderate step of their partners
“distancing” themselves from the alliance. Distancing is undesirable for two reasons. The first is
that the perception of disunity may weaken deterrence by tempting adversaries to drive a wedge
between the allies or by emboldening them to behave more aggressively (Weitsman, 2004; Craw-
ford, 2011). Second, distancing raises questions about the amount of support that the partner will
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furnish. Allies may fear that the patron will give only minimal support if they are attacked, while
the patron may anticipate that more autonomous allies will be less likely to provide basing rights,
less likely to support its foreign policy initiatives, and more likely to come to a separate under-
standing with adversaries (Lake, 2009). In early 2018, for example, steps toward détente between
North and South Korea – including North Korea’s participation in the Winter Olympics and dis-
cussions of potential bilateral talks – worried many in the United States, who feared that such a
rapprochement might undermine South Korea’s support for the United States’ preferred policy of
putting military and economic pressure on the North.3
Two general forms of outside options are available to alliance partners: self-sufficiency and
search. In the case of the former, states reduce their need for partners. Allies, for example, can
attempt to increase their own military capabilities such that they no longer need protection. Patrons,
for their part, can reduce their need for loyal allies by pursuing a more unilateral or isolationist
foreign policy, and by striking a deal with adversaries. In terms of search, patrons and allies can
seek alternative partners.
While the types of outside options weaker allies can pursue – ranging from nuclearization, to
neutrality, to finding other countries to rely on for support – are diverse, and in many cases will
not be the precursor to actual alliance termination, their causes are fundamentally similar, and they
share common features that will make them worrisome to the patron. First, all of the forms of exit
I discuss reduce allies’ dependence on the patron. This, in turn, makes them less likely to cave
into its pressure in the future, and gives them less incentive to be automatically loyal. As a result,
a patron has good reason to discourage allies from pursuing any of these options. Second, allies
will be most prone to consider all of these forms of exit when relying on the patron’s protection
becomes less attractive – whether because the patron seems unreliable, because the severity of the
threat environment makes trusting the patron risky, or because the barriers to exit decrease. I am
3Choe Sang-Hun and David E. Sanger, “Kim Jong-un’s Overture Could Drive a Wedge Between South Korea and the
U.S.,” New York Times, January 1, 2018; Josh Rogin, “Pence: The United States is Ready to Talk with North Korea,”
Washington Post, February 11, 2018.
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ultimately agnostic as to which form of exit allies will be most likely to pursue in a given situation.
Indeed, in many cases, allies can pursue multiple options in tandem, such as unilateral military
arming coupled with efforts at rapprochement with adversaries. Nevertheless, I treat the threat of
all forms of exit as a key driver of patron reassurance.
3.2.2 Ally Outside Options
Search
The first measure allies can take to reduce their dependence on their patron and lower the barriers
to exiting the alliance is to move closer to a third party. This can be either another great power
or a non-great power – including but not limited to allies’ or the patron’s adversaries. Indeed,
even in a bipolar system, in which the other great power is likely to be a threat, or in a unipolar
system, in which the patron is the only great power, it is not impossible for allies to form other
alliances, pursue nonalignment, or even simply to come to an understanding with third parties in
which they make concessions in exchange for safety (Rothstein, 1968: 26-28; Kim, 2016). Even
if an adversary is hostile to the patron, it is not necessarily hostile or an imminent threat at all
times to all of the patron’s allies, particularly if they come to an independent rapprochement with
it. Allies may be willing to accommodate adversaries if the threat is great enough or the prospect
of outside help is remote (Walt, 1987; Jervis, 1991: 40; Labs, 1992). In the wake of the U.S.-
China rapprochement during the 1970s, for example, Taiwan made an effort to play the “Soviet
card” in its relations with the United States by entertaining contacts with the Soviet Union in order
to signal its search for outside options.4 Moreover, even if they stop short of aligning with an
adversary, allies can use improved relations with the adversary as a means to the end of pursuing a
more neutral, nonaligned foreign policy (Schroeder, 1994).
Allied efforts to settle differences with and move closer to adversaries will be a source of
4Telegram from U.S. Embassy (Taipei) to Henry Kissinger, “Apparent Soviet Approach to ROC: Embassy Comment,”
January 1974, Folder “China, Republic of (1),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Staff Files, Box 2, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
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concern for the patron since, in the most extreme case, doing so may represent a precursor to
switching sides. Even short of that, however, a patron will oppose allies’ independent attempts at
détente with the adversary because they: 1) represent a threat to its leadership of its alliances; 2)
run the risk of undermining deterrence by signaling discord within the alliance; and 3) potentially
reduce its control of its other allies by encouraging them to distance themselves from the patron as
well (Liska, 1962: esp. ch. 5; Lake, 1999: 140-141). By unilaterally coming to an understanding
with the adversary, allies reduce the patron’s ability to present a unified front and bargain with
the adversary from a position of strength, and potentially undermine deterrence by indicating their
desire to improve relations and reduce tensions. American fears that Japan might undermine the
United States’ efforts to contain China and defend Taiwan led to the “Yoshida Letter” in 1952, in
which the Japanese – under pressure from U.S. officials – agreed not to strike a separate treaty with
Beijing (Swenson-Wright, 2005: 87-88). Moreover, the ability of an ally to rely on a third-party
– even one that is not fundamentally hostile to the patron – will diminish the patron’s ability to
control that ally. Indeed, during the early 1970s American policymakers were extremely skeptical
of West Germany’s independent efforts toward improving relations with the Communist bloc, for
fear that its rapprochement would undercut the United States’ own negotiations with the Soviet
Union, undermine NATO unity, and that it could even be a harbinger of a more assertive, neutral
Germany (Scott, 2011: 42-48).
Self-Sufficiency
Although weaker partners in asymmetric alliances are almost by definition dependent upon the
protection of their patrons, in some circumstances they may be able to threaten to improve their
security not by improving relations with a third party, but by standing alone against states that
threaten them. The capacity for self-reliance decreases allies’ dependence on their patron by de-
creasing the opportunity costs they face for breaking the alliance, thus diminishing the patron’s
bargaining power and rendering allies more capable of extracting reassurance measures. Here, re-
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assurance serves as a means for patrons to restrain their allies (Schroeder, 1976; Weitsman, 2004).
Many studies emphasize that allies can restrain their partners in large part because the benefits
of the alliance can be held hostage for leverage, which might suggest that reassurance would be
detrimental to restraint (Gelpi, 1999; Pressman, 2008; Owsiak and Frazier, 2014; Cha, 2016).5
Nevertheless, reassurance can serve as a means to the end of restraint insofar as it discourages
allies from pursuing the outside option of their own independent military arming, or from under-
taking preventive attacks out of insecurity (Christensen, 1999; Art, 2003; Monteiro, 2014).
The goal of discouraging exit via self-reliance is at odds with the goal of burden-sharing, and
as discussed previously creates a dilemma for patrons seeking to devolve responsibility to local
partners. In this way, the patron’s challenge is like that of the policymaker seeking to delegate
authority to bureaucrats to improve efficiency. While delegation enables principals (patrons) to re-
lieve their own burden, it runs the risk of empowering agents (allies) which may then not behave in
ways consistent with the principal’s preferences (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999). Yet the patron’s
challenge is even more severe, owing to the anarchic nature of the international system; unlike
legislators, patrons cannot create binding laws enforceable by a higher authority in order to keep
its allies in line (Waltz, 1959, 1979).6
In principle, American policymakers have at times been in favor of increased allied indepen-
dence. Presidents as far back as Dwight Eisenhower, for example, have supported the enterprise
of self-reliance in Europe, Japan, and elsewhere in the hopes that it would allow the United States
to pass more of the burden of defending their regions onto them (Osgood, 1968; Sheetz, 1999).
In practice, however, actual allied self-reliance has often been met with ambivalence or even op-
position. Allied independence is risky, as allies which become less dependent on U.S. protection
also have less incentive to follow its lead. For example, despite the “Guam Doctrine” that called
5As Liska (1962: 36) put it: “The task of restraining is made easier when the commitment is not automatic.” See also
the moral hazard literature discussed above (Kim, 2011a; Benson, 2012; Beckley, 2015).
6On the means policymakers can use to monitor the behavior of bureaucratic agents, see McCubbins and Schwartz
(1984).
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for increased allied responsibility, the Nixon Administration was reluctant to retrench and devolve
responsibility to Japan for fear that it would then move into a more neutral, re-militarized position
(Komine, 2014). The administration also found that Australian and Southeast Asian assertive-
ness often took the form of efforts to circumvent or even oppose U.S. foreign policy (McMahon,
1999: 170-175; Curran, 2014). Similarly, in the post-Cold War environment, despite the potential
burden-sharing benefits, U.S. policymakers were apprehensive at the prospect of a united Europe’s
defense capabilities, and were skeptical of the European Defense Identity (EDI) in the 1990s and
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the 2000s (Howorth and Keeler, 2003; Posen,
2006). Indeed, even the Trump Administration, despite its insistence on European burden-sharing,
expressed concern about efforts by European allies to coordinate more in their own defense, in-
cluding through the creation of a European Defense Fund, fearing that the Europeans might use
their own defense cooperation as a substitute for NATO.7
While exit via conventional military self-reliance will be difficult for most (though not all) al-
lies, nuclear weapons represent a means by which they can unilaterally ensure their survival even
in the presence of an overwhelming conventional foe (Waltz, 1981; Jervis, 1989). Indeed, the
United States and Soviet Union placed great emphasis on arresting the spread of nuclear weapons,
particularly from the 1960s onward (Gavin, 2015). More generally, patrons will be uneasy about
the possession of nuclear weapons by their allies for at least three reasons. First, nuclearization
decreases allies’ dependence, making them more capable of acting unilaterally and reducing pa-
trons’ leverage by rendering them less able to threaten or coerce those allies in the future (Kroenig,
2010). The example of France illustrates this logic well, as France’s independent nuclear arsenal
reduced its dependence on NATO and allowed it to withdraw its forces from NATO’s unified com-
mand in 1966. This not only weakened the combined military capabilities available under NATO’s
direct command, but also raised the prospect that the French might remain neutral in the event
7Steven Erlanger, “U.S. Revives Concerns About European Defense Plans, Rattling NATO Allies,” New York Times,
February 18, 2018; Erik Brattberg and Jamie Fly, “Two Cheers for European Defense Cooperation,” Foreign Policy,
March 9, 2018.
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of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Central Europe, preferring instead to rely on its independent
nuclear deterrent (Yost, 1985a: 1-13; Yost, 1985b: 2-5, 32-33).
Second, proliferation potentially raises the risk of nuclear war – whether accidental or inten-
tional – by increasing the number of independent actors possessing nuclear weapons (Sagan, 1995);
by potentially emboldening nuclear-armed states to behave more aggressively (Bell, 2015); and by
raising the specter of preventive war by a third party. Third, proliferation may beget further pro-
liferation, both by undermining the norm of nonproliferation and by increasing the insecurity of
neighboring non-nuclear states (Monteiro and Debs, 2014). Indeed, there is a great deal of mount-
ing evidence showing that the United States put considerable pressure on its allies to refrain from
gaining independent nuclear capabilities (Miller, 2014a,b; Gerzhoy, 2015). However, this gives
potentially nuclear-capable allies leverage to extract assurances by threatening nuclearization.8
3.2.3 Patron Outside Options
Search
One option available to the patron is find other allies with which it can replace its current partners.
All else being equal, the patron’s threat to abandon an ally becomes more credible to the extent
that losing the ally does not mean losing the good that ally provides. Around the time of the U.S.
invasion of Iraq, for example, the United States was able to secure the support of states in eastern
Europe – such as Poland and the Baltic states – even though traditional allies such as France and
Germany refused to participate. Similarly, during the 1980s the United States was able to turn to
alignment with China as a supplement to – and, in the case of Taiwan, arguably as a replacement for
– its other alliances in Asia. The option of search becomes less credible to the extent that the ally
is of great strategic value, as in such cases it cannot be as easily replaced (Lake, 1999; Cooley and
8The cases in which allies with a potential nuclear option have extracted U.S. security assurances are numerous, and
includes Germany (Gerzhoy, 2015), Israel (Cohen, 1998), Italy (Levite, 2002), Japan (Samuels and Schoff, 2015),
South Korea (Gul Hong, 2011), and Ukraine (Einhorn, 2015). The United States also proposed creating a multilateral
nuclear force for NATO in an effort to discourage independent nuclear programs in Europe (discussed in greater detail
in Chapters 5-6.
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Spruyt, 2009). West Germany and Japan during the Cold War, for example, represented enormous
prizes by virtue of the size of their economies and their latent military potential, the loss of which
would have greatly undermined the United States’ position in Europe and East Asia by not only
reducing its ability to maintain a forward presence, but also by removing their military resources
from the combined clout of the U.S. bloc.
Similarly, a patron can reduce dependence on its allies by pursuing rapprochement with its
adversaries. This improves its security environment and thus inherently reduces the raison d’être
of its alliances. The patron is thus more free to pursue policies independent of its alliances, and
even to shed those alliances. This was the fear of many U.S. allies especially during the 1970s,
when the United States pursued détente with the Soviet Union and China (Fang and Ramsay, 2010;
Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, and Cooper, 2016). Similarly, almost immediately in the aftermath of the
news that U.S. President Donald Trump had agreed to hold a summit with North Korean leader
Kim Jong-Un to discuss North Korea’s nuclear weapons, observers worried that Trump might be
willing to “trade away” the U.S.-South Korean alliance or settle for an arrangement in which North
Korea only kept only its shorter-range missiles that were incapable of striking the U.S. homeland.9
Self-Sufficiency
Patrons can also decide to forgo the autonomy benefits of an alliance by pursuing a more unilateral
foreign policy, thus reducing their need for allies in the first place. For one, a patron may decide to
“go it alone” and rely on its own capability to manage threats and project power rather than coop-
erating with allies (Voeten, 2001; Posen, 2006). Posen (2003, 2014), for example, has argued that
the United States’ “Command of the Commons” gives it the freedom to project power unilaterally.
Alternatively but related, the patron may decide to retreat into isolationism, devolving most or all
of the responsibility for protecting its interests and maintaining regional balances of power to local
partners. This approach, however, hinges on the patron’s ability to find an ally that is both willing
9Victor Cha, “What Will Trump Give Up for Peace with North Korea?” New York Times, March 9, 2018; Thomas
Wright, “Trump Risks Trading Away the U.S.-South Korean Alliance,” The Atlantic, March 9, 2018.
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and able to contain expansionist states in its region, and which has foreign policy interests that
align with the patron’s own (Haynes, 2015).
3.3 What Factors Shape the Threat of Exit?
In focusing on the threat of exit, one potential issue that arises is reverse causality, as states may be
more likely to exit the alliance if their partners are not providing them with sufficient reassurance
(in the case of allies) or burden-sharing effort (in the case of patrons). Moreover, allies and patrons
should be anticipating each others’ risk of exit and moving to discourage it. Thus, I focus on ex
ante factors that shape partners’ threats of exit, as well as the cost each state can impose on its
partner by exiting.
In order for a state’s threat of exit to act as a potent source of bargaining leverage, it must be
both credible and salient to its partner. Exit is credible when the benefits a state expects from the
alliance are low while the costs are high, as well as when outside options are readily available. In
turn, a state’s threat of exit will be more salient to its partner to the extent that the partner needs
either security (in the ally’s case) or autonomy (in the patron’s case).
Snyder’s (1997) argument that bargaining leverage is a function of dependence and commit-
ment requires some amendment when applied to asymmetric alliances, where the patron provides
security to its allies while allies give up autonomy to their patron. In such asymmetric partnerships,
allies are not always (or even often) expected to come to their patron’s defense; rather, the guaran-
tee is by-and-large one-directional (Morrow, 1991; Rapp-Hooper, 2015). In asymmetric alliances,
the weaker partner can more easily threaten to leave the alliance when the security benefits of the
alliance are low and the costs of giving up autonomy are high, while its threat of exit carries more
weight to the extent that the autonomy benefits it provides are valuable to the patron. As for the
patron, its threat to abandon allies is more credible to the extent that the autonomy benefits of the
alliance are low, while the costs of providing security are high. Patrons’ threats are more salient
when the ally is more vulnerable and in need of protection.
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My Conceptualization Snyder’s Conceptualization
Patron Credibility
1) Need for Partners
Patron Dependence2) Value of Allies’ Autonomy
3) Outside Options for Autonomy
4) Benefits/Costs of Providing Security Patron Commitment
Ally Credibility
1) Need for Security
Ally Dependence2) Value of Patron’s Security Provision
3) Outside Options for Security
4) Benefits/Costs of Giving Up Autonomy Ally Commitment
Patron Salience Security benefits provided by patron Ally Dependence
Ally Salience Autonomy benefits provided by ally Patron Dependence
Table 3.1: Comparison of my theory to that of Snyder (1997).
Thus, in a variation on Snyder’s (1997) criteria for bargaining leverage, I propose the following
factors which can explain bargaining over reassurance and burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances.
For the patron, the credibility of its threats to abandon allies is a function of: 1) its autonomy
needs; 2) the extent to which allies provide valuable autonomy benefits; 3) its outside options.
Additionally, I would expect that the costs and benefits of providing security play an important
role in determining whether the patron prefers to abandon its allies. Finally, the patron’s threats of
abandonment are more salient to allies that have greater security needs.
As for allies, the credibility their own threats of exit depend on: 1) their need for security; 2)
the extent to which the patron actually provides that security; 3) their outside options. Similarly,
allies can more credibly threaten to pursue outside options to the extent that giving up autonomy
is costly. The salience of these threats, in turn, hinges on the extent to which the patron needs the
autonomy benefits they provide.
A comparison of my theory to that of Snyder (1997) can be found in Table 3.1, while a general
summary of the theory can be found in Table 3.2. Here the “Potency” of a state’s threat of exit
is a combination that threat’s credibility and salience to its partner. Additionally, a summary of
the observable implications of the theory – which in turn serves as a preview into my testable
hypotheses – can be found in Table 3.3.
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Potency of Patron Exit
Potency of Ally Exit
Higher Lower
Higher High Reassurance, High Reassurance,
High Burden-Sharing Low Burden-Sharing
Lower Low Reassurance, Low Reassurance,
High Burden-Sharing Low Burden-Sharing
Table 3.2: Summary of theory.
3.3.1 Allies
Credibility
The credibility of allies’ threat of exit is a function of the security benefits of the alliance, the costs
of giving up autonomy, and the availability of outside options. The security benefits an ally expects
from the alliance depend both on how badly it needs security and on the patron’s willingness and
ability to meet those needs. States enter alliances with the expectation that their partner(s) will
provide them with certain benefits – though the certainty with which these will be provided is
always in question, given the anarchic nature of the international system. The net benefits an ally
expects from an alliance thus stem in large part from its perception of the patron’s reliability. The
less an ally expects the patron to actually be willing or able to follow through on its promises –
whether due to the patron’s past behavior (Miller, 2003; Gibler, 2008; Crescenzi et al., 2012), to
signals from its domestic audiences (Schultz, 1998), or to its inability to project power, to name
just a few – the less valuable the patron is (Selden, 2013). Thailand, for example, responded to
fears about U.S. reliability in the early 1970s by reaching out to the Communist bloc and distancing
itself from the United States, and also by cooperating more closely with other states in Southeast
Asia (McMahon, 1999: 158-159, 170-173). South Korea and Taiwan similarly attempted to pursue
nuclear weapons during this same time period.
Threat, however, has an indeterminate effect on the credibility of allies’ threats to leave the al-
liance. On the one hand, threat makes the alliance more necessary, which reduces allies’ incentives
to leave the alliance. For allies, threat creates insecurity that renders them in need of protection.
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This makes the alliance beneficial for it and diminishes its likelihood of seeking to distance itself
from the alliance. Allies which face a high likelihood of being conquered will find it difficult
to pursue outside options, whether by obtaining nuclear weapons, pursuing a conventional arms
buildup, or simply adopting a policy of neutrality. These measures may not only be insufficient
for deterring the adversary, but they may also carry great risk. The adversary would likely seek to
forestall the proliferation of nuclear weapons to its non-friendly neighbors, and would also be more
likely to demand a “pound of flesh” from a state seeking to secure a promise of non-aggression
from it in the form of territorial concessions or policy influence. During the Cold War this was the
position of Finland, which maintained independence in exchange for allowing the Soviet Union to
have a great deal of influence over Finnish foreign policy and domestic politics. Moreover, even if
allies are able to reach rapprochement with adversaries on fairly equitable terms, there is nothing
to guarantee that the adversary will not seek to coerce it in the future (Fearon, 1995).
But threat also increases’ allies security needs, which is likely to make allies question whether
the alliance is adequate to meet those needs. By surrendering some autonomy and relying on
the patron for security, the ally risks jeopardizing its survival if the patron’s protection becomes
inadequate for its security needs. While threat does indeed make it risky for allies to forgo the
patron’s protection, threat also makes outside options more attractive to reclaim autonomy and
bridge the potential gap between the ally’s security needs and the patron’s protection. Allies facing
a high likelihood of being conquered by one of the patron’s enemies may be better served by
keeping open the option to strike a separate deal with the adversary, obtain nuclear weapons, or
pursue another outside option in order to hedge their bets. Unlike the patron, allies facing high
levels of threat may have little incentive to balance against rather than bandwagon with threats.
Indeed, even authors arguing that states prefer to balance against threats rather than bandwagon
with them have claimed this applies most readily – if not exclusively – to great powers rather than
to non-great powers (Walt, 1987; Snyder, 1997; Mearsheimer, 2001).10
10See also Rothstein (1968: 26-28) on how weakness creates incentives for nonalignment and accommodating adver-
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For allies, standing firm against adversaries is only desirable to the extent that doing so makes
survival more likely than rapprochement with the adversary (or other outside options), even if doing
so involves concessions. But giving up autonomy to the patron can jeopardize allies’ security by
putting them “in the adversary’s sights” and foreclosing their ability to pursue friendly relations
with the adversary (Snyder, 1997). The higher the perceived threat, the more incentives allies
have to cultivate outside options to hedge their bets while remaining under the patron’s protection.
Unless it is assured of patron protection, an ally may prefer to take its chances by unilaterally
arming itself or by placating the adversary than to place its fate wholly in the patron’s hands. Thus,
allies which perceive higher levels of threat may or may not be better able to extract assurances
from their patron; the effect is theoretically indeterminate.
Finally, allies’ threats of exit are more credible when outside options are readily available. In
particular, pursuing outside options becomes more attractive to the extent that the ally has the capa-
bility to defend itself and has alternative security partners to choose from. Allies which can more
easily pursue nuclear weapons, rely on third parties for security, or pursue a course of nonalign-
ment or neutrality can more easily meet their security needs without the patron’s protection. Thus,
the more available options allies have, the more credible their threat to leave the alliance is, and
the more reassurance they will receive.
Salience
Allies are also able to extract more reassurance from their patron to the extent that the patron needs
the alliance. In particular, an ally can inflict more harm on a patron to the extent that it is strate-
gically valuable to the patron. Some allies will be inherently more valuable than others, whether
due to their geo-strategic locations or to the resources they can bring to bear on the patron’s behalf
(Lake, 1999). Chamberlain (2014), for example, finds that American and Soviet arms transfers
to the Middle East were in large part driven by recipients’ strategic value – measured using oil
saries. Jervis (1991: 40) and Labs (1992) qualify the argument but still emphasize that high levels of threat or a
perceived dearth of outside support give states incentives to accommodate or even bandwagon with adversaries.
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production and geographic location – as both superpowers sought to sway more valuable partners
to their side.
Additionally, allies’ threats of exit will be more salient to the extent that the patron perceives
a high level of threat. In such circumstances, patrons have a greater need to attract partners to its
side in order to keep them from aligning with adversaries, add their strength to its own coalition,
and facilitate its efforts to project power. Allies can exploit this opportunity to extract assurances
of protection from it. As Handel (1981: 149) puts it: “the readiness on the part of the super powers
to pay almost any price to keep their primacy and alliance systems intact create[s] a situation in




Much like its allies, the alliance is more valuable to the patron when it perceives a higher level
of threat. The more a patron faces the prospect of threat from a great power competitor, the more
beneficial it is to have foreign security commitments rather than abandon its allies. Otherwise,
it runs the risk of encouraging its adversaries to expand their influence – and even to dominate
their regions if they have the capability. For the patron, threat generates incentives to check the
expansion of its adversaries in order to prevent them from upending regional balances of power.
When the patron perceives a high level of threat from an adversary, it has less incentive to remain
aloof from its allies, or else risk tempting the adversary to take its chances and attack a seemingly
disunited alliance that does not have the patron’s full commitment. The patron has more incentives
to remain actively engaged in allies’ defense when it has an adversary that is able and willing to
become a regional hegemon or a peer competitor (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987; Mearsheimer, 2001;
Montgomery, 2016).
This in turn reduces the credibility of the patron’s threats of abandonment. Indeed, Christensen
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(2011) argues that alliance disunity – including over issues of burden-sharing – can tempt ad-
versaries into attacking, presenting evidence from competition between the U.S. and Communist
alliance systems in East Asia. Because running such a risk is more dangerous when relations with
the adversary are more hostile, allies can effectively exploit the patron’s reluctance to drive a hard
bargain with them during such periods (Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, 1973: chs. 3-4; Fang and
Ramsay, 2010).
Second, the credibility of a patron’s threat of abandonment will be shaped by the extent to
which the patron has other allies it can turn to which fulfill its needs. In asymmetric alliances, the
patron is unlikely to “need” any of its allies in the way that great powers in symmetric alliances do,
simply due to the power disparity between the patron and its allies (Waltz, 1979; Christensen and
Snyder, 1990; Snyder, 1997). Nevertheless, some allies will have “specific assets” that the patron
is hard-pressed to find elsewhere (Lake, 1999: 9), such as its geostrategic location or the economic
and military resources it brings to the alliance. Moreover, the patron will have greater interest in
keeping these allies’ assets out of the hands of adversaries.
Finally, while providing security is beneficial to the extent that doing so discourages adversaries
from expanding, it is also costly to provide security. Extending security guarantees risks entangling
the patron in costly local conflicts, while the peacetime costs of maintaining military readiness for
the sake of its alliances (e.g., a sizable standing military or foreign-deployed forces) represent
a steady drain on the patron’s financial and manpower resources. I would expect the costs of
providing security to allies to become less tenable to the extent that the patron faces constraints on
the resources it is able to devote to its foreign commitments. The more strain on those resources,
the more costly maintaining its partnerships will be – even if the alliances are otherwise highly
beneficial.
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Theoretical Concept Determined by
Patron Credibility
1) Need for Autonomy Patron’s Threat Perception
2) Value of Allies’ Autonomy Ally’s Strategic Value
3) Outside Options for Autonomy Ally’s Asset Specificity
4) Benefits/Costs of Providing Security Patron Resource Constraints
Ally Credibility
1) Need for Security Ally’s Threat Perception
2) Value of Patron’s Security Provision Patron’s Reliability
3) Outside Options for Security Latent Military/Nuclear Potential;
Alternative Partners
4) Benefits/Costs of Giving Up Autonomy Ally’s Threat Perception
Patron Salience Security benefits provided by patron Ally’s threat perception
Ally Salience Autonomy benefits provided by ally Ally’s strategic value to patron;
Patron’s threat perception
Table 3.3: Observable implications of the theory.
Salience
Additionally, the patron’s threat of exit is more salient to the extent that allies have greater need
for the security it provides. Specifically, I would expect allies with more dangerous threat envi-
ronments to be more responsive to the patron’s threats. Such allies are more exposed to the costs
of being abandoned, and have a higher need for security. The patron’s threat of abandonment thus
carries more weight for them.
3.3.3 A Simple Formal Model
I illustrate the logic of the theory in a simple two-stage, two-player game depicted in Figure 3.1. In
this model, the patron firsts decides whether to reassure (R) or not reassure (∼R), and the ally then
decides on its level of effort – whether to burden-share (B), maintain the status quo (SQ), or exit to
pursue an outside option (E). These choices are of course stylized; in reality, reassurance is a matter
of degree rather than a binary decision, and allies may pursue multiple options simultaneously. In
this game, the patron always prefers that its allies increase their burden-sharing efforts rather than
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Figure 3.1: The Reassurance and Burden-Sharing Game
I first turn to the patron’s payoffs. As long as the ally does not exit, the patron receives the
benefit of collective defense D. When it reassures its ally, it receives a cost from the reassurance
CP . Finally, when its ally increases its burden-sharing effort, the patron receives a benefit CA
equivalent to the cost of burden-sharing to the ally.
As for the ally’s payoffs, it receives patron protection P in all scenarios where it does not
exit. This payoff is a composite of the benefits and costs of relying on the patron relative to
other means of achieving security. This benefit will be higher to the extent that the ally does not
have attractive outside options. An ally receives this benefit with a given probability 1 − α when
the patron reassures and 1 − γ when the patron does not reassure. α and γ refer to the ex ante
probability of patron abandonment (as perceived by the ally) and 0 < α < γ < 1, as the ally’s
confidence in the patron will be higher when the patron reassures than when it does not. When the
ally shares more of the burden it suffers a cost CA in the form of more resources devoted to the
alliance. However, free-riding (i.e., pursuing the status quo) also entails a cost F , which refers to
the risk and vulnerability the ally incurs by doing nothing and relying on the patron’s commitment.
This cost will be lower for allies which perceive a lower level of threat, and is weighted by the
probability of patron abandonment (α or γ) – that is, the probability that the ally will be forced to
stand alone in a time of need.
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Implications
A few implications of the model follow. First, reassuring reduces the attractiveness of exit for allies
relative to burden-sharing and free-riding, but also reduces the attractiveness of burden-sharing
relative to free-riding. This illustrates the reassurance dilemma: reassurance serves to maintain
alliance cohesion, but also undermines burden-sharing.
Second, when holding reassurance constant, allies are more likely to free-ride relative to burden-
sharing when: 1) the probability of patron exit (α and γ) is lower; and 2) allies’ vulnerability to
threat (F ) is lower. Allies are more likely to free-ride relative to exit when: 1) the probability of
patron exit (α and γ) is lower; and 2) the net benefits of remaining loyal to the patron (P ) are
higher. Allies are more likely to burden-share relative to exit when 1) the net benefits of remaining
loyal to the patron (P ) are higher; and 2) the probability of patron exit (α and γ) is lower.
As for the conditions under which allies are likely to prefer (R,B) to (R,SQ) and (R,E) – that
is, the conditions under which allies are likely to burden-share even if they are reassured – this can
occur in three ways. (Proofs can be found in the appendix.) First, when there is a high F , high P ,
and high α, and thus when the patron has a credible threat of exit, the ally is vulnerable, and the
net benefits of patron protection are high. South Korea during the early 1970s illustrates this, as it
was highly dependent on U.S. protection and its outside options were limited. Its levels of burden-
sharing contributions were thus consistently high. Nevertheless, concerns about U.S. reliability led
it to pursue nuclear weapons – which, in turn, led to more U.S. reassurance. Second, when there is
a high F , low P , and low α, and thus when the patron has a low threat of exit, the ally is vulnerable,
and the net benefits of patron protection are low. An example would be West Germany during the
late 1950s and early 1960s; concerns about U.S. reliability were not yet as severe as they would
be during the 1970s, but West Germany’s vulnerability to attack gave the United States enormous
burden-sharing leverage, while the FRG’s capacity for exit – inherent in its latent military power
and latent nuclear weapons capability – also allowed it to extract U.S. assurances. Third, when
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there is a high F , high P , and low α, and thus when the patron has a limited threat of exit, the
ally is vulnerable, and the net benefits of patron protection are high. Turkey, for example, needed
U.S. protection and was directly contiguous to the Soviet Union, but the United States also had an
inherent stake in protecting Turkey in order to keep the Bosporus Straits out of Soviet control.
Finally, higher values of α and γ – which act as my proxies for the ex ante credibility of
the patron’s threats of abandonment – increase the likelihood of both reassurance and burden-
sharing. Any factor that makes the patron’s threat of abandonment inherently more credible is
also likely to make allies suspicious of its long-term reliability.11 That is, factors which increase
the patron’s ability to threaten abandonment for the purposes of burden-sharing also increase the
need for reassurance. This is consistent with the claims of scholars who argue that coercive threats
must be combined with assurances for maximum effectiveness (Davis, 2000; Carnegie, 2015).
Moreover, it suggests that the correlation between reassurance and burden-sharing is likely to be
more complicated than existing studies which look for a negative or positive correlation allow
(Lake, 2007, 2009; Machain and Morgan, 2013; Allen, VanDusky-Allen, and Flynn, 2016).
3.4 Testable Hypotheses
The credibility of allies’ threats to exit the alliance is thus shaped by their assessments of how the
benefits of the alliance compare with the benefits of seeking alternative means of ensuring their
security. More concretely, I expect that allies’ threats of exit are shaped by their perception of the
patron’s reliability and the availability of outside options. The salience of these threats of exit, in
turn, is determined by how much the patron needs the alliance – which I argue is determined by
allies’ strategic value to the patron, and by the patron’s perception of threat. Thus, allies are more
likely to receive reassurance when they have credible outside options; when they see the patron as
unreliable; and when the ally is of great value to the patron.
11Sechser (2010) makes a similar argument about what he calls “Goliath’s Curse,” wherein a powerful state may be
unable to coerce weaker states because it cannot credibly commit to refrain from making additional demands or
threats in the future.
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As for the patron, its ability to threaten abandonment determines its ability to make its pro-
tection conditional on burden-sharing. Specifically, the credibility of the patron’s threats of aban-
donment depends on its own perception of threat, the extent to which it faces resource constraints
and pressure to retrench from its foreign commitments, and how strategically valuable the ally is.
Its threats of abandonment are more salient to allies to the extent that they perceive high levels of
external threat .
In terms of observable implications, then, I focus on four factors that shape reassurance and/or
burden-sharing. The first is the availability of outside options for allies. Each partner can more
credibly threaten to exit the alliance to the extent that it has attractive outside options. Allies with
significant latent military potential, a latent nuclear weapons capability, and alternative alliance
partners can more easily afford to leave the alliance and go their own way, thus forcing the patron
to reassure them more. Similarly, the patron’s outside options are shaped by the assets allies
provide to the alliance (i.e., their strategic value). The patron will not be able to as easily abandon
allies that have considerable economic and military resources, or which are in geostrategically
important locations, as in such cases the patron’s alternatives are limited and it has a greater stake
in these allies’ security.
Third, when the patron faces resource constraints brought about by economic hardship or costly
foreign wars, its threat of abandonment is more ex ante credible, as maintaining a foreign military
presence and waging wars become less sustainable. As a result, these constraints facilitate the
patron’s burden-sharing pressure. However, because such uncertainty makes the patron more in-
herently unreliable, it reduces allies’ incentives to give up their autonomy in exchange for promises
of protection, thus making allies’ threat of exit more credible as well. This, in turn, forces the pa-
tron to reassure its allies or else risk losing their loyalty. Under conditions of resource constraints,
then, I expect that reassurance and burden-sharing will increase in tandem.
Finally, the external threat environment faced by the alliance can have multiple mechanisms by
which it influences reassurance and burden-sharing. Higher levels of threat increase the costs that
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the patron can impose on allies by abandoning them, which favors more burden-sharing. At the
same time, however, threat may also reduce the credibility of the patron’s threat of abandonment
by rendering the autonomy benefits of the alliance more salient and diminishing the patron’s ability
to act unilaterally.
3.4.1 Allies’ Outside Options
Outside options are difficult to measure a priori, especially in a generalizable way, as they are
always context-specific.12 As discussed above, allies’ outside options can take the form of either
self-sufficiency, a search for alternative partners, or a combination of the two. Thus, I would expect
that allies which can more credibly threaten to pursue these options will receive more reassurance.
Specifically, allies with significant latent military power, a latent nuclear weapons capability, and
a greater number of alternative security partners have stronger outside options.
First, allies with greater conventional military potential can more easily pursue a nonaligned,
autonomous foreign policy, whether by relying on their own military power or by aligning with
other states. While they may not be able to defeat a great power by themselves, powerful allies
can more credibly threaten to impose significant costs on an invader (Mearsheimer, 1983). More-
over, stronger allies are better equipped to engage with adversaries on more semi-equal terms, and
are not as vulnerable to the bullying or coercion which might otherwise make them reluctant to
negotiate bilaterally or proceed without the patron’s protection. They can thus more easily pursue
neutrality without having to bandwagon or make asymmetric concessions (Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith, 2007). Moreover, larger allies have more sizable internal markets and are likely to be less
dependent on international trade (Rector, 2009: 20-21). U.S. concerns about German and Japanese
neutralism, for example, pervaded the Cold War, and were part of the driving force behind the U.S.
12Note that for the purposes of parsimony the theory I present focuses on systemic factors that make it easier or
more difficult for states to exit an alliance. In doing so I abstract away from measures which states can take to
“manufacture” commitment or dependence, such as through military inter-operability that makes partners better able
to fight together but less able to fight alone (Morrow, 1994; Leeds and Anac, 2005). When states are systematically
more capable of exit, this may in fact incentivize their partners to seek such binding measures (Mattes, 2012).
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presence in Europe and the Western Pacific (Trachtenberg, 1999; Komine, 2014).
Second, the credibility of allies’ threats to pursue nuclear weapons is a function of both their
conventional military strength and whether they have the latent capacity to build nuclear weapons.
Conventionally powerful allies have a more credible threat of obtaining nuclear weapons for two
reasons. For one, they have greater resources with which they can attempt to develop nuclear
weapons. Second, their greater conventional strength renders them more able to deter preventive
attacks on their nuclear programs (Fuhrmann and Kreps, 2010; Monteiro and Debs, 2014). States
with a latent nuclear capacity, in turn, can more quickly obtain nuclear weapons. Fuhrmann and
Tkach (2015) even find that nuclear latency itself may deter attacks.
Finally, allies with more partners to choose from can more easily meet their security needs by
relying on third parties. Specifying which allies have more viable alternative security partners is
difficult a priori, as states can choose their partners based on expedient circumstances. Kim (2016)
argues that system polarity dictates allies’ outside options; the more great power poles there are,
the more alternative security providers allies can choose from. Yet this is a coarse measure, one
that is not only quite slow-moving and entirely country-invariant, but which rules out alliances
between non-great powers. Alternatively, in Lake’s (2009) conceptualization of security hierarchy,
he treats alternative allies as his indicator of outside options. Because of my focus on the post-
World War II period, I follow Lake in defining alternative alliances not in terms of polarity but in
terms of states’ number of other allies.
This leads to the following set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Allies with stronger outside options will receive more reassurance from their patron.
Hypothesis 1a. Allies with greater latent military power will receive more reassurance.
Hypothesis 1b. Allies with a latent nuclear weapons capability will receive more reassurance.
Hypothesis 1c. Allies with more alternative allies will receive more reassurance.
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3.4.2 Allies’ Strategic Value
The availability of outside options for the patron, in turn, is driven by the extent to which its allies
possess strategically valuable assets that make them difficult to replace (Lake, 1999; Cooley and
Spruyt, 2009; Rector, 2009). When a patron has few options for local partners, its threat to abandon
allies is less credible, and therefore its ability to pressure allies for burden-sharing is diminished.
Allies’ strategic value can take the form of their geographic location or resources (Chamberlain,
2014).
In particular, the resources of more powerful allies – those with larger economies and potential
military strength – make them more strategically valuable to the patron. In bargaining with these
allies, the United States may not have any other options to turn to which can fulfill the same
function, thus reducing its ability to threaten abandonment. When allies are more valuable, the
patron will have more “commitment-by-interest” in protecting them (Snyder, 1997: 169). Indeed,
Danilovic (2002) finds that great powers’ deterrent threats are more effective in regions that are of
greater intrinsic interest to them. Thus, because they are so valuable, the patron’s threat to abandon
more powerful allies may lack credibility. This suggests that the patron may have little leverage
over them when it comes to burden-sharing.13
As for the effect of strategic value on reassurance, on the one hand these allies’ intrinsic value
makes their threats to exit the alliance more salient to the patron. I would thus expect that the
patron will reassure strategically valuable allies more because it does not want to lose them. At
the same time, however, because the patron does have an inherent interest in these allies’ security,
they are likely to be more confident that it will protect them (cf. Danilovic, 2002). They may
thus not need to be reassured, as the patron’s likelihood of abandoning them is lower. As a result,
while strategically valuable allies are likely to be able to leverage the patron’s dependence on their
assets to extract other forms of support, the effect of strategic value on reassurance is somewhat




Hypothesis 2a. Allies with greater economic resources will receive neither more nor less reassur-
ance.
Hypothesis 2b. Allies with greater economic resources will contribute less for burden-sharing.
Hypothesis 2b partly runs counter to the conventional wisdom on burden-sharing in asymmetric
alliances. In the logic of collective goods, larger allies should be more likely to share a higher
portion of the defense burden. They not only have more resources to devote to defense, but also can
also potentially affect the overall level of deterrence through their efforts (Olson and Zeckhauser,
1966). These countervailing mechanisms – one based on a bargaining framework, the other based
on a public goods framework – may help explain why the correlation between defense effort and
GDP was not always as strong among U.S. allies during the Cold War as the logic of collective
goods would suggest (cf. Oneal, 1990).
Additionally, I would expect that the patron will have a less credible threat to abandon allies
in geostrategically valuable locations. Having access to such locations – and denying them to
adversaries – allows the patron to project power while restricting its adversary’s ability to do so.
Turkey, for example, controls the Bosporus strait, which serves to connect the Black Sea and
Mediterranean Sea. As a result, Russian and Soviet attempts to project naval power from the
Black Sea faced potential interdiction, thus serving to make Turkey strategically valuable for not
only Russia, but also any adversary seeking to deny it access to the Mediterranean (Chamberlain,
2014). Likewise, U.S. bases in the Western Pacific allowed it to contest Soviet attempts to project
power using its Pacific Fleet (Desch, 1989; Lake, 1999).
Hypothesis 3a. Geostrategically valuable allies will receive neither more nor less reassurance.
Hypothesis 3b. Geostrategically valuable allies will contribute less for burden-sharing.
It is difficult to specify a priori which allies have the greatest geostrategic value, as this is
inherently dependent on the patron’s foreign policy priorities. Moreover, geostrategic value has
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most often been invoked to explain bargaining leverage over military basing (Cooley and Spruyt,
2009), where many hosts are not U.S. allies and the relationship is based more on the transactional
exchange of material goods (such as aid and arms) rather than guarantees of security (Pettyjohn,
2012). In most alliances, the United States cares not only about maintaining its military bases,
but in ensuring that its partners are not conquered – whether or not it has a presence on the ally’s
territory.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect that preventing the adversary from conquering or oth-
erwise gaining access to allies’ territory will be more vital in some cases than others. In particular,
I would expect that allies situated at key maritime chokepoints will be more valuable. Maintain-
ing the ability to interdict the adversary’s naval forces and maritime trade at such points during
wartime would be compromised if the adversary seized the ally’s territory, if the ally broke away
from the alliance, or even if the ally simply denied the patron the right to operate on its territory.
The patron’s threat to abandon strategically valuable allies is thus less believable. Moreover, the
patron is likely to fear that if the ally distances itself from the alliance, it may be more likely to
grant the adversary military access on its territory.
3.4.3 Patron Resource Constraints
Additionally, when the patron faces strain on its resources and pressure to retrench from its for-
eign commitments, its reliability becomes inherently more suspect. Resource constraints, whether
they are the result of economic hardship, rising debt, or costly foreign wars, weaken the patron by
diminishing its ability to exert influence in the international system. Great powers can do only as
much as their resources allow, and attempting to maintain their current level of military might or
foreign commitments during periods of reduced resources can run the risk of over-extension (Mac-
Donald and Parent, 2011). Similarly, resource constraints are likely to sap the patron’s appetite
for foreign entanglements. It is during times of weakness that great powers are most sensitive to
the costs of overseas engagement and to face internal pressure to prioritize domestic issues at the
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expense of foreign commitments (Chapman, McDonald, and Moser, 2015).14
This, in turn, encourages allies to hedge their bets, and thus forces the patron to use reassurance
measures. As Selden (2013: 339) puts it, “a United States that demonstrates a lack of will to
defend its hegemony would not be as valuable a security partner.” As a result, when the patron
is seen as unreliable by its allies, it must offset this perception through reassurance in order to
discourage them from pursuing outside options. During the 1950s, for example, the Eisenhower
Administration sought to reassure U.S. allies that its “New Look” approach, in which the United
States would rein in its defense spending and foreign commitments in the aftermath of the Korean
War, did not imply a weakening of the U.S. commitment. This was done in large part to dissuade
allies from pursuing independent nuclear arsenals (Sloan, 2016: 38-39).
At the same time, during periods of resource constraints the United States will be more tempted
to place burden-sharing pressure on its allies so that it can reduce its own costs (Haynes, 2015).
When U.S. policymakers have intrinsic incentives to retrench, they can use those incentives to put
burden-sharing pressure on allies. Leaders can claim that the United States’ commitment is not
entirely in their hands, and that allies must contribute more to the common defense in order to both
appease U.S. domestic audiences clamoring for retrenchment and condemning allied “free-riding,”
and to offset the United States’ reduced ability to provide security.15 Resource constraints and/or
domestic sensitivity to the costs of foreign entanglements will tempt the patron to rely more on the
efforts of its allies as a substitution for its own efforts.
Resource constraints influences patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing via two mecha-
nisms. The first of these is “involuntary defection” – the possibility that factors beyond policymak-
ers’ control will force them to renege on their commitments (Putnam, 1988). When policymakers
face domestic pressure to retrench by reducing either defense spending or their country’s overseas
14The literature on resource constraints and great power retrenchment is voluminous (see, e.g., Gilpin, 1981; Kennedy,
1987; Friedberg, 1988; MacDonald and Parent, 2011).
15This is closely related to the concept of “inside options” in bargaining models, which refer to the benefits that an
















Figure 3.2: Resource constraints and reassurance.
military presence, exit becomes more attractive for allies. For one, the costs of maintaining foreign
commitments at their present level may become less tenable due to budgetary constraints brought
on by economic hardship or the loss of blood and treasure in foreign wars. Moreover, resource con-
straints are likely to prompt domestic audiences to favor retrenchment and be more wary of foreign
entanglements due to war weariness and a desire to prioritize spending for domestic consumption
(Chapman, McDonald, and Moser, 2015). A long line of research suggests that protracted, costly
wars sap domestic political support for foreign entanglements (Mueller, 1973; Mack, 1975; Gelpi,
Feaver, and Reifler, 2009).
Unlike executives, who represent the entire country and thus uniquely have incentives to pursue
policies which are in the “national interest,” domestic actors have fewer incentives to pursue poli-
cies that benefits others and instead have incentives to pursue their own interests (Howell, 2013).
As such, domestic actors have greater freedom to vilify foreign policies that are costly without of-
fering direct benefits to their constituents (Milner and Tingley, 2015). Policies designed to protect
allies outside the context of direct fighting are one such example. Unlike the actual use of combat
forces in wartime – in which informational asymmetries are likely to empower executives and for
which there is a clearer motivation to have military forces abroad – the use of scarce resources to
reassure allies can instead have the appearance of a “hand out” and raise concerns about free-riding
to domestic actors.
Resource constraints thus increase policymakers’ leverage for persuading allies to expand their
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burden-sharing efforts. Even for allies that do not host U.S. troops, pressure on U.S. commitments
will be disconcerting, as it will be perceived as diminishing the likelihood that the United States
would intervene to protect them, both by reducing its willingness to intervene (due to domestic
pressure) as well as its ability (due to shrinking resources). Domestic isolationism effectively
makes reassurance less costly from a bargaining perspective, as allies less certain of U.S. commit-
ment can be expected to be less prone to free-ride even if they are reassured. Pressure to retrench
allows patrons to effectively combine implicit (even unintended or unwanted) threats of defection
with promises of continued commitment if the ally complies.16
At the same time, however, resource constraints can make the U.S. threat of exit too credible
by making it appear less reliable. This reduces allies’ expected value of relying on the United
States, and thus encourages them to pursue outside options. Indeed, Lanoszka (2014) finds that
U.S. allies are more likely to consider nuclear weapons in the wake of a major withdrawal of
American troops. South Korea and Taiwan, for example, began pursuing nuclear weapons in
response to U.S. retrenchment from East Asia during the 1970s and ceased pursuit only in response
to strong American pressure. Similarly, allies may be more inclined to improve relations with
adversaries when their patron’s commitment seems tenuous. The Nixon Administration feared
that Congressional and public pressure in the wake of the Vietnam War – most notably in the form
of a series of amendments and resolutions sponsored by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield,
which called for withdrawing significant numbers of U.S. troops from Europe (Williams, 1985)
– might lead allies to move closer to the Soviet Union. U.S. officials thus used considerable
reassurance measures to counteract the voices of domestic actors.
Second, constraints on the exercise of U.S. power create incentives for it to pursue détente with
or accommodate its adversaries in order to avoid over-extension and buy time until it can reassert
itself (Treisman, 2004). Indeed, this was part of the logic behind Mikhail Gorbachev’s pursuit of
détente with the West during the 1980s (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2000; Schweller and Wohlforth,
16On the importance of combining threats and assurances, see Schelling (1966), Davis (2000), and Carnegie (2015).
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2000), as well as Richard Nixon’s opening to China and détente with the Soviet Union during the
1970s. Détente with the adversary makes the patron’s threat of exit more credible by reducing its
deterrence needs, and thus reducing the value of its alliances. This increases the patron’s influence
over allied burden-sharing. Fang and Ramsay (2010) argue that allies’ value to the United States
diminishes when relations between the United States and the adversary are less tense, and that as
a result allies increase their burden-sharing in response to the credibility of U.S. exit.
However, patron-adversary détente is also likely to encourage allied exit, as allies will fear
being “sold out” as part of a deal between the great powers. During the late 1960s and 1970s, many
U.S. allies, despite seeing merits in the relaxation of tensions between the Eastern and Western
blocs, feared that if dictated by the United States, détente could be the precursor to the United
States striking a deal with the Soviet Union or China at the expense of their own interests. Thus,
even though the level of adversary threat will be lower, the United States will paradoxically have
to reassure its allies more during periods where it pursues détente with adversaries (cf. Yarhi-Milo,
Lanoszka, and Cooper, 2016).
It is important to note that setbacks such as costly foreign wars or economic hardship are
certainly not the only reason why domestic actors may favor retrenchment. However, for the
purpose of establishing causation, focusing on the effects of exogenous shocks is preferable to
studying the effects of, for example, public opinion, which could be endogenous to the level of
U.S. assurances or to allied defense efforts. Domestic actors may favor making demands of allies
or withdrawing troops because they are responding to perceived allied free-riding or “excessive”
U.S. reassurance, and thus in such cases the direction of causality could be reversed.
Hypothesis 4. When a patron faces resource constraints, it will use more reassurance, but will also
make its assurances more conditional on allied burden-sharing.
3.4.4 The Countervailing Effects of Adversary Threat
Although alliances may serve a number of functions for their members, ranging from fostering gen-
eral transparency and conflict management among the allies themselves (Schroeder, 1976; Weits-
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man, 2004; Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros, 2006) to gaining influence and establishing control over
their partners (Morrow, 1991; Pressman, 2008; Cha, 2016), all alliance relationships will inevitably
be shaped by the threat environment, as states exist in anarchy and alliances are a key means of
cooperation in the face of threat (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987; Snyder, 1997).
The role of adversary threat in driving reassurance is well-discussed in the literature, as many
existing arguments treat allied reassurance as largely a second-order effect of adversary deterrence
(Schelling, 1966; Morgan, 1983; Fearon, 1997). Moreover, the act of reassurance to some extent
presumes the existence of a threat. This may not always necessarily be the case, as the patron may
seek to reassure allies not only of their safety against present threats, but also that its commitment
will endure in the case that threats emerge in the future. Nevertheless, one might reasonably expect
that the need for reassurance intensifies to the extent that an ally faces greater levels of threat to
its security. Additionally, the patron may use gestures of support to not only reassure its allies, but
also to deter adversaries, and this latter need is also likely to be more intense when the level of
perceived threat from those adversaries is elevated (McManus, 2014).
However, my theory suggests that there are countervailing mechanisms through which threat
might influence reassurance, such that the relationship may be indeterminate. Threat can shape
each side’s credibility of exit and the cost it can impose by exiting. The effect of threat is thus
partly a question of which partner perceives the threat more acutely – the ally or the patron. A
state’s bargaining power is reduced when it perceives a high level of threat, as that increases its
dependence on the alliance. When a state’s partner perceives a higher threat level, however, the
state’s bargaining power increases (Snyder, 1997). In the following two sections I discuss the
effects of threat on reassurance and burden-sharing, respectively.
Threat and Reassurance
Threat has an indeterminate effect on reassurance, as there are numerous offsetting mechanisms
through which threat shapes allies’ threats of exit. First, threat increases’ allies security needs.
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While this makes the alliance more valuable and the pursuit of outside options more risky, thus
decreasing the credibility of allies’ threat to leave the alliance, it also makes relying solely on the
alliance more risky, thus giving allies incentive to consider pursuing outside options. Indeed, it was
likely in no small part due to its margin of security that France was able to withdraw from NATO’s
unified military command and seek to maintain an option of “non-belligerence” in the event of a
NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Central Europe (Yost, 1985a: 1-13; Yost, 1985b: 2-5, 32-33).
Nevertheless, it is difficult to say a priori whether allies facing high threat or low threat will
be more likely to exit the alliance. Under conditions of high threat, allies may prefer to exercise
autonomy by seeking alternative means of meeting their security needs. Low-threat allies may
conclude that the alliance is of little utility, while high-threat allies may conclude that relying on
the alliance alone is too risky.
Second, as for the patron’s perception of threat, in a high-threat environment the patron does
not necessarily have to reassure its allies in order to discourage them from leaving the alliance.
The patron’s commitment is more automatic when it perceives a high level of threat because it has
more incentive to keep allies from being conquered by an adversary. By contrast, allies are more
likely to doubt the patron’s reliability – and thus to consider outside options – when it perceives a
low level of threat. In such circumstances the patron has less need to take an active role in checking
the expansion of an adversary and can more easily afford to shed its alliances (Walt, 2009).
At the same time, however, when the patron perceives a high level of threat, allies’ threats of
exit will also have more salience to it. This gives the patron incentive to reassure them in order to
keep them in its camp. In circumstances where the patron is seeking to isolate an adversary and
discourage its neighbors from aligning or cooperating with it, allies may be able to use this to their
advantage by extorting the patron into providing assurances of protection.
Hypothesis 5. Threat has an indeterminate effect on reassurance.
Thus, I do not lay out specific hypotheses on the relationship between threat and reassurance.
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Nonetheless, threat is an important omitted variable which it is important to control for when I
attempt to demonstrate the explanatory power of the factors I focus on here.
Threat and Burden-Sharing
The effect of threat on burden-sharing will depend on whether the threat is felt more acutely by
the patron or by the ally, as the effect of patrons’ and allies’ threat perceptions cut in different
directions. While threat raises the consequences of abandonment for allies, it may also undermine
the credibility of abandonment for the patron. When the patron perceives a high level of threat and
the ally a low level of threat, the patron’s leverage for extracting burden-sharing is minimal. In
such circumstances, the patron’s threat to abandon allies not only lacks credibility, but it also lacks
consequences for allies. The patron is by definition the most disproportionately powerful member
of the alliance, and as such its ability to pass the back to its allies is limited (Olson and Zeckhauser,
1966; Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). This is especially the case when an adversary poses a high
level of threat to its neighbors, as allies may lack the capability to manage the threat themselves.
Moreover, the patron has incentive to contain the expansion of hostile regional powers, lest they
become even more of a threat in the future (Walt, 1987; Montgomery, 2016).
By contrast, the patron’s threats of abandonment will be quite salient when the ally perceives
a high level of threat while the patron perceives a low level of threat. As described above, I expect
that a patron’s leverage for burden-sharing will be shaped by the level of damage it can impose
by abandoning an ally. This, in turn, is a function of how much worse-off an ally would be if it
were suddenly left without the patron’s protection. Allies will thus be more vulnerable to coercive
burden-sharing pressure to the extent that they have a high perception of external threat.
The challenge to making empirical predictions is that there is likely to be a strong correlation
between patrons’ and allies’ threat perceptions. Walt (1987) famously argued that threat is a func-
tion of capabilities, intentions, and geography. Capabilities are a constant between patrons and
allies, and it is difficult to say a priori the conditions under which patrons’ and allies’ perceptions
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of adversary intentions are likely to diverge. Thus, I argue that geography is the best-suited to
making empirical predictions for its effect on burden-sharing, as it is a constant for the patron but
varies significantly between allies.
I begin first with the effects of adversary intentions and capabilities. States infer information
about the desires and plans of other states largely from their behavior – in other words, how they
treat other states. Benign behaviors such as unilaterally giving up contested territory or engaging
in arms control suggest benign motives (Kydd, 1997, 2005; Glaser, 2010).17 By contrast, acts of
aggression such as seizing territory from other states suggest expansionist motives and a disregard
for international norms (Cohen, 1979; Walt, 1987; Ambrosio, 2017).
Importantly, hostile adversary intentions may be endogenous. Not only can states shape their
own environments – for example, by pursuing rapprochement with their rivals (Rasler, Thomp-
son, and Ganguly, 2013; Akcinaroglu, Radziszewski, and Diehl, 2014) – but adversaries may also
change their behavior in response to the level of reassurance and cohesion in the alliance (Morrow,
1994; Leeds, 2003b; Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014). As such, in order to assess the effects of inten-
tions, it is necessary to focus on events and factors that affect perceptions of adversary intentions
but which are outside of the control of the patron and its allies.
Instances of adversary aggression toward non-allied third parties are one such behavior. Non-
allies do not benefit from the patron’s extended deterrent commitment, and thus aggressive acts
toward them will be all but impossible to predict or deter. These events signal information about
the adversary’s willingness to use coercive force but are unrelated to the alliance. The Soviet
invasions of Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979), for example, all
generated increased American threat perception. Because these provocations were related to the
domestic affairs of each target and the countries involved did not enjoy U.S. security guarantees,
one can treat them as exogenous shocks to the intra-alliance dynamics of the U.S. alliances.
17Using military arming as an indicator of intentions, however, is problematic, as it risks conflating the intentions
inferred by the behavior with the capabilities generated by the arming.
67
In the case of the invasion of Afghanistan, for example, the importance the United States placed
on resisting the Soviets gave Pakistan an enormous bargaining chip that it was able to exchange
for American aid packages and even acquiescence to Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons
(Rabinowitz and Miller, 2015: 77). Similarly, in the wake of the invasion the United States was
unable to pressure its NATO allies into greater defense effort with much success. As Lundestad
(2003: 212) puts it, by strengthening the U.S. commitment to and presence in Europe, the Reagan
Administration “took away much of the incentive for the Europeans to increase their conventional
strength.”18 Similarly, as I show in the case studies, European allies responded to the Soviet inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 with only token measures toward burden-sharing. Instead, what
the invasion brought was a temporary silencing of voices within the United States pushing for
retrenchment from Europe, thus taking the pressure off the allies.
As for adversary capabilities, they have a similarly indeterminate effect on burden-sharing. On
the one hand, the more capabilities an adversary has, the greater the costs that the patron can im-
pose on its allies by exiting; the threat of being left to stand alone against a weak adversary will
have little potency. On the other hand, if an adversary is powerful enough to pose a serious threat
to the states around it, the patron’s threat of exit may lack credibility. The more powerful an ad-
versary, the greater the risk that it could dominate its region in the patron’s absence (Mearsheimer,
2001; Montgomery, 2016). The balance of power between the patron and adversaries is essentially
constant in multipolar and bipolar systems, where the patron’s adversaries are peer competitor
great powers. Thus, for my purposes studying the effects of adversary capabilities is more mean-
ingful in the context of unipolarity (i.e., the post-Cold War period), where the United States has
faced a diverse array of adversaries across regions that vary in terms of their capabilities.
Third and finally, with geography one can make clearer empirical predictions than with capa-
bilities and intentions. The patron’s proximity to the adversary is constant, and thus variation in its
18Stanley R. Sloan, “Defense Burden Sharing: U.S. Relations with NATO Allies and Japan,” CRS Report No. 85-101
F, July 8, 1983 (Revised and Updated, April 10, 1985). On NATO’s muted response, see pp. 10-15; on Japan’s, see
pp. 27-30.
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perception of threat at any given time can be explained little by geography. Allies, however, differ
in terms of how proximate they are to the adversary, as well as in whether they share a border with
it.
Geographic proximity directly exposes allies to the costs of abandonment. As a result, the
patron will be able to more effectively wield the threat of exit against geographically vulnerable
allies – and thus to more effectively demand burden-sharing. By contrast, allies which are far from
danger may be able to easily free-ride on the protection the patron provides to allies on the front-
lines. Moreover, vulnerable allies are more likely to see independent military strength both as a
necessary hedge in the case of patron abandonment and as a crucial component of the alliance’s
overall deterrent capacity vis-à-vis the adversary.
During the Cold War, vulnerable allies such as South Korea, Turkey, and West Germany tended
to be quite susceptible to U.S. burden-sharing pressure despite receiving more assurance measures.
Turkey, for example, hosted a substantial number of U.S. forces, but was among the largest contrib-
utors to NATO – including its “second largest land force” (Uslu, 2003: ch. 4; quote at p. 101).19
Indeed, it is telling that many smaller U.S. allies that have faced comparatively higher levels of
threat, including South Korea and the “new NATO allies” in Eastern Europe such as Poland and
the Baltic states, have often punched above their weight in assisting U.S. military interventions in,
for example, Vietnam and Iraq (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, 1994; Yong Lee, 2011).
By contrast, states that are not immediately proximate to a major source of threat are less
likely to accept burden-sharing costs. During the Cold War, distant U.S. allies often found it
easier to resist U.S. pressure. Portugal, for example, contributed little to NATO for much of the
1950s through the 1970s, as it was far more concerned with protecting its overseas empire – and
indeed even threatened to hold its bases in the Azores hostage from the United States as a means
19Iran and Pakistan, highly vulnerable owing to their position on the Soviet border, are somewhat special cases due to
their lack of clear formal security guarantees from the United States. However, the U.S. provided “reassurance” in
the form of military aid and arms sales, but did lean heavily on them to essentially take care of their regions on their
own, without direct U.S. involvement (Kux, 2001; Zanchetta, 2014).
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of gaining American acquiescence (Vasconcelos, 1988).20 Japan proved more resistant to U.S.
burden-sharing pressure during the Cold War than was South Korea or West Germany, in no small
part because Japan’s margin of security was much greater due to its being separated from the Asian
mainland by water, and because South Korea provided a buffer for it. As a result – and often to
the frustration of U.S. officials – the Japanese have spent relatively little of their GDP on their
self-defense (Swenson-Wright, 2005: ch. 6).
The same even goes for the United States’ Anglo-Saxon allies; despite their history of strong
support for it, the United States found it difficult to coerce them when their support was not vol-
untarily forthcoming (Handel, 1981: 139-141). During the 1970s, the United States realized it had
few levers with which it could coerce Australia into supporting its policies in the Asia-Pacific by
virtue of its margin of security, which afforded Australia the option of both ignoring U.S. prefer-
ences and of reaching out to China and the Soviet Union with little risk (Curran, 2014).21 New
Zealand’s expulsion from the ANZUS alliance in 1986, the result of its refusal to allow American
nuclear-armed submarines into its waters, also illustrates the comparative looseness that character-
izes ties between patrons and remote allies (Catalinac, 2010). Similarly, U.S. policymakers saw
few means of deterring Canadian troop withdrawals from West Germany during the Nixon Ad-
ministration.22 Finally, as I show in Chapter 6, the United States had limited capability to coerce
the United Kingdom; despite threats to cut off intelligence and nuclear cooperation, it was unable
to compel the British into forestalling defense cuts or delaying retrenchment from their imperial
holdings in Asia.
20Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, “Current Problems in NATO,” January 21,
1969, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 9.
21As British Prime Minister Edward Heath put it in 1973: “The Australians had gone back into Fortress Australia.”
Memorandum for the President’s File from Kissinger, “Meeting with British Prime Minister Heath and Sir Burke
Trend, Thursday, February 1, 1973, 10:43 a.m.-12:25 p.m., The Oval Office, The White House,” February 1, 1973,
FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, p. 708.
22Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, “Current Problems in NATO,” January 21,
1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 9; Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, “NATO Defense Planning Commit-
tee Meeting,” May 23, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 63.
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Hypothesis 6. Geographically vulnerable allies will contribute more for burden-sharing.
3.4.5 The Risk of Nuclear Retaliation
One factor I have not yet discussed is the existence of nuclear weapons. There is good reason to
expect that the risk of nuclear retaliation might have a different effect on reassurance and burden-
sharing than threat perception caused by other adversary capabilities, in ways consistent with my
theory’s focus on intra-alliance bargaining via threats of exit. When the patron faces the risk of be-
ing attacked with nuclear weapons as a result of honoring its foreign commitments, the preventive
logic of proactively deterring expansion by adversaries in order to prevent them from dominating
their regions is turned on its head. The patron’s promise to uphold its commitments becomes in-
herently less believable when it faces the risk of nuclear retaliation, as entering into conflict with
a nuclear-armed adversary carries the potential to bring the patron’s home territory under nuclear
attack.
Allies are likely to question whether the patron would put its own population at risk of nuclear
attack. A long line of scholarship holds that conflict between nuclear-armed powers has become
nearly unthinkable, as there is no conceivable benefit which could outweigh the costs of a nuclear
war (Waltz, 1981; Jervis, 1989). Indeed, doubts about the credibility of extended nuclear deter-
rence commitments have been endemic since the early years of the Cold War. Schelling (1966),
for one, took it as his starting point that the threat to accept nuclear annihilation as the price of
honoring one’s commitments and preventing adversary expansion was inherently difficult to be-
lieve. A common refrain throughout the Cold War was that the United States could not be trusted
to “sacrifice Washington, New York, and Chicago for Bonn, Paris, and London” (Fergusson, 2003:
156). During the 1960s and through the 1970s, for example, in response to the growth of the Soviet
nuclear arsenal U.S. policymakers began moving away from its doctrine of “Massive Retaliation,”
which called for responding to Soviet aggression with an overwhelming nuclear attack, and toward
a policy of “Flexible Response,” in which NATO would have a variety of options, including con-
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ventional defense and the use of tactical nuclear weapons (Freedman, 2003: chs. 6, 19). Many
allies were uneasy with this change, as it gave the United States options to keep the U.S. homeland
safe from nuclear retaliation, thus signaling that it did not place enough value on the security of
Europe to put its own cities at risk (Freedman, 2003: 221, 275-277, 279-281; Rapp-Hooper, 2015:
237-238). U.S. allies effectively feared that Flexible Response would decouple the defense of Eu-
rope and the defense of the United States, thus allowing the Americans to spare their cities if a
Soviet invasion was not repelled using conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons (Sandler
and Forbes, 1980; Howard, 1982).
On the one hand, this inherent unreliability gives allies less incentive to remain loyal to it rather
than to pursue outside options as means of bolstering their security. One might thus expect that
the greater the possibility the patron will face nuclear retaliation as a result of upholding its al-
liance commitments, the more reassurance it will provide to allies. On the other hand, because
allies will be more inclined to doubt the patron’s protection, they may be more susceptible to its
burden-sharing pressure. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for example, argued that the end of
U.S. nuclear dominance meant that Japan needed to increase its conventional forces, and implic-
itly referencing the threat of abandonment by stating that “A nuclear exchange is not a defense
operation we [the Americans] would want to undertake.”23
Testing the effects of the risk of nuclear retaliation, however, is difficult. This is in large part
because the United States has faced a nuclear-armed adversary for virtually the entire period under
study. Moreover, other potential ways of measuring the risk, such as the relative balance of nuclear
weapons, are not ideal because once an adversary has obtained a sufficient large and dispersed
arsenal that it can launch a nuclear strike even after absorbing a first strike from the patron it is
not clear how and to what extent the risk of nuclear retaliation would be shaped by changes in
the nuclear balance – nor is it clear what that second-strike threshold would necessarily be (Waltz,
23Memorandum of Conversation, “The Japanese Defense Effort and Military Offsets,” December 3, 1962, FRUS, Vol.
22, p. 753.
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Table 3.4: Mechanisms by which H1-H6 affect patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing.
Ally Patron
Hypothesis Credibility Salience Credibility Salience Net Effect Net Effect
(Reassurance) (Burden-Sharing)
Ally outside options (H1) ↑ N/A N/A N/A ↑ ?
Ally strategic value (H2-H3) ↓ ↑ ↓ N/A ? ↓
Patron resource constraints (H4) ↑ N/A ↑ N/A ↑ ↑
Ally vulnerability (H6) N/A N/A N/A ↑ ? ↑
1981; Jervis, 1989). Indeed, existing evidence on the benefits of nuclear superiority is mixed (Betts,
1987; Sechser and Fuhrmann, 2013, 2017; Kroenig, 2013). Thus, while I do not incorporate it into
the main portion of the analysis, I do control for the nuclear balance in the quantitative analysis,
while also looking for evidence in the case studies that U.S. policymakers sought to reassure allies
that were worried about the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance.
3.5 Alternative Explanations
Additionally, I pit my hypotheses against other potential explanations. One alternative explanation
is legitimacy. That is, U.S. reassurance could be driven by a “logic of appropriateness” rather than
a “logic of consequences” (Hurd, 1999). This could particularly be the case given the arguable
existence of a “Security Community” in the post-Cold War period (Wendt, 1999; Jervis, 2002b).
But, especially since it is the United States and its allies that make up the Security Community,
this factor will be largely constant across allies – except to the extent that allies are more or less
democratic (as discussed below) – and thus cannot explain variation in reassurance. Thus, I con-
sider three other possible explanations that could explain variation in the United States’ use of
reassuring measures toward allies: U.S. domestic politics; ally domestic politics; and the desire to
deter adversaries.
3.5.1 U.S. Domestic Politics
First, some authors have pointed to the ability of allies to influence U.S. policies from within by
engaging in lobbying efforts, both at the grassroots level via public relations campaigns and by
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directly attempting to promote their agendas through pressure groups (Keohane, 1971; Bar-Siman-
Tov, 1980; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007). That is, some allies may have a systematically greater
capacity for exerting “voice” over U.S. policy (Hirschman, 1970). These arguments suggest that
allies which are able to gain a major presence in U.S. domestic politics – whether in the form of
direct government-to-government lobbying, or in the form of emigrants that have taken residence
in the United States – are likely to receive reassurance measures due to their out-sized influence.
Alternative Hypothesis 1 (Lobbying). States with more clout in U.S. domestic politics (e.g., a
sizable diaspora or a significant lobbying presence) will receive more reassurance.
Second, reassurance may vary based on U.S. leaders’ electoral incentives. For one, sitting
presidents’ partisanship may influence their use of reassurance. In American politics, Democrats
are often seen as more in favor of dovish and multilateral foreign policies, while Republicans are
hawkish and favor unilateralism (Chanley, 1999; Narizny, 2003; Whitten and Williams, 2011).
Moreover, presidents may reassure allies more or less depending on their electoral cycles. Presi-
dents facing imminent re-election may be less likely to use reassurance because they are distracted
by their campaigns. Alternatively, however, presidents facing re-election may use reassurance in
an effort to project leadership and signal competence to the electorate. Finally, presidents may be
more or less likely to reassure allies during their second terms, when they do not have to worry
about re-election. Indeed, Lebovic and Saunders (2016) find that second-term presidents visit for-
eign countries more often, which they attribute to presidents’ seeking to cement their personal
legacies as statesmen.
Alternative Hypothesis 2 (Partisanship). The United States will use reassurance more (less) when
the president is a Democrat.
Alternative Hypothesis 3 (Re-election Years). The United States will use reassurance less during
presidents’ re-election years.
Alternative Hypothesis 4 (Lame-Duck Presidents). The United States will use reassurance more
during presidents’ second (lame-duck) terms.
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3.5.2 Ally Domestic Politics
As for allied domestic politics, the logic of the democratic peace suggests that, for normative
and ideological reasons, policymakers in democracies are more likely to trust each other, and to
value the survival of other democracies. Arguments vary somewhat, but this affinity has been
attributed to democracies’ predilection for peaceful resolution of disputes (Doyle, 1986; Russett,
1994; Dixon, 1994), and to feelings of ideological similarity among democratic publics (Haas,
2005, 2014; Gartzke and Weisiger, 2013).24 Even if policymakers themselves do not hold their
democratic allies in high regard, domestic audiences – and especially pro-democracy groups and
human rights advocates – are likely to favor democratic allies over more autocratic ones (Owen,
1997). For my purposes, the implication is that U.S. policymakers may be more likely to reassure
other democracies, whether due to domestic pressure or to their own ideological proclivities, in
order to show favoritism toward their democratic allies. Indeed, McManus and Yarhi-Milo (2017)
find that the United States is more likely to issue public signals of support such as visits to its demo-
cratic allies than its autocratic allies, as it faces domestic constraints against publicly supporting
autocracies.
Alternative Hypothesis 5 (Regime Type). Democracies will receive more reassurance.
Second, it is possible that allies which have governing ideologies compatible with those of
adversaries may be more likely to exit. For one, U.S. allies with left-wing governments may have
been regarded as more prone to seeking détente with the Soviet Union. Left-wing governments
could be expected to perceive a lower degree of threat from the Communist bloc, and thus to be
less dependent on the United States and less opposed to an understanding with the Soviet Union
(Liska, 1962: 90, 187, 191; Haas, 2005, 2014). More generally, a great deal of research suggests
that left-wing parties have more dovish foreign policy preferences than right-wing parties, and thus
24Others, however, have attributed the absence of war between democracies to the logic of political survival, wherein
democracies choose only to fight opponents against which they are likely to win – i.e., non-democracies (Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 1999; Reiter and Stam, 2002).
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will be less likely to take a hard line and more likely to make concessions to adversaries (Budge
and Hofferbert, 1990; Russett, 1990; Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, 1994; Eichenberg, 1996;
Schultz, 2001; Palmer, London, and Regan, 2004; Foster, 2008; Clark, Fordham, and Nordstrom,
2011).
Indeed, there are numerous examples where the United States saw the presence of a left-wing
government in foreign states as a potential precursor to their tilting closer to the Soviet Union.25
In Japan, for one, anti-American sentiment was generally associated with the Social Democratic
Party (JSP) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), which were skeptical of the alliance with
the United States (Greene, 1975: 23; Welfield, 1988: 283-284, 292). By contrast, the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) was much more staunchly anti-communist and in favor of maintaining the
alliance with the United States, and U.S. decision-makers doubted that the LDP could reconcile
with communism and the Soviet Union (Simon, 1974: 126; Welfield, 1988: 291, 295-296, 299,
306, 317, 335; Cha, 1999: 104; Zubok, 2013: 61). Similarly, left-wing governments in Greece
were seen as being at high risk of moving closer to the Soviet Union, thus diminishing American
leverage and increasing the United States’ need for continual effort to keep Greece tied to NATO
(Crawford, 2003; Pelt, 2006).
The potential problem with this explanation is that left-wing governments with a desire to
pursue rapprochement with the Communist bloc may come to power because of perceptions of U.S.
unreliability. Indeed, as I show in the case studies, the Social Democrats came to power in West
Germany in 1967-1969 in no small part because of dissatisfaction with the country’s dependence on
the United States. Similarly, Italian Communists invoked the possibility of American withdrawal
as reason to distance Italy from the United States (Fornasier, 2012: ch. 18). Thus, while it is an
entirely plausible explanation, left-wing influence may be in part endogenous to the patron’s use
of assurances and threats – as well as to more general perceptions of its credibility. Moreover,
it is possible that U.S. policymakers may prefer to punish left-wing governments by withholding
25On U.S. support for right-wing regimes more generally, see Schmitz (1999).
76
reassurance.
Alternative Hypothesis 6 (Political Ideology). Allies with left-wing governments will receive
more reassurance and contribute less for burden-sharing.
3.5.3 Pure Deterrence
Third, the logic of deterrence theory would expect that both reassurance and burden-sharing would
be positively related to the level of threat posed by adversaries. While H5 and H6 emphasize
the role of threat, their predictions stem from my expectations about how threat influences intra-
alliance bargaining. This alternative explanation, by contrast, essentially ignores alliance politics
and bases its predictions on extra-alliance dynamics with the adversary, with allied partners in-
creasing or decreasing their efforts based on how much the adversary needs to be deterred.
Alternative Hypothesis 7 (Pure Deterrence). Reassurance and burden-sharing will both be higher
when adversary threat is higher.
3.6 Methodology
This dissertation represents the first systematic attempt to study the determinants of reassurance
and coercive burden-sharing. I use both quantitative and qualitative methods in order to maximize
my leverage on the hypotheses. The quantitative tests allow me to show that my hypotheses have
their intended effects in the population of U.S. allies, while case studies allow me to investigate
their causal mechanisms in order to verify that reassurance and burden-sharing were indeed the
product of a bargaining process – tacit or explicit – and that policymakers modified their behavior
based on expectations about allied exit.
3.6.1 Quantitative Analysis
I test the theory first by quantitatively studying the relationship between U.S. resource constraints
and allied exit options, on the one hand, and U.S. reassurance, on the other. The unit of analysis
is the U.S. ally-year. My sample runs from 1950-2012 and includes all states that are defined
as having defense pacts or ententes with the United States in Version 4.1 of the Correlates of
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War’s Formal Alliances Dataset (Gibler, 2009). These alliances are all “written agreement[s] that
identif[y] at least the members and the obligations of each alliance member” (Gibler and Sarkees,
2004: 212). Specifically, “defense pacts commit states to intervene militarily on the side of any
treaty partner that is attacked,” while ententes “pledge consultation and/or cooperation in a crisis,
including armed attack” (p. 215). While imperfect – the list excludes some informal U.S. allies
such as Israel (except during 1981-1991), Saudi Arabia, and post-1979 Taiwan, as well as wartime
partners such as South Vietnam – this coding by-and-large captures the peacetime alliances that I
am interested in here.
However, I exclude U.S. allies in the Americas – both Canada, to which the United States is
allied through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Latin American countries,
many of which it is allied to through the Organization of American States (OAS). This is because
these countries were not subject to direct threat of attack from the Communist bloc – only to
internal subversion, which is not my focus. Moreover, they were within the U.S. Monroe Doctrine
sphere of influence, and did not share many adversaries with the United States – aside from (in
some cases) the Soviet Union, from which they were quite far.26
In the next chapter, I describe the dataset I created in order to test my theory, which includes
new data on U.S. presidential statements of reassurance, foreign visits, joint military exercises,
and foreign troop deployments. I also test the propositions on allied burden-sharing using data
on allies’ military spending, financial compensation for U.S. bases, and support for U.S. foreign
military interventions.
3.6.2 Qualitative Analysis
In addition to quantitative tests, I also marshal qualitative historical evidence to better uncover the
causal logic of the hypotheses. While the quantitative evidence allows me to uncover broad pat-
26One exception is Canada; but the results are robust to the inclusion of Canada – and to the exclusion of Liberia, the
United States’ only formal African ally.
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Table 3.5: U.S. allies included in the sample, Correlates of War list.
Country Years Country Years
Albania 2009- Latvia 2004-
Australia 1951- Liberia (entente) 1959-
Belgium 1949- Lithuania 2004-
Bulgaria 2004- Luxembourg 1949-
Croatia 2009- Netherlands 1949-
Czech Republic 1999- New Zealand 1951-1986
Denmark 1949- Norway 1949-
Estonia 2004- Pakistan (entente, 1954-1958; defense pact, 1959-)
France 1949- Philippines 1951-
Germany 1954- Poland 1999-
Greece 1951- Portugal 1949-
Hungary 1999- Romania 2004-
Iceland 1949- Slovakia 2004-
Iran (entente) 1958-1979 Slovenia 2004-
Iraq (entente) 1958-1959 Spain (entente, 1970-1980; defense pact 1981-)
Israel (entente) 1981-1991 Taiwan 1954-1979
Italy 1949- Thailand (entente) 1954-1977
Japan 1951- Turkey 1951-
Korea, Republic of 1953- United Kingdom 1949-
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terns, case studies allow me to use process-tracing in order to better assess why U.S. policymakers
used reassurance measures, as well as why allies shared in the defense burden. Moreover, since
burden-sharing pressure (rather than simply actual allied contributions) is difficult to capture in
a quantitative analysis, case studies are essential if I am to determine whether the United States
did in fact make threats (explicitly or implicitly) in order to induce its allies into sharing more of
the defense burden. I rely primarily upon declassified U.S. government documents, supplemented
with secondary historical and contemporary observer texts.
I examine U.S. reassurance and burden-sharing pressure toward the Federal Republic of Ger-
many (FRG), the United Kingdom, Japan, and South Korea from the mid-1960s through the mid-
1970s. The within- and between-case comparisons of these cases provide significant variation on
the key independent variables, and allow me to trace their effects on U.S. reassurance and burden-
sharing pressure. First, regarding H1, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom were three of the
United States’ most powerful allies, and each of them had at the very least a latent nuclear weapons
capability – and, in the case of the United Kingdom, an actual nuclear arsenal. These three allies
thus had comparatively more credible threats to exit the alliance, and can be expected to have been
prioritized for reassurance when compared to a weaker ally such as South Korea. Second, I ex-
pect that South Korea and West Germany will have been comparatively more vulnerable to U.S.
burden-sharing pressure than Japan and Britain because of their direct contiguity to communist
states (H6).
Additionally, these cases feature within-case variation on H5 and H4. NATO was subjected to
the shock of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (H5), which generated an increased
level of American reassurance, but also produced little movement toward burden-sharing among
the Europeans. As for H4, the costs of Vietnam led to increasing retrenchment pressure from
the U.S. Congress, exemplified in the amendments and resolutions sponsored by Senate Majority
Leader Mike Mansfield. The result was increased uncertainty about the credibility of the U.S.
commitment – and, in turn, increased willingness to consider outside options such as nuclearization
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or neutralism. As such, the United States went to great lengths to reassure its allies – even in Asia,
despite the “Guam Doctrine” – and was reluctant to threaten abandonment despite the retrenchment
pressure it faced. However, policymakers also sought to use Congressional pressure as a lever to
extract allied burden-sharing, often to considerable success.
Finally, these cases feature extreme values on many of my independent variables. Such cases
are useful for tracing the logic of hypotheses because they are the cases in which one would expect
the theory’s causal mechanisms to operate the most strongly (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994;
George and Bennett, 2005; Lieberman, 2005; Seawright, 2016). West Germany and Japan have
an extreme value on the independent variable for H1 (latent military power), as they had large
economies and populations, and thus greater capacity for exit and self-help. The United Kingdom,
for its part, started as a powerful ally, and one that was quite strategically valuable by virtue of
its network of overseas bases, but grew significantly weaker – and thus less valuable – over time.
West Germany and South Korea have an extreme value on H6 by virtue of their land border with
the Communist bloc, while the United Kingdom also has an extreme value on H6 in the opposite
direction by virtue of its considerable distance from the “front-line.” Finally, because the costs
of the Vietnam War generated such intense pressure on the United States’ ability to sustain its
commitments and deep domestic divisions over its role in the world, it is an ideal time period
for investigating the effects of resource constraints and domestic retrenchment pressure on U.S.
reassurance and allied burden-sharing.
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Chapter 4
Quantitative Analysis: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing
in U.S. Alliances
In this chapter, I perform statistical tests of the hypotheses derived in the previous chapter. The
first half evaluates the determinants of U.S. reassurance, while the second half focuses on the
hypotheses pertaining to burden-sharing. Overall, I find considerable support for the hypotheses.
4.1 Research Design: Reassurance
I test the hypotheses on reassurance using a cross-national dataset of U.S. reassurance between
1950 and 2010. The unit of analysis is the U.S. ally-year, and my sample includes all states defined
as having defense pacts or ententes with the United States in Version 4.1 of the Correlates of War’s
Formal Alliances Dataset (Gibler, 2009).
4.1.1 Threats to Inference
In studying the effects of the threat of exit on U.S. reassurance, there are three primary threats to
making inferences about the relationship. The first is endogeneity. It is possible, indeed likely,
that allies may make threats or attempts to exit the alliance in response to a lack of reassurance,
and thus the causality of the relationship could run in reverse. As a result, I do not use attempts
to pursue outside options as my independent variables. Instead I focus on factors that affect allies’
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ex ante ability to credibly exit. These factors are observable by both parties, thus allowing them to
tailor their behavior in anticipation of the other’s actions.1
The second is unobserved variation across countries and regions. The threat environment allies
face is likely to vary considerably across regions due to their differences in geography – such as
whether allies are separated from their neighbors by water, their proximity to the United States,
and their proximity to U.S. adversaries. In addition, the type of alliance and the number of U.S.
allies varies significantly across regions; whereas it had a tight multilateral alliance (NATO) with
numerous states in Europe, it had bilateral pacts (excluding SEATO) with a smaller number of allies
in Asia and the Middle East. Cha (2009, 2016) argues that multilateral allies can better threaten to
exit the alliance because they can rely on each other. Thus, alliance size and the number of regional
allies the United States has may be important omitted variables as well. As such, I always include
country or region fixed effects in my models.
Third is change over time. It may be the case that U.S. assurances universally increase or
decrease over time in ways not captured by the control variables, and thus the estimated effects for
the independent variables might be biased if they are correlated with these secular trends.2 In order
to account for temporal trends, I always include one of the following: linear, squared, and cubic
time trends; year fixed effects; or decade fixed effects.
4.1.2 Dependent Variable
For my dependent variable I use instances of public statements and diplomatic visits made by U.S.
officials to allied countries. I argue that statements and visits best capture the theoretical concept
of reassurance for a quantitative analysis. Even if allies are reasonably confident in their patron’s
commitment, continual rhetorical assurances are necessary if only because they are likely to be
1One may be concerned that the factors discussed in H1b and H1c – latent nuclear capacity and independent alliances –
may be partly endogenous to reassurance. Nevertheless, while these results should be interpreted with some caution,
the potential for endogeneity is reduced both because these factors do not directly capture allies’ efforts to pursue
outside options, and because they vary extremely little over time.
2The over-time trend in U.S. reassurance can be found in Figure A1.1, and shows that there has indeed been a gradual
uptick in reassurance over time, especially after the 1950s and early 1960s.
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expected, and thus their absence would be noticeable – and all the more so if they have reason to
doubt the patron’s reliability (Jervis, 1970: e.g., 81-82). In the case studies, I examine additional
means of reassurance that are harder to capture in a quantitative analysis, including nuclear and
conventional military doctrine, consultations, and private statements.
While not as costly a signal as more tangible measures such as foreign-deployed troops, state-
ments and visits are far from costless. The time leaders spend visiting other countries or making
public statements of support is time not spent on other priorities (Lebovic and Saunders, 2016).
Moreover such public signals are likely to generate some expectation of support on the part of
allies, domestic audiences, and other international audiences (Schelling, 1966; Fearon, 1994; Mc-
Manus, 2014). Signals of support, especially if done in public, can thus have the effect of tying the
patron’s hands by creating reputational costs if it does not follow through (Guisinger and Smith,
2002; Sartori, 2002, 2005). Indeed, McManus (2017) finds that visits and statements of support
from major powers decrease the likelihood of attack against their protégés.
The evidence suggests that both U.S. allies and U.S. policymakers take statements and vis-
its of support very seriously. For example, the South Koreans interpreted Vice President Walter
Mondale’s decision to visit Tokyo but not Seoul in early 1977 as a signal of U.S. disinterest in
their country (Lee and Sato, 1982: 107-108). Similarly, U.S. officials in the Nixon Administration
feared that Defense Secretary James Schlesinger’s statement that the United States would be “auto-
matically” involved in the event of a North Korean attack would be misread by the South Koreans
as a stronger statement of support than intended (Oberdorfer, 1997: 13-14).
Moreover, other measures of reassurance are even more imperfect, first of all because of data
availability. For one, troop deployments change very little over time, and are skewed by a number
of outlier countries that account for a large percentage of the total number of troops. Similarly,
data on military exercises are not widely available until the late 1970s (D’Orazio, 2013). Second,
statements and visits are the most direct form of reassurance. Troop deployments and military
exercises can be multi-purpose, and used not only for reassurance but also for power projection
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and building partner fighting capacity. Military aid may also in some cases represent a reassuring
signal, but is just as likely to be a way of helping allies do more for themselves rather than rely on
U.S. protection.
Using text from U.S. presidential statements, I hand-coded instances of public presidential
declarations of reassurance between 1950 and 2010. With the paragraph as the unit of analysis,
I summed the number of statements a president made toward each ally in a given year that ex-
pressed a reaffirmation of the United States’ commitment to protect it. My data on U.S. presiden-
tial statements come from the American Presidency Project (Peters and Woolley, 2016).3 Second,
I collected data on U.S. President and Secretary of State visits to foreign countries from the U.S.
Department of State (2017). I then sum statements and visits together to create my measure of
reassurance. As a check on the validity of my measure, I compare it to codings of promises,
assurances, and visits from two existing datasets. The first is the World Event/Interaction Survey
(WEIS) dataset, available for 1965-1990, which codes New York Times articles (McClelland, 1999;
Tomlinson, 2001). The second is an extension of the WEIS dataset for 1990-2004 coded by King
and Lowe (2003a,b), who machine-code Reuters articles. The correlation between my coding of
reassurance and these measures are quite high – 0.421 for the 1965-1989 period using the WEIS
coding, and 0.662 for the 1990-2004 period using the King and Lowe coding.4
4.1.3 Independent Variables
Allies’ Outside Options
Allies’ latent conventional military power is captured using their logarithmized gross domestic
product (GDP). This captures the total resources available to allies for their own self-defense. Data
3Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ (accessed March
8, 2017). I thank Roseanne McManus for generously sharing some of the raw speeches data she collected. My coding
rules can be found in the appendix.
4Statements and visits are also correlated with U.S. troop deployments and military exercises, even though the latter
two are slow-moving over time. Correlation matrices for the Cold War and post-Cold War periods can be found in
Tables A1.2 and A1.3 in the appendix, respectively.
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come from version 8.0 of the Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer, 2015), extended
by Gleditsch (2002). As robustness checks I use alternative proxies – namely allies’ population
and their Correlates of War Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) scores.
Second, following the convention in the literature (Fuhrmann and Tkach, 2015; Mehta and
Whitlark, 2017), I measure whether allies have a latent nuclear weapons capability using a dummy
variable, which takes a value of 1 if the ally has an operational nuclear reactor (pilot- or lab-scale),
and 0 otherwise.5 Nuclear latency data are from Fuhrmann and Tkach (2015).
Third, following Lake’s (2009) measure of alternative alliances, I use the number of indepen-
dent alliances an ally has – i.e., those not shared with the United States. The distribution of this
variable is skewed by a number of outliers with many independent alliances, so I take the natural
logarithm. Importantly, however, the commonality or divergence of an ally’s alliance portfolio
with that of the United States may influence reassurance not because it shapes the credibility of
their outside options, but because it reflects the underlying degree to which the ally and the United
States have common interests (Signorino and Ritter, 1999). Thus, I also control for the percentage
of alliances that the ally shares with the United States.
U.S. Resource Constraints
My first proxy for resource constraints captures the aftermath of protracted, costly foreign wars.
I use a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 during the tenures of presidents who oversaw
the end of the wars in Korea (Eisenhower, 1953-1960), Vietnam (Nixon/Ford, 1969-1976), and
Iraq and Afghanistan (Obama, 2009-2016) – and 0 otherwise. This is an attractive proxy because
I expect resource constraints and concerns about U.S. reliability to be high both during the later
stages of a costly foreign war, after years of fighting have inflicted losses in blood and treasure, and
for a time thereafter, while policymakers and the public recover from the war and the armed forces
rebuild their strength. Second, I measure economic hardship using U.S. GDP growth. Economic
5This measure includes allies that obtained nuclear weapons (United Kingdom, France, Israel, Pakistan), but the results
hold when separating these states out.
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contractions constrain government revenues, while war can similarly divert resources from the
economy, increase the deficit and debt, contribute to inflation, and lead to shortages in military
manpower (Rockoff, 2012: esp. 27-42).
Ally Strategic Value
In order to measure allies’ strategic value, I create a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if an
ally is positioned near a key maritime chokepoint. In particular, I include the following countries:
Japan; Turkey; United Kingdom; Spain; South Korea; Denmark; Norway.6 In the post-Cold War
I also include Estonia due to its position between St. Petersburg and the Baltic Sea. Access to
these countries facilitated U.S. efforts to project power near adversary (Soviet/Russian, Chinese,
and North Korean) shores, while simultaneously allowing it to create a bottleneck through which
adversary ships traveling from its territory to the open seas would need to pass. Thus, having access
to countries at key maritime chokepoints allowed the United States to both project power itself and
secure its own maritime trade while simultaneously hindering adversaries’ ability to project power
and exposing adversaries’ maritime trade to interdiction.7
4.1.4 Control Variables
Additionally, I include a number of controls, all of which (except those which are time-invariant
or are dummy variables for specific years) are lagged by one year to ameliorate concerns about
simultaneity bias.
External Threat
First, I control for the level of threat posed by shared adversaries, which one might expect to drive
allies’ need for reassurance – and the patron’s desire to supply it – in the first place. From a purely
6On Japan and South Korea’s role in access through the Sea of Okhostsk and the Sea of Japan, see Ranft and Till
(1989: 117). On Denmark and Norway’s role in access through the Baltic and North Sea, see Ranft and Till (1989:
117, 216-217, 234). On the UK and Spain’s role in access between the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea, see
Ranft and Till (1989: 206-209, 218, 222-224). On Turkey’s role in access from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean
Sea, see Ranft and Till (1989: 206-209, 224) and Chamberlain (2014).
7The results are also robust to the inclusion of the Philippines and Australia.
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deterrence perspective, the patron should be more likely to send signals of support to its allies in
the context of high threat environments in order to send a strong deterrent signal to the alliance’s
shared adversaries. I use five variables to account for the level of threat from shared adversaries
– which I define as the Soviet Union during the bipolar Cold War period (1950-1989), and then
China (for U.S. allies in East Asia and the Western Pacific) and Russia (for allies elsewhere) during
the post-Cold War period.
The first is adversary conflict involvement with U.S. allies. This is coded as the number of
MIDs in a given year between the adversary and each ally, with each MID weighted by its max-
imum level of hostility. MID data come from version 4.1 of the Correlates of War’s Militarized
Interstate Dispute dataset (Palmer et al., 2015). Second, I control for the level of adversary hostility
with the United States. This is coded in the same way as ally-adversary conflict involvement. Both
of these variables are likely to be somewhat endogenous to reassurance but they may nevertheless
be important omitted variables.
Next, I include a dummy indicator for instances in which an adversary – or one of its proxies at
its behest – invaded and occupied the territory of a country not allied with the United States. ally.
During the Cold War, there were four such instances: Korea (1950), Hungary (1956), Czechoslo-
vakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979). Additionally, after the Cold War I also include the Russo-
Georgian War in 2008. These events are likely to have influenced U.S. and allied threat perception
because they represented instances of clear aggression, and because these states did not benefit
from U.S. protection, adversary behavior in these cases can be considered more plausibly exoge-
nous to U.S. reassurance. I code the first year of each of these instances as 1, as well as the
following two years, as I would expect U.S. reassurance to have increased in response to the initial
shock of the attacks.8
Finally, I include two measures of allies’ geographic proximity to adversaries. The first is a
8The one exception is Afghanistan, which began in December 1979, and thus I also code the year 1982 as 1. See
appendix for more details.
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dummy variable indicating whether the ally shares a land border with a member of the Soviet
bloc (during the Cold War), or with Russia or China (during the post-Cold War).9 Data come from
version 3.1 of the Correlates of War’s Direct Contiguity dataset (Stinnett et al., 2002).10 The second
is the ally’s proximity to the centers of adversary military power, which for allies in East Asia I
treat as Beijing, both because of its location in China and because of its proximity to the center
of Soviet military power in the Far East, and for allies everywhere else I treat as Warsaw, owing
to its proximity to the center of Soviet military power in Europe. During the post-Cold War I use
distance to Moscow instead of Warsaw, as the Russian western frontier was pushed to the east. This
is measured as the distance between the ally’s capital city to either Beijing or Warsaw/Moscow (in
kilometers). Capital city distance data come from Gleditsch and Ward (2001).
Economic Development
Second, I control for allies’ level of economic development using their logarithmized GDP per
capita. Wealthier, more developed allies may receive more attention from the United States, both
in terms of visits and statements, because they are more economically important to U.S. interests
(Lebovic and Saunders, 2016). Data are from Gleditsch (2002).
Alliance Type
Finally, I also control for alliance type by including a dummy variable for whether the country is
allied to the United States via a defense pact, which carries an explicit guarantee of assistance, or
via an entente, which does not. These differences in terms may produce different expectations of
reassurance.
9The Soviet bloc includes all members of the Warsaw Pact, as well as China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and (starting
in 1976) Laos and Cambodia.
10Correlates of War Project. Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2006. Version 3.1.
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4.1.5 Model Specification
Because my dependent variable is a count of the number of U.S. reassurance statements and visits,
I employ count regression models. The distribution of the dependent variable is somewhat over-
dispersed, however, which suggests that a negative binomial model is more appropriate than the
basic Poisson model (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984; Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). The three
negative binomial regression equations I use are specified as follows:
Assurancesi,t = exp(β1GDPi,t−1 + β2NuclearLatencyi,t−1 + β3AlternativeAlliesi,t−1
+β4GeostrategicLocationi,t + γXi,t−1 + µi + ζt + i,t)
(4.1)
Assurancesi,t = exp(β1Postwari,t + β2USGrowthi,t + γXi,t−1 + µi
+Timet + Time2t + Time3t + i,t)
(4.2)
where i indexes countries, t indexes years, Postwar is a dummy variable indicating the after-
math of a protracted U.S. foreign war, USGrowth indicates U.S. GDP growth, GDP represents
the logarithmized value of the ally’s gross domestic product, NuclearLatency represents whether
an ally has an operational pilot- or lab-scale nuclear reactor, AlternativeAllies represents the log-
arithmized number of the ally’s independent alliances, GeostrategicLocation is a dummy variable
indicating allies in geostrategically valuable locations, Xi,t−1 is a vector of control variables, µi is
a vector of country or region fixed effects, ζt is a vector of year fixed effects, Time is the number
of years that have elapsed since the beginning of the sample, and i,t is a stochastic error term. I
employ standard errors clustered by country throughout.11
4.2 Results: Reassurance
The econometric results provide support for my propositions. U.S. allies with stronger outside
options, measured using latent military and nuclear potential as well as alternative alliance partners,
11Summary statistics can be found in Table A1.1 in the appendix. As a robustness check, I also cluster standard errors
by year, since some of the independent variables vary at the year level.
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receive significantly more reassurance. Additionally, the United States goes to greater lengths
to reassure its allies when it faces resource and political constraints that bring its reliability into
question. Finally, I find that these factors provide a stronger explanation for U.S. reassurance than
adversary threat, U.S. domestic politics, or the domestic politics of the ally.
Table 4.1 focuses on explaining variation in reassurance across allies and tests Hypotheses
1-3a. Model 1 contains only the primary independent variables, while Model 2 adds additional
controls which vary at the country-level. Both models include year and region fixed effects in
order to account for temporal and spatial heterogeneity. The results support the expectations of H1
and H2; the United States reassures larger allies and those with latent nuclear capacity more. The
results for independent alliances (H1c) are similarly positive but weaker, only reaching statistical
significance at the 0.1 level.
However, the United States does not appear to reassure allies in geostrategically valuable loca-
tions more. One potential explanation is that the patron simply does not need to reassure strategi-
cally valuable allies as much, as these allies are likely to know that the United States is unlikely
to abandon them owing to its intrinsic interest in their security and in keeping them aligned with
itself. This would be consistent with the general thrust of the theory; in the formal model I pre-
sented, allies’ perceptions of the patron’s reliability (α and γ) determined whether they would be
likely to exit the alliance. Indeed, H2a and H3a predicted a largely null effect of strategic value on
reassurance.
Next, Table 4.2 focuses on variation over time to test H4. Both models include country fixed
effects and linear, squared, and cubic time trends, while Model 2 also includes the year-level
control variables.12 These results provide support for both Hypotheses 2 and 3. The aftermath of
costly foreign wars and periods of economic hardship both feature more reassurance. Specifically,
the United States uses about 25% more reassurance during postwar years, while each one percent
12Due to collinearity, time-invariant variables (such as U.S. GDP growth) cannot be included alongside country fixed




GDP (log) 0.337∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.056)
Nuclear latency 0.442∗ 0.449∗
(0.204) (0.208)
Independent alliances (log) 0.262 0.270+
(0.170) (0.153)
Geostrategic location -0.154 -0.173
(0.223) (0.230)




Distance to adversary -0.000
(0.000)






Country FE No No
T,T2,T3 No No
Region FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 1357 1345
Log-likelihood -1827.191 -1790.651
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001














Country FE Yes Yes
T,T2,T3 Yes Yes
Region FE No No
Year FE No No
N 1373 1373
Log-likelihood -1764.394 -1760.681
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.2: Main results for variation in reassurance over time.
reduction in U.S. GDP is associated with about 3% more reassurance.
As for the controls, wealth and alliance type do not have a statistically significant effect on U.S.
reassurance. Notably, the coefficients on the threat variables other than ally-adversary hostility
are negative or statistically insignificant, suggesting that aggressive adversary behavior is not the
sole or even the most important driver of reassurance. This is consistent with H5 but is in direct
contradiction to “pure deterrence” explanations for reassurance, which focus on signaling vis-à-vis
adversaries rather than allies. This increases my confidence that the results are driven by a logic of
reassurance.
4.2.1 Causal Mechanisms
Next, I provide evidence to support the causal mechanisms behind H4. In particular, I would expect
resource constraints to be associated with political constraints, declines in U.S. military spending,
and the U.S. pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union. First, in order to capture domestic pressure,
I coded Congressional bills. Using a dataset of bills from the Policy Agendas Project13, I took a
13http://www.comparativeagendas.net/ (accessed August 15, 2016). The data used here were originally collected by
Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR
9320922 and 0111611, and are distributed through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at
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subset of bills pertaining to U.S. alliances and then hand-coded them, creating a count variable for
“retrenchment bills.” These are bills that either call for troop reductions from allied territory, assert
congressional authority over the executive’s ability to use force on allied territory, or which put
pressure on allies to contribute more for burden-sharing. This is an attractive measure first of all
because Congress has a more direct role in foreign policy than does the public. While the electorate
can in theory punish or reward policymakers based on whether they act in ways consistent with
public opinion, Congress can directly shape policy by passing laws and by appropriating (or not
appropriating) funds (Milner and Tingley, 2015). Second, research suggests that public opinion on
foreign affairs responds to elite cues (Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2007). Finally, annual public opinion
data on foreign policy are difficult to come by, particularly during the early years of the Cold War
(Chanley, 1999).
Second, I create a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the United States reduced its
military spending in a given year.14 Third, in order to capture US-Soviet relations, I use event data
from the WEIS dataset between 1965 and 1989, employing the commonly-used weighting scheme
proposed by Goldstein (1992) to assign values to U.S.-Soviet interactions based on how conflictual
or cooperative they are. Higher scores indicate more cooperative relations.
Table 4.3 shows that domestic retrenchment pressure occurs most often during periods of re-
source constraints – and, in particular, during the aftermath of foreign wars. The results for U.S.
military spending and détente can be found in Table 4.4. Models 1 and 2 use logistic regression to
show that postwar periods and economic hardship are associated with declines in military spend-
ing. Models 3 and 4, in turn, show that in the wake of costly foreign wars and domestic pressure,
the United States pursued détente with the Soviet Union. These findings support the expectations
of Hypothesis 4, as they suggest that resource and political constraints put pressure on the United
Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here.
14Data on U.S. military spending (in constant 2005 dollars) come from SIPRI. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
2016, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex (accessed March 25, 2017).
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(1) (2)
Congressional retrenchment bills Congressional retrenchment bills
Postwar 4.499∗∗ 6.971∗
(1.541) (2.708)











Robust standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.3: Results for the relationship between material and political constraints.
States to retrench and seek rapprochement with its adversaries.
4.2.2 Robustness Checks
Next, I subject the results to a variety of robustness tests. I do so first of all by adding more control
variables to account for the threat environment. First, I control for adversary capabilities, using
the Soviet Union’s CINC score between 1950 and 1989, as well as Russia’s and China’s since
1990. Second, I control for the U.S.-adversary nuclear balance, measured as the ratio of adversary
nuclear weapons to U.S. nuclear weapons.15 Third, I control for the number of MIDs an ally was
involved in during a given year with all states (rather than solely shared adversaries), weighted by
the hostility level of each MID. The results in Tables A1.4 and A1.5 show that the findings are
robust to controlling for these variables.16
15Data on nuclear arsenals run from 1945-2014, and come from the Federation of American Scientists, Nuclear
Notebook: Nuclear Arsenals of the World, http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook-multimedia (accessed March 16,
2017).
16The results are also robust to the inclusion of decade fixed effects, as well as to the use of a lagged dependent
variable. See Tables A1.6-A1.8 in the appendix.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Milex decline Milex decline US-Soviet relations US-Soviet relations
Postwar 2.331∗ 3.673∗ 401.445∗∗ 332.780∗
(0.999) (1.642) (125.623) (157.718)
US GDP growth -0.037 -0.278+ 7.536 -2.074
(0.127) (0.148) (18.829) (23.536)
Adversary aggression -2.203∗ -119.993
(0.888) (137.996)
US-Adversary hostility 0.142 -7.953
(0.153) (11.189)
Ally-Adversary hostility (year-mean) -1.460+ 98.649
(0.815) (128.920)
Congressional retrenchment bills
T,T2,T3 Yes Yes No No
N 61 61 25 25
Log-likelihood -33.543 -28.613
R2 0.326 0.350
Robust standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.4: Results for the causal mechanisms.
Second, I use alternative proxies to capture my independent variables. For allies’ latent con-
ventional military power (H1a), I replace allies’ log GDP with both their log population and CINC
scores. Table A1.9 replicates the main results from Model 2 of Table 4.1 using these measures,
and the original findings remain intact. As for the aftermath of costly foreign wars (H4), instead of
postwar presidencies I include a dummy variable indicating years in which the United States with-
drew troops from a protracted foreign war.17 Table A1.10 replicates Models 1-2 of Table 4.2 after
replacing the postwar dummy variable with the war withdrawal dummy variable. The coefficients
on war withdrawals remain positive, similar in magnitude, and at or near statistical significance.
Finally, I also use different measures for my dependent variable. First, I operationalize reas-
surance using the number of U.S. troops deployed on an ally’s territory, with data on U.S. forces
obtained from Kane (2006). Table A1.11 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results
using logarithmized troop numbers as the dependent variable. The level of U.S. troops does not
vary much over time, however, and so I focus largely on explaining cross-national variation. These
17Troop level data are from Kane (2006).
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results show that more powerful allies and allies with a latent nuclear capability hosted significantly
more U.S. troops. Second, I use allies’ military exercises with the United States as the dependent
variable, employing exercise data for 1977-2004 from D’Orazio (2013). Tables A1.12 and A1.13
show the results, which are largely consistent with those from using statements and visits as the
dependent variable.
4.2.3 Alternative Explanation: Domestic Politics
My theory treats reassurance as the result of bargaining, whether tacit or explicit, wherein a pa-
tron reassures its allies to the extent that they can credibly threaten to pursue outside options.
Alternatively, however, as discussed in the previous chapter, reassurance could be the product of
non-strategic factors such as the domestic politics of the ally or of the United States. Thus, in
Tables A1.14 and A1.15 I control for factors capturing features of both ally and U.S. domestic
politics. First, to measure allies’ regime type I include their composite Polity score, which ranges
from -10 (fully autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic).18 Additionally, I measure allies’ political
ideology using the percentage of seats in their legislature that are controlled by left-wing parties.19
For U.S. domestic politics, I include three dummy variables – one for whether a given year was
one in which a sitting president sought re-election, another for whether a year took place during a
president’s second term, and a third for whether the president was a Democrat. The results show
that, even after controlling for these variables, H1-H4 receive considerable support. As for the
alternative explanations, U.S. presidents use less reassurance during their re-election years, while
presidential partisanship and second-term status, as well as ally regime type, have no effect.
18Data are from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2011; Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, 2014).
19To measure left-wing influence in government, I use the percentage of parliamentary seats controlled by left-wing
parties. Data come from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Lehmann et al., 2015). For non-democratic allies, this
variable takes the value of 0.
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4.3 Research Design: Burden-Sharing
Next, I conduct a similar analysis using many of the same independent variables but focusing on
explaining allied burden-sharing instead of U.S. reassurance. The unit of analysis is again the ally-
year, and the sample runs from 1960-2012 and includes all states that are defined as having defense
pacts or ententes with the United States by the Correlates of War (Gibler, 2009).20
4.3.1 Dependent Variable
My primary dependent variable is allies’ level of burden-sharing effort, measured using their mil-
itary expenditures in constant 2005 dollars. Data on expenditures come from version 5.0 of the
Correlates of War’s National Material Capabilities (NMC) dataset and are used from 1960-2012
(Singer, 1987). In order to assess variation in military spending over time for H4, I use annual
variation in allies’ expenditures, measured as a percentage of the previous year’s spending. For
cross-national variation, I instead use allies’ absolute amount of spending. I then take the natural
logarithm, as the distribution of military spending is somewhat skewed. In alternative models I also
use allies’ military spending as a percentage of GDP as a measure of the defense burden. This is
particularly important for testing the effects of allies’ GDP, which I would expect to be associated
with higher defense spending overall, but not with a disproportionately larger share of the overall
defense burden, as per H2b.
While military spending is a somewhat coarse measure of allied burden-sharing, given that it
does not separate independent allied arming from efforts which are explicit alliance contributions,
it is the most widely available measures for cross-national analysis. Moreover, while some military
spending may be purely internal balancing for allies’ own purposes rather than direct alliance
contributions, this may in some cases be exactly what the United States seeks: for allies to do more
20My sample only begins in 1960 because the 1950s were largely a rebuilding decade for U.S. allies, during which
burden-sharing was not a realistic possibility. Moreover, as shown in Figure A1.2, allied military spending barely
changed at all during the 1950s. Again, I exclude U.S. allies in the Americas – both Canada, to which the United
States is allied through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Latin American countries, many of




Two of my sets of independent variables – namely, U.S. resource constraints and allied strategic
value – are the same as the previous analysis on reassurance: postwar presidencies; U.S. GDP
growth; allies’ economic resources; and allies’ geostrategic locations. However, for burden-sharing
I also add an additional covariate: allies’ geographic vulnerability to adversaries.
Ally Vulnerability
I measure geographic vulnerability to threat by using a composite measure that captures both
whether the ally shares a land border with an adversary country and its distance from the adver-
sary’s capital. The first component is a dummy variable indicating whether the ally shares a land
border with a member of the Communist bloc (during the Cold War) or Russia, China, or North
Korea (during the post-Cold War period).21 Data come from version 3.1 of the Correlates of War’s
Direct Contiguity dataset (Stinnett et al., 2002).22 The second component is the ally’s proximity to
adversaries. In particular, I measure allies’ proximity to Beijing for those in East Asia because of
its proximity to the center of Soviet military power in the Far East, and for allies everywhere else
I treat as Warsaw, owing to its proximity to the center of Soviet military power in the European
theater. In 1990 I use Moscow instead of Warsaw, as the Russian frontier moved eastward fol-
lowing the collapse of the Communist bloc. This second component is measured as the inverse of
the distance between the ally’s capital city to either Beijing or Warsaw (in kilometers), normalized
to be between 0 and 1. Capital city data come from Gleditsch and Ward (2001). The composite
measure thus varies between 0 (New Zealand; Liberia) and 2 (South Korea; West Germany).
21The Soviet bloc includes all members of the Warsaw Pact, as well as China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and
(starting in 1976) Laos and Cambodia.
22Correlates of War Project. Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2006. Version 3.1.
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4.3.3 Control Variables
Economic and Political Characteristics
In addition to allies’ overall economic size, I account for allies’ annual GDP growth – measured as
a percentage of the previous year’s GDP – as economies not strained by recession may be able to
spend more. Data come from version 8.0 of the Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer,
2015), with data extended to include more countries and years by Gleditsch (2002).
Second, I control for allies’ economic development, using GDP per capita. Allies which have
greater resources at their disposal might be expected to spend more on defense (Goldsmith, 2003).
Alternatively, economically developed countries may instead prefer to focus their spending on do-
mestic welfare. Data are logarithmized and in constant 2005 U.S. dollars, and come from Gleditsch
(2002).
Next, I control for allies’ regime type. Democratic states are more accountable to their popu-
lations than are autocratic states, and a large body of literature finds that democracies on average
spend less on their militaries than non-democracies (Garfinkel, 1994; Goldsmith, 2003; Fordham
and Walker, 2005; Carter and Palmer, 2015). To measure regime type I use the Polity score, with
data from the Polity IV version (Marshall and Jaggers, 2011; Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, 2014).
Security Environment
Additionally, because allies may tailor their defense efforts based on their perceptions of threat, I
also control for numerous factors that shape allies’ security environments. The first of these are the
adversary’s capabilities, which I measure using its Composite Indicator of National Capabilities
(CINC) score. Here, I define the primary adversary of the alliance as the Soviet Union during the
bipolar Cold War period (1950-1989), and then China (for U.S. allies in East Asia) and Russia
(for allies elsewhere) during the post-Cold War period. Because the Soviet Union’s CINC score
exhibits barely any variation between 1960 and 1989, however, I only include this variable during
the post-Cold War period. Data come from version 5.0 of the Correlates of War’s National Material
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Capabilities (NMC) dataset (Singer, 1987)
Second, I control for factors which capture the degree to which the adversary is likely to be
seen as hostile by the United States and its allies. The first of these is a dummy indicator for
instances in which the adversary invaded and occupied a non-U.S. ally. During the Cold War
portion of the sample, there were two such instances: Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan
(1979). Additionally, during the post-Cold War I also include the Russian invasion of Georgia in
2008. These events are likely to have influenced U.S. and allied threat perception because they
represented instances of clear aggression. Moreover, focusing on non-U.S. allies gets around the
issue of endogeneity, as an adversary’s willingness to behave aggressively toward U.S. allies is
likely to be affected by perceptions of U.S. credibility. I create a dummy variable in which I code
the first year of each of these instances as 1, as well as the following two years, as I would expect
allied burden-sharing to have decreased in response to the initial shock of the attacks.23
Additionally, I control for both the level of hostility between the adversary and the United
States, and the level of hostility between the adversary and each ally. This is coded as the number
of MIDs in a given year between the adversary and the United States or the ally, with each MID
weighted by its maximum level of hostility. MID data come from version 4.1 of the Correlates of
War’s Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (Palmer et al., 2015).
Third, I control for the level of threat that allies face from states other than U.S. adversaries
using several measures. The first of these is each ally’s conflict environment, which I account for by
controlling for either its number of foreign policy rivals and/or the number of MIDs it was involved
in with non-adversary countries, weighted by the MIDs’ hostility level. Rivalry data are from
Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006). Finally, I control for whether an ally had colonial possessions
in a given year. The literature on burden-sharing notes that states which pursue “private goods” –
23The one exception is Afghanistan, which began in December 1979, and thus I also include the year 1982. See ap-
pendix for more details. Note that I exclude North Vietnam’s conquest of South Vietnam in 1975, as that represented
the culmination of a longstanding civil war – and one in which the United States had been involved. However, the
results are robust to its inclusion.
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those unrelated to the purpose of the alliance – are likely to spend more on defense. Allies’ efforts
to exert control over their colonial possessions were one such good, as doing so was extraneous
to defending against the threats allies shared in common with the United States (Oneal and Elrod,
1989; Oneal, 1990). I code this variable as a dummy which takes the value of 1 for the following
country-years: Belgium (through 1962); France (through 1977); Portugal (through 1975); Spain
(through 1968); and United Kingdom (through 1984). Data on colonial possessions come from
version 1.0 of the Issue Correlates of War’s Colonial History Data Set (Hensel, 2014).
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Finally, consistent with existing literature (e.g., Carter and Palmer (2015) and Plümper and Neu-
mayer (2015)), in some models I include a lagged dependent variable in order to account for the
slow-moving, dynamic nature of military spending and to correct for serial correlation. However,
because including a lagged dependent variable turns the models into dynamic models, it makes
estimating the effects of time-invariant variables (e.g., geography) difficult. Thus, to estimate the
effects of such variables I also include models that remove the lagged DV and instead include
region fixed effects as well as year fixed effects in order to account for unobserved temporal and
spatial heterogeneity.
4.3.4 Model Specification
Because I use two variations of the dependent variable – one capturing change in military spending
over time, the other capturing variation across countries – I include different control variables
depending on the dependent variable. In the models which analyze change in military spending
over time and include a lagged dependent variable, I exclude those controls which are slow-moving
or time-invariant, such as geography, regime type, and colonial holdings. Similarly, in the models
which assess cross-national variation in military spending and include region and year fixed effects
exclude those controls which are country-invariant. Nevertheless, the results are robust to including
these additional controls.
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The regression equation I use to test change over time is as follows:
∆Milexi,t = β1Postwari,t + β2USGDPGrowthi,t
+β3∆Milexi,t−1 + γXi,t−1 + i,t
where i indexes countries, t indexes years, Postwar is a dummy variable indicating the after-
math of a protracted U.S. foreign war, USGrowth indicates U.S. GDP growth, ∆ Milex represents
the change in allies’ military expenditures, Xi,t−1 is a vector of control variables, and i,t is a
stochastic error term. In some models I include country fixed effects in place of the lagged depen-
dent variable. I employ standard errors clustered by country throughout. Additionally, the model
specification I use to test H3a/H3b and H6 is the following:
Milexi,t = β1Vulnerabilityi,t + β2GDPi,t−1 + β3GeostrategicLocationi,t + γXi,t−1 + ζt + µi + i,t
where i indexes countries, t indexes years, Vulnerability is a composite variable of allies’ prox-
imity to the adversary, GDP represents the logarithmized value of the ally’s gross domestic product,
GeostrategicLocation is a dummy variable indicating allies in geostrategically valuable locations,
Milex represents allies’ logarithmized military expenditures Xi,t−1 is a vector of control variables,
ζt is a vector of year fixed effects, µi is a vector of region fixed effects, and i,t is a stochastic error
term. I employ standard errors clustered by country throughout.24
4.4 Results: Burden-Sharing
The results provide strong support for Hypotheses 2b-4 and 6. The results suggest that allies
increase their military spending in the aftermath of U.S. foreign wars and in the wake of U.S.
economic downturns. Similarly, geographically vulnerable allies spend considerably more on their
defense. Finally, the results show that allies do not increase their military spending during periods
of elevated hostility between the United States and adversaries, and indeed may even decrease their
defense expenditures.
24Summary statistics can be found in Table A1.16.
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Cold War Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ Milex (%) ∆ Milex (%) ∆ Milex (%) ∆ Milex (%) ∆ Milex (%) ∆ Milex (%) ∆ Milex (%) ∆ Milex (%)
Postwar 0.039∗ 0.039∗ 0.039∗ 0.039∗ 0.027 0.044∗ 0.027 0.043∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
US GDP growth -0.009∗ -0.009∗ -0.009∗ -0.009∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
GDP growth 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Adversary aggression -0.068∗∗ -0.068∗∗ -0.069∗∗ -0.069∗∗ -0.081∗∗ -0.070∗∗ -0.081∗∗ -0.070∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
US-Adversary conflict 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002+ 0.001 0.002+
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ally-adversary hostility -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007∗ -0.006+ -0.007∗ -0.006+
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Rivalries (lag) 0.003 0.005 0.006∗ 0.007∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Ally MIDs -0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Milex (lag) -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ Milex (%, lag) 0.146∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.080+ 0.076+ 0.080+ 0.076+
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.044) (0.040) (0.044)
Adversary CINC 0.354∗∗ 0.554∗∗ 0.354∗∗ 0.547∗∗
(0.101) (0.153) (0.101) (0.153)
N 653 653 653 653 1133 911 1133 911
R2 0.065 0.066 0.065 0.066 0.060 0.067 0.060 0.068
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
+p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.5: Results for change in military expenditures over time.
Table 4.5 focuses on explaining change in military spending over time and uses percent annual
change in expenditures as the dependent variable. Models 1-4 include only Cold War observations
(through 1989), while Models 5-8 include the full sample through 2012. Models 2 and 4 include
a linear time trend in order to capture secular changes over time. Models 2 and 6 control for the
number of foreign policy rivals an ally has, while Models 3 and 7 control for ally MID involvement.
Models 4 and 8, in turn, control for both, though the two are highly correlated. The results show
that the aftermath of U.S. foreign wars is associated with annual changes in allied military spending
that are four percent higher than in other periods. Similarly, each one percent decrease in U.S. GDP
is associated with about a one percent increase in allied military spending. The results are similar
in the Cold War and in the full sample.
As for the control variables, threat does not have a uniform effect on burden-sharing, let alone
a uniformly positive one. On the contrary, the results show that in the aftermath of the Soviet
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invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, as well as the Russian invasion of Georgia, allies
reduced their military spending by around seven percent. This is direct contrast to what balance of
power theory might suggest, as my findings show that the possibility of U.S. abandonment is a far
better predictor of allied burden-sharing than the objective threat environment.
Table 4.6, in turn, shows that geographically vulnerable allies spend substantially more on
defense than more remote allies. In terms of substantive effects, the most vulnerable allies (those
scoring a two on the index) spend about 92% more on defense more than the least vulnerable allies
in Model 1. Additionally, allies in geostrategically valuable locations spend around 24% less on
defense on average. This supports the expectations of H3b, as it suggests that these allies are less
willing to contribute to the common defense because the patron’s threat of abandonment over them
is less credible. These findings hold across a variety of model specifications, as well as both in the
Cold War and in the full sample.
As for allies with more resources (H2b), Table 4.7 shows that, contrary to the expectations
of the collective goods logic of burden-sharing, larger allies do not shoulder a disproportionately
larger share of the defense burden than smaller allies. The coefficient on the log GDP variable is
statistically insignificant and is most models is actually negative This provides illustrative support
for my the theory while simultaneously providing disconfirming evidence for what has been the
dominant explanation for burden-sharing since Olson and Zeckhauser (1966).
In sum, then, the results support H2b-H4 and H6. Allies spend more on defense in the aftermath
of costly U.S. foreign wars and in the wake of U.S. hardship, while the allies most vulnerable to
attack tend to spend more as well. By contrast, strategically valuable allies – against which the
United States does not have as credible a threat of abandonment – spend less.
4.4.1 Further Analysis
Notably, however, these results are stronger during the Cold War than after. This is unsurprising
for a number of reasons, however. The first is that the nature of the threat environment faced
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Cold War Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Milex (log) Milex (log) Milex (log) Milex (log) Milex (log) Milex (log) Milex (log) Milex (log)
Vulnerability 0.327∗∗ 0.260∗ 0.286∗ 0.247∗ 0.171 0.240∗ 0.157+ 0.247∗
(0.116) (0.122) (0.103) (0.094) (0.107) (0.103) (0.092) (0.094)
Geostrategic location -0.281+ -0.395+ -0.304∗ -0.286+ -0.173 -0.313+ -0.189 -0.286+
(0.141) (0.194) (0.135) (0.147) (0.139) (0.153) (0.135) (0.147)
GDP growth 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.010∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.010∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
GDP (log) 1.064∗∗∗ 1.062∗∗∗ 1.069∗∗∗ 1.053∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗ 1.056∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 1.053∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.120) (0.112) (0.105) (0.078) (0.108) (0.078) (0.105)
GDPpc (log) 0.111 0.175 0.150 0.087 0.153 0.086 0.175 0.087
(0.164) (0.161) (0.149) (0.188) (0.158) (0.191) (0.152) (0.188)
Colonial power 0.804∗∗ 0.597∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗ 0.666∗∗ 0.637∗∗ 0.566∗∗ 0.629∗∗
(0.226) (0.165) (0.172) (0.187) (0.191) (0.197) (0.175) (0.187)
Ally-adversary hostility -0.003 -0.014 0.001 -0.000 0.012 -0.004 0.008 -0.000
(0.033) (0.035) (0.030) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025)
Rivalries (lag) 0.109 0.042 0.091 0.042
(0.083) (0.048) (0.057) (0.048)
Ally MIDs 0.043+ 0.033∗∗ 0.039∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.021) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011)
Polity 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.007 -0.006 0.005 -0.004 0.007
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020)
Entente 0.184 0.111 0.055 0.169 0.131 0.204 0.083 0.169
(0.469) (0.417) (0.403) (0.446) (0.494) (0.461) (0.457) (0.446)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 653 653 653 913 1168 913 1168 913
R2 0.928 0.930 0.932 0.930 0.929 0.928 0.933 0.930
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
+p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.6: Results for logarithmized military expenditures.
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Cold War Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Milex/GDP Milex/GDP Milex/GDP Milex/GDP Milex/GDP Milex/GDP Milex/GDP Milex/GDP
Vulnerability 0.007∗ 0.004 0.006∗ 0.005∗ 0.004 0.005+ 0.003 0.005∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Geostrategic location -0.009∗ -0.014∗ -0.010∗ -0.009∗ -0.005 -0.009∗ -0.006 -0.009∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
GDP growth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP (log) -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
GDPpc (log) 0.002 0.005 0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Colonial power 0.025∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Ally-adversary hostility -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rivalries (lag) 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Ally MIDs 0.002+ 0.001+ 0.001+ 0.001+
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Polity 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Entente 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.020 0.021
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 653 653 653 913 1168 913 1168 913
R2 0.287 0.329 0.346 0.292 0.259 0.277 0.286 0.292
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
+p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.7: Results for military expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
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by U.S. alliances changed dramatically after the Cold War ended. Indeed, a number of scholars
and policymakers predicted and even recommended that the United States would shed its alliances
(e.g., Mearsheimer, 1990). Second, the nature of alliance burden-sharing underwent a shift, with
the United States placing less emphasis on military spending and planning for conventional con-
flicts against peer competitors, and more emphasis on peacekeeping and stabilization operations
(Dorussen, Kirchner, and Sperling, 2009; Zyla, 2015).
Third is the change in U.S. global defense posture. Beginning in the 1990s and continuing
in the 2000s, U.S. policymakers placed less emphasis on planning for Cold War-style conflicts
involving large numbers of forces on both sides. Instead, U.S. officials sought more flexibility in
being able to rapidly project power to a larger number of potential locations, including the Middle
East and Africa. As part of this, the United States increasingly sought military access in states
where it had not previously had it – and often in the form of smaller facilities such as forward
operating sites (FOSs) and cooperative security locations (CSLs) rather than large, Cold War style
bases (main operating bases, or MOBs).25 Similarly, the United States increasingly looked to its
allies to contribute troops to U.S. foreign military interventions – which not coincidentally also
became more numerous after the Soviet Union’s collapse – such as Iraq in 1990-91 and 2003,
Afghanistan, Libya, Kosovo, and Bosnia (Kreps, 2010).
In order to probe the extent to which the theory is able to explain burden-sharing in the post-
Cold War period, I employ data on other forms of allied burden-sharing that have become more
prominent since 1990. In particular, I assess whether allies with severe threat perceptions are more
likely to: 1) support the United States’ foreign military interventions; and 2) provide compensation
to the United States for its bases. To assess the former, I look at whether allies contributed to the
United States’ war in Iraq (2003) – namely, whether they were members of its “coalition of the
willing” in 2003, as well as whether they contributed troops at all during the period 2003-2009.
25For an overview of the shift in U.S. global posture during the 1990s and 2000s, see Pettyjohn (2012: 83-96) and
Henry (2006).
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Iraq is an ideal test case for the theory when compared to the United States’ other major military
interventions in the post-Cold War: the Gulf War (1990), Yugoslavia (1990s), Afghanistan (2001),
and Libya (2011). The former two were largely over-determined, as the Gulf War received autho-
rization from the UN Security Council while the war in Afghanistan invoked NATO’s Article V.
Support for operations in and around the former Yugoslavia and in Libya was similarly concen-
trated in Europe (and, in the case of the latter, Southern Europe), due to geographic proximity. The
invasion of Iraq, by contrast, was politically contentious and featured an ad hoc coalition of states
from a variety of regions.
Table 4.8 contains the results for allied support for the invasion of Iraq. The dependent variable
in Model 1 is a dummy variable indicating whether a country was a member of the “coalition
of the willing”26 in 2003, while in Model 2 it is a dummy variable indicating whether a country
contributed troops during 2003-2009.27 I estimate these models using logistic regression models,
while controlling for allies’ size, wealth, and regime type. These results show that vulnerable allies
were more likely to contribute troops and to be members of the coalition of the willing, though the
results for the latter are not quite statistically significant.
Additionally, the U.S. Department of Defense has data on allies’ “host nation support” (HNS)
between 1995 and 2002, which capture the compensation provided to the United States by states’
hosting U.S. troops.28 I deflate these data to constant 2005 U.S. dollars, and then logarithmize
them. Table 4.9 presents the HNS results for the nine countries with an average of 1,000 U.S.
troops or more between 1995 and 2002.29 These findings again show that vulnerable allies burden-
share more on average.
26Steve Schifferes, “US names ’coalition of the willing,”’ BBC News, March 18, 2003; and Steve Schifferes, “US says
’coalition of willing’ grows,” BBC News, March 21, 2003.
27Data on allied troop contributions are from Carney (2011). Annual data are not available, however, and so these data
are not time-series.
28See the 1995 through 2004 reports: Department of Defense, Allied Contributions to the Common Defense,
http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/allied.aspx (accessed May 11, 2017).
29Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom.
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(1) (2)



















Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.8: Results for allied support for U.S. invasion of Iraq. Coalition of the willing results are
for the year 2003, while the troop participation variable captures whether an ally contributed troops




















Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
+p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.9: Results for host-nation support, 1995-2002. Sample limited to country-years in which
an ally had > 1000 U.S. troops on its territory.
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4.4.2 Robustness Checks
Next, I subject the initial results to a variety of additional robustness tests. First, in place of the
postwar presidencies dummy variable, I use a dummy variable to indicate years in which the United
States withdrew troops from a protracted foreign war (Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan).30 Second, I
cluster standard errors by year instead of by country, as the independent variables for H4 vary at the
year level. Third, I add a linear time trend to the models from Table 4.5 in order to account for any
secular temporal trends. Fourth, I control for the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance, measured using the
ratio of Soviet-to-U.S. nuclear weapons. A number of scholars have argued that the condition of
nuclear parity undermined the credibility of the United States’ commitment to defend its allies by
making a disarming counterforce strike less feasible, thus rendering the use of nuclear weapons less
believable by increasing the risk of retaliation against U.S. cities (e.g., Howard, 1982). Thus one
might expect that nuclear parity would also be conducive to allied burden-sharing. Fifth, I control
for allies’ governing ideology by adding a variable to the models which captures the percentage of
legislative seats held by left-wing parties. The models can be found in Tables A1.19 and A1.20 in
the appendix, and show that the results from these tests are consistent with the findings from the
main analysis.
30Troop data are from Kane (2006).
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Chapter 5
From Tough Love to a Soft Touch: The U.S.-West
German Alliance, 1961-1974
5.1 Case Overview
The “German problem” was arguably only second in importance to containing the Communist bloc
in U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War. Keeping the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
tied to the Western bloc was a near-constant concern among policymakers in both the United States
and other NATO allies; as Secretary General Hastings Ismay put it, the purpose of NATO was “to
keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” (Reynolds, 1994: 13). As
such, American security assurances to West Germany were crucial as a means of not only directly
deterring Soviet aggression, but also of ensuring NATO unity and preventing the emergence of
a neutral Germany that could play the Western and Eastern blocs against each other, and even
threaten its neighbors once more (Trachtenberg, 1999: esp. pp. 321-322). West Germany was
“the fulcrum of the European balance of power,” as a U.S. embassy telegram put it.1 Indeed, since
World War II Germany has hosted the largest number of peacetime U.S. foreign-deployed forces.
However, although the FRG’s latent military power afforded it significant ex ante capability for
1Telegram from U.S. Embassy (Bonn) to William Rogers, “The European Balance in the Early 1970s,” January 1969,
Folder “Germany, Vol. I [2 of 2],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 681, Richard M. Nixon Library, Yorba Linda,
California [hereafter RMNL].
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exit in the form of Soviet rapprochement or nuclearization, its proximity to the center of Soviet
military power also gave the United States a significant amount of leverage over it. While German
exit was a significant concern, it was less attractive so long as the American commitment was
credible. As such, while the United States was judicious in its use of assurances, it was frequently
able to secure German burden-sharing concessions.
These coercive efforts were both facilitated and complicated by the presence of voices within
the United States which called for reducing the U.S. footprint in Europe and forcing allies to
increase their share of the burden. On the one hand, U.S. leaders – particularly in the Nixon Ad-
ministration – were able to use this domestic pressure as a means of making credible threats to
the FRG. On the other hand, however, this domestic pressure threatened to make the U.S. commit-
ment seem sufficiently unreliable as to encourage West Germany to take its chances and reduce
its reliance on U.S. protection by either obtaining nuclear weapons or moving closer to the Soviet
Union. As a result, U.S. policymakers used significant reassurance to counterbalance the signals
of unreliability emanating from domestic audiences.
My theory would predict very high levels of U.S. reassurance toward the FRG, particularly
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. West Germany’s nuclear latency and conventional military
potential made it at high risk of exit, thus forcing the United States to reassure it. But the FRG’s
capacity for exit should also have been balanced by the United States’, which was quite potent
owing to West Germany’s vulnerability to attack by the Soviet Union.
Additionally, I anticipate intense West German interest in outside options during the later years
of the Johnson Administration and during the Nixon Administration, owing to concern about U.S.
unreliability in the wake of the Vietnam War and accompanying domestic isolationism. As such,
I would expect to see even greater preoccupation with reassuring the FRG under Nixon (and, to a
lesser extent, Johnson) than under Kennedy. At the same time, however, resource constraints and
retrenchment pressure stemming from the costs of fighting in Vietnam should have facilitated U.S.
efforts to extract burden-sharing.
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5.2 1961-1966: American Hard Bargaining
Despite granting West Germany enormous levels of reassurance in the form of hundreds of thou-
sands of U.S. troops, the United States placed an enormous amount of pressure on the FRG and
frequently threatened to withhold its assurances. These threats were used to both prevent West
Germany from obtaining nuclear weapons and to extract burden-sharing. Because of the FRG’s
vulnerability, these threats were quite successful, with the United States sustaining West Ger-
many’s non-nuclear status and convincing the FRG to offset the costs of U.S. troop deployments
by purchasing American arms.
5.2.1 Reassurance and the FRG’s Outside Options
High U.S. troop levels in West Germany were the result of two factors: its geographic position and
its latent capacity for exit. Fears of German neutralism and nuclearization pervaded the Cold War,
with concerns about the “German problem” dating back to the first days after World War II and
driving much of American reassurance behavior toward West Germany and toward NATO more
generally. As a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) put it in 1969: “The Alliance provides secu-
rity for West Germany against the USSR, while relieving the anxieties Western Europe would have
about independent German military power.”2 Richard Nixon similarly highlighted the importance
of reassuring Germany when he remarked in a May 1971 a conversation with his advisors that “as
a freshman Congressman he saw three reasons for NATO: the threat from the Soviet Union, the
weakness of Western Europe and the need for a home for the Germans,” arguing that “one could
perhaps debate the first two of the original reasons for NATO, but the third still existed.”3 Indeed,
part of the initial bargain of the FRG’s entry into NATO in 1955 involved its pledge to never pro-
2National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 20-1-69, “Europe, the US, and the USSR,” December 4, 1969, Foreign Relations
of the United States (FRUS), 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 87.
3Memorandum for the Record, “The President’s Meeting with Former High Government Officials and Military Offi-
cers on the Mansfield Amendment,” May 13, 1971, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969-1976, Vol.
41, p. 275.
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duce nuclear weapons coupled with British and American pledges to maintain troops in Germany
(Kelleher, 1975: 23, 28).
Kennedy and Johnson were far more preoccupied with precluding German nuclearization – and
proliferation more generally – than Dwight Eisenhower. Unlike Eisenhower, who saw the sharing
of nuclear weapons as a way to satisfy allied concerns and spread the burden of common defense
more equally (Trachtenberg, 1999: chs. 5-6), Kennedy and Johnson opposed the FRG’s control
over U.S. nuclear weapons, and instead saw nuclear sharing as a way discourage proliferation.
Kennedy was even willing to collude with the Soviets, offering German nonproliferation in ex-
change for a maintenance of the status quo over Berlin. As such, Kennedy not only cracked down
on allies’ de facto control of American nuclear weapons on their territory, but also shelved future
plans for sharing American weapons.
As I expect, American opposition to proliferation stemmed from three sources. First was the
fear that having too many actors with control over nuclear weapons could both increase the risk
of “accidental” nuclear war in a crisis and make coordinating on the use of nuclear weapons more
difficult (Lepgold, 1990: 123).4 Second was the fear of preventive Soviet attack, which was espe-
cially pronounced in the case of the FRG given the depth of Soviet opposition to a nuclear-armed
Germany (Trachtenberg, 1999: 202-204, 239, 305). Third, American policymakers expected that
a nuclear-armed Germany would be less dependent on the United States, and thus emboldened to
pursue a more independent foreign policy and more difficult to control (Trachtenberg, 1999: 219-
221). As Johnson put it, the point of nuclear sharing was “to keep the Germans with us and keep
their hand off the trigger,” describing to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson a scenario in which
another Hitler could rise to power (Schwartz, 2003: 44-45).
Fears about German nuclearization, inherent in its size and latent power, were exacerbated
by the FRG’s ambiguous nuclear behavior. This included covert nuclear cooperation with France
4Rusk-Couve conversation, June 20, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 13, pp. 413-419; Rusk-Adenauer conversation,
June 22, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 13 pp. 419-422.
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(and, briefly in the 1950s, Italy), skepticism of nonproliferation treaties such as the Limited Test
Ban Treaty, and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s refusal to renounce the possibility of West Ger-
many obtaining nuclear weapons despite the 1954 Brussels Treaty prohibiting it from possessing
them (Lanoszka, 2014: 84, 90-91, 95-96, 106; Gerzhoy, 2015: 109-110, 112-114). Secretary of
State Rusk argued “that latent intention [for nuclearization] exists that any responsible German
leader must keep possibility in back of mind as possible answer to future contingencies for which
no concrete anticipation now required” (Lanoszka, 2014: 91). Indeed, German leaders inten-
tionally used ambiguity as a bargaining chip in order to secure American assurances and nuclear
sharing.5 Adenauer declared in 1955 that the FRG could not indefinitely remain an “atomic protec-
torate” (Trachtenberg, 1999: 231), while Minister of Defense Franz Strauss made a veiled threat in
1961 that, without some form of nuclear sharing, France and Britain “could easily find followers”
seeking to become nuclear states (Kelleher, 1975: 186). FRG officials held out from supporting
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and attempted to make their support conditional on nuclear
sharing and consultation (Haftendorn, 1996: 141, 151-152).
American policymakers debated over potential avenues for nuclear cooperation without di-
rectly facilitating the development of independent national nuclear weapons programs or inflaming
tensions with the Soviets (Kelleher, 1975: 95, 124, 128, 136-139, 154, 180-183, 186, 203, 229,
235-237, 241). While Kennedy and Johnson moved away from direct nuclear sharing in the form
of giving allies control over U.S. weapons, they still recognized that retaining it in some form was
a useful way of reassuring the FRG and discouraging it from pursuing nuclear weapons unilat-
erally. To this end, both administrations focused on creating a NATO Multilateral Force (MLF),
first proposed in the closing days of Eisenhower’s presidency, in which the United States would
retain a veto. They hoped that the MLF would allow for centralized American control while also
reducing allies’ incentives to develop their own nuclear arsenals (Trachtenberg, 1999: 213-215,
5Memorandum of Conversation, “Nuclear Sharing,” December 20, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13, pp. 289-292.
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284-285, 304-305, 309-314, 321-329).6 Kennedy admitted in private that the MLF was “merely a
façade” designed to discourage allied – and particularly West German – nuclearization (Trachten-
berg, 1999: 314). Undersecretary of State George Ball similarly described the MLF as a way of
“giving the Germans a legitimate role in the defense of the Alliance, but ‘on a leash”’ (Haftendorn,
1996: 121).
Kennedy’s Military Representative Maxwell Taylor wrote to him that the creation of a Multi-
lateral Force would be a crucial means of ensuring that West Germany remained tied to NATO
and non-nuclear: “If West Germany is to continue to be a contented non-nuclear member of
NATO....West Germans need reassurance not only through the provision of this NATO nuclear
force but also through evidence of a determination to use all NATO atomic weapons under certain
predetermined conditions which will satisfy German security requirements.”7 The operative phrase
here was “all NATO” weapons, as this would include the U.S. arsenal. Additionally, Secretary of
State Dean Rusk noted that “While there was little present German insistence on nuclear capability,
future pressures could bring about dangerous change in German attitude unless solution reached
which Germany could reconcile with her national interest. MLF would give Germany both propin-
quity to weapons and share in control which should satisfy German aspirations for [a] long time to
come.”8 Rusk made this same observation on numerous occasions – including in his discussions
with French President Charles de Gaulle – arguing that the MLF “was a means of preventing the
Germans from developing in the future a national weapon.”9 Johnson’s Special Assistant Robert
Komer put the matter directly: “What better way to reassure Bonn than to give it a finger on the
6Memorandum of Conversation, “Summary of Discussion on MLF, Atlantic Defense and Related Matters,” October
31, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13, pp. 95-100.
7Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany, February 18, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13,
pp. 314-315.
8Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany, October 29, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13,
pp. 93-95.
9Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State, December 15, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13,
pp. 160-165 (quote at p. 163); Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and European Regional Organizations, February 18, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13, pp. 315-316.
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nuclear trigger, or at least a greater sense of nuclear participation?”10
The MLF was never implemented, however, as a result of Soviet, French, and British opposi-
tion, as well as skepticism from the U.S. Congress, and by early 1966 the concept was effectively
dead. As an alternative, the Johnson Administration instead turned to creating a NATO Nuclear
Planning Group (NPG) that would give allies greater access to information on U.S. nuclear strategy
(Kelleher, 1975: 247, 249-257; Gerzhoy, 2015: 118-121). Although the NPG did not give allies
control over U.S. policy, it did give them a seat at the table of nuclear decision-making and insight
into U.S. nuclear policy (Buteux, 1983: 194-196; Rapp-Hooper, 2015: 236-259). As part of its
effort to coerce the FRG into signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1966-1968
the Johnson Administration assured the FRG that the NPT’s stipulations were compatible with the
NPG, as the new Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt publicly insisted
that the FRG’s adherence to the treaty was contingent upon the NATO security guarantee (Mackby
and Slocombe, 2004: 190, 192-195, 199).
In addition to nuclear sharing and consultation, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations
used an extensive set of reassurance measures as part of their efforts to discourage German nucle-
arization. Kennedy reassured Adenauer in April 1961 that “the United States was prepared and
determined to stand by its commitments.”11 To secure the FRG’s signature to the Limited Test Ban
Treaty (LTBT) in 1963 he promised to keep six American divisions in Germany (Gerzhoy, 2015:
117), while Rusk assured German policymakers that the security of the United States and its allies
was “indivisible” (Trachtenberg, 1999: 317).
Subsequent administrations’ shift away from Eisenhower’s more permissive attitude toward al-
lied proliferation and nuclear sharing required moving away from Eisenhower’s intention of reduc-
ing the U.S. footprint in Europe (Trachtenberg, 1999: 283-284, 321). The fundamental trade-off
10Memorandum From the President’s Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President
Johnson, March 16, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13, p. 366.
11Memorandum of Conversation, NATO and East-West Relations, April 12, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 13, p. 273.
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they faced was that, as long as preventing German nuclearization remained a U.S. foreign policy
priority, the FRG would continue to need considerable assurances – including a substantial U.S.
troop presence. This was ultimately the course they chose, and the one followed by subsequent
administrations as well, and U.S. troop levels remained stable until the end of the Cold War.
5.2.2 U.S. Threats of Abandonment
But although Kennedy and Johnson were willing to accept that reassurance was the price that
would be paid for nonproliferation, they also proved willing to threaten the FRG to the same end.
As Bundy put it: “We are bound to pay the price of leadership. We may as well have some of its
advantages” (Trachtenberg, 1999: 303). Thus, while the FRG’s threat of nuclearization enabled
it to extract considerable American assurances, it did not shield it from American pressure. U.S.
Ambassador McGhee noted that “we would withdraw our forces and support for Germany” if Bonn
attempted to go nuclear.12
American nonproliferation pressure was brought to bear on two occasions in particular. The
first of these was in 1962-63, as the Kennedy Administration sought to both quash the incipient,
covert Franco-German nuclear cooperation that was taking shape and secure the FRG’s signature
of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). During a meeting with the French Cultural Minister An-
dré Malraux, Kennedy threatened that “the United States would like nothing better than to leave
[Europe]” if France and Germany continued on their present course, and made similar threats to
Adenauer (Gerzhoy, 2015: 114).13 He asserted that if the French and Germans were expecting the
United States to continue to defend Europe despite their nuclear programs, “they are asking and
expecting things that have never been and never will be” (Trachtenberg, 1999: 375). As a result,
when the FRG ratified the Élysée Treaty with France, which established regular diplomatic consul-
tation between the two countries, it added a preamble reaffirming its commitment to its relationship
12McGhee to Rusk, August 25, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 15, p. 395.
13Memorandum of Meeting, The President, Ambassador Alphand, M. Malraux, M. Lebel, Mr. Bundy, May 11, 1962,
FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 13, p. 699.
120
with the United States, and it signed the LTBT as well (Trachtenberg, 1999: 394-397; Gerzhoy,
2015: 114-117). Second, U.S. policymakers similarly threatened to abandon the FRG in order to
coerce it into joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), warning of the likelihood of a
Soviet preventive attack if the FRG pursued nuclear weapons and the United States withdrew its
support.14 Nevertheless, when West Germany ratified the NPT in 1969, it requested and received a
public reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to NATO by Secretary of State William Rogers.15
In addition to nuclearization, U.S. policymakers sought to discourage West Germany from
moving closer to the Soviet Union and distancing itself from NATO (Lepgold, 1990: ch. 5). In
the words of a former adviser, Kennedy “was very conscious of the possibility that given a few
turns or twists of events, you could be headed back into another situation where Germany could
again become a menace” (quoted in Lanoszka (2014: 90)), while the American Secretary-General
of NATO pointed out in 1962 that “There was clearly a sense of the growing military strength of
the Federal Republic and the beginnings of a wave of nationalism.”16 American officials opposed
to the push for troop withdrawals – or threats to move in that direction – argued against them on
the grounds that the troop presence served to tie the Germans to NATO, and that without them the
FRG was likely to pursue a more independent course that leaned more heavily on France and the
Soviet Union (Gavin, 2004: 114, 154-155). The flip side of Germany’s – and Europe’s – stunning
economic growth since 1945 was that although burden-sharing was now conceivable, the FRG was
now less dependent on the United States, and thus more able to go its own way (Kaplan, 1999:
155-156).
14McGhee to Rusk, August 25, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 15, p. 395; Rostow-Barzel conversation, February 23,
1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 15, pp. 630-637.
15Rogers to Nixon, “Reaffirmation of NATO at the Time of FRG Signing of Non-Proliferation Treaty,” November 11,
1969, Folder “Nonproliferation Treaty, April 1969-Mar 1970,” NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 366, RMNL.




Although the FRG’s capacity for exit allowed it to extract U.S. assurances, its vulnerability to at-
tack from the Soviet Union also gave the United States significant leverage. It was able to combine
its assurances with threats of abandonment in order to coerce the West Germans into burden-
sharing.
By the early 1960s, U.S. policymakers increasingly expected the now-recovered European
NATO members to contribute more to the common defense. Kennedy, Johnson, and their Defense
Secretary Robert McNamara placed great emphasis on reducing the costs of the U.S. overseas
presence. However, this goal was in tension with the United States’ emerging strategic concept
of “Flexible Response,” wherein it sought to reduce its reliance on the threat of massive nuclear
retaliation against Soviet cities to deter Soviet expansion by giving NATO more options in the form
of conventional armaments and tactical nuclear weapons. In doing so, it would not only put the
U.S. homeland in less danger, but also make the threat of escalation more credible. The problem
was that the Germans and other Europeans were skeptical of NATO’s capacity to defeat a Soviet
invasion without recourse to strategic nuclear weapons, and were also loath to fight another con-
ventional or tactical nuclear war on their soil (Kissinger, 1979: 82-83, 391-393). They were thus
unlikely to pick up the conventional military slack on their own accord. As such, in an effort to
maintain and improve NATO’s position in the conventional balance of power, throughout the 1960s
the United States put significant pressure on West Germany and the other European countries to
both improve their own capabilities and to “offset” the foreign exchange costs incurred by the
American presence, which was exacerbated by the existence of the gold standard. The result was
a series of biannual agreements beginning in 1961 in which the FRG agreed to purchase American
military equipment as a means of compensation.
U.S. pressure on the FRG for the purposes of obtaining burden-sharing was frequently accom-
panied by threats of abandonment. Policymakers in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations ex-
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plicitly linked U.S. troop levels to German compensation, and were often brutally straightforward
with their pressure. If the United States was to maintain its troop presence, it “was an ‘absolute ne-
cessity”’ for the FRG to provide offset (Gavin, 2004: 135, 141, quote at p. 139). Kennedy directed
that “we should get ready with actions to squeeze Europe,” in response to allied free-riding and to
French efforts to assist the Germans in their nuclear efforts (Trachtenberg, 1999: 374). Kennedy
argued that “we should be prepared to reduce quickly, if we so decided, our military forces in
Germany” in order to cut costs and put pressure on the Europeans to do more for themselves, re-
marking that “We cannot continue to pay for the military protection of Europe while the NATO
states are not paying their fair share and living off the ‘fat of the land.”’17 Secretary McNamara
was an especially vocal proponent of troop withdrawals, telling FRG Defense Minister Kai-Uwe
von Hassel that “America cannot carry this burden [of defense] if it couldn’t reduce this deficit” via
offset payments, and led the way in crafting plans for withdrawals (Gavin, 2004: 103-108; quote
at p. 111). National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy later advised Johnson that Chancellor
Ludwig Erhard “should be left in no doubt” that the continuation of American deployments was
contingent on offset (Lepgold, 1990: 129, quote at p. 127). In a phone conversation with McNa-
mara, Johnson similarly recommended putting pressure on Erhard: “Looks like to me, we ought
to take advantage of this opportunity to make him tell us that he cannot afford to have our troops
there.”18
As a result, the United States was able to attain biannual offset agreements with the FRG of
over $1 billion in 1961 and 1963, which served to both reduce the American deficit and build up
the West German military with American arms – and which accompanied a more general increase
in German defense spending and in the size of the German army (Lepgold, 1990: 127; Gavin,
2004: 112-113; Creswell and Kollmer, 2013: 84). Johnson continued to put pressure on, explicitly
17Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting, No. 38 (Part II), January 25, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963,
Vol. 13, pp. 486, 489.
18Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara, September 26, 1966,
FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 15, p. 435.
123
linking FRG offset with the continued presence of U.S. troops. McNamara and other officials made
very explicit threats to the Germans that without offset, withdrawals would follow (Gavin, 2004:
135, 139, 141, 147, 151; Zimmermann, 2009: 15; Lanoszka, 2014: 107).
The willingness of FRG policymakers to cave into American demands was largely influenced
by West Germany’s position as the NATO ally most exposed to Soviet attack. Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer and his successors pursued burden-sharing not only to hedge against the possibility of
abandonment but also to explicitly curry favor with the United States (Kelleher, 1975: 37, 44, 55,
75, 77-78, 91, 93). Numerous statements by U.S. policymakers – both among themselves and to
FRG officials – make it clear that they recognized and were willing to exploit the FRG’s vulnerable
position. Secretary of State Dean Rusk cautioned the German ambassador in January 1963 that
geography made it very dangerous for the FRG to risk defying the United States (Trachtenberg,
1999: 375), while in 1968 Rostow similarly stressed the “simple fact” of German vulnerability
in order to coerce the FRG into signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).19 The State
Department put the matter quite bluntly in an internal memorandum as well: “The Germans know
their security depends on the U.S. umbrella.”20 A 1969 report argued that the FRG’s bargaining
power was restricted by its “geographic position – an exposed country, with a contiguous border
with the Soviet bloc.”21
By comparison, the United States had few levers with which it could employ similar coercion
against the French, as France was much less vulnerable to a Soviet attack by virtue of its position
in the rear of Western Europe. Kennedy recognized that “there was ‘not much we can do about
France,”’ owing to its geographic insulation, but indicated he was unafraid to use the “threat of
withdrawal” to put pressure on the FRG for the purposes of coercing it into ceasing its nuclear
19Memorandum of Conversation, February 23, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 15, pp. 630-637.
20Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Bowie) to Secretary of State Rusk, July 20, 1967,
FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13, p. 598.
21Theodore S. Eliot to Henry Kissinger, “Political Consequences of SPD-FDP Coalition in the Federal Republic,”
October 6, 1969, Folder “Germany, Vol. III [3 of 3],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 682, RMNL.
124
cooperation efforts with France, signing on to nonproliferation treaties, and offsetting U.S. deploy-
ments (Trachtenberg, 1999: 373-375, quotes at p. 374). Indeed, FRG policymakers hesitated in
moving too close to France in part because they feared – with no small help from American urging
– that France could more easily come to an understanding with the Soviet Union by virtue of its
more insulated position (Powaski, 1994: 72). They were also not nearly as willing to risk Ameri-
can displeasure, instead preferring to use the French “option” as a hedge against U.S. unreliability
without fully embracing cooperation with France (Kelleher, 1975: 127, 149, 151-153).
Importantly, however, U.S. pressure on the FRG was coupled with the explicit assurance that,
given offset, American troops would remain (Lepgold, 1990: 119-120). The FRG enjoyed con-
siderable U.S. assurances in the form of: (1) the largest number of U.S. foreign-deployed troops
of any peacetime ally throughout the Cold War; (2) constant private and public assurances that
troops would remain and the NATO security guarantee would be honored in the event of Soviet
aggression; and (3) plans for giving the FRG partial control – or at least input – over the use of
American nuclear weapons.
5.3 1967-1969: Mansfield and Czechoslovakia Change the Game
5.3.1 Retrenchment Pressure and the Need for Reassurance
Resource constraints during the late 1960s and early 1970s, stemming in large part from the costs of
the Vietnam War, intensified the need for reassurance. Allies increasingly doubted the reliability of
U.S. protection, and as a result became more interested in exploring outside options to reduce their
dependence on the United States. U.S. military spending declined throughout much of the decade,
and President Nixon proclaimed the “Nixon Doctrine,” which stressed that allies would hold the
primary responsibility when it came to defending themselves (Nixon, 1971: 5). Nixon noted that
“the American people have grown somewhat weary...of international burdens,” and argued that
“The Nixon Doctrine will enable us to remain committed in ways that we can sustain” (Nixon,
1971: 7, 8).
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Moreover, the year 1966 saw the first major congressional resolution by Senate Majority Leader
Mike Mansfield to cut U.S. forces in Europe, which was followed up by similar resolutions in 1967,
1969, and 1974, as well as by the Mansfield Amendments in 1971 and 1973-74, which also pro-
posed troop reductions (Kaplan, 1999: 138; Lázár, 2003: 3, 24, 34). Other congressional propos-
als were less dramatic, but still very much intent on withdrawing troops and demanding that West
Germany and NATO make greater contributions (Williams, 1985: 150-151), while the National
Commitments Resolution of 1969 and the War Powers Act of 1973 sought to limit the president’s
ability to deploy U.S. forces abroad without congressional approval. Mansfield and other propo-
nents of troop withdrawals, including Senators Stuart Symington and William Fulbright, argued
that the costs from Vietnam made stationing hundreds of thousands of troops in Europe unsus-
tainable, and favored prioritizing domestic spending (Williams, 1985: 142, 162, 170; Kissinger,
1979: 939-940). Additionally, sluggish economic growth coupled with a mounting balance of pay-
ments and trade deficit provided further impetus for troop withdrawals as a cost-saving measure
(Williams, 1985: 200-201). Both Brandt and NATO Secretariat Manilo Brosio warned in 1971
that troop withdrawals would destroy Europe’s faith in the United States (Kissinger, 1979: 945).
As a consequence, the Johnson (and later Nixon) administration used considerable reassurance to
discourage the FRG’s pursuit of outside options.
Indeed, the FRG’s interest in its outside options increased as U.S. reliability came into question.
The first of these was its nuclear option German leaders implicitly linked potential nuclearization
with concerns about American credibility, particularly as Congressional pressure escalated (Gavin,
2004: 142-144, 149, 162, 164; Gerzhoy, 2015: 121-123). American fears of German exit became
more pronounced as evidence mounted that the FRG was, in fact, “reexamining [its] relations to
the United States and to NATO” (Gavin, 2004: 143) and considering increased cooperation with
France in late 1966 (Gavin, 2004: 154-155). Previously the French option had been less attractive,
as it could not offer the kind of protection the United States could. But with the American com-
mitment in doubt the FRG’s other options were becoming increasingly attractive (Powaski, 1994:
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71-72; Haftendorn, 1996: 154-155; Gavin, 2004: 112-113). More generally, the Johnson admin-
istration feared that French behavior, particularly its withdrawal from NATO’s military command,
could represent a model that other NATO allies might follow if they saw the U.S. commitment as
unreliable (Lepgold, 1990: 144, 147).
What also gave U.S. policymakers pause was the FRG’s “Soviet option” and the fear of German
neutralism that came with it. This option was related to the FRG’s nuclear option insofar as the
FRG’s size and military potential made its threat of exit more credible in both cases. However, the
two options were also somewhat incompatible, as the Soviet Union vehemently opposed German
nuclearization (Kelleher, 1975: esp. pp. 131, 267). Indeed, the credibility of the FRG’s Soviet
option was enhanced by its ultimate abandonment of the nuclear option (Lanoszka, 2014: 113-
116).
Fears of German neutralism and the FRG’s Soviet option were especially intense during the
later Johnson years and during the Nixon Administration because of the domestic retrenchment
pressure that policymakers faced. While there was a more general concern that allies in Europe
and Asia could seek to either obtain nuclear weapons or pursue closer ties with the Communist
bloc, these concerns were magnified in the German case because of its economic and latent mili-
tary power, which not only made the threat of German neutralism and nuclearization more credible,
but also made the consequences of “losing” Germany more severe to NATO. One State Department
report argued that threats of American withdrawal would likely push the Germans into the arms
of the Soviet Union, which could ultimately deprive NATO of its second most powerful member,
and other policymakers – including McNamara – began to increasingly come to the same conclu-
sion (Gavin, 2004: 154-155, 176-177). Ambassador George McGhee warned that if the United
States seemed on the verge of withdrawing troops, West Germany “would be forced to reorient
its basic security policy,” which “could take the form of...a ‘go-it-alone’ nationalism or efforts to
accommodate itself to the Soviets.”22
22McGhee to State, September 20, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 15, p. 418.
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After Erhard’s government fell at the end of 1966 and the Social Democrats increased their
share of power, with Willy Brandt as Foreign Minister and Kurt Kiesinger as Chancellor in 1967
(Kaplan, 1999: 139; Gavin, 2004: 141, 156-157). When Brandt became Chancellor in 1969,
trends toward Soviet rapprochement accelerated in the form of Ostpolitik (discussed in more detail
below). Brandt had argued in 1968 that “West Germany cannot really depend on the Americans”
(Trachtenberg, 2012: 167), and as a result pursued rapprochement with East Germany and the
Soviet Union to reduce the FRG’s dependence on the United States.
The result was increased U.S. reassurance measures in order to offset the perception that with-
drawal was coming “no matter what the Germans offered” (Schwartz, 2003: 156). For one, Amer-
ican policymakers increasingly went to great lengths to assure NATO allies that there would be no
unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. During offset negotiations at the end of 1966,
policymakers began to reconsider taking a hard-line with the FRG due to concerns that a perception
of U.S. unreliability might “confirm the opinion that NATO is falling apart” as a result of domestic
pressures within the United States, and thus the United States agreed to drop the link it had previ-
ously insisted on between U.S. troop levels and German willingness to offset them (Gavin, 2004:
144, 151). Throughout the remainder of 1967-68, the Johnson Administration continued to balk
at the prospect of threatening troop withdrawals, as they feared that doing so would only further
encourage the FRG to reach out to the Soviet Union – as had begun to occur under Kiesinger’s
leadership – and attempt to exploit its ties with France (Gavin, 2004: 176-177). As a result, the
1967 offset agreement was considerably less than hoped for, and represented a decrease from the
previous agreement (Lepgold, 1990: 147; Kaplan, 1999: 139-140; Gavin, 2004: 162-163).
5.3.2 Retrenchment Pressure and Burden-Sharing Leverage
Yet while they were opposed to withdrawing troops, thus adding fuel to the fire of perceived U.S.
unreliability, policymakers used domestic pressure as a means of persuading allies to increase their
burden-sharing efforts. Johnson pointed to voices in Congress and the public calling for reduced
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U.S. presence and more allied burden-sharing in Europe, and sought to use offset as a way to quell
these voices (Zimmermann, 1996: 337, 339-340). In effect, policymakers attempted to play the
role of a “good cop,” allowing the pressure from their domestic audiences to play the “bad cop” that
would push allies to contribute more to the common defense – both in terms of offset and defense
efforts more generally (FRUS v41, Docs 48, 71, 76). Johnson presented allied burden-sharing as
a means of appeasing Congress (Gavin, 2004: 151, 160-161; Zimmermann, 2009: 17-18), and
although he increasingly hesitated to make direct ultimatums, his administration issued ambiguous
signals about U.S. deployments in an effort to induce allied efforts to comply with Congressional
demands (Lepgold, 1990: 150-151; Zimmermann, 2009: 23).
Implicit in U.S. assurances was the threat that, if allies did not increase their efforts, the United
States would have difficulty avoiding troop withdrawals. Numerous U.S. officials made statements
to the effect that, while the United States had every intention of maintaining its troop levels, this
was conditional upon allies’ willingness to share in the burden.23 Johnson told his representa-
tive to offset negotiations John McCloy in early 1967 that “In the absence of a financial solu-
tion...Congressional and public opinion would be intense, and the Germans should recognize that
the situation might get out of hand” (Lepgold, 1990: 146). When McCloy asked whether Johnson
could “hold the line” against withdrawals if the FRG agreed to offset, he replied: “Perhaps, but you
have to go over there and find out what they will do” (Schwartz, 2003: 155). In his own meeting
with Kiesinger, Johnson stressed that, although “he wanted to be friends with Germany,” voices
in Congress were asking “Why should we keep on maintaining our troops there?” (Schwartz,
2003: 163). Indeed, as the FRG weighed defense cuts in July 1967, Mansfield publicly put pres-
sure on both Johnson and on West German officials to avoid such measures, and as a result the
FRG backpedaled. In October, pressure from other U.S. senators helped push the Europeans into
launching the European Defence Improvement Programme, which devoted an extra billion dol-
lars of military spending over the next five years for the European NATO allies (Williams, 1985:
23See FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 31-36, 240-241, 282-287, 315-322, 346-347.
129
154-155, 165-166).
In late 1968, however, the situation changed with the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia. The lull in Soviet provocation in Europe after the Berlin Crisis of 1961-63 had led many
within the United States to see an opportunity to reduce the U.S. presence – to pursue what Kaplan
(1999: 122) calls a “benign neglect” of Europe (Zimmermann, 2009: 14; Lanoszka, 2014: 103).
Indeed, the comparatively more friendly tone of Soviet-American relations generated unease in
Bonn, raising German concerns about being sold out by the United States as part of a superpower
settlement (Kelleher, 1975: 260; Trachtenberg, 1999: 231).
Yet the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia led to a temporary lull in domestic pressure for
withdrawal.24 Indeed, even Mansfield paused his efforts in Congress as a result of heightened
concern about the Soviet threat (Williams, 1985: 158-159; Brady, 2004: 139).25 Moreover, the
United States increased military maneuvers in Central Europe and rotated two mechanized in-
fantry brigades into West Germany (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978: 499-500). A telegram from the
U.S. embassy in Bonn to Secretary of State William Rogers argued in favor of reassurance on the
grounds that without it, the Europeans might “search for accommodation” with the Soviets.26
As a result, although the United States pushed the Europeans – including the FRG – to increase
their efforts as a result of the Soviet invasion, this pressure amounted to little.27 Despite U.S. re-
24Memorandum of Conversation, “Berlin,” February 13, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 40, pp. 19-22; Draft Mem-
orandum of Conversation, February 26, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 40, pp. 42-48; Intelligence Memorandum
Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, “Current Problems in NATO,” January 21, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976,
Vol. 41, pp. 1-12; Memorandum of Conversation, “Meeting of Secretary Laird with the Secretary General of NATO,
14 February 1969,” February 14, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 31-36.
25Memorandum of Conversation, “United States Delegation to the Forty-Second Ministerial Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council,” November 14, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13, pp. 787-790.
26Telegram from U.S. Embassy (Bonn) to William Rogers, “The European Balance in the Early 1970s,” January 1969,
Folder “Germany, Vol. I [2 of 2],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 681, RMNL.
27As one intelligence memorandum put it in November 1968: “So far the European allies have responded to the events
in Czechoslovakia with far more promise than performance. Among the four or five that have pledged concrete new
contributions, only Greece has offered anything approximating a clear net gain for the alliance. Belgium, for its part,
has offered only to ‘postpone’ impending troop cutbacks in West Germany; Britain has pledged further commitments
which represent almost nothing new for the common defense; and West Germany, with most to fear from the Soviets,
has refrained from making any substantial gesture.” Intelligence Memorandum No. 2049/68, “The Response of the
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quests for a 15% increase in German defense spending after Czechoslovakia, “the Germans plan an
increase of only about 3%, to be used largely for pay and benefit increases.”28 Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird argued in a letter to Nixon, “The FRG...does not make a defense effort commensu-
rate with its strength.”29, and pointed out that, “frankly, many people in Congress had expected a
bigger European response to the Czechoslovakian invasion than we got. So far as dollars and cents
are concerned, there has not been that much of a response.”30 The invasion of Czechoslovakia
“led few of the allies to disavow the goal of ‘peaceful engagement’ with the Soviet bloc,”31 and
did not slow down Brandt’s push for rapprochement with the Eastern bloc (Trachtenberg, 2012:
174-175). Indeed, the Soviet willingness to use force even confirmed Brandt’s desire for Ostpolitik
(Blechman and Kaplan, 1978: 504-505).
5.4 1969-1974: Ostpolitik and American Retrenchment
Concerns about Congressional pressure and German exit only deepened in the Nixon administra-
tion. Rather than proposing non-binding resolutions as he had in previous years, Mansfield for the
first time introduced in 1971 what would be binding legislation mandating troop reductions, and
did so again in 1973. These attempts were ultimately defeated but nevertheless caused enormous
consternation both within the Nixon administration and among the NATO allies. More gener-
ally, Congress forced defense cuts while simultaneously increasing domestic spending (Kissinger,
1979: 213-215; Lepgold, 1990: 147-148).
The Nixon Administration was increasingly reluctant to withhold reassurance. Policymakers
feared that the FRG’s unfolding detente with the Eastern bloc reduced U.S. leverage for burden-
NATO Countries to the Invasion of Czechoslovakia,” November 4, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13, pp. 778-780.
28Laird to Nixon, “NATO Defense Issues,” February 20, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 41.
29Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, “NATO Defense Issues,” February 20, 1969,
FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 41.
30Memorandum of Conversation, “Meeting of Secretary Laird with the Secretary General of NATO, 14 February
1969,” February 14, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 32.
31Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, “Current Problems in NATO,” January 21,
1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 2.
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sharing, as it not only made using threats of abandonment dangerous, but it also reduced the FRG’s
perception of threat from the Soviets (Powaski, 1994: 87; Gavin, 2004: 176-171, 190-191; Zim-
mermann, 2009: 24). This is not to say that there was no burden-sharing pressure; U.S. officials
continued to use the threat of involuntary defection due to domestic pressure in order to coerce the
FRG. However, the pressure was used with much more caution, and was paired with considerable
reassurance (Powaski, 1994; Kaplan, 1999: 156-157).
In addition to domestic pressure from Mansfield and others, what also raised concerns about
U.S. unreliability was the American effort toward detente with the Soviet Union – which included
the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaties in 1972 and 1979 (SALT I and SALT II, respectively), as
well as efforts toward Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) from Europe. These efforts
were in no small part motivated by the costs of Vietnam, which made reducing tensions more
attractive as a means of decreasing the probability of war and containing the arms race attractive
as a means of cutting costs (Haftendorn, 1996: 155-156). Yet detente similarly raised concerns on
the part of allies, who feared that the result could be a U.S.-Soviet bargain in which allied interests
were sold out in order for the superpowers to make themselves more secure (Powaski, 1994: 98-99,
102-103; Kaplan, 1999: 116-117).32 In particular, since the defense of Europe relied heavily on
the threat of nuclear retaliation, the U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War in
1973 raised concerns about U.S. willingness to escalate.33 Similarly, the West Germans resented
the concerted US-Soviet push for a nonproliferation treaty, which they saw as discriminatory and
as evidence that the United States attached more importance to its relations with its adversary than
to the well-being of its allies; Kiesinger, for one, called it “atomic complicity” (Haftendorn, 1996:
154, 159; quote at p. 159).
32Kissinger to Ford, “Meeting with Permanent Representatives of the North Atlantic Council,” June 19, 1975, Folder
“North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1975 (3) WH,” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC Europe,
Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files, Box 53, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
33Clift to Kissinger, “Reported Reactions in FRG Cabinet to US-USSR Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War,”
June 30, 1973, Folder “Germany, Vol. XIII [2 of 3],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 687, RMNL.
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The Germans feared that, if done bilaterally and without consultation, these efforts might ig-
nore allied interests and even provide cover for a U.S.-Soviet grand bargain.34 Discouraging allies
from pursuing their own, separate versions of detente with the Soviet Union thus required reas-
suring them that the United States would not sell them out, and consulting and informing them on
decisions made (Kissinger, 1979: 382-383, 386).35 National Security Adviser (later Secretary of
State) Henry Kissinger put the matter well in his memoirs: “in times of relaxing tension, they [the
Europeans] dreaded a US-Soviet condominium” (Kissinger, 1979: 94). Indeed, in 1973 Mansfield
cited the comparatively less tense relations that had prevailed since the Cuban Missile Crisis (the
1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia aside) as evidence that Soviet intentions no longer demanded a
massive U.S. presence in Europe (Williams, 1985: 215-216).
Decision-makers in the Nixon Administration feared that West Germany – as well as the other
members of NATO – were likely to undertake “increasing accommodation to the Russians on po-
litical and economic issues” in response to their perceptions of U.S. unreliability.36. They worried
that this process could incite a trend toward “Finlandization,” with allies distancing themselves
from the United States and becoming increasingly willing to defer to Soviet interests (Lepgold,
1990: 138). Kissinger wrote in 1969 that allies were likely to drift toward the Soviets if they
perceived imminent U.S. retrenchment (Zimmermann, 2009: 20), and warned in 1971 of the like-
lihood “that Europe will seek nuclear autonomy or will move in the direction of Finland or possibly
do both things simultaneously” if American withdrawal seemed imminent.37
As a result, policymakers turned to strong reassurance as a means of counteracting the percep-
34Telegram from U.S. embassy (Bonn) to Rogers and Hillenbrand, “Recent FRG Views on MBFR,” June 1971, Folder
“Germany, Vol. IX [3 of 3],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 685, RMNL.
35Telegram from U.S. embassy (Bonn) to Rogers, “US-German MBFR Consultations,” June 1971, Folder “Germany,
Vol. IX [3 of 3],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 685, RMNL.
36Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary of
State Rogers, “Tensions in US Relations with Europe,” November 15, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 326.
37Minutes of a Legislative Interdepartmental Group Meeting, “Mansfield Resolution,” May 12, 1971, FRUS, 1969-
1976, Vol. 41, p 270.
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tion of U.S. retrenchment, and vigorously opposed the efforts by Mansfield and others in Congress.
Nixon, for one, claimed in his 1970 report on foreign policy that the United States would no sooner
withdraw from Europe than from Alaska (Cha, 1999: 69). His first visit as President in February-
March 1969 was to Europe, during which his primary objective was to “affirm our commitment
to NATO” (Kissinger, 1979: 88-89). He then visited again the following year, strongly reaffirm-
ing the United States’ commitment to defend NATO (Kissinger, 1979: 921-922). While in Ireland
(ironically not a NATO member), he promised that the United States would not make any unilateral
withdrawals (Williams, 1985: 165). Nixon declared the NATO security guarantee to be “unique”
and “irreplaceable” (Lepgold, 1990: 149; Gavin, 2004: 190), and proclaimed that “the United
States will, under no circumstances, reduce, unilaterally, its commitment to NATO.” The adminis-
tration further stressed that it would consult and inform the NATO allies on bilateral U.S.-Soviet
negotiations on arms control and other issues.38 In this way, the administration followed the ap-
proach favored by Hillenbrand, who argued that “Statements by both the President and [Secretary
of State Rogers] can still do much to influence European attitudes toward this country, given their
continuing psychological need for assurances from us.”39 These assurances are particularly strik-
ing when one compares them to U.S. threats during the 1950s and 1960s, when troop withdrawals
were not being ruled out (Kelleher, 1975: 135) and officials in the Kennedy Administration ex-
plicitly stated that they would have no qualms pulling out of Europe if the FRG did not cooperate
(Gerzhoy, 2015: 114).40
U.S. officials stressed the need for reassurance in private and among themselves as well.41
38Telegram from U.S. embassy to William Rogers, “Allied Consultation on SALT,” June 1969, NSC Files, Country
Files, Box 681, RMNL; “Memorandum of Conversation between President Nixon and Chancellor Kiesinger at the
White House,” August 7, 1969, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 682, RMNL.
39Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary of
State Rogers, “Tensions in US Relations with Europe,” November 15, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 328.
40Memorandum of Meeting, The President Ambassador Alphand, M. Malraux, M. Lebel, Mr. Bundy, May 11, 1962,
FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 13, pp. 695-701.
41National Security Decision Memorandum 12, “NATO,” April 14, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 57-58;
Kissinger to Nixon, “Under Secretaries Committee Recommendation on Scenario for Explaining Reduction in Our
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They feared that withdrawals would encourage Finlandization among NATO allies and undermine
American bargaining leverage with the Soviets (Kaplan, 1999: 151-153).42 Officials hesitated to
threaten withdrawals as Johnson had, for fear of “erod[ing] German confidence in our security
commitments.”43 Kissinger asserted that “one thing we must avoid is any arm-twisting of the
Germans,” for fear of encouraging German neutralism (Gavin, 2004: 190-191), while Laird and
U.S. Representative to NATO David Kennedy similarly counseled that Nixon go out of his way to
emphasize that troop withdrawals would not be forthcoming.44 An NSC paper further argued that
troop withdrawals “would be strongly resisted by the Allies, would cause them to doubt U.S. credi-
bility, and would probably remove their incentive to maintain present forces, much less make force
improvements,” recognizing that unilateral withdrawals, particularly during a time of retrenchment
pressure, would expend the United States’ bargaining chip.45 This problem was particularly acute
with regards to Germany, due to the fear of renewed German militarism. Nixon “remembered that
as a freshman Congressman he saw three reasons for NATO: the threat from the Soviet Union, the
weakness of Western Europe and the need for a home for the Germans,” and argued that while “one
could perhaps debate the first two of the original reasons for NATO, but the third still existed.”46
Force Commitments to NATO,” October 14, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 69-71; Report on a NATO
Commanders Meeting, September 30, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 190-194.
42Memorandum of Conversation, “Notes on President Nixon’s Meeting with NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers,”
April 11, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 51-56; Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group
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of a Combined Review Group and Verification Panel Meeting, August 31, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp.
180-189.
43C. Fred Bergsten to Henry Kissinger, “German Offset Problem,” March 24, 1969, Folder “Germany, Vol. I [1 of
2],” National Security Council Files, Subject Files, Box 681, RMNL. See also Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon,
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of 2],” National Security Council Files, Subject Files, Box 681, RMNL.
44Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, “Report on My Trip to Europe,” November 9,
1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 315-322; Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
to the Department of State and the Department of Defense, “NATO’s December Ministerial,” November 29, 1972,
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1976, Vol. 41, p. 224.
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Nixon dropped the link that made troop levels conditional on offset, firmly decided in 1970
to maintain U.S. force levels in Europe, and optimized U.S. conventional forces for combat in the
European theater (Lepgold, 1990: 149; Gavin, 2004: 190; Robb, 2014: 132). Furthermore, Nixon
abandoned the “two-and-a-half war” concept which held that the United States should be prepared
to simultaneously fight a major war with Soviet Union in Europe, a major war with China in Asia,
and a smaller war elsewhere. Instead, he replaced it with a one-and-a-half war strategy to fight
only one major war and one smaller war simultaneously, with Europe considered the theater in
which a major war might be fought (Kissinger, 1979: 220-222).
Nixon argued against troop withdrawals on the grounds that “The key to what we do is what
effect does it have on Germany....Some Europeans would think to move toward the Russians be-
cause they are uneasy about more US reductions,” and his advisers – including Secretary Rogers,
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe Andrew Goodpaster, and NATO Ambassador Robert Ellsworth
– agreed that “reductions would push [the FRG] toward the Russians.”47 Nixon further posited that
“the effect [of withdrawals] would be catastrophic” on Germany, potentially setting off a chain
of events in which “the Germans left the fold and the umbilical cord [was] cut.”48 A 1971 State
Department memo argued that “From the top of Norway to the tip of Italy there is a growing con-
viction that the United States will disengage from Europe,” further arguing that the FRG was likely
to show “increasing accommodation to the Russians on political and economic issues.”49
Preoccupation with German neutralism became especially acute as the Social Democrats in-
creased their electoral share in late 1966 and again in 1969, and as Social Democrat Willy Brandt
became Chancellor in 1969. Brandt’s new government was far more open to pursuing rapproche-
cers on the Mansfield Amendment,” May 13, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 275.
47Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, “NSC Meeting: NATO & MBFR,” November 19, 1970, FRUS,
1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 230.
48Memorandum for the Record, “The President’s Meeting with Former High Government Officials and Military Offi-
cers on the Mansfield Amendment,” May 13, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 275.
49Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary of
State Rogers, “Tensions in US Relations with Europe,” November 15, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 326.
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ment with the Soviets and to normalizing relations with East Germany, and in short order began
pursuing a policy of Ostpolitik that emphasized rapprochement with the Communist bloc (Powaski,
1994: 80). Brandt linked American domestic pressure to doubts about American reliability, and
he became more assertive in standing up to American pressure.50 In response to the Mansfield
Amendment in 1971, Brandt publicly proclaimed doubt in the viability of the U.S. commitment
to NATO (Powaski, 1994: 90-91). U.S. policymakers feared that other allies might take the same
course if the American commitment continued to be in doubt (Lepgold, 1990: 153).51 Assistant
Secretary of State Martin Hillenbrand argued that “developments in the United States could jeop-
ardize” Brandt’s willingness to rely on the United States, and pointed to “a recent poll show[ing]
fifty percent of the population favoring such a neutralist position between East and West.”52 Indeed,
German officials explicitly used the Soviet option in order to extract U.S. assurances. In a meeting
with Laird, West German Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt “made a strong plea for maintaining a
substantial US troop presence in Europe,” and warned that “if the US cuts its troop level, Germany
and other European countries would inevitably begin to accommodate with the East.”53
The Nixon Administration’s concerns with Ostpolitik were twofold. The first was that a more
independent foreign policy course could eventually result in a nationalistic FRG that felt less tied
to and dependent upon the United States, and more willing to play both sides of the Cold War
(Lepgold, 1990: 153; Klitzing, 2009: 80, 91-92; Juneau, 2011: 279, 281-282). A desire for
rapprochement with the Soviet Union was not in itself unreasonable; however, as Kissinger put
it, “we have to distinguish between the things that have already happened in Ostpolitik and the
50Memorandum for the Record, “Luncheon Conversation Between Henry Kissinger and Egon Bahr, April 8, 1970,”
April 8, 1970, Folder “Germany, Vol. IV [1 of 2], NSC Files, Country Files, Box 683, RMNL.
51Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, “NSC Meeting: NATO & MBFR,” November 19, 1970, FRUS,
1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 225-232.
52Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary of
State Rogers, “Tensions in US Relations with Europe,” November 15, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 324.
53Telegram from U.S. Embassy (Bonn) to William Rogers, “Secretary Laird’s Talk with FRG Defense Minister Helmut
Schmidt,” June 1970, Folder “Germany, Vol. V [2 of 2],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 683, RMNL.
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longer term danger. What has happened up to now is not dangerous. What the long-term change
may be is another matter.”54 Kissinger’s fear was that “The Germans may also become so engaged
in their Eastern policy that their commitment to West European unity may decline,” and even
“create a momentum that may shake Germany’s domestic stability and unhinge its international
position” that would lead it to lapse into neutralism (Juneau, 2011: 281).55 A December 1969
National Intelligence Estimate raised the possibility that “Bonn may become less inclined to defer
to Western interests and views” due to its rapprochement with the Soviets.56
Writing ten years later, Kissinger argued that:
Detente was difficult to manage for the other Western allies because it might encourage
euphoria, be confused with psychotherapy, and fail to insist on Soviet reciprocity. But
for Bonn all these dangers were compounded because the Soviet Union in effect held
17 million Germans hostage....On one occasion I said to an associate that I dreaded the
moment when ‘no German Chancellor can afford the hostility of the Soviet Union.’
(Kissinger, 1982: 145-146)
Second, policymakers thought a unilateral German detente with the Communist bloc would un-
dermine NATO cohesion and undercut American leadership in the Western bloc, thus also reducing
the United States’ bargaining leverage with the Soviet Union. This was particularly undesirable
during a period in which it was trying to negotiate with the Soviets for nuclear arms control and
Mutual Balanced Force Reductions in Europe (Powaski, 1994: 96-97; Klitzing, 2009: 84, 87, 97,
101, 103-104, 108; Juneau, 2011: 278, 281, 284, 286). As Kissinger told the State Secretary at
54Memorandum of Conversation, “Meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Heath,” December 17, 1970,
FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 1000.
55In a memo to Nixon, Kissinger argued that his worry “stems not so much from the broad purpose which Brandt
wants,” but from the possibility that Ostpolitik could create “momentum and will lead Brandt into dangerous con-
cessions.” Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, “Brandt’s Eastern Policy,” February 16, 1970, Folder “Germany, Vol.
IV [1 of 2],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 683, RMNL.
56National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 20-1-69, “Europe, the US, and the USSR,” December 4, 1969, Foreign Relations
of the United States (FRUS), 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 82.
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the West German Foreign Office, “If there is to be a policy of detente with the USSR, then we
will do it” (Juneau, 2011: 284). A 1972 NIE argued that “Alliance unity is likely to become even
harder to maintain as...the Soviets have direct opportunity to play upon Western disagreements.”57
Nixon emphasized to Brandt that “If [the Soviets] can weaken the NATO Alliance” by dividing the
Germans and the Americans, ”it will be a great accomplishment for them.”58
At the same time, the Nixon Administration hesitated from sending blatant signals of displea-
sure to the FRG over Ostpolitik. This was in large part because of the concern that breaking with
Brandt might accelerate the FRG’s desire for rapprochement and push it into pursuing an even
more independent foreign policy, but also because Nixon sought to avoid giving the impression
of disunity within NATO, which would only further undercut the United States’ ability to bargain
with the Soviets (Powaski, 1994: 97; Klitzing, 2009: 91-93, 100-101, 110; Juneau, 2011: 283-
289). As such, the administration’s position was “to try to get on board and get something for the
US” rather than openly break with the FRG (Juneau, 2011: 287) – though they were wary of openly
endorsing Ostpolitik for fear of undermining the Christian Democrats’ opposition to it within the
FRG (Juneau, 2011: 291). This position extended to avoiding troop withdrawals, as administration
officials feared that withdrawals would “play into the hands of those who support Ostpolitik.”59
Kissinger put the matter quite simply: “We face this dilemma: We can’t afford to oppose Brandt
but we can’t support his policy too strongly either.”60
However, although the Nixon administration put great emphasis on reassuring the FRG, it still
exerted burden-sharing pressure via threats of involuntary defection. As Lepgold (1990: 143) puts
it: Nixon and Kissinger “appeased domestic pressures just enough...to contain them.” Kissinger
57National Intelligence Estimate 20-72, “Problems in US-West European Relations,” December 14, 1972, FRUS,
1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 354.
58Draft Memorandum of Conversation, February 26, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 40, p. 39.
59Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, “Meeting of the National Security Council: Berlin and Germany
(NSSM 83),” October 14, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 196.
60Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, “Meeting of the National Security Council: Berlin and Germany
(NSSM 83),” October 14, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 40, p. 362.
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recommended “emphasiz[ing] our commitment to maintain strong American forces in Europe”
while simultaneously pointing out “that Congressional support in the United States required pro-
portionate contributions from our allies” (Kissinger, 1979: 386). A 1970 NSC paper similarly
prescribed that U.S. policymakers “reaffirm our intention to maintain and improve US forces in
Europe, if the Europeans do their share in improving their forces.”61 Kissinger admitted that the
primary motivation for offset was not economic but rather political, arguing that “in real terms...we
would get very little additional balance of payments help even from our maximum position [in ne-
gotiations].” As such, although skeptical of offset’s economic utility, Kissinger nevertheless argued
that “we should maintain a fairly tough position in this stage. We will face renewed Congressional
pressure...if we do not get a substantially better offset than the previous Administration.”62
Indeed, at a meeting with NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers in April 1969, Nixon warned
that “it would be very popular for him to announce a reduction of the US defense program, or
to announce the withdrawal of divisions from Europe,”63 and he stressed privately that “They’ve
just got to believe that the situation is serious. A Mansfield resolution will surely pass if they don’t
make a bigger effort.”64 Similarly, Laird wrote to Nixon that “I would judge the need to be for a nice
balance between (i) reassurances about the American commitment to NATO, which are clearly in
order, and (ii) polite reservations in response to any invitations to ‘stabilize’ (i.e., freeze) US force
levels in Europe, which might pose serious Congressional and policy problems,” thus allowing the
United States to effectively balance threat and assurance.65 The U.S. ambassador to West Germany
framed the matter quite straightforwardly to Brandt, making clear “the administration’s intent to
61Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff, “NSSM 121–Issues at the June, 1971 NATO Ministerial
Meeting,” May 14, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 287 (emphasis added).
62Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, “Offset Negotiations with Germany,” undated [May 1969], Folder “Germany,
Vol. I [2 of 2],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 681, RMNL.
63Memorandum of Conversation, “Notes on President Nixon’s Meeting with NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers,”
April 11, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 51.
64Minutes of a Defense Program Review Committee Meeting, “NATO Force Improvements,” August 4, 1971, FRUS,
1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 301.
65Laird to Nixon, “NATO Defense Issues,” February 20, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 39-40.
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maintain substantial US forces in Europe, although at the same time pointing to heavy pressures in
certain quarters in the US for reduction. To counter these latter pressures, it was vitally important
that Germany and other European countries do everything possible to improve their own defense
contribution.”66 Kissinger similarly told Brandt in September 1973 that although “we are trying to
stem” Congressional pressure, “the more offset we can get, the more it will help,”67 while Nixon
made a speech in March 1974 in which he argued that the Europeans “will find it almost impossible
to get Congressional support for continued American presence at present levels” if the Europeans
did not increase their efforts and pursued economic integration that excluded the United States
(Williams, 1985: 239).
A December 1971 State Department memo pointed to the importance of combining threats and
assurances as a means of obtaining this allied burden-sharing: “These steps to share a greater pro-
portion of the common defense burden are a tangible earnest of European intent to meet the terms
of the President’s 1970 pledge, repeated at this NATO meeting, and warmly welcomed, that the
US would maintain and improve its forces in Europe, provided the Allies do likewise.”68 Similarly,
during the buildup to the 1972-73 offset arrangement, in June 1971 Sonnenfeldt recommended
to Kissinger that the United States use the Mansfield Amendment as a means of putting pressure
on the Germans, but adding that “we have no intention whatsoever of a repetition of the Erhard
crisis.”69 During the “Year of Europe” in 1973, in which the administration attempted to create
a new Atlantic Charter and strike a grand bargain with allies on the issues of trade and defense
burden-sharing, U.S. officials repeatedly emphasized that it was in the Europeans’ interest to make
66Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State, “Ambassador’s Call on Chancellor Brandt,”
October 29, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 40, p. 110.
67Memorandum of Conversation, September 29, 1973, Box 2, National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversa-
tions, 1973-1977, Gerald Ford Presidential Library and Museum, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
68Telegram From the Department of State to All North Atlantic Treaty Organization Capitals, “NATO Ministerial
Meeting: An Overview,” December 11, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 335 (emphasis added).
69Helmut Sonnenfeldt, “Your Meeting with Ambassador Pauls, Wednesday at 12,” June 1, 1971, Folder “Germany,
Vol. IX [2 of 3],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 685, RMNL.
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concessions, lest they empower domestic proponents of troop withdrawals in the United States.70
The result was increased offset payments in 1969 and 1972-73 to the tune of over $1.5 billion
and over $2 billion, respectively, as well as increased allied military contributions, as the FRG
and other NATO allies sought to defuse Congressional pressure (Kissinger, 1979: 400; Lepgold,
1990: 153-154; Powaski, 1994: 93; Kaplan, 1999: 155-157).71 Additionally, the Jackson-Nunn
Amendment in Congress in 1973 re-established the link between U.S. troop levels and offset that
Nixon had dropped in 1970, thus ultimately reducing the immediate need for withdrawals – as
evidenced by the abrupt decline of Mansfield’s ability to gain support for withdrawals after 1973
(Williams, 1985: 252-253). Similarly, days after Nixon’s March 1974 speech the United States and
the FRG made another offset agreement that fully covered U.S. costs (Williams, 1985: 239-241).72
Indeed the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the FRG and other NATO members very
much took domestic constraints in the United States seriously. One U.S. official even hypothesized
in 1969 that the Europeans saw “their defense requirements primarily in terms of what they need to
provide to keep the Americans committed” (Hunt, 2015: 313). During the Johnson administration,
the West German ambassador reported that a number of factors, including the war in Vietnam and
the “neo-isolationist trend,” that made major troop withdrawals quite possible (Gavin, 2012: 48).
In 1970 the West Germans requested “an indication...of the minimum European defense contribu-
tion we will need...in order to constrain budgetary and congressional pressures.”73 Moreover, the
70Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, “Your Meeting with German Finance Minister Helmut Schmidt, July 31, 1973, 4 p.m.,”
July 30, 1973, Folder “Germany, Vol. XIII [2 of 3],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 687, RMNL; Henry A. Kissinger,
“Meeting with Walter Scheel,” Folder “Germany, Vol. XIII [2 of 3],” July 12, 1973, NSC Files, Country Files, Box
687, RMNL; Henry A. Kissinger, “Meeting with Rainer Barzel,” April 18, 1973, Folder “Germany, Vol. XIII [2 of
3],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 687, RMNL.
71Bergsten to Kissinger, “German Offset Agreement,” July 9, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 68-69; Telegram
From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State, “Alliance Defense for the
70’s,” December 3, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 236-240; Telegram from U.S. consul (Munich) to Rogers,
“FRG Defense Budget for 1972,” December 27, 1971, Folder “Germany, Vol. X [1 of 2],” NSC Files, Country Files,
Box 686, RMNL.
72State Department Briefing Paper, “President Nixon’s Visit to Brussels,” June 1974, Folder “NAC Summit - Brussels
The President,” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, Box 54, RMNL.
73Telegram from U.S. Embassy (Bonn) to William Rogers, “Defense Burden Sharing,” June 1970, Folder “Germany,
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Germans became far more amenable to burden-sharing efforts in 1971, after Mansfield introduced
his first piece of binding legislation to cut U.S. troops in Europe by 50% in the form of an amend-
ment to the Selective Service bill. Whereas in October 1970, the Germans had taken a somewhat
hard-line on burden-sharing74, German willingness to raise offset payments and burden-sharing
increased significantly in mid-1971.75
5.5 Alternative Explanations
5.5.1 German Domestic Politics
Before becoming a major influence on German foreign policy at the end of the decade, the Social
Democrats had been proponents of rapprochement with the Communist bloc since the mid-1960s
(Ninkovich, 2004: 123). In October 1966, Ludwig Erhard’s government fell in no small part be-
cause of his willingness to cave in to American pressure over offset, even in the face of German
economic woes that year. In the “Grand Coalition” that followed under Chancellor Kiesinger, the
Social Democrats had a more prominent role, with Willy Brandt becoming Foreign Minister. The
first signs of detente started under Kiesinger, but did not truly take off until Brandt became Chan-
cellor in 1969, when Ostpolitik became a cornerstone of West German foreign policy (Powaski,
1994: 80; Lanoszka, 2014: 113-114).
Indeed, there is evidence that U.S. policymakers recognized the Social Democrats’ ideology as
a source of the problem. Nixon and Kissinger saw the center-right Christian Democrats as more
reliable partners than Brandt’s Social Democrats, with Nixon saying that “I don’t want to hurt our
Vol. V [2 of 2],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 683, RMNL.
74Telegram from U.S. Embassy (Bonn) to William Rogers, “Schmidt on NATO and Burden Sharing,” October 1970,
Folder “Germany, Vol. VII [3 of 3],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 684, RMNL; Telegram from U.S. Embassy
(Bonn) to William Rogers, “Burden Sharing,” October 1970, Folder “Germany, Vol. VII [3 of 3],” NSC Files, Coun-
try Files, Box 684, RMNL; Telegram from U.S. Embassy (Bonn) to William Rogers, “Burden-Sharing,” October
1970, Folder “Germany, Vol. VII [3 of 3],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 684, RMNL.
75Telegram from U.S. consul (Munich) to Rogers, “Offset - Discussion with Foreign Minister Scheel,” May 1971,
Folder “Germany, Vol. IX [3 of 3],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 685, RMNL; Telegram from U.S. consul
(Munich) to Rogers, “Offset: Conversation with Herbst,” October 1971, Folder “Germany, Vol. IX [3 of 3],” NSC
Files, Country Files, Box 685, RMNL.
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friends in Germany by catering to that son of a bitch [by endorsing Ostpolitik]” (Klitzing, 2009:
103), referring to Brandt, and that “any non-socialist government would be better” (Juneau, 2011:
284). The generalization extended beyond the FRG as well. As Laird put it: “I am afraid it would
take little persuasion to cause many of the Socialist countries of NATO to reach an accommodation
with the USSR, which looks more and more like the ‘good guy’ in their eyes.”76
In sum, then, Social Democratic rule did correlate with American unease and increased FRG
willingness to reach out to the Soviets. However, since the Social Democrats gained power in part
because of U.S. threats – and because of perceived U.S. unreliability – left-wing influence in the
FRG was in part endogenous to broader trends affecting U.S. reassurance behavior and burden-
sharing pressure, and to those behaviors themselves. Thus, while ideology is certainly part of the
story in explaining why the FRG’s Soviet option became more credible in the late 1960s and early
1970s, its causal role is difficult to clearly establish.
5.6 Conclusion
To summarize, I have shown that the FRG received an enormous number of reassurance measures
from the United States – in the form of U.S. troop deployments, steps toward nuclear sharing, and
countless public and private promises. These assurances were directly linked to fears of German
exit – exacerbated by the FRG’s latent military power and by the costs of Vietnam. At the same
time, however, the FRG’s vulnerability to abandonment and U.S. retrenchment pressure forced the
FRG to satisfy American expectations for burden-sharing.
Similarly, this case provides at best mixed support for the alternative explanations. Aside from
the Congressional retrenchment pressure, which was of concern to all U.S. allies, there was no
significant lobbying on behalf of the FRG in particular that shaped U.S. reassurance or burden-
sharing pressure. Regarding the role of German domestic politics, this case does suggest that U.S.
policymakers’ expectations about the likelihood of FRG exit were influenced by the left-leaning
76Laird to Nixon, “Report on My Trip to Europe,” November 9, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 321-322.
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character of German governments from 1967-74. At the same time, however, the evidence suggests
that German policymakers were reacting to perceptions of U.S. unreliability that resulted from the
Mansfield Amendments and associated retrenchment pressure, and that left-wing influence was in
part a reaction to dissatisfaction with the United States.
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Chapter 6
Burden-Sharing in the Special Relationship: The U.S.-
UK Alliance, 1961-1976
6.1 Case Overview
From the earliest days of the Cold War, British policymakers realized that in light of U.S. and
Soviet strength, their country would be unable to play the role of a great power as it had for
centuries. Nevertheless, Britain’s importance to the United States, and one of the foundations of
the “special relationship” between the two countries, was its unique role as the loyal ally with the
single greatest overseas military presence, which took pressure off the United States. This made
the UK strategically valuable, which in turn gave it bargaining leverage, helping it garner U.S.
assistance for its nuclear program and, later, bailouts that would allow Britain to avoid devaluing
the pound and reducing its defense expenditures and overseas commitments.
By the mid-1960s, Britain’s position had eroded considerably from what it had been prior to
World War II. While the United States initially responded by trying to prop up the British economy,
ballooning British deficits and shrinking defense spending soon made it clear that Britain’s ability
to maintain its global role was rapidly diminishing. The United States tried to use its support
for the British pound – both unilaterally and through international financial institutions – as a
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lever to influence the UK’s continued presence abroad (Schwartz, 2003: 82).1 These included
a package of almost $1 billion in credits ($400 million of which came directly from the United
States) in 1965, as well as a grant from the United States in 1966 (Schwartz, 2003: 82, 146).
Indeed, part of the impetus for arrangements with West Germany to offset the foreign exchange
costs of stationing troops through military purchases was Britain’s threat to not only withdraw its
forces from Germany, but to retrench from Asia as well if it was not compensated. In 1967 the
United States was again forced to come to Britain’s aid, making up for some of the offset shortfall
that West Germany was unable to pay due to its own budgetary woes (Schwartz, 2003: 155-159;
Gavin, 2004: 162-163; Priest, 2006: 133; Gill, 2014: 156).
Ultimately, the American approach of using “carrots” was unsuccessful. British defense bud-
gets were cut during much of the latter half of the 1960s, shrinking from 6.3% of GDP in 1960
to 4.6% in 1970.2 As a result of economic difficulties, at the end of 1967 Britain devalued the
pound and then in January 1968 announced that it would be accelerating the withdrawal of the
90,000 forces it had stationed “east of Suez” in the Middle East and Asia, essentially leaving the
defense of these areas to the United States by March 1971 (Schwartz, 2003: 191-199; Priest, 2006:
141-142). Despite U.S. urging, the decision was not reversed.
As such, the “carrots” approach was abandoned as it became clear that Britain’s value as an ally
1Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson,
“Report from George Ball,” September 10, 1965, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964-1968, Vol.
12, pp. 507-509; Memorandum Prepared by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read), “Visit
of Prime Minister Wilson,” undated [December 1965], FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, pp. 510-512; Memorandum
From the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to President
Johnson, “UK East of Suez Proposals,” January 20, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, pp. 512-514; Memorandum of
Conversation, “British Defense Review,” January 22, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, pp. 514-515; Memorandum
of Conversation, “UK Defense Review–Principal UK Presentations and U.S. Responses,” January 27, 1966, FRUS,
1964-1968, Vol. 12, pp. 516-528; Memorandum From Francis M. Bator of the National Security Council Staff to
President Johnson, “Harold Wilson’s Message of this Morning on the U.K. Defense Review,” February 16, 1966,
FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, p. 529; Telegram From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson, February 25, 1966,
FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, p. 530.
2Source for military spending as a percentage of GDP is the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research Insti-
tute (SIPRI) Military Expenditures Database, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/
milex_database (accessed April 19, 2016).
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had diminished considerably. Indeed, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird even proposed threaten-
ing U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe in 1970 in order to put pressure on the British, though
this approach was rejected by others on the grounds that it was unlikely to be successful and would
only cause tensions at a time when Atlantic relations were already strained by the Vietnam War
and the prospect of U.S. retrenchment (Robb, 2014: 30-33). When Britain proposed further de-
fense cuts in 1974-76, the Ford Administration weighed options that included threats of cutting
off American nuclear cooperation and intelligence sharing. While these threats were unsuccessful,
the United States did not attempt to bail Britain out as it had during the mid-1960s – even when
UK policymakers sought U.S. help in securing a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
(Hughes and Robb, 2013: 896-899; Robb, 2014: 143-149).
In this case, my hypotheses lead me to expect that the UK’s economic and military strength
would have made it extremely valuable to the United States, thus allowing it to extract consider-
able support. However, because it was insulated from conventional attack owing to its distance
and water buffer, and because Britain was of great strategic value due to its network of overseas
bases, Britain’s need for reassurances against conventional attack should have been fairly low, thus
leading it to prefer other forms of support – including nuclear assistance and consultation. Addi-
tionally, its secure position should have insulated it from U.S. burden-sharing pressure. Ultimately,
Britain’s economic decline over the course of the 1960s and into the 1970s should have reduced
both its level of burden-sharing effort and its strategic value to the United States, thus diminishing
the need for a “special relationship” and making the United States more likely to apply significant
burden-sharing pressure.
6.2 1961-1967: British Decline and the United States’ Search for Leverage
The United Kingdom’s primary leverage came in the threat to “go it alone” – both in its nuclear
weapons program, and in its conventional military posture. Because it was so much more removed
from the threat of attack than most U.S. allies, Britain did not need as much reassurance against
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the threat of Soviet invasion. However, because of its size, Britain was able to obtain a number
of concessions from the United States, most notably nuclear assistance and consultation as well as
financial bailout packages, by leveraging its value and threatening to reduce its foreign presence
and leave the defense of Asia (and West Germany) to the United States.
First, much to the chagrin of other NATO allies such as France, Italy, and West Germany,
Britain was able to obtain preferential nuclear cooperation with the United States. The U.S. repre-
sentative to NATO pointed out that Britain’s position as “one of our most important allies” was the
primary motivation behind the “UK having been given preferred position with regard to receiving
information and equipment from US in atomic and missiles field.”3 As Britain’s relative power
declined, however, U.S. enthusiasm for nuclear collaboration diminished.4
When John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency in 1961, however, the United States began to
turn strongly against allied possession of independent nuclear arsenals. As a result his administra-
tion was ambivalent about nuclear assistance to the United Kingdom – a concern exacerbated by
France’s resentment of the Anglo-American nuclear partnership.5 The administration canceled fur-
ther sales of the AGM-48 Skybolt ballistic missile to Britain, largely due to the missile’s technical
problems but also partly out of ambivalence regarding Britain’s independent possession of nuclear
weapons. This led to a crisis in U.S.-UK relations that culminated in the Nassau Conference in
December 1962 (Clark, 1994: 297-301, 305, 362-363).
When the British stood firm and asserted that their nuclear program would continue with or
without U.S. assistance, Kennedy relented and as a compromise committed to providing Polaris
nuclear submarines, calculating that it was better that Britain remain at least somewhat dependent
3Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the
Department of State, December 18, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 13, p. 1052.
4Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the
Department of State, December 18, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 13, pp. 1052-1054; Scope Paper Prepared in the
Department of State, “Prime Minister Macmillan’s Visit to Washington,” April 20, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 13,
pp. 1064-1068.
5Rusk to McNamara, September 8, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 13, pp. 1078-1080; Rusk to McNamara, November
24, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 13, pp. 1086-1088.
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on U.S. assistance and that Britain would ultimately acquiesce to making its nuclear arsenal a part
of the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF) for NATO.6 While the United Kingdom did heavily rely
on the United States for its ballistic missiles and, subsequently, its nuclear submarines, it neverthe-
less had its own bomber force and was willing to push forward alone – with French assistance, if
possible (Neustadt, 1999: 71-73, 85-87, 110; Dumbrell, 2006: 174; Gill, 2014: 48).7
Kennedy sought to avoid a major rupture in U.S.-UK relations which might undermine Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan’s government and strengthen “neutralist” voices – particularly those in
the Labour Party. As a pre-Nassau report put it, if the Conservative government fell, its successor
might indulge “in dangerous illusions regarding East-West relations, would wish to spend more
on social welfare and less on defense” and even “drift toward the Scandinavian position of part-
participant, part-spectator with regard to the Atlantic community” (Clark, 1994: 409-410, quotes
at p. 410). Moreover, as a State Department memo cautioned prior to the Nassau Conference, “we
still rely heavily on British real estate all over the world, from Christmas Island to Holy Loch; we
should carefully consider the possible consequences of an estrangement of this relationship.”8 The
American position was thus explicitly influenced by Britain’s threat of exit, which was rendered
particularly salient because of its strategic value – its capabilities, its global presence, and the
territory it provided for U.S. military bases.
Although the Americans tried to force Britain into committing its nuclear arsenal to the MLF
at Nassau, British policymakers used the threat of “reassessing their global defense posture” if
they were not allowed to keep an independent arsenal. While the Nassau Agreement did officially
assign Britain’s Polaris submarines to a “multilateral force,” in practice the British resisted giving
up control in subsequent years (Neustadt, 1999: 91-92, 94, 99). They thus avoided having their
6Kitchen to Rusk, “Principle Substantive Issues Emerging from Nassau Follow-Up,” January 4, 1963, FRUS, 1961-
1963, Vol. 13, pp. 1123-1128.
7Indeed, in the early 1960s, Britain revised its nuclear targeting to destroy only ten Soviet cities rather than the original
forty, thus reducing its independent deterrent needs (Clark, 1994: 382-394).
8Department of State Memorandum, “Implications for the United Kingdom of Decision to Abandon Skybolt,” October
31, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 13, p. 1084.
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deterrent subsumed under the MLF (Priest, 2006: 31, 34-35, 40, 42, 47-48, 52). This pattern
persisted into the Johnson Administration as well, with preferential nuclear cooperation being
maintained in order to avoid a major break between the two allies that would only lead Britain
to continue its nuclear weapons program on its own.9 Under Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who
came to power in October 1964, Britain also exploited Johnson’s fear of British retrenchment
east of Suez, which had become especially undesirable as a result of U.S. preoccupation with the
Vietnam War (Middeke, 2001: 152), to keep U.S. pressure for British integration into the MLF at
bay (Kelleher, 1975: 145, 253-254; Schwartz, 2003: 62-63; Priest, 2006: 77, 87-88, 93-94; Gill,
2014: 100-101, 123-124, 134). Additionally, Johnson formally reassured Britain that it would
be consulted before a use of nuclear weapons by the United States, a promise which was later
reaffirmed by the Nixon Administration.10
British opposition was a major contributing factor to the end of the MLF concept. Bundy
pointed to seven reasons why the MLF should be left for dead, the first being “a deeply reluctant
and essentially unpersuaded Great Britain” (Priest, 2006: 106). Johnson was unwilling “to kick
mother England out the door into the cold while I bring the Kaiser into the sitting room” (ibid.,
p. 108). In place of the MLF, Wilson counter-proposed the creation of an Atlantic Nuclear Force
(ANF), in which Britain would have a veto over the use of the multilateral arsenal and in which
West Germany would not have access to nuclear weapons. While the ANF never came into being
– and, indeed, may have been designed just as much to kill the MLF as it was a serious proposal
in its own right – neither did the MLF (Haftendorn, 1996: esp. 121-122, 137-139). Thus British
9Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson, “Military Nuclear Cooperation
with the United Kingdom,” November 22, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, pp. 632-635.
10Letter From President Nixon to British Prime Minister Wilson, September 17, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41,
pp. 965-966; Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, “Nuclear consultation
with the British,” December 15, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 994-997; Letter From President Nixon to
British Prime Minister Heath, May 4, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 1015; Nixon to Heath, “Understandings
with the British on the Use of British Bases and Nuclear Weapons,” December 14, 1970, Folder “United Kingdom,
Vol. V [1 of 2],” National Security Council Files, Country Files, Box 728, Richard M. Nixon Library and Museum,
Yorba Linda, California [hereafter RMNL].
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policymakers got their wish: continued preferential nuclear cooperation with the United States,
and no German control of nuclear weapons (Priest, 2006: 93-94, 101-103, 106-112; Dumbrell,
2006: 176-177). In place of the MLF, the United States created the NATO Nuclear Planning
Group (NPG), which would create a regular forum for consultation over nuclear weapons use and
targeting (Priest, 2006: 116-117, 120-121; Gill, 2014: 100-101).11
Second, Britain’s position as the only U.S. ally with global military reach gave it enormous lee-
way in making demands for economic assistance. Most notably, these included American efforts
to support the British pound such as direct bailout packages and efforts through international insti-
tutions such as the IMF. U.S. policymakers feared that if Britain was not bailed out, there was little
stopping it from devaluing the pound and withdrawing from Asia; Undersecretary of State George
Ball, for one, emphasized that Britain’s threat of retrenchment militated against trying to drive a
hard deal with it (Dumbrell, 1996: 223; Gill, 2014: 84, 123-124). Johnson Administration officials
explicitly tied their concessions to Britain – including nuclear cooperation and financial support –
to its “importance,” but noted that this importance might not continue beyond “the short-term” as
British decline continued (Dumbrell, 1996: 217-218).
The United Kingdom’s defense budget dropped precipitously in the 1960s, and it retrenched
from its deployments “east of Suez” much faster than the United States wished, accelerating from
a mid-1970s timetable to 1971. Indeed, during the early 1960s Britain proved resistant to a con-
ventional build-up, despite the insistence of the Kennedy Administration.12 As Britain prepared its
Defence Review under the new Labour government led by Wilson in 1965-66, it was in the midst
of a prolonged economic crisis revolving around its balance of payments deficit.13 As such, fiscal
11Memorandum of Conversation, “Summary of Discussion on MLF, Atlantic Defense and Related Matters,” October
31, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13, pp. 95-100; Memorandum of Conversation, December 8, 1964, FRUS, 1964-
1968, Vol. 13, pp. 146-156.
12Kohler to Rusk, “U.K.’s Nuclear Role: A Program of Action,” May 24, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 13, pp.
1073-1075.
13A comprehensive account of the crises surrounding the balance of payments and price of sterling can be found in
O’Hara (2003).
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realities soon produced deep defense cuts and considerable debate within the United Kingdom over
the merits of the east of Suez commitments (Priest, 2006: 123-126).14
U.S. pressure under Johnson was strikingly light. The American response was not to threaten
abandonment, but rather to bail Britain out, and U.S. officials refrained from making American
support conditional upon the British presence in Asia or on British assistance in the Vietnam War
(Dumbrell, 1996: 219-220, 222; Schwartz, 2003: 62-63, 82; Priest, 2006: 123-124; Hughes and
Robb, 2013: 871).15 In spite of pressure from some officials – including Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy – Johnson hesitated to explic-
itly make the massive multilateral bailout package Britain received a quid pro quo for Britain’s
continued presence east of Suez (Gill, 2014: 123-124, 134-136, 156, 158). Again during 1967,
as the British were leaning toward planning withdrawal from east of Suez by the mid-1970s, the
Americans only asked Britain to “avoid taking, or in any event making public in any way, basic
decisions at this point on withdrawal by the mid-1970’s,” without bringing any hard pressure to
bear.16 Even when Britain announced its devaluation of the pound in late 1967, followed by the
January 1968 announcement that its retrenchment east of Suez would be accelerated from 1975
to 1971, American expressed only expressed disappointment with the British decision (Dumbrell,
1996: 222-223, 227-230).17 A letter from Johnson to Wilson is worth quoting at length:
14Memorandum of Conversation, “Defense Problems,” December 7, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, pp. 475-479;
Memorandum of Conversation, “British Defense Review,” May 14, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, pp. 488-489;
Memorandum of Conversation, “U.K. Defense Review,” June 30, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, pp. 493-496;
Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson, July 29, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, pp. 499-500.
15Telegram From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson, July 13, 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, pp. 575-
578; Memorandum of Conversation, “British Defense White Paper,” July 17, 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, p.
579; Briefing Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to
President Johnson, “Your Meeting This Afternoon at 6:30 on German Offset and U.S. and UK Forces in Germany,”
August 23, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13, pp. 453-456.
16Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to Foreign Secretary Brown, April 21, 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol.
12, p. 568.
17Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, “Healey views on UK defense
policy,” January 9, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, pp. 599-602; Memorandum of Conversation, “British Budget
and Defense Cuts,” January 11, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, pp. 603-608; Diary Entry by the Ambassador to
the United Kingdom (Bruce), February 8, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, pp. 615-616.
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Although the decision must, of course, be your own, I can only wonder if you and all
of your associates have taken fully into account the direct and indirect consequences.
While the hour is late, I urge you and your colleagues once more to review the alter-
natives before you take these irrevocable steps. Even a prolongation of your presence
in the Far East and the Persian Gulf until other stable arrangements can be put in place
would be of help at this very difficult time for all of us.18
U.S. policymakers recognized that there was little the United States could do, aside from fur-
ther bailouts, to keep Britain from cutting spending and withdrawing from east of Suez. State
Department officials acknowledged in 1967 that the British “will do what they will do” and that
there was “no real prospect that the process [of retrenchment] can or will be halted” (O’Hara, 2003:
275). Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler came to a similar conclusion in June 1966, pointing out
that the United States essentially faced the choice of leaving Britain to its own devices – which
would almost certainly mean a devaluation of the pound and further cuts – and additional “bail
money.”19
6.3 1967-1970: Diminished British Stature, Diminished British Leverage
While Britain was insulated from U.S. pressure by geography, its economic and military decline did
ultimately reduce its bargaining leverage. By retrenching from east of Suez, it effectively played
its hand, and was increasingly coming to be seen by American officials more as one ally among
many rather than having a “special” place in U.S. foreign policy (Hynes, 2009: 11-12). After
Britain’s decision to accelerate its east of Suez withdrawal, decision-makers in the Johnson and
Nixon administrations no longer felt compelled to provide as many favors and were less reluctant
to apply significant pressure on the United Kingdom. A Central Intelligence Agency report noted
18Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson, January 11, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, p. 609.
19Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to President Johnson, “The Sterling Crisis and the U.S. Bar-
gaining Position vis-a-vis the U.K.,” July 18, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, p. 543.
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in early 1969 that Britain’s defense cuts had reduced “Britain’s credit as an ally,”20 while a 1969
National Intelligence Estimate similarly claimed that “The ‘special relationship’ with the US has
lost much of its psychological hold,” in Britain, adding that it “in any case no longer confers upon
the UK any indispensable benefits.”21
Indeed, even by late 1967, it was apparent that British retrenchment was inevitable, and as
a result U.S. policymakers’ willingness to give Britain what it wanted diminished considerably
(Dumbrell, 1996: 227-230). U.S. policymakers had realized earlier that Britain was on the de-
cline; Johnson had said in December 1964 that “Britain is not that important anymore” (Schwartz,
2003: 49), and Britain’s recurring currency crises, defense cuts, and ultimately its announcement it
would be withdrawing from east of Suez solidified this perception (Schwartz, 2003: 67, 71).22 As
a result, policymakers increasingly questioned the value of the special relationship; by 1967, U.S.
Ambassador David Bruce argued that “the so-called Anglo-American special relationship” was
“little more than sentimental terminology,” while Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford
agreed in 1968 that Britain’s retrenchment represented a turning point in the relationship (Dumb-
rell, 1996: 219). When the Tories came to power, Prime Minister Edward Heath promised to keep
some forces east of Suez; however, he reneged on this pledge the following year.23
Developments on the U.S. side also put strain on the relationship. The costs of fighting the
war in Vietnam led many in the U.S. Congress and public to increasingly favor a reduced U.S.
20Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, “Current Problems in NATO,” January 21,
1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 12.
21National Intelligence Estimate, “Europe, the US, and the USSR,” December 4, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p.
80.
22Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to President Johnson, “The Sterling Crisis and the U.S. Bar-
gaining Position vis-a-vis the U.K.,” July 18, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, pp. 539-543; Memorandum From
the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson, “Harold Wilson’s Visit–The Opportunity for an Act of
Statesmanship,” July 22, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, pp. 545-555; Paper Prepared in the Department of State,
“Directions of UK Policy,” undated [March-June 1968], FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, pp. 618-624.
23Kissinger to Nixon, “State Memorandum on Heath’s New Reform Programs,” November 16, 1970, Folder “United
Kingdom, Vol. IV [1 of 1],” National Security Council Files, Country Files, Box 727, RMNL; Huntsman to
Kissinger, “British Withdrawal – Persian Gulf,” March 5, 1971, Folder “United Kingdom, Vol. V [1 of 2],” Na-
tional Security Council Files, Country Files, Box 728, RMNL
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overseas presence – both in Europe and in Asia. Regarding Europe, this most notably took the
form of a series of resolutions and amendments during the years 1966-74 sponsored by Senator
Mike Mansfield, proposing massive reductions in U.S. troops stationed in Europe (Williams, 1985:
142, 162, 170; Kaplan, 1999: 138; Zimmermann, 2009: 16). In a May 1970 memo to Kissinger,
senior NSC staffer Helmut Sonnenfeldt pointed to British concerns about Vietnam, writing that
Defence Minister Denis Healey “is deeply disturbed by what he feels has happened to our elan; he
is quite persuaded...that we will be unable if not unwilling to maintain our force levels in Europe
and he sees our commitments as eroding.” Sonnenfeldt added that Healey believed “the longer
we stay and the more we bleed [in Vietnam] the stronger the impulse toward isolationism and the
danger of domestic upheaval.”24
But domestic actors within the United States provided policymakers with a way of putting ef-
fective burden-sharing pressure on its allies – including Britain. Policymakers carefully leveraged
the possibility of withdrawal in order to encourage increased defense effort by Britain (and NATO
more generally). During a North Atlantic Council meeting in November 1968, Rusk used the
threat of domestic “isolationism” as a means of pressuring allies to increase their efforts25, while
Kissinger similarly argued in a meeting of the Defense Program Review Committee Meeting in
August 1971 that the Europeans needed “to believe that the situation is serious,” adding that “A
Mansfield resolution will surely pass if they don’t make a bigger effort.”26 In his February 1970
Foreign Policy Report to Congress, Nixon argued that Europe needed to make more of an effort for
its own defense. Indeed, in June 1970 Britain’s Under-Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office argued in favor of increasing European defense efforts in order to “reduc[e] US domestic
pressure for withdrawals” and “mitigat[e] the impact of such withdrawals as occur” (Hynes, 2009:
24Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry Kissinger, “Impressions of European Attitudes, May 1970,” May 22, 1970, Folder
“Europe General [1 of 2],” National Security Council Files, Country Files, Box 667, RMNL.
25Memorandum of Conversation, “General Tour d’Horizon (1 of 2),” November 14, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13,
p. 788.
26Minutes of a Defense Program Review Committee Meeting, “NATO Force Improvements,” August 4, 1971, FRUS,
1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 301
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14-15). Secretary of State Rogers told British Foreign Minister Alec Douglas-Home that because
of Congress, “we have a serious problem and we can use all the help we can get in solving it.”27
As a result, the downward trend in British defense spending during the late 1960s reversed
in 1970-72.28 Nevertheless, they focused their efforts on improving their own forces rather than
making contributions to NATO infrastructure, much to the chagrin of the other NATO members (in-
cluding the FRG) that sought to pool their resources.29 More generally, European defense budgets
increased during the early 1970s.30
The Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 undercut these efforts, how-
ever. U.S. officials were now in agreement on the need for a show of strength to deter further Soviet
aggression (Priest, 2006: 150-152).31 As President Lyndon Johnson put it: “Czechoslovakia pro-
vided some time” during which domestic pressure would be muted.32 Yet this also limited the
incentives of allies – including the United Kingdom – to do more themselves. While the NATO
allies supported the United States’ push for allied unity after the invasion, their actual military re-
27Telegram from U.S. embassy (London) to Secretary Rogers, “Sec Visit: Conversation with Foreign Secretary:
NATO, US Troops and A.D. 70,” July 1970, Folder “United Kingdom, Vol. III [2 of 4],” National Security Council
Files, Country Files, Box 727, RMNL.
28Odeen to Kissinger, “UK Defense Expenditures,” December 18, 1971, Folder “United Kingdom, Vol. VII [2 of 4],”
NSC Files, Country Files, Box 729, RMNL.
29Telegram from U.S. mission to NATO to Secretary Rogers, “Eurogroup Defense Ministers Meeting,” November
1970, Folder “United Kingdom, Vol. IV [1 of 3],” National Security Council Files, Country Files, Box 727, RMNL;
Telegram from U.S. embassy (London) to Secretary Rogers, “UK and NATO Burden Sharing,” November 1970,
Folder “United Kingdom, Vol. IV [1 of 3],” National Security Council Files, Country Files, Box 727, RMNL;
Telegram from U.S. embassy (Bonn) to Secretary Rogers, “Euro Group Defense Ministers Meeting/FRG Proposal,”
November 1970, Folder “United Kingdom, Vol. IV [1 of 3],” National Security Council Files, Country Files, Box
727, RMNL; Kissinger to Laird and Rogers, “My Talk with Lord Carrington, November 23, 1970,” November 23,
1970, Folder “United Kingdom, Vol. IV [1 of 3],” National Security Council Files, Country Files, Box 727, RMNL.
30State Department Briefing Paper, “President Nixon’s Visit to Brussels,” June 1974, Folder “NAC Summit - Brussels
The President,” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, Box 54, RMNL.
31Memorandum of Conversation, “General Tour d’Horizon (1 of 2),” November 14, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13,
pp. 787-790; Memorandum of Conversation, “Meeting of Secretary Laird with the Secretary General of NATO, 14
February 1969,” February 14, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 31-36.
32Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Johnson,
March 22, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, p. 629.
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sponses were largely symbolic.33 A Central Intelligence Agency memorandum noted in November
that “the European allies have responded to the events in Czechoslovakia with far more promise
than performance....Britain has pledged further commitments which represent almost nothing new
for the common defense.”34 New British contributions were regarded as “bottom of the barrel,”
while the United Kingdom refused such U.S. requests as permanent commitment of the aircraft
carrier HMS Ark Royal to NATO (Priest, 2006: 151-152; quote at p. 151). Another report in early
1969 came to a similar conclusion:
As for Britain, the pullback from east of Suez does not necessarily have as a corollary
an expanded military input into the alliance. Despite an expected realignment of forces
in the Mediterranean, the army’s strength in Europe will not increase, and the Royal
Air Force of the 1970s will be hard-pressed to assume a much larger role than at
present. By 1970, when London intends to have demobilized more than 75,000 men,
its armed forces will quite possibly rank fifth in size in Western Europe.35
6.4 1969-1976: Strains on the Special Relationship
Domestic pressure produced significant concern among Europeans about the credibility of the
U.S. commitment in the early 1970s. The United Kingdom’s increased interest in the European
Economic Community (EC) stemmed in no small part from concerns about the U.S. commitment
to NATO (Hynes, 2009: 139-140).36 British policymakers saw joining the EC as a way to bargain
33Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State, “Wrap-up of NATO Ministerial Meeting, Novem-
ber 14-16,” November 16, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13, pp. 790-792; Memorandum From Secretary of Defense
Laird to President Nixon, “NATO Defense Issues,” February 20, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 37-43.
34Intelligence Memorandum No. 2049/68, “The Response of the NATO Countries to the Invasion of Czechoslovakia,”
November 4, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13, p. 778.
35Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, “Current Problems in NATO,” January 21,
1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 12.
36Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary
of State Rogers, “Tensions in US Relations with Europe,” November 15, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp.
322-328.
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with the United States “from a single position, and as far as possible with a single voice” (Hynes,
2009: 79-80; quote at p. 79). Despite initially favoring British membership in the EC, the Nixon
Administration became concerned that both the EC and Britain were becomingly increasingly
willing to not only challenge U.S. economic interests but also to undermine the United States’
position in Europe. Britain increasingly put less value on the special relationship, and doubted the
United States’ “long term staying power” (Hynes, 2009: 59-60, 75, 78; quote at p. 60).
In February 1971, Nixon expressed reservations about EC trade policies in his Foreign Policy
Report to Congress, arguing that the Community needed to consider the United States’ “legitimate
economic interests” (Hynes, 2009: 27). Of particular concern was the EC’s unified tariff on im-
ported goods, as well as its preferential trade agreements with non-EC members such as Spain and
Israel (Kissinger, 1982: 135).37 Treasury Secretary John Connally similarly declared in May that
EC protectionism, defense free-riding, and foreign exchange restrictions were unsustainable in an
era of shrinking U.S. resources (Hynes, 2009: 29). In an effort to cope with U.S. economic con-
ditions, Nixon announced in August that the dollar would be taken off the gold standard, causing
great consternation among U.S. partners.
Additionally, the Nixon administration feared that the NATO allies might drift from the United
States and go their own way, becoming more willing to seek separate, “bilateral” rapprochement
with the Communist bloc or pursue nuclear weapons (Robb, 2014: 49).38 Commenting on the
Mansfield proposals, Kissinger argued that “our withdrawal will mean that Europe will seek nu-
clear autonomy or will move in the direction of Finland or possibly do both things simultane-
ously.”39 Assistant Secretary of State Martin Hillenbrand similarly reported that “Many Europeans
37Bergsten and Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, “Preparation for Malfatti Visit,” January 15, 1971, Folder “European Com-
mon Market, Vol. I,” NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 322, RMNL; Davis to Kissinger, “U.S. Policy toward the
European Community,” June 4, 1970, Folder “European Common Market, Vol. I,” NSC Files, Subject Files, Box
322, RMNL.
38Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, “NSC Meeting: NATO & MBFR,” November 19, 1970, FRUS,
1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 225-232.
39Minutes of a Legislative Interdepartmental Group Meeting, “Mansfield Resolution,” May 12, 1971, FRUS, 1969-
1976, Vol. 41, p. 270.
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believe that the failure of the United States to achieve victory in Vietnam has caused American dis-
enchantment with foreigners and less willingness to meet Alliance responsibilities,” and arguing
that in the absence of reassurance, “we can expect from them [Europe]....increasing accommo-
dation to the Russians on political and economic issues.”40 The fear that allies might seek to
independently strike deals with the Soviet Union extended to Britain as well. In the aftermath of a
NATO Ministers meeting in May 1970, Kissinger wrote to Nixon that “several of the Allies, led by
the British, want to come out...with a very forward looking approach to the Soviets on a European
Conference and on balanced force reduction proposals. We have tried to combat this drift.”41
In addition to unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals, what concerned the European allies was the
United States’ efforts at detente with the Communist bloc, about which they felt inadequately
consulted and informed. In particular, the British resented being left out as the United States
pursued the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviets and the opening to China
(Hynes, 2009: 37, 51, 60-61, 63-64). They feared these efforts could be precursors to further deals
that sold out the interests of U.S. allies in favor of reducing the risk of war for the United States
(Kissinger, 1982: 147-148).
As a result, U.S. policymakers went to great lengths to reassure not only Britain but all the
NATO allies. This first of all took the form of vigorous opposition to Congressional pressure for
troop withdrawals, combined with assurances to Europe that such withdrawals would not occur.42
Later that year, Nixon made the decision to maintain U.S. troop levels despite Congressional pres-
sure for withdrawal.43 He repeatedly promised that there would be no “unilateral” U.S. withdrawal
40Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary of
State Rogers, “Tensions in US Relations with Europe,” November 15, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 326;
see also Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State, “Secretary LairdâA˘Z´s Talk With FRG
Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt,” June 12, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 157-158.
41Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, “Secre-
tary Rogers’ Plans for the NATO Meeting,” May 26, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 156.
42Memorandum for the Record, “The President’s Meeting with Former High Government Officials and Military Offi-
cers on the Mansfield Amendment, Thursday, May 13, 1971, 4:35 p.m.,” May 13, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41,
pp. 274-281.
43National Security Decision Memorandum 95, “U.S. Strategy and Forces for NATO,” November 25, 1970, FRUS,
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– that is, no withdrawal of U.S. forces that was not also accompanied by a withdrawal of Soviet
forces – and that decisions on mutual force reductions with the Soviet Union (Mutual Balanced
Force Reductions, or MBFR) would not be made without allied consultation (see, e.g., FRUS
Nixonv43, Docs 48, 74, 85).44 In a visit to the UK in fall 1970, Nixon reassured the new British
Prime Minister Heath of the U.S. commitment, and then during a visit by Heath in February 1973,
Nixon again promised that “You can be sure...that we will stay in Europe as long as I am here”
(Hynes, 2009: 79, 93; quote at p. 93). Nixon’s successor Gerald Ford similarly promised that “the
United States remains committed to playing a responsible role of leadership in the world,” and
that he would “not permit the Congress or any other entity to tie our hands.”45 In a memo to Ford
in May 1975, Kissinger wrote that “your reassurances of U.S. fidelity to its NATO commitments
will be taken as meaning that the U.S. has no intention of unilaterally drawing down its military
strength in Europe.”46
Additionally, U.S. policymakers attempted to reassure the UK that detente would not sacrifice
1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 233-235; National Security Decision Memorandum 133, “U.S. Strategy and Forces for
NATO; Allied Force Improvements,” September 22, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 306-308.
44Report on a NATO Commanders Meeting, September 30, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 190-194; Memo-
randum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, “Report on My Trip to Europe,” November 9, 1971,
FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 315-322; Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion to the Department of State and the Department of Defense, “NATO’s December Ministerial: some Mission
views,” November 29, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 346-347. Hillenbrand argued in April 1969 that “Re-
ductions...would cause Europeans to question the firmness of our resolve to participate in European defense, our
willingness to meet our NATO commitments, and our combat capabilities. Such reductions would call into question
the President’s statements in Europe about maintaining our force levels.” Memorandum From the Assistant Secre-
tary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary of State Rogers, “NSC Meeting on US Policy Toward
NATO–BRIEFING MEMORANDUM,” April 7, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 48-49.
45Memo from Scowcroft to Ford, “Meeting with Anne L. Armstrong, Ambassador Delegate to Great Britain,” January
14, 1976, Folder “United Kingdom, 1976 (1) WH,” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC Europe, Canada, and
Ocean Affairs Staff Files, Box 39, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan [hereafter GRFL]. In an April
1975 memo to Ford, Kissinger similarly argued that Ford’s trip to Europe should serve “to emphasize to our NATO
Allies the fundamental importance you attach to the Alliance...and your commitment to meaningful consultations
with the Allies.” Kissinger to Ford, “Schedule Proposal: Permanent Representatives of the North Atlantic Council,”
February 6, 1975, Folder “North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1975 (1) WH,” National Security Adviser’s
Files, NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files, Box 53, GRFL.
46Kissinger to Ford, “Meeting with NATO Heads of Government,” May 1975, Folder “May-June 1975 - European Trip
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit (2) WH,” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC Europe,
Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files, Box 69, GRFL.
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the interests of U.S. allies.47 Upon announcing an upcoming Moscow summit for SALT, Nixon
argued in October 1971 that it would not come “at the expense of any other nation,” and promised
“extensive consultation” (Hynes, 2009: 37). Reiterating this promise the following month, Nixon
stressed that the United States would not “abandon or put aside any existing relationships” in
the name of “a relaxation of tensions” (Hynes, 2009: 51). Nixon and Heath similarly held a
summit in Bermuda in December, during which Nixon sought to assuage British concerns about
U.S. reliability and a lack of consultation, while Kissinger promised to consult the British on
negotiations for the U.S.-Soviet Agreement for the Prevention of Nuclear War.48 However, despite
numerous assurances, the British continued to have suspicions about the secrecy with which the
United States pursued its bilateral detente with the Soviets, as well as about the U.S. commitment
in the face of rising domestic isolationism (Hynes, 2009: 53-57, 65-68, 115-116).
Aside from trade and relations with the Soviet Union, the other major point of contention
was burden-sharing. In light of the strains on U.S. resources, as well as pressure from Congress,
increased efforts by the Europeans was seen as a crucial way to not only defuse domestic iso-
lationism within the United States, but also to maintain NATO’s ability to defend against Soviet
conventional attack. Nixon explicitly attempted to link the staying power of the U.S. commitment
to allied burden-sharing efforts (Nichter, 2015: 11-12, 112-113, 138). Laird, who despite initial
opposition to troop reductions later favored threatening withdrawal as a means of burden-sharing
pressure, asserted that while “reassurances” were “clearly in order,” the United States should not
“freeze” U.S. force levels, as this “might pose serious Congressional and policy problems for us”
(Hughes and Robb, 2013: 876; Robb, 2014: 53).49 Indeed, limited reductions from Europe were
47Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, “Your Breakfast with Denis Healey, November 13, 1969,” November 10, 1969, Folder
“United Kingdom, Vol. II [1 of 4],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 726, RMNL; Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, “Wilson’s
Brief on SALT,” January 26, 1970, Folder “United Kingdom, Vol. I [3 of 3],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 726,
RMNL; Telegram from U.S. embassy (London) to Secretary Rogers, “Wilson Visit - SALT,” January 1970, Folder
“United Kingdom, Vol. II [1 of 4],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 726, RMNL.
48Memorandum of Conversation, “Nuclear Understanding; UK Deterrent, Modernization,” August 10, 1972, Folder
“UK Memcons (Originals) [1 of 2],” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, Box 62, RMNL.
49Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, “NATO Defense Issues,” February 20, 1969,
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made in 1969 as part of the REDCOSTE (Reduction of Costs in Europe) program, though Nixon
Administration emphasized that the reductions were not harbingers of steep withdrawal.50
Speaking with British Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend, Nixon emphasized that “we would not
give up our defense of or our commitments to our allies,” but added that “The coming election
period would not be good for the Alliance.”51 The British received the message, and recognized
that the Nixon Administration faced constraints limiting its freedom of action due to its balance of
payments deficits and the costs of Vietnam (Hynes, 2009: 31). Heath argued in March 1971 that
“we Europeans must do more for our own defence” in order to satiate the United States (Hynes,
2009: 27). The British realized that they needed to acquiesce to at least some U.S. demands in
order to avoid an American withdrawal from Europe forced by Congress, and thus the British,
alongside the other NATO allies, increased their contributions (Scott, 2011: 147, 153).52
In an attempt to deal with all of these matters simultaneously, the Nixon Administration launched
its “Year of Europe” initiative in 1973. The Americans hoped to link all of these issues into “one
ball of wax,” as Nixon put it, and create a new Atlantic Charter (Hynes, 2009: 89). In April 1973,
Kissinger delivered a speech hailing in the Year of Europe, in which he reassured the Europeans
of the U.S. commitment but stressed the need for burden-sharing and the avoidance of preferential
EC trade policies. The speech was not well-received, however, as the Europeans saw it as pedantic
FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 39-40.
50Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary of State Rogers,
“NSC Meeting on US Policy Toward NATO–BRIEFING MEMORANDUM,” April 7, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976,
Vol. 41, pp. 47-50; National Security Decision Memorandum 12, “NATO,” April 14, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976,
Vol. 41, pp. 57-58; Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to
President Nixon, “Under Secretaries Committee Recommendation on Scenario for Explaining Reduction in Our
Force Commitments to NATO,” October 14, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 69-71.
51Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), “The
President’s Meeting with Sir Burke Trend, British Ambassador Cromer, and Henry A. Kissinger,” July 28, 1972,
FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 1053.
52Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State, “Alliance Defense
for the 70’s,” December 3, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 236-240; Memorandum From Secretary of State
Rogers to President Nixon, “NATO Ministerial Meeting,” December 5, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 240-
241; Telegram From the Department of State to All North Atlantic Treaty Organization Capitals, “NATO Ministerial
Meeting: An Overview,” December 11, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, pp. 334-337.
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and (largely correctly) as a veiled attempt at using U.S. security leverage for economic coercion
(Hynes, 2009: 79-81, 86, 97, 100-102, 169).
Nixon and Kissinger repeatedly pushed for increased European defense efforts – both to im-
prove their own forces and to offset U.S. costs for stationing troops – with Nixon claiming in a
May 1973 speech to Congress that the Europeans need “to provide for their own defenses” (Hynes,
2009: 115). This pressure largely took the form of a “good cop-bad cop routine,” in which Ameri-
can officials used the retrenchment pressure they faced from domestic audiences as leverage while
simultaneously reassuring the UK of the United States’ long-term commitment. U.S. officials
warned of a tide of “neo-isolationism” if the Europeans did not increase their efforts (Hynes, 2009:
132-133, 140, 163). Kissinger argued that “regional egoism” in economics could not continue to
coexist along “integrated defense” in security (Hynes, 2009: 127), with Sonnenfeldt recommend-
ing that Kissinger warn the British that “if NATO cannot come together” on burden-sharing, “then
the chances of unilateral [American reductions] will rise.”53
As it had recently joined the EC, Nixon and Kissinger hoped Britain would act as an advocate
for the American position among the other Community members. However, the British were
skeptical, fearing not only U.S. security linkage but also an attempt to weaken EC unity. Heath
was far more committed to Britain’s role in Europe, and less so to its role as a close partner to
the United States, than his predecessors, and was unwilling to jeopardize EC unity for the sake of
loyalty to the Americans. As such, on July 23, 1973, the UK and other EC foreign ministers agreed
to exchange with each other any information they received from the United States bilaterally, thus
presenting the United States with a united front (Scott, 2011: 156-157).
Shortly thereafter in August 1973, Kissinger ordered a cessation to U.S.-UK intelligence coop-
eration in order to coerce Prime Minister Edward Heath into backing the United States’ positions
in the EC regarding trade disputes and burden-sharing, with Nixon arguing that there would be “no
53Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, “Your Meeting with Sir Alec Douglas Home,” September 20, 1973, Folder “United King-
dom, Oct. 72-Sep. 73,” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 730, RMNL.
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more special relations.” American officials also sent ambiguous signals about continued support
for Britain’s Polaris nuclear submarine (Hughes and Robb, 2013: 881-883, quote at p. 881). Pres-
sure in this case was successful, with Britain reversing course and taking the lead in lobbying on
the United States’ behalf and not only dealing with the United States bilaterally, but also providing
the United States with information about its own multilateral dealings with the EC (Robb, 2014:
89-90). The threat to cut off cooperation was used again later in 1973 in order to bring Britain into
line on the U.S. position in the Yom Kippur War. Kissinger referred to these measures as “punish-
ment” that would teach British policymakers a “lesson” not to oppose the United States (Hughes
and Robb, 2013: 885).
Because Britain was no longer as valuable, Nixon and Kissinger felt little hesitation in using
threats to apply pressure on it.54 Nevertheless, the Year of Europe initiative came to little, and the
following year Britain again proved willing to cut its defense efforts. Due in part to the domes-
tic retrenchment pressure it faced, the United States had been more effective in deterring further
reductions in British effort during the Nixon Administration. But upon Wilson’s return to office
amid economic hardship in 1974-76, Britain again weighted defense cuts.55 The Ford Administra-
tion found itself without an effective means of coercion, as Congressional pressure declined after
1973 (Williams, 1985: ch. 8). The proposed cuts amounted to around 1.5% of GDP, with a forty
thousand reduction in manpower. While policymakers weighed their options – including threats
by Kissinger and Defense Secretary James Schlesinger to cut off nuclear and intelligence coop-
eration – ultimately the United States could again do little to compel the British aside from pleas
and verbal and written reprimands.56 As a result, Britain proceeded with several rounds of defense
54As a 1976 State Department memo put it: “It would be possible to picture a UK so pressed economically as to be
ineffective in many of the areas, military, economic and diplomatic, where we have cooperated in the past.” See
Memo from John J. Crowley, Jr. to various recipients, “Policy Objectives Toward the UK,” May 24, 1976, Folder
“United Kingdom, 1976 (5) WH,” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff
Files, Box 40, GRFL.
55Kissinger to Nixon, “Your Meeting with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson,” June 26, 1974, Folder “Meeting
with NATO Heads of Government Briefing Papers,” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, Box 54, RMNL.
56Telegram from Kissinger to U.S. Embassy (London), “US-UK Discussions on UK Defense Review,” November
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cuts (Hughes and Robb, 2013: 893-900).57 However, U.S. officials did attempt to use the specter
of Congressional reaction as a means of encouraging UK defense spending, and British cuts were
largely directed at non-NATO British comments (i.e., those in Asia), which were considered lower
priority.58
Nevertheless, the Ford Administration declined to provide any kind of assistance, and in 1976
also refused to use its influence in the IMF to let the United Kingdom off the hook in cutting public
spending in exchange for a loan (Hughes and Robb, 2013: 887-888, 893-900).59 Ford declined to
help Britain on the grounds that it was no longer important enough to justify bailing it out (Robb,
2014: ch. 5). But threats were also unsuccessful in this case, as Britain made steep defense cuts
and Ford had little choice but to accept them.60
1974, Folder “United Kingdom - State Department Telegrams from SECSTATE - NODIS (1),” National Security
Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 15, GRFL.
57Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Spring-
steen) to Secretary of State Kissinger, “Possible Pressure Points on the U.K.,” October 30, 1973, FRUS, 1969-
1976, Vol. E-15 (Part 2), pp. 724-728; Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger) to President Ford, “UK Defense Review,” November 15, 1974, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15 (Part 2),
pp. 746-748.
58Telegram from Kissinger to U.S. Embassy (London), “British Defense Review,” November 1974, Folder “United
Kingdom - State Department Telegrams from SECSTATE - NODIS (1),” National Security Adviser’s Files, Presi-
dential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 15, GRFL; Telegram from Kissinger to U.S. Embassy (London),
“Consultations on British Defense Review,” November 1974, Folder “United Kingdom - State Department Tele-
grams from SECSTATE - NODIS (1),” National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for Europe and
Canada, Box 15, GRFL; Telegram from Kissinger to U.S. Embassy (London), “Message from Secretary to Foreign
Secretary Callaghan on British Defense Cuts,” December 1975, Folder “United Kingdom - State Department Tele-
grams from SECSTATE - NODIS (4),” National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for Europe and
Canada, Box 15, GRFL.
59Memo from Hyland to Ford, “Statement on UK,” October 28, 1976, Folder “United Kingdom (8),” National Se-
curity Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 15, GRFL; Memo from Scowcroft,
“Schedule Proposal: Private office visit with Harold Lever,” November 12, 1976, Folder “United Kingdom (8),”
National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 15, GRFL; Memo from
Scowcroft, “Meeting on the UK Economic Situation,” November 1976, Folder “United Kingdom (19),” National
Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 15, GRFL.
60Memorandum of Conversation, “Middle East; Concorde; Law of the Sea; UK Defense Review; Mildenhall Agree-




6.5.1 British Domestic Politics
In terms of alternative explanations, there is some evidence that U.S. officials perceived left-wing
parties in Britain as more likely to seek outside options. U.S. officials were somewhat suspicious
of the left-wing Labour Party in Britain, seeing it as being more prone to seek accommodation
and take a softer line with the Soviet Union. Part of the Kennedy Administration’s hesitation
in cutting off preferential nuclear cooperation with Britain was the fear that the pro-U.S. Tories
might lose power.61 Indeed, some within the Central Intelligence Agency even considered Labour
PM Harold Wilson a “Soviet Asset” (Kissinger, 1979: 91; Dumbrell, 1996: 213-215, 216; quote
at p. 213; Priest, 2006: 80). The U.S. ambassador to Britain wrote in October 1964 that “The
greatest single danger, provided he is satisfied otherwise, to an agreement with Mr. Wilson on the
principle of British adhesion to the MLF...will, in my estimation, spring from his over sanguine
views of what concessions might be obtained from the Soviet Govt in the security field.”62 When
Edward Heath and the conservative Tories came to power in 1970, Nixon and Kissinger expected
this to herald in an era of closer U.S.-UK ties and more reluctance on the part of the British to
pursue accommodation with the Soviets (Hynes, 2009: 11). Kissinger wrote to Nixon, saying that
“the Tories will be more skeptical than Labor of the possibilities for fruitful negotiations with the
Soviets,” adding that “the Conservatives...may be less timid in pressing the Soviet Union.”63 Nixon
and Kissinger also expected the Tories to be more accommodating on Vietnam and Britain’s east
of Suez retrenchment.64
61Memorandum of Conversation, December 16, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 13, pp. 1088-1091.
62Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, October 16, 1964, FRUS, 1964-
1968, Vol. 12, p. 466.
63Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, “The
New British Government,” undated [June-July 1970], FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 981.
64Kissinger to Nixon, “The New British Government,” July 2, 1970, Folder “United Kingdom, Vol. III [1 of 4],”
National Security Council Files, Country Files, Box 727, RMNL.
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Nevertheless, even though Johnson and Nixon expected Labour to be a less reliable ally than the
Tories, Heath ultimately proved more frustrating than Wilson (Kissinger, 1999: 606-607). Heath
preferred to cultivate closer ties with the EC over the United States, and before the United States
applied considerable pressure, Heath actively opposed U.S. efforts during the Year of Europe to
use U.S. protection as a bargaining chip. Thus, while Wilson and the Labour Party were more
enthusiastic for defense cuts, it was under Heath and the Tories that Anglo-American relations
reached their low-point.
6.6 Conclusion
In summary, the case of U.S.-UK bargaining over reassurance and burden-sharing supports the
predictions of the theory. Due to the margin of security afforded to it by geography and by its
strategic value, Britain was able to resist U.S. burden-sharing pressure during much of the 1960s
under Johnson and then again during the Ford Administration. Moreover, as the U.S. ally with the
greatest capacity for power projection, the United Kingdom was able to exert considerable sway
in extracting not only U.S. assurances on consultation over the use of nuclear weapons, but also
U.S. nuclear cooperation and financial assistance. While the Nixon Administration found greater
success in burden-sharing pressure and was less willing to refrain from explicit coercion, even
during the height of Congressional retrenchment pressure Britain only held the line against further
defense cuts.
Thus, the United States’ use of reassurance and other forms of compensation were very much
driven by the United Kingdom’s threat of exit, while British obstinacy was a function of the mar-
gin of security it enjoyed – a position only somewhat tempered by increased probability of U.S.
abandonment in the wake of Vietnam.
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Chapter 7
“They Live at Our Sufferance”: The U.S.-ROK Al-
liance, 1965-1976
7.1 Case Overview
The U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) dated to 1953, when the two countries signed
a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). Due to its land border with North Korea and its proximity both
to China and to the Soviet Far East, South Korea was highly vulnerable to U.S. threats of aban-
donment. This rendered it susceptible to U.S. burden-sharing pressure, but also allowed it to enjoy
considerable U.S. reassurance, including the deployment of about sixty thousand American troops
after the end of the Korean War. Moreover, South Korea’s isolation and small size relative to its
neighbors made it highly dependent on U.S. support, as it had no realistic potential for exiting the
alliance. Although it attempted to pursue nuclear weapons in the 1970s, its attempt demonstrated
just how much leverage the United States had, as the ROK’s dependence made U.S. pressure highly
effective.
As a result of its dependence, South Korean burden-sharing was very high during the 1960s
and 1970s (McLaurin, 1988: 179). During the Vietnam War, South Korea was the second largest
contributor of foreign forces fighting on behalf of South Vietnam after the United States. Its moti-
vation for participating was in large part to remain in the good graces of the United States and gain
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a bargaining chip with which it could extract U.S. concessions such as military and economic aid
– though it was unable to force the United States to revise the MDT to stipulate that “an attack on
Korea would be regarded as an attack on the United States.”1
In the late 1960s, South Korean fears of U.S. abandonment intensified. Owing to the costs
of Vietnam, U.S. policymakers in the Johnson and then Nixon administrations faced pressure to
retrench and reduce U.S. foreign commitments. Two North Korean provocations in early 1968 –
an assassination attempt on ROK President Park Chung-Hee and the seizure of the USS Pueblo
– met with (from the ROK’s perspective) little U.S. response, with the United States launching
bilateral talks with North Korea for the return of the Pueblo’s crew and pressuring ROK officials
not to retaliate for the assassination attempt. In 1969, Richard Nixon began withdrawing U.S.
forces from South Vietnam, and proclaimed the “Guam Doctrine” in July 1969, which held that
allies would be expected to do more for their own defense. In turn, Nixon in 1970 announced
the withdrawal of one of the U.S. divisions in South Korea, and then the following year revealed
that he would be traveling to China in 1972, much to the shock of U.S. allies in East Asia. These
developments further served to heighten feelings of unease among the South Koreans, owing not
only to the reduction of U.S. commitment they implied, but also to the unilateral, non-consultative
way in which the events unfolded.
South Korea did receive assurances of U.S. support, but also faced considerable threats of
abandonment for the purposes of burden-sharing pressure. U.S. officials repeatedly affirmed the
American commitment to South Korea’s security even as they made partial troop withdrawals.
Moreover, the United States contributed $1.5 billion in military assistance to ROK military mod-
ernization over 1971-1977. In 1975, President Gerald Ford proclaimed a “Pacific Doctrine” which
promised allies that the U.S. would remain engaged in Asia despite withdrawal from Vietnam, and
launched what became the annual Team Spirit military exercises in 1976. Defense Secretary James
1Memorandum of Conversation, May 12, 1965, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964-1968, Vol. 29
(Part 1), p. 85.
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Schlesinger publicly claimed in 1975 that U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea could be used to
defend the ROK.
In contrast to Europe, however, the United States never promised that its withdrawals would
cease; U.S. officials would only claim that there were no current plans for further withdrawals.
Similar to Europe, though, policymakers used the domestic pressure they faced from the public
and Congress in order to put pressure on the ROK, indicating that U.S. withdrawal and South
Korean burden-sharing were essential, lest Congress force even deeper withdrawals or cuts to U.S.
material assistance. Indeed, even after South Korea was suspected of having a nuclear weapons
program, U.S. officials continued to put significant burden-sharing pressure on South Korea to
great success, and Ford’s successor Jimmy Carter even announced a plan to withdraw all U.S.
troops from Korea – though these plans were later scuttled due to revised estimates of the threat
posed by North Korea.
In this case, my theory would lead me to expect that South Korea’s relatively small size would
inhibit its capacity for exiting its alliance with the United States. As a result, U.S. assurances
should be more equivocal and less frequent, and its willingness to withdraw troops should be
fairly high in the absence of a clear and compelling threat of invasion of the ROK. Similarly,
South Korea’s geographic vulnerability to attack should have facilitated U.S. efforts to extract
burden-sharing by threatening abandonment. Finally, the costs of the Vietnam War should have
put pressure on the United States to place more of the defense burden on South Korea and do less
itself, while also pursuing rapprochement with its regional adversaries. However, because these
factors bring U.S. reliability into question, U.S. policymakers should have used reassurance to
offset ROK perceptions that the U.S. commitment was inherently not credible.
7.2 Reassurance and ROK Participation in Vietnam, 1964-1967
The first U.S. requests for South Korean participation in the Vietnam War came in May and De-
cember 1964, upon which South Korea sent just over two thousand noncombat troops. Then in
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early 1965, South Korea agreed to send one combat division. Park saw involvement in Vietnam as
a way of ingratiating SK with the United States, and indeed he gained a number of concessions.
The United States defrayed the costs of stationing the South Korean forces in Vietnam and trans-
porting them there, increased its military aid to South Korea, and promised not to withdraw troops
from South Korea without prior consultation (Yong Lee, 2011: 409-413). However, American
officials refused to entertain revising the Mutual Defense Treaty to guarantee that U.S. assistance
would be automatically forthcoming in the event of an attack on South Korea, arguing that “it was
not possible under our constitutional system for the President to change the treaty commitment
which we had with Korea, even if he wished to do so.”2 As the situation in Vietnam deteriorated
in 1966, the United States requested and secured an additional division of South Korean forces to
Vietnam, in exchange for more economic and military assistance. Park again sought to reopen the
issue of revising the MDT, but the United States refused. Instead, the Johnson Administration dis-
patched Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who privately assured Park that U.S. assistance would
be automatic the event of a North Korean attack but declined to revisit the MDT issue (Yong Lee,
2011: 416-419).
This, however, was the limit on South Korea’s bargaining power. Indeed, at the heart of South
Korean participation was not the exercise of South Korean influence on U.S. decision-making,
but rather the exercise of U.S. influence on ROK decision-making. U.S. policymakers made it very
clear that the United States “could not make any commitment to keep any specific number of troops
in any specific locality for any specific period of time,” nor “give assurance of the maintenance
of any specific level of military assistance.”3 Rather, they only promised that “our commitment
to their defense is absolute under the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, and that we would certainly
consult with them on any changes in force levels which might be dictated by our regional and
2Memorandum of Conversation, May 12, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 1), p. 88.
3Memorandum of Conversation, May 12, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 1), p. 88.
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global requirements.”4 Moreover, American officials threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from
Korea in the absence of ROK participation in South Vietnam (Yong Lee, 2011: 410). In April
1968, for example, Johnson’s Special Assistant Walt Rostow noted in a letter to Johnson that “We
have told them many times that we have no plan to reduce the general level of our ground forces
[in South Korea]–by implication as long as they have forces in Viet-Nam. Suggest you repeat that
we have no plan to reduce our ground forces under present circumstances, but avoid going further
than promising full consultation...on any later plan concerning ground forces.”5 U.S. envoy Cyrus
Vance similarly told Park during his early 1968 trip “that were they even to consider removing
troops from South Vietnam we would pull ours out of Korea.”6
7.3 American Retrenchment and Détente, 1968-1974
The costs of the Vietnam War, in tandem with the advent of nuclear parity with the Soviet Union
and recognition of animosity between the Soviets and the Chinese, contributed to a shift in U.S.
foreign policy that dramatically affected South Korea’s calculations of U.S. credibility. This first
of all took the form of a reduced U.S. overseas footprint, particularly in Asia. Second, the United
States pursued détente with both the Soviet Union and China. In the following section, I discuss
these two developments in turn, and then discuss how they influenced the need for U.S. reassurance
as well as American leverage for burden-sharing.
4Thomson to Johnson, “Your Meeting at 5 p.m. today with President Park,” May 17, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol.
29 (Part 1), p. 96. See also Memorandum of Conversation, May 17, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 1), pp.
97-99. Similar exchanges, in which the South Koreans sought an assurance of troop levels while the United States
promised only that it had no current plans to withdraw forces and that it would consult the ROK prior to withdrawal,
pervaded the 1960s. See, for example, Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, October
19, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 1), pp. 199-200; and Memorandum of Conversation Between President
Johnson and President Pak, November 1, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 1), pp. 205-207.
5Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas, April 13, 1968, FRUS,
1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 1), p. 412.
6Notes of the President’s Meeting With Cyrus R. Vance, February 15, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 1), p.
378.
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7.3.1 The Guam Doctrine
In the 1960s, U.S. domestic pressure had been largely a non-factor, with the U.S.-ROK alliance
largely flying under the radar of domestic audiences (Lee and Heo, 2002: 82-83). As the costs of
Vietnam mounted, however, the Nixon administration faced obstacles to maintaining U.S. com-
mitments, both from the U.S. Congress and public and from a constrained pool of resources and
manpower. Public opinion increasingly favored reduced U.S. involvement in international affairs
and lower defense spending, while there were a series of Congressional resolutions and amend-
ments during the late 1960s and early 1970s – most notably those of Senate Majority Leader Mike
Mansfield – proposing reductions in the U.S. footprint abroad. The focus of these proposals was
on burden-sharing and U.S. troop deployments in Europe, given the larger U.S. peacetime pres-
ence there, but they reflected an increasing preoccupation with burden-sharing and the costs of
the United States’ foreign commitments more generally. Indeed, many in Congress favored troop
withdrawals from Korea.7 Moreover, Congress forced the largest defense cuts since the 1950s,
and in 1973 passed the War Powers Act that limited the President’s ability to wage war without
congressional approval (Lee and Heo, 2002: 87-89, 102-104).
In response, in July 1969 Nixon described what became known as the Guam Doctrine, in which
allies would be expected to carry more of the burden for their own defense. The goal of such an
approach was two-fold: to rein in the costs of U.S. commitments and to reduce the probability
of entanglement in future conflicts (Nam, 1986: 83). The hallmark of the Guam Doctrine was a
reduced U.S. footprint. Nixon promised that the United States would assist its allies if they were
attacked, but reserved the right to decide how much assistance would be forthcoming, as well as
whether that assistance would take the form of direct involvement or simply financial and military
assistance. Indeed, Nixon even hinted that reconsidering “some of the relationships and practices
that are vestiges of the past” was not out of the question (Nam, 1986: 70-72, 100; quote at p. 72).
7Study Prepared by the Office of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense, “Policy Problems in
Korea,” undated, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Doc. 274.
174
As part of the Guam Doctrine, Nixon announced in March 1970 that one of the American di-
visions deployed in South Korea would be withdrawn, without any prior consultation with ROK
officials and despite his having told Park in August 1969 that he opposed troop withdrawals.8
By 1972, the U.S. presence on the peninsula had fallen from around 60,000 personnel to around
40,000. Moreover, U.S. forces by-and-large pulled away from the Demilitarized Zone, thus allow-
ing the United States to avoid immediate engagement if North Korea attacked (Kim, 2001: 55).
Administration officials made frequent reference, both internally and to the South Koreans, to the
Congressional retrenchment pressure they faced.9 Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird similarly
told Congress in 1971 that U.S. ground forces should not fight in another war in Asia, and inter-
nally pushed for further withdrawals (Hayes, 1991: 55-56; Cha, 1999: 111). Laird’s successor
James Schlesinger similarly pushed to make U.S. forces in South Korea a “mobile reserve” based
outside of Korea that could be used elsewhere in the region (Nam, 1986: 83). As compensation
for the reduced U.S. presence, the Nixon Administration agreed to give $1.5 billion to assist South
Korea’s Five-Year Military Modernization Plan over 1971-1975 (Nam, 1986: 101).
These developments caused enormous consternation within the ROK. Park saw the Guam Doc-
trine and U.S. withdrawal as a sign of reduced commitment, and was concerned about the reluc-
tance with which Congress disbursed the military aid that had been promised to South Korea. He
resented the unilateral, non-consultative way in which the United States proceeded with reducing
its footprint in Asia (Cha, 1999: 111-112). More generally, Park saw dwindling U.S. support for
South Vietnam – and, after it began rapprochement with China, Taiwan – as potential harbingers
for what might be in his country’s own future (McLaurin, 1988: 170-171).10
8Memorandum of Conversation, “Talks Between President Nixon and President Pak,” August 21, 1969, FRUS, 1969-
1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 96-102.
9See, for example: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, “MAP and U.S. Force Levels,”
January 29, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 121-122; Draft Minutes of a National Security Council
Meeting, March 4, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 142-147; Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in Korea, April 23, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 150-152; Laird to Nixon, “Trip to
Republic of Korea,” July 19, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 254-263.
10Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, December 22, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19
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7.3.2 Unilateral U.S. Détente with the Communist World
Also raising fears of abandonment in South Korea was the United States’ perceived soft line toward
North Korea and China – which not coincidentally came at a time in which it was bogged down
in Vietnam and facing domestic pressure for retrenchment. Because of the cumulative costs and
ongoing strain of the Vietnam War, the United States wanted to avoid responding to regional provo-
cations (North Korean or otherwise) that would increase the risk of yet another war in Asia (Sim-
mons, 1978: 6-13, 25-27; Nam, 1986: 83-85). In January 1968, North Korea took two provocative
actions: first, North Korean infiltrators attempted to assassinate Park at the Blue House, and then
a few days later abducted the spy ship USS Pueblo. In response, the United States started bilat-
eral negotiations without South Korean representation for the return of the Pueblo, and put serious
pressure on the ROK to refrain from any kind of retaliation – much to the chagrin of Park (Nam,
1986: 86; Yong Lee, 2011: 420-421). Then in April 1969, the United States made no retaliation
upon North Korea’s shooting down of the U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft (Simmons, 1978:
21-33; Cha, 1999: 63-65).
The United States’ responses to these provocations – restraint coupled with private, bilateral
negotiations – unnerved the South Koreans. ROK officials resented what they saw as the United
States’ almost exclusive emphasis on the Pueblo at the expense of concern over safeguarding Park
from future assassination attempts (Cha, 1999: 65). A letter from Ambassador William Porter in
February 1968 reported that “Park doubted both the resolve of the United States and her commit-
ment in Korea, partially because of U.S. involvement in [Southeast Asia] and partially because of
alleged delays in providing military equipment to ROK military forces and in modernizing those
forces. He objected to the bilateral discussions at Panmunjom between U.S. and North Korean
representatives since he considered them demeaning to the U.S. and therefore to the ROKG.”11
The U.S. opening to China similarly contributed to ROK feelings insecurity. Reduced Sino-
(Part 1), pp. 307-310.
11Vance to Johnson, February 20, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 1), p. 385.
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American tensions fostered a fear of abandonment among American allies, as they diminished the
value of U.S. partners by removing the United States’ primary adversary in East Asia (Lee and
Heo, 2002: 76-77, 93-94). According to a U.S. Senate fact-finding group, Park saw “the new
U.S. policy to China” as a sign “that U.S. interest in Asia...was decreasing” (Cha, 1999: 110).
The ROK’s fear was that the United States would be either lured into a false sense of security
that would lead it to reduce its military commitment to South Korea, or that it would be tempted
to deliberately sell out South Korean interests in broader negotiations with China (Nam, 1986:
126).12 In particular, ROK officials expected that China might ask the United States to remove its
forces from the Korean peninsula (Kim, 2001: 55).
Indeed, Nixon saw détente as a means of reducing the need for a U.S. footprint in Asia and
thus bringing the costs of U.S. commitments in line with its resources (Nam, 1986: 68-69, 109-
111, 114). As a result of its diminished threat perception in Asia, the United States shifted to a
strategy of preparing to fight one major war (in Europe) and one limited war (in Asia), rather than
two major wars (one in Europe and one in Asia) and one limited war. In turn, this facilitated the
United States’ efforts to withdraw troops from South Korea, as U.S. foreign policy in East Asia no
longer centered around “the containment of the Soviet Union and China,” as Nixon put it in a 1972
foreign policy report (Nam, 1986: 75, 78, 81, 126; quote at p. 81).
In December 1971, months after Nixon announced he would be traveling to China and in the
wake of the troop withdrawals, Park declared a state of emergency and sought emergency presiden-
tial powers. The U.S. ambassador Philip Habib described the situation that month: “Park felt that
they could no longer be assured of an American military presence....President Park believed ROK
needed to be prepared for any contingency.”13 He made a similar appraisal in December 1972:
President Park is determined to move toward a policy of greater ”self-reliance,” diplo-
12Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, December 13, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19
(Part 1), pp. 302-305.
13Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, December 22, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19
(Part 1), p. 308.
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matically, economically and militarily. Concern over the great powers, including the
U.S., is a clear theme in Park’s justification for his domestic political actions as well
as the South-North dialogue. However, Park’s view of self-reliance, paradoxically, in-
cludes a desire and an expressed need for the U.S. presence and assistance to continue–
at least in the short run. His concern that we will reduce our aid program, withdraw
our troops sooner than he would like, and his doubt over the firmness of our treaty
commitment, come to the surface from time to time. Generally speaking, he wishes
to hold on to these elements of strength for as long as he can, expecting they will
diminish as time goes on.14
7.3.3 U.S. Reassurance
To offset the perception of unreliability created by its troop withdrawals, domestic pressure, and
unilateral détente with Communist adversaries, the United States took steps to reassure South Ko-
rea of the U.S. commitment – albeit in a highly limited, restrained way. U.S. policymakers repeat-
edly assured ROK officials both privately and publicly that the United States would not abandon
Korea, and that future troop withdrawals would involve prior consultation with South Korean of-
ficials (Nam, 1986: 125-126; Cha, 1999: 112).15 Nixon met with Park in August 1969 in order
to reassure him that the United States remained willing and able to protect South Korea despite
the beginning of withdrawal from Vietnam.16 Ambassador Porter told Park that increased U.S.
14Airgram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, “U.S. Policy in Korea–Country Team Message,”
December 10, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), p. 439.
15National Security Decision Memorandum 48, “U.S. Programs in Korea,” March 20, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.
19 (Part 1), pp. 148-150; Paper Prepared in the Department of State, “Republic of Korea Forces in Viet-Nam
(ROKFV),” undated [June 1971], FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 242-247; Memorandum of Conversation,
“Foreign Minister Kim’s Remarks on the Korean Question in the UN, the President’s China Initiative, and Textiles,”
September 28, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 281-285; Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to
the Department of State, “ROK Forces in Viet-Nam,” November 3, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp.
290-293.
16Rogers to Nixon, “Your Meeting with President Park Chung Hee of Korea, August 21, 1969, 11:30 a.m.,” Folder
“Background Papers Korean Visit, August 19, 1969,” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, Box 102, Richard
M. Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California [hereafter RMNL]. Nixon personally wrote to
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military assistance was the “result of USG desire to reassure ROKG and people of our continuing
concern for their safety, even though we are withdrawing some troops.”17 The Commander of U.S.
Pacific Command similarly wrote to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late 1966 that
calls in the Senate for troop withdrawals were “taken very seriously by the ROK Govt,” and thus
South Korea needed “frequent reassurances of our interest and support.”18
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance was sent as a special envoy in the wake of
the assassination attempt on Park and the capture of the Pueblo in order to allay South Korean fears
that the United States was striking a deal with the North Koreans for the return of U.S. sailors at
the exclusion of ROK concerns about North Korean infiltration.19 Johnson Administration officials
saw doing so as necessary in order to help deter Park from undertaking any kind of unilateral
retaliation, and these assurances were combined with warnings that the United States would not
back South Korea if it went on the offensive.20 July 1971 saw the first of what would become
annual defense minister-level meetings (the Security Consultative Meetings) in order to assuage
ROK fears about not being consulted on U.S. policy toward the peninsula (Nam, 1986: 86; Jang,
2016: 512).21 Moreover, the United States reassured the South Koreans that the opening to China
Park in May 1970 and again in July expressing the continued U.S. commitment to South Korea’s defense. Letter
From President Nixon to Korean President Park, May 26, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 152-154;
and Letter From President Nixon to Korean President Park, July 7, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp.
164-165.
17Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, May 29, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part
1), pp. 154-157.
18Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler),
October 10, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 1), p. 197.
19Paper Prepared in the Department of State, “Mission of Cyrus R. Vance,” undated [February 1968], FRUS, 1964-
1968, Vol. 29 (Part 1), pp. 355-356; Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State, “Themes for the Mission
of Cyrus Vance,” February 9, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 1), pp. 358-360.
20Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Commander of United States Forces, Korea (Bon-
esteel), February 10, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 1), pp. 361-362; Telegram From the Department of
State to the Embassy in Korea, February 11, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 1), pp. 368-369; Notes of the
President’s Meeting With Cyrus R. Vance, February 15, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 1), pp. 376-383;
Letter From the Ambassador to Korea (Porter) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
(Bundy), February 27, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 1), pp. 392-395.
21Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the PresidentâA˘Z´s Assistant for
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did not mean a reduction in South Korea’s importance, and that it refused to negotiate with China
on the U.S.-ROK alliance.22 Similarly, the United States launched two new military exercises with
South Korea in 1969 and 1971 to demonstrate the U.S. capability for power projection (Cha, 1999:
67).
Nevertheless, South Korea’s dependence mitigated the extent to which U.S. officials cared to
reassure it. There was little concern about South Korean realignment, as it by and large continued
to see the Communist countries as highly threatening and détente as dangerous. While a December
1970 National Intelligence Estimate noted that while the ROK was “edging cautiously toward a
different relationship with neutralist and even communist states,” in response to perceived U.S.
unreliability and to “US efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union,” the estimate noted
that this development was “likely to remain a matter of very small steps, far behind those of most
other non-communist states” owing to the high level of threat South Korea still faced.23 North
Korean provocations continued unabated despite a joint communique between the North and South
in July 1972 in which both sides pledged to pursue unification peacefully (Cha, 1999: 130-133).
One option the South Koreans did seriously pursue was nuclear weapons, as I discuss in the next
section, but the United States did not seriously suspect the ROK had a nuclear weapons program
until 1974-75.
U.S. officials recognized the extent of South Korean dependence. A paper by the State De-
National Security Affairs (Kissinger), “U.S./ROK Joint Statement,” November 16, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19
(Part 1), pp. 198-199.
22Memorandum of Conversation, “Foreign Minister Kim’s Remarks on the Korean Question in the UN, the President’s
China Initiative, and Textiles,” September 28, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 281-285; Letter From
President Nixon to Korean President Park, November 29, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 293-295;
Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, December 13, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19
(Part 1), pp. 302-305.
23National Intelligence Estimate, “The Changing Scene in South Korea,” December 2, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.
19 (Part 1), p. 210. See also Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, “ROK Emphasis
on North Korean Threat,” December 2, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 295-296; Telegram From
the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, “North-South Contacts,” June 13, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.
19 (Part 1), pp. 362-365; Airgram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, “U.S. Policy in Korea–
Country Team Message,” December 10, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 436-445.
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partment’s Policy Planning Staff put the matter quite directly in June 1968: “ROK leaders will
be unhappy over the withdrawal of the two US divisions and the prospect that other forces would
eventually follow, but in time they would realize that they had no rational alternative but to go
along....we can probably continue to rely on ROK dependence on US logistic support to inhibit
any rash adventures.”24 Similarly, Nixon remarked in April 1971 that the South Koreans “live at
our sufferance.”25 Ambassador Porter made this point when discussing the troop withdrawals with
Kissinger in March 1970, arguing that “we could swing the option which we wanted. The ROKs
would go into their usual banging tactics, but could be held.”26 Again in December 1971, as Park
was seeking emergency powers, the next ambassador Philip Habib argued that Park “is perceptive
enough to see that we can accelerate the American disengagement that he fears, and we can play
on that fear. He should therefore understand if he uses powers granted to him under other than
clearest evidence of serious emergency, no assurance can be given that U.S. people, Congress, and
administration will continue to provide him with moral and material support they have given in the
past.”27
As a result, reassurance was limited. U.S. policymakers refused to rule out future troop with-
drawals (Nam, 1986: 77-79, 97-99) and did not consult the South Koreans before making the
decision to withdraw the division in 1970 (Yong Lee, 2011: 423). Internally, the Nixon admin-
istration continually weighed the merits of further withdrawals. Indeed, in March 1970, National
Security Decision Memorandum 48 proposed that “the feasibility and timing of further reductions
in the U.S. military presence in Korea should be thoroughly evaluated.”28 The officials who favored
24Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State, “U.S. Policy Toward Korea,” June 15,
1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 433-436.
25Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of the Treasury Connally, the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs (Johnson), and Others, April 17, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), p. 237.
26Memorandum of Conversation, “Ambassador Porter’s Comments on US Troop Withdrawals from Korea,” March 3,
1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), p. 142.
27Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, December 23, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19
(Part 1), p. 312.
28National Security Decision Memorandum 48, “U.S. Programs in Korea,” March 20, 1970, Box H-208, National
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further withdrawals included Secretary of State William Rogers29 and Defense Secretaries Melvin
Laird and James Schlesinger (Hayes, 1991: 55-56; Oberdorfer, 1997: 86). The U.S. embassy team
recommended in December 1972 to “frankly point out that our MAP and U.S. force levels are not
immutable. They are based on ongoing assessments of the threat and on the ability of ROK to bear
the costs of its defense.”30
Nixon sought to maintain flexibility in his decisions on force levels in Korea, making them on
an effectively annual basis.31 In December 1969, Nixon asked for “a plan developed now to bring
about the ROK take over,” adding that eventually the United States would “provide a trip wire
and air and sea support only” (Hunt, 2015: 349). When Park wrote a personal message pleading
with Nixon not to sell out South Korea on his trip to China, Nixon failed to respond for several
months – even then only reaffirming the U.S. commitment – and refused to hold a summit with
Park (Oberdorfer, 1997: 13-14).
To the South Koreans, U.S. officials gave ambiguous assurances on troop levels. Even Kissinger,
who internally opposed Laird and Schlesinger’s plans for further withdrawals in the absence of a
peace agreement on the Korean peninsula, told the ROK Prime Minister in December 1970 that “in
principle he could see the possibility of a Korean withdrawal, for example in the case of a peace
settlement.”32 Vice President Spiro Agnew even claimed during a visit in August 1970 that “all
U.S. forces were to be withdrawn within 5 years anyway” (Nam, 1986: 78). Schlesinger similarly
Security Council Institutional Files, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
29Rogers to Nixon, September 22, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 184-185.
30Airgram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, “U.S. Policy in Korea–Country Team Message,”
December 10, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), p. 445.
31Smith and Holdridge to Kissinger, “ROK Forces in South Vietnam,” September 1, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19
(Part 1), pp. 270-271; Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, December 22, 1971, FRUS,
1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 307-310; Summary and Options From a Study Prepared by the Interdepartmental
Group for East Asia and the Pacific,Washington, undated, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Doc. 235.
32Memorandum of Conversation, “Kim Chong Pil’s Remarks on US-Korea Relations,” December 2, 1970, FRUS,
1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), p. 213.
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refused to make any promises on troop levels during his July 1971 trip.33 When U.S. officials did
make assurances, they were always short-term. A joint agreed minutes in October 1970 stated that
“the United States confirms that, based on present conditions, it does not plan or intend to reduce
the number its troops stationed in Korea,”34 while Kissinger and Nixon made similar promises
throughout the early 1970s to the effect that the United States did not currently have plans to
withdraw, or that the United States would not change troop levels through 1973 or 1974.35 Encour-
aging progress in efforts toward a peace agreement between North and South Korea in mid-1972
and into 1973 led Nixon and Kissinger to temporarily put the brakes on further troop withdrawals,
however.36 Kissinger told the ROK Foreign Minister in February 1973 that troop levels “might
fluctuate a few thousand one way or another, but would remain essentially the same.”37 However,
U.S. assurances on troop levels continued to pertain only to the very short-term.38
33Laird to Nixon, “Trip to Republic of Korea,” July 19, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Part 19 (Part 1), pp. 254-263.
34Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, October 26, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19
(Part 1), p. 188.
35Memorandum of Conversation, “Foreign Minister Kim’s Remarks on the Korean Question in the UN, the President’s
China Initiative, and Textiles,” September 28, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 281-285; Letter From
President Nixon to Korean President Park, November 29, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 293-295;
Irwin to Nixon, “Republic of Korea Forces in South Viet-Nam,” March 21, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part
1), pp. 321-322; Kissinger to Nixon, “Korean Forces in South Vietnam,” March 31, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.
19 (Part 1), pp. 326-328; Letter From President Nixon to Korean President Park, May 19, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1976,
Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 351-353.
36Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, “North-South Contacts,” June 13, 1972, FRUS,
1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 362-365; Miller to Kissinger, “Korean Question at the 27th UN General Assembly,”
July 3, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 366-368; Holdridge to Kissinger, “State’s Analysis of North
Korean Premier Kim Il-song’s Proposals of June 21,” July 4, 1972, pp. 369-370; Telegram From the Embassy in
Korea to the Department of State, “Assistant Secretary Green’s Conversation with President Park Chung Hee, July
6, 1972,” July 7, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 371-376; Kennedy to Kissinger, January 16, 1973,
FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Doc. 231; Kissinger to Rogers and Schlesinger, July 18, 1973, FRUS, 1969-1976,
Vol. E-12, Doc. 241.
37Memorandum of Conversation, “Mr. Kissinger’s Discussion with Kim Yong-sik of U.S.-ROK Relations,” February
24, 1973, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Doc. 232, p. 3.
38Memo from Smyser to Kissinger, “Your Meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Kim on March 20, 1974 at
6:00pm,” March 19, 1974, Folder “Korea (3),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Staff Files, Box 5, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan [hereafter GRFL].
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7.3.4 South Korean Burden-Sharing
In the wake of perceived American unreliability, Park became less cooperative on participating in
Vietnam. He refused to send a third combat division or further civilian deployments. Nevertheless,
South Korea was unable to leverage its troop deployments in Vietnam to forestall U.S. withdrawals
from the Korean peninsula, as the Nixon Administration withdrew one of its divisions stationed
in South Korea in 1970-71, would not rule out further withdrawals, and refused to negotiate with
South Korea exchanging U.S. presence in South Korea for South Korean presence in South Viet-
nam.39 Rather, the ROK was again only able to use its continued presence in Vietnam to help it
extract U.S. economic and military assistance (Yong Lee, 2011: 421-424). Indeed, some within
the administration – most notably Secretary of Defense Laird – saw the return of South Korean
forces from Vietnam as a means of justifying further U.S. withdrawals from Korea (Hunt, 2015:
354-355).
More generally, the Nixon and Ford Administrations applied considerable burden-sharing pres-
sure. Allied self-reliance was a hallmark of the Nixon Doctrine, with Nixon and other officials
emphasizing that allies would be responsible for taking care of their own defense (Nam, 1986:
67, 78, 97). In a letter to Park, Nixon wrote in May 1970 that “it is reasonable to expect [allies]
to assume more of the responsibility for their own defense and specifically to provide the bulk of
the manpower required for that purpose.”40 Similarly, in a marked and much-criticized semantic
change from previous statements, the joint U.S.-ROK communique from the annual Security Con-
sultative Conference (SCC) in July 1970 recommended that “the forces defending the Republic
39Holdridge to Kissinger, “Recommendation That You See Korean Ambassador Kim Before Peking Trip,” February
12, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 316-317; Irwin to Nixon, “Republic of Korea Forces in South
Viet-Nam,” March 21, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 321-322; Laird to Nixon, “Republic of Korea
Forces in South Vietnam (ROKFV),” March 27, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 323-324; Kissinger
to Nixon, “Korean Forces in South Vietnam,” March 31, 1972, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 327-328;
National Security Decision Memorandum 161, “Republic of Korea Forces in South Vietnam,” April 5, 1972, FRUS,
1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp. 328-329.
40Letter From President Nixon to Korean President Park, May 26, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), pp.
152-154.
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of Korea must remain alert and strong,” whereas previous SCC statements had emphasized that
“Republic of Korea and American forces stationed in Korea must remain strong and alert” (Cha,
1999: 66). Nixon stressed that the United States would “place a greater defense burden on the
Koreans” as the United States reduced its footprint, and used $1.5 billion in aid between 1971-77
to assist South Korean military modernization (Lee and Heo, 2002: 99). Ford similarly promised
that although “I will continue to urge Congress to support allies like South Korea,” Congress was
“not as cooperative as I would have hoped.”41
In response to both direct U.S. pressure and concerns about U.S. reliability South Korea took
dramatic steps toward military self-reliance. Park built up a reserve force of 2.5 million soldiers,
increased the South Korean defense budget from 3.9% of GDP in 1969 to over four percent of
GDP during the first half of the 1970s, and pursued a five-year military modernization in 1971-75
(Nam, 1986: 101; Lee and Heo, 2002: 38-40, 100-101; Yong Lee, 2011: 421). Moreover, while
the Nixon Administration used an injection of military assistance to help South Korea make up
for the shortfall that would be left behind by a reduced U.S. presence, from the mid-1970s onward
U.S. aid dramatically shrank as a percentage of South Korean military spending, down from to
99% in 1961, to 49.7% in 1971, to effectively zero percent in 1978 (Lee and Heo, 2002: 74, 100).
Instead of grant military aid, the United States shifted more toward the use of foreign military sales
(FMS), in which South Korea would receive credit for the purchase of American arms (McLaurin,
1988: 177-178).
7.4 Showdown over the South Korean Nuclear Program, 1975-1976
South Korean fears of abandonment did not abate in the mid-1970s. The United States’ withdrawal
from Vietnam, in tandem with the U.S. Congress’s refusal to continue providing material assistance
to South Vietnam, made South Korean policymakers nervous, with the ROK Defense Minister
issuing a formal request for assurances that the abandonment of South Vietnam would not impact
41Memorandum of Conversation, “South Korean Dependence on US Support,” November 22, 1974, Folder “President
Ford Memcons (1),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 16, GRFL.
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U.S. protection of South Korea (Cha, 1999: 148). More generally, Congressional pressure for
limitations on the U.S. footprint abroad, as well as on defense spending and military aid, continued
to cause unease within the ROK (McLaurin, 1988: 170, 176; Lee and Heo, 2002: 102-103).
The fall of Saigon in 1975 further worried the ROK, with the National Assembly passing
a resolution asking that the United States “demonstrate by deeds its firm determination not to
commit the same failure on the Korean peninsula as it did on the Indochinese peninsula” (Cha,
1999: 149).42 A telegram from the U.S. embassy in South Korea described the situation in Seoul
in April 1975: “focal point of concern is Congressional attitudes and fear that in conflict situation
Congress (and American public) may – as in case [in] Vietnam – deny funds and use of us forces
needed to defend Korea and even force US troop withdrawals before then.”43
In response to perceived U.S. unreliability, South Korea attempted to obtain nuclear weapons
during the 1970s. However, its attempt further demonstrated just how limited its capacity for exit
was – as well as how potent the U.S. threat of exit could be. As Nam (1986: 79) puts it, South
Korea’s challenge was that “Although the ROK could no longer count on a firm U.S. conventional
commitment, it did not wish to live without the U.S. shield,” and thus outside options provided a
means of bolstering South Korean security despite U.S. unreliability and despite the high level of
threat it faced.
Park made the decision to pursue nuclear weapons in November 1971, and South Korea pro-
ceeded to secure nuclear assistance from France and Canada and plan the creation of ballistic
missiles (Gul Hong, 2011: 488, 491-492, 494-495). India’s nuclear test in May 1974 brought
proliferation to the top of the U.S. agenda, leading American officials to review other potential
countries that might be on the path toward or at risk of pursuing nuclear weapons. In late 1974, the
42According to Lieutenant General James F. Hollingsworth, who was in command of the ROK/U.S. I Corps in Seoul
during 1973, Park had asked him “Are you going to do the same thing here you did in Vietnam?” (Oberdorfer, 1997:
61).
43Telegram 2685 From the Embassy in the Republic of Korea to the Department of State, “ROK Views of US Security
Commitment,” April 18, 1975, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Doc 267.
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United States detected the South Korean deals for plutonium reprocessing capabilities with France
and Canada, and proceeded to scrutinize South Korea’s nuclear activities (Gul Hong, 2011: 496-
497). The United States saw South Korean proliferation as a potential trigger for a regional nuclear
arms race that could result in North Korea and Japan obtaining nuclear weapons. Similarly, South
Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons would reduce its dependence on the United States – and,
in turn, U.S. leverage (Nam, 1986: 106; Gul Hong, 2011: 497-498).
Initial U.S. diplomatic efforts to discourage South Korean nuclearization and persuade South
Korea to cancel construction of its reprocessing plant included warnings that the United States
would not tolerate ROK acquisition of nuclear weapons and might cancel U.S. nuclear assistance
(Oberdorfer, 1997: 71).44 These attempts failed, however, and as a result the United States even-
tually issued an ultimatum in December 1975 that the “whole range of security and political re-
lationships” between the United States and South Korea would be jeopardized if it did not cancel
the reprocessing deal with France (Gul Hong, 2011: 501). The next month, the deal was canceled
(Gul Hong, 2011: 498-503). Similar threats were made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
in May 1976 (Oberdorfer, 1997: 72). This clearly demonstrated the leverage the United States had
over South Korea, owing to the latter’s vulnerability to U.S. abandonment and its limited capacity
for exit.
7.4.1 U.S. Reassurance
While the United States used considerable pressure to coerce the ROK into nuclear abstention, it
also coupled its pressure with considerable reassurance of the U.S. commitment throughout 1974-
1976 (Lee and Sato, 1982: 102-103; Lanoszka, 2014: 215). Continued protection of South Korea,
including the U.S. troop presence on the peninsula, was seen by American officials as a way to
discourage South Korean nuclearization (Nam, 1986: 106). Both the Department of State and
44Study Prepared by the Office of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense, “Policy Problems in
Korea,” undated, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Doc. 274; Memo from Lodal and Elliott to Kissinger, “Approach
to South Korea on Reprocessing,” July 24, 1975, Folder “Korea (9),” National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential
Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, GRFL.
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the Department of Defense recognized that the ROK’s nuclear weapons program was a reaction
to perceived U.S. unreliability (Lanoszka, 2014: 213).45 Ambassador Sneider argued in April
1975 that the fall of Saigon was shaking South Korean confidence in the United States, and in June
advocated making very “clear to the Koreans what the prospects are for a continued, long-term U.S.
military presence,” as uncertainty only encouraged Park “into preparations for what he sees as our
eventual withdrawal...which include internal repression and plans for the development of nuclear
weapons” (Oberdorfer, 1997: 64-65, quote at p. 65).46 U.S. officials turned to “pointing up the
differences between Vietnam and Korea, with respect to the internal situations in both countries the
nature of the us commitments, and their different strategic positions” in order to counteract South
Korean fears that the ROK might receive the same treatment as South Vietnam.47 A memorandum
from the Central Intelligence Agency in August 1977 similarly argued that “the withdrawal of
all US nuclear weapons will clearly strengthen [Park’s] determination to move toward military
self-reliance.”48
U.S. officials became less equivocal in their assurances of troop levels in South Korea as well.
Kissinger told the South Koreans in March 1974 that there would be no further withdrawals (Hayes,
1991: 56), and when Ford visited Seoul in November 1974 he promised Park that there was “no
intention of withdrawing U.S. personnel from Korea.”49 Ford gave similar assurances when the
45Study Prepared by the Office of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense, “Policy Problems in
Korea,” undated, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Doc. 274.
46Telegram from Kissinger to U.S. Embassy (Seoul), “ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” March
1975, Folder “Korea - State Department Telegrams from SECSTATE - NODIS (3),” National Security Adviser’s
Files, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 11, GRFL.
47Telegram 2685 From the Embassy in the Republic of Korea to the Department of State, “ROK Views of US Security
Commitment,” April 18, 1975, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Doc. 267. See also Memorandum from Kissinger to
Ford, “Meeting with the Speaker of the South Korean National Assembly Chung Il-Kwon,” May 8, 1975, Folder
“President Ford Memcons (1),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files,
Box 16, GRFL.
48“Memorandum: The Implications of Withdrawing Nuclear Weapons from Korea,” August 11, 1977, p. 3. Re-
trieved from CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/
DOC_0001091920.pdf.
49Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, Washing-
ton, “Future U.S. Military Assistance to South Korea,” January 3, 1975, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Doc. 260, p.
188
South Korean National Assembly Speaker visited the White House in May 1975.50 Additionally,
Defense Secretary James Schlesinger publicly declared in July 1975 that the United States had
nuclear weapons in South Korea and hinted toward their potential use if South Korea was attacked
(Hayes, 1991: 60). He then visited Seoul in August 1975, telling the South Koreans there would
be “no basic changes over the next five years” in U.S. troop levels (Oberdorfer, 1997: 67).51 In
December 1975, during a visit to Hawaii Ford proclaimed what he called a “Pacific Doctrine”
reaffirmed the United States’ engagement in the region, stating that “World stability and our own
security depend upon our Asian commitments” and argued that the U.S. troop presence Korea was
a guarantee of U.S. protection.52 Similarly, June 1976 saw the first of what became the annual
Team Spirit joint military exercises between the United States and the ROK, and later that year
Ford decided that “until further notice there should be no further withdrawals...from Korea without
his explicit approval” (Cha, 1999: 146-149).53
Indeed, the evidence suggests that Park saw the threat to obtain nuclear weapons as a bargaining
chip the ROK could use to extract security assurances from the United States (Nam, 1986: 103-
104). Beginning in 1975, ROK officials explicitly threatened that their country might go nuclear
if the U.S. commitment was in doubt (Reiss, 1988: ch. 3; Cha, 1999: 113; Gul Hong, 2011: 494,
501-502, 506-509). Park told a group of American journalists in June 1975 that “We have the
capability [to obtain nuclear weapons,” and that “If the U.S. nuclear umbrella were to be removed,
1.
50Memorandum of Conversation, “Meeting with the Speaker of the South Korean National Assembly Chung Il-Kwon,”
May 8, 1975, Box 11, National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977, Gerald Ford Presidential
Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
51Memorandum for the Record, “Meeting with President Pak Chung Hee in Seoul, Korea 27 August 1975,” September
2, 1975, Folder “Korea (10),” National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the
Pacific, Box 9, GRFL.
52“Address by President Gerald R. Ford at the University of Hawaii,” December 7, 1975, Gerald R. Ford Presiden-
tial Library and Museum, https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/speeches/750716.asp (accessed November 2,
2016).
53Memo from Scowcroft to Schlesinger, “Troop and Equipment Withdrawals from Korea,” December 1976, Folder
“Korea (20),” National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 10,
GRFL.
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we have to start developing our nuclear capability to save ourselves” (Oberdorfer, 1997: 71).
Nevertheless, while the U.S. used such assurances to induce South Korean nuclear restraint, in-
ternally U.S. officials still saw the U.S. presence as finite.54 U.S. officials feared that Schlesinger’s
pledge of “automatic” American involvement in a North Korean invasion, as well as his promise
that American troop levels would not change in the near future, went further than intended and
would be misread by the South Koreans.55
U.S. officials refused a request to allow the South Korean ambassador to meet with the Vice
President in August 1974, and numerous U.S. officials – including the U.S. ambassador Richard
Sneider – “floated the idea of U.S. troop reductions.”56 Even Kissinger, among the most con-
sistent opponents of further withdrawals, anticipated withdrawing troops after a peace agreement
between North Korea and South Korea had been settled (Hayes, 1991: 55-56; Oberdorfer, 1997:
86; Lanoszka, 2014: 214).57 Kissinger suggested in a meeting with Department of State officials
in January 1975 that “I would say that South Korea, within five years, would be substantially left
alone by us.”58 Jimmy Carter even planned to withdraw all U.S. forces from Korea, and he only
canceled the plan after sustained opposition from the Army and other officials, who objected that
doing so would leave South Korea too exposed to attack – particularly in light of new intelligence
showing larger numbers of North Korean tanks than had been known about previously (Nam, 1986:
54Memorandum From Richard Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Wash-
ington, “Telling the Koreans our Aid Plans,” undated, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Doc. 256.
55Memo from Barnes to Scowcroft, “Secretary Schlesinger’s Discussions in Seoul,” September 29, 1975, Folder “Ko-
rea (12),” National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, GRFL.
56Memo from Davis to Marsh, “South Korean Ambassador’s Request to Call on the Vice President,” August 2, 1974,
Folder “Korea (6),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 5, GRFL;
Memo from Froebe to Snowcroft, “Your Meeting with Ambassador Sneider on September 12, 1974, at 2:30pm,”
September 11, 1974, Folder “Korea (6),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff
Files, Box 5, GRFL.
57Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Nixon, Washington, March 25, 1974, FRUS, 1969-
1976, Vol. E-12, Doc. 252; National Security Decision Memorandum 251, Washington, March 29, 1974, FRUS,
1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Doc. 253. In April 1975, Kissinger advised against further withdrawals, and Ford concurred
(Lanoszka, 2014: 214).
58Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, January 6, 1975, 8 a.m., FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.
E-12, Doc. 261, p. 10.
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159-161; Kim, 2001: 67-68; Kim, 2011b: 458). While Carter sought to reassure Japan that U.S.
withdrawals from Korea would not endanger it, he did little to reassure South Korea, sending Vice
President Walter Mondale to Tokyo in January 1977 to reassure Japan, but notably not to Seoul
(Lee and Sato, 1982: 107-108).
Given the forceful U.S. response during 1975-1976 to force the ROK nuclear program’s termi-
nation, one important question that arises is why the United States did not use more reassurance
to discourage South Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons in the first place. Based on evidence
currently available – though admittedly some of the documentation from the Nixon-Ford period
remains classified – there is little indication that either President worried about South Korean nu-
clearization prior to 1975, and especially prior to the Indian nuclear test in May 1974. Thus it
would seem that the Nixon and Ford administrations underestimated either the ROK’s willingness
or ability to go the nuclear route. Indeed, doing so was not unreasonable, as the United States
had a variety of powerful levers it could use to try and induce South Korean nuclear restraint –
all of which it threatened to use. The ROK was highly dependent on the United States for trade,
investment, protection, and for its nuclear energy needs (Lanoszka, 2014: 215). Even in April
1975, U.S. officials recognized the extent of South Korea’s dependence. A telegram from the U.S.
embassy reported that “there is no present alternative to continued dependence on us. In short run,
Korea has no other policy options, with any dependence on Japan particularly out of question.”59
Nevertheless, it is admittedly somewhat puzzling that U.S. officials did not infer the possibility of
South Korean nuclearization in light of the ROK’s precarious security environment and numerous
pleas by South Korean officials for reassurance.
7.4.2 South Korean Burden-Sharing
Although the United States went to great lengths to deter South Korean nuclearization, this did not
prevent it from simultaneously extracting a significant amount of additional burden-sharing from
59Telegram 2685 From the Embassy in the Republic of Korea to the Department of State, April 18, 1975, 0933Z,
FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Doc. 267.
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the ROK. Ford and other U.S. officials continued to invoke the threat to U.S. commitment posed by
Congress.60 Kissinger noted that Ford’s visit to Korea in November 1974 was to “reaffirm for Seoul
our commitment...while providing the Korean leadership with a direct appreciation of our reduced
resources.”61 In 1974, Park levied a ten percent income tax to fund defense spending, doubled
military expenditures from $714 million in 1975 to $1.5 billion in 1976, and continued to increase
spending throughout the late 1970s (McLaurin, 1988: 179; Cha, 1999: 148-149; Gul Hong, 2011:
487-488). By 1979, South Korea’s defense spending as a percentage of GDP totaled almost six
percent (Lee and Heo, 2002: 99-101).
7.5 Alternative Explanations
7.5.1 U.S. Domestic Politics
There is evidence of South Korean lobbying in U.S. domestic politics. As the ROK grew in-
creasingly uneasy about the U.S. commitment, the Korean government turned to lobbying as an
alternative means to diplomacy for pressuring the U.S. government into policies favorable to it.62
Most notably Park provided funds to South Korean lobbyist Tong Sun Park, who then provided
bribes to numerous U.S. Congressmen in order to discourage U.S. retrenchment from Korea. The
scheme blew up in 1976, however, and became known as the “Koreagate” scandal (Nam, 1986:
156-157; Moon, 1988: 111-112; Kim, 2011b: 473-476). Given that it was the Congress which was
the most consistent source of pressure for limiting or reducing the U.S. footprint in South Korea,
however, and also consistently delayed implementation of U.S. military aid in the 1970s, it is diffi-
cult to make the case that ROK lobbying had a great effect on U.S. reassurance or burden-sharing
60Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, November 22, 1974, 3 p.m., FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Doc. 258; Infor-
mation Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of
Defense (Bergold) to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Washington, March 16, 1976, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12,
Doc. 275.
61Memo from Kissinger to Ford, “Your Visit to Korea,” October 1974, Folder “Korea (7),” National Security Adviser’s
Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 5, GRFL.
62Memorandum for the President, “Visit of Korean National Assemblymen,” undated [June 1975], Folder “Korea (8),”
National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, GRFL.
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pressure.
Indeed, on the contrary, there is evidence that South Korea’s human rights record and Park’s
authoritarian tendencies, in addition to the Koreagate scandal, cost South Korea in Congress. Park’s
repression escalated during the mid-1970s as he instituted the yushin system, which concentrated
power in the president, eliminated the National Assembly, and cracked down on dissent. This was
a direct result to an increased perception of threat in the ROK owing to reduced U.S. presence
(Oberdorfer, 1997: 37-41; Kim, 2011b: 459-460). As a result, calls for reducing U.S. material
assistance intensified in Congress and among human rights groups, thus delaying implementation
of U.S. assistance for South Korea’s five-year modernization plan (Moon, 1988: 111; Cha, 1999:
112, 286-287; Kim, 2011b: 462-464).63
Nevertheless, because Congressional pressure for withdrawal was arguably just as strong vis-
a-vis Europe as South Korea – if not stronger – South Korea’s regime type would not seem to be
a crucial factor in U.S. reassurance and burden-sharing pressure toward South Korea. Moreover,
while South Korea’s human rights record and attempted bribery made Congress reluctant to appro-
priate military aid, Carter actually faced enormous opposition from Congress – encouraged by a
number of officials in the Defense and State Departments – to his withdrawal plan (Sungjoo, 1980:
1079-1080; Hayes, 1991: 77-79; Oberdorfer, 1997: 88-93, 103). Indeed, when Carter first began
calling for troop withdrawals, the South Koreans did not take him very seriously in part because
they assumed he would be restrained from enacting his campaign pledges (Lee and Sato, 1982:
105).
While policymakers in the Nixon and Ford administrations were concerned about Park’s repres-
sion, this was generally only the case to the extent that they feared it might influence Congressional
63Kissinger to Ford, “Future U.S. Military Assistance to South Korea,” January 3, 1975, FRUS, Vol. E-12, Doc. 260;
Memorandum of Conversation, “Korean and other Subjects,” June 12, 1975, FRUS, Vol. E-12, Doc. 269; Telegram
9567 From Embassy in the Republic of Korea to the Department of State, “Kim Case and Its Aftermath in Korea,”
December 3, 1976, FRUS, Vol. E-12, Doc. 290; Memo from Froebe to Scowcroft, “Request by Eight Congressmen
to Call on the President Prior to His Visit to South Korea,” November 5, 1974, Folder “Korea (7),” National Security
Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 5, GRFL.
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pressure or South Korea’s domestic stability – not because of normative concerns.64 Indeed, the
Nixon administration deliberately attempted to remain on the sidelines with regards to the yushin
repression (Oberdorfer, 1997: 37-41). Ford also told Park that “we don’t agree with some of his
oppressive domestic tactics,” but also admitted that “on the other hand, it doesn’t hurt to have a
strong leader in that part of the country.”65 Similar sentiments existed in Congress, with conser-
vatives being concerned with yushin not because of its effects on human rights per se, but rather
because of its potential deleterious effects on South Korean stability and security (Kim, 2011b:
462-465).
Thus, from 1964-1976 there is only limited evidence that either amity or animus toward South
Korea played a significant role in U.S. reassurance or burden-sharing pressure. Moreover, any such
effects were dwarfed by the roles played by South Korea’s vulnerability and limited capacity for
exit, and by more general U.S. domestic retrenchment pressure.
7.5.2 ROK Domestic Politics
As the preceding discussion suggests, Park was staunchly anti-Communist and without left-wing
tendencies. He used the prospect of U.S. withdrawal to solidify his hold on power, declare a
state of emergency in 1971, and justify his use of repression under the revised yushin constitution
beginning in 1972 (Nam, 1986: 125, 156-157). Thus, the evidence does not allow me to rule out
the possibility that the ideology of the Park regime reduced fears in the United States about the
possibility of the ROK moving closer to the Communist bloc.
64Memorandum of Conversation, “Korean and other Subjects,” June 12, 1975, FRUS, Vol. E-12, Doc. 269; Telegram
9567 From Embassy in the Republic of Korea to the Department of State, “Kim Case and Its Aftermath in Korea,”
December 3, 1976, FRUS, Vol. E-12, Doc. 290.
65National Security Council Meeting, “SALT,” December 2, 1974, Box 1, National Security Adviser, National Security
Council Meetings File, 1974-77, Gerald Ford Presidential Library and Museum, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
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7.6 Conclusion
In conclusion, South Korea was highly vulnerable to U.S. burden-sharing pressure by virtue of its
geographic exposure to attack. Its comparatively small size, in turn, minimized its threat of exit,
thus reducing its capacity for extracting U.S. security assurances – even despite its threat to pursue
nuclear weapons. Finally, retrenchment pressure further facilitated the ability of the Nixon and
Ford administrations to demand increased defense effort from the ROK. As a result, South Korean
burden-sharing was quite high throughout the 1960s and 1970s, with ROK forces making up the
second largest contingent of foreign soldiers fighting on behalf of South Vietnam and South Korean
defense budgets skyrocketing as U.S. retrenchment became a more credible possibility. Moreover,
U.S. policymakers were reluctant to reassure the ROK by foreclosing the possibility of future troop
withdrawals for much of the 1960s and 1970s, and many officials – including both Secretaries of
Defense under Nixon as well as President Carter – favored pulling out most if not all U.S. forces.
Thus, the case of U.S.-ROK bargaining supports my theory’s expectations. Additionally, the
South Korean case provides at best limited evidence for alternative explanations. While Park’s
authoritarian tendencies and human rights abuses did raise concern among U.S. policymakers,
and also led to Congressional opposition to military aid for the ROK, it was strategic concerns
– particularly the level of threat posed by North Korea and the desire to keep the costs of U.S.
commitments down via allied burden-sharing – that ultimately determined U.S. reassurance toward
South Korea. Moreover, South Korea’s threat of exit may have been inhibited because, unlike U.S.
allies in Europe, it lacked other multilateral allies that it could turn to. However, U.S. policymakers
not only tolerated better ties between the ROK and Japan; they actively encouraged them.
195
Chapter 8
The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the Era of the Guam Doc-
trine, 1965-1976
8.1 Case Overview
After the end of World War II, the United States sought to ensure that Japan would not threaten
its neighbors again, while simultaneously trying to keep Japan from aligning with the Communist
bloc. It did so initially through occupation, which lasted until 1952 when the two countries signed
a Mutual Security Treaty (MST). In 1960, the MST was revised to ensure that the United States
was obligated to protect Japan – though Japan had no such obligation to defend U.S. possessions
(Greene, 1975: 30-33). Japan was considered to be the United States’ primary ally in East Asia
by virtue of its economic and potential military might.1 In addition to the commitment formalized
in the MST, the United States also stationed tens of thousands of forces on Japanese territory, in
large part to reassure the Japanese of U.S. protection. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for example,
argued in favor of the U.S. presence in Japan because “even relatively small” withdrawals “might
severely undermine the confidence of Japan in our determination to maintain strong defenses in
1Kissinger to Rockefeller, “Courtesy Call on Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki,” August 6, 1975, Folder “Prime
Minister Miki of Japan, August 6-7, 1975 (4),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Staff Files, Box 22, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan [herafter GRFL].
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the Far East, and thus weaken its desire to maintain its Free World alignment.”2 The U.S. presence
also provided additional forces that could be deployed elsewhere in the event of conflict on the
Asian mainland. Indeed, as I discuss below, one of the United States’ motivations for keeping a
large presence in South Korea was to assure Japan that the buffer between it and Communist North
Korea would remain intact.
Japanese burden-sharing, however, was very limited. Japan’s constitution did not allow it to
maintain military forces for purposes other than self-defense, and thus its defense spending was
always at a very low level of its gross domestic product (GDP) and it did not provide forces to
assist the United States in the Vietnam War despite Japanese policymakers’ support for the war
as a measure to stop the spread of communism. Indeed, under the MST Japan was responsible
only for the defense of its own home territory. This relatively low level of burden-sharing was
facilitated by Japan’s secure position, as it was separated from Asia by the Sea of Japan, and was
more powerful than its closest rival, the People’s Republic of China.
This situation appeared on the verge of change, however, during the late 1960s and 1970s, when
the costs of Vietnam put pressure on the United States to retrench and demand more from its allies.
In 1969, President Richard Nixon began large-scale withdrawals of U.S. troops from Vietnam
and also announced the “Guam Doctrine,” which proclaimed that allies would be responsible for
shouldering more of the burden for their own defense. As a result, Japan moderately increased
its defense spending and contemplated a more far-reaching shift toward autonomous defense and
even nuclear weapons acquisition.
Nevertheless, despite Japan’s objectively large capacity for burden-sharing, U.S. officials re-
frained from demanding self-sufficiency or even significantly greater effort for fear that doing so
would lead Japan to move closer to the Soviet Union and even potentially revive Japanese mili-
tarism. The United States reassured Japan that the Guam Doctrine would not mean a reduction in
the U.S. commitment to Japan’s (or East Asia’s) defense, and that the American détente with the
2Rusk to Gilpatric, February 23, 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961-1963, Vol. 22, p. 772.
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Soviet Union and more amicable ties with China would not involve sacrificing Japanese interests.
Thus, the Japanese unilateralism that U.S. policymakers feared ultimately never came to fruition.
I expect fairly high levels of U.S. reassurance but relatively low levels of Japanese burden-
sharing. While Japan had numerous exit options owing to its latent power – including nuclear and
conventional self-reliance, as well as neutralism vis-a-vis the Soviets and the Chinese – it was also
far safer from attack than contiguous allies such as South Korea. But constraints on U.S. resources
due to the costs of Vietnam should have put pressure on the United States to retrench, which in
turn should have led to more Japanese burden-sharing but also more U.S. reassurance as American
policymakers increasingly feared Japanese exit.
8.2 Chinese Nuclearization and the Fear of Japanese Proliferation, 1964-
1970
Japan’s separation from mainland Asia and its distance from the center of Soviet military power
in Eastern Europe considerably insulated it from the threat of conventional attack. As a result,
Japan’s vulnerability to threat, and to U.S. burden-sharing pressure, was quite low – as was its
need for reassurance. Throughout much of the late 1950s and early 1960s, many Japanese saw no
real threat to their security due to both their favorable geographic and to the buffer that U.S. forces
in South Korea (and, for a time, South Vietnam) gave it (Greene, 1975: 39-41; Cha, 1999: 71,
75-77).3 The Japanese public, as well as the left-wing parties – the Social Democrats (JSP) and
Communists (JCP) – saw little need for a U.S. military presence, and the JSP even questioned the
need for armed forces at all (Greene, 1975: 5-6, 8, 23).
When China obtained nuclear weapons in late 1964, Japan now faced a potential threat to its
homeland. As a result, Japanese policymakers began both internally discussing the merits of ob-
3Memorandum of Conversation, “Balance of Payments; Japanese Role in Asia and Views Toward Vietnam; Sato’s
Visits to Southeast Asia; China and Japan’s Security; Ryukyus Reversion,” November 14, 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968,
Vol. 29 (Part 2), pp. 227-232; Memorandum of Conversation, September 1, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part
1), pp. 272-277.
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taining nuclear weapons and seeking external reassurance from the United States that it would
protect East Asia – including Vietnam, Korea, and Taiwan – using its nuclear weapons. Japanese
officials were also deliberately ambiguous to U.S. officials about Japan’s nuclear intentions de-
spite making a joint communique in 1965 affirming Japan’s non-nuclear status (Lanoszka, 2014:
164-166). In July 1966, for example, in a conversation with Secretary of State Rusk, Japanese
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato pointed out that “Now that Communist China has a nuclear capabil-
ity...arguments have appeared in Japan that Japan would need nuclear weapons for its own de-
fense.”4 While discussions about potential nuclearization did not proceed into action, these con-
siderations re-emerged in the late 1960s as the United States seemed poised to retrench from East
Asia. Moreover, the United States used considerable reassurance to discourage Japanese nucle-
arization.
8.2.1 U.S. Reassurance
Before, during, and after the Johnson administration, the United States saw the U.S. security guar-
antee as a way to discourage Japan from becoming either a neutral competitor or a nuclear-armed
state – or both. Japan’s latent military strength, in addition to its history of expansion, contributed
greatly to fears in both East Asia and the United States that the Japanese would, left to their own
devices, pursue their security unilaterally in a way that might not serve U.S. interests and threaten
the region. These included obtaining nuclear weapons, charting a neutral course in the Cold War
in which it moved closer to the Communist powers, and pursuing independent, unilateral conven-
tional arming. In August 1964, writing on challenges in U.S.-Japan trade disputes (specifically
wool) the U.S. ambassador wrote that “gradual growth of defense consciousness in Japan and will-
ingness consider larger role in Asian affairs is inevitably being accompanied by revival of some
degree of Japanese nationalism,” adding that “it is essential...to recognize that irritations aroused
4Memorandum of Conversation, “U.S.-Japan Security Treaty,” July 7, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), p.
150; see also Memorandum Prepared by Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen), “Japanese
Attitudes on Non-Proliferation,” July 12, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), pp. 153-154.
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by international economic issues could help deflect this nationalism into less desirable channels.”5
U.S. officials explicitly used reassurance to discourage Japan from pursuing outside options.
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy wrote to Secretary of State Rusk
in January 1965 that “We must insure that the U.S.-Japan military partnership remains more attrac-
tive to Japan than the alternatives of military non-alignment or independent defense measures,”6
while the U.S. ambassador similarly wrote in July on the importance that “Japanese industrial po-
tential does not drift to the Communist side or into a position of neutrality.”7 Thus the ambassador
had concluded in December 1964: “We must...be very watchful of any tendencies in Japan to doubt
the firmness of U.S. defense commitments or the value of our nuclear deterrent in defense of Free
World positions in Asia and in particular Japan. In this regard we must be alert to any weaken-
ing of Japan’s current position and stance in the face of Chicom nuclear-weapon rattling.”8 After
China’s nuclearization in 1964, Johnson administration officials reassured Japan on the credibility
of the U.S. commitment – including on the use of U.S. nuclear weapons to defend Japan in the
case of a nuclear attack.9 Johnson visited Japan in January 1965, during which he and Prime Min-
ister Sato issued a joint communique that publicly “reaffirm[ed] the United States’ determination
to abide by its commitment under the treaty to defend Japan against any armed attack from the
outside” (Greene, 1975: 33). During a meeting with Sato in November 1967, Johnson reaffirmed
– at Sato’s request – this promise to defend Japan from nuclear attack.10
5Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, August 20, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part
2), p. 30.
6Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State
Rusk, “The Sato Visit; Proposed Cabinet-Level Meeting on Economic Problems,” January 6, 1965, FRUS, 1964-
1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), p. 60.
7Memorandum From the Ambassador to Japan (Reischauer) to Secretary of State Rusk, “Our Relations with Japan,”
July 14, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), pp. 104-105.
8Airgram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, “Politico-Economic Assessment: Japan, as of
December 1, 1964,” December 4, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), p. 48.
9Memorandum of Conversation, “Current U.S.-Japanese and World Problems,” January 12, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968,
Vol. 29 (Part 2), pp. 66-74.
10Memorandum of Conversation, “Balance of Payments; Japanese Role in Asia and Views Toward Vietnam; Sato’s
200
8.2.2 Japanese Burden-Sharing
As a result of its geographic position, Japan was relatively insulated from U.S. burden-sharing
pressure. Chinese power projection capabilities were minimal, and the Soviet Union did not have
substantial air and naval forces in the Far East until the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, many Japanese
officials saw the two Communist powers as too preoccupied with each other to pose an immediate
threat to Japan (Welfield, 1988: 364).11 Many Japanese saw little threat to their security and were
ambivalent about the need for a U.S. troop presence at all – particularly ground forces (Welfield,
1988: 143; Lanoszka, 2014: 145, 157-158). Indeed, a 1974 State Department Briefing Paper
argued that “in the absence of any perceptible direct military threats to Japan proper, the US-
Japan security arrangement came to be appreciated principally as a means of honoring US defense
commitments to other allies.”12
Moreover, while American officials did attempt to encourage increased Japanese efforts, they
were reluctant to press the matter too far. While Bundy noted in November 1964 that “we have
quite properly stepped up pressures on Japan to increase significantly its assumption of inter-
national responsibilities,”13 U.S. officials realized that U.S. protection – even if it discouraged
Japanese burden-sharing – was a key factor in keeping Japan from sliding back into militarism or
moving closer to the Communist bloc (Lanoszka, 2014: 159-160). American officials recognized
Visits to Southeast Asia; China and Japan’s Security; Ryukyus Reversion,” November 14, 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968,
Vol. 29 (Part 2), pp. 227-232; Memorandum of Conversation, “Ryukus and Bonins,” November 15, 1967, FRUS,
1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), pp. 232-234; Memorandum of Conversation, “U.S.-Japanese Relations and Security
Problems,” November 15, 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), pp. 235-244.
11“U.S. Defense Issues in East Asia,” December 3, 1976, p. 7, Digital National Security Archives.
12US Information Agency, “US-Japan Security Relations: Their Place in US Strategic Thinking,” November 1974,
Folder “President Ford’s Trip to Tokyo, November 1974 (3),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and
Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 18, GRFL.
13Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary
of State (Ball), “Frictions in U.S.-Japan Relations,” November 9, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), p. 42;
see also Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary
of State Rusk, “The Sato Visit; Proposed Cabinet-Level Meeting on Economic Problems,” January 6, 1965, FRUS,
1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), pp. 58-62; Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense
McNamara, “DOD Policy on the Japanese Defense Effort (U),” July 8, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2),
pp. 100-101.
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the delicate balancing act of trying to keep Japan tied to the United States while also assuming
more responsibility for its own defense. As Bundy put it: “any government which proposed a
sharp expansion of defense expenditures would risk its early replacement, in all probability by a
more neutralist government less likely to ensure Japan’s continued, effective Free World align-
ment,” adding that the “Japanese might be tempted by the nuclear route.”14 U.S. burden-sharing
pressure on Japan thus proceeded with great caution. A memo from Rusk to Johnson in November
1967 captured the reassurance dilemma well: “Fundamentally, we want Japan as a partner–not as a
rival–in Asia, but as partner sharing the political and economic burdens of regional responsibility.
While we do not now seek a greater Japanese military role, other than in its own defense, Japan’s
actions should contribute to–and not detract from–effective fulfillment of our military and security
commitments to Asia.”15 As a result, Japanese defense effort was low relative to its economic size.
Japan similarly did not offset the costs of U.S. deployments nearly as much as West Germany.
Much to the frustration of American policymakers in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the
Japanese preferred to put their defense spending toward domestic production of arms and equip-
ment rather than toward purchases of U.S. materiel.16 In 1963, for example, Deputy Secretary
of Defense Roswell Gilpatric argued that of the over $300 million in costs, “Realistic military
sales/cooperative logistics goals for offset would be $50 million for FY 64, $100 million for FY
65, and $150 million for FY 66.”17
14Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary
for Political Affairs (Thompson), “Japanese Defense Policy,” August 20, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2),
p. 117.
15Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, “United States-Japan Cabinet-Level Talks,”
September 4, 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), p. 206.
16Gilpatric to Kennedy, “U.S./Japanese Defense Relationships,” February 8, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 9, pp. 766-
771; Dillon to Rusk, March 8, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, pp. 165-166; Telegram From the Embassy in Japan
to the Department of State, November 1, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, pp. 795-798; Letter From Secretary of
Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk, November 16, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, pp. 801-803.
17Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President Kennedy, “U.S./Japanese Defense
Relationships,” February 8, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, p. 769.
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8.3 The Era of U.S. Retrenchment, 1967-1976
In March 1968, Johnson announced a deescalation of the war in Vietnam, raising Japanese fears of
abandonment (Lanoszka, 2014: 166-167) and leading many in Japan to favor “a more independent
foreign policy” that would “loosen” Japan from the United States.18 As the costs of the Viet-
nam War mounted, the Johnson and Nixon administrations faced considerable pressure to retrench
from U.S. foreign commitments. These took the form of numerous Congressional resolutions and
amendments to reduce the U.S. overseas military presence and demand increased allied burden-
sharing, as well as Congressional reluctance to continue providing material assistance to a number
of U.S. allies – most notably South Vietnam and South Korea, in Asia. Moreover, the War Powers
Act in 1973 increased Congressional influence over the President’s ability to conduct overseas mil-
itary operations. The Japanese took notice; the State Department’s country director for Japan noted
in April 1968 that “U.S. balance of payments difficulties, the Tet offensive, the Pueblo incident,
domestic disorders and the President’s March 31 speech are all cited as evidences of American
weakness” in Japan, and that the Japanese were concerned that U.S. foreign policy “is constantly
swinging with the whims of public opinion.”19 A telegram from the U.S. embassy in May similarly
reported that “Racial violence and social unrest in America have roused concern over basic stabil-
ity of American society,” and argued that domestic volatility within the United States, in addition
to Johnson’s refusal to run for re-election, might create in Japan a momentum to more seriously
consider both nuclear weapons and “more than very gradual acceleration of buildup in Japan’s
own defense which has been case over last few years,” which could “be accompanied by assertive
nationalist overtones and aggressive demands for phase down of U.S. bases.”20
18Editorial Note, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), p. 270.
19Memorandum From the Department of State’s Country Director for Japan (Sneider) to the Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy), “Japan: Partner in Possible Disarray,” April 26, 1968, FRUS,
1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), p. 273.
20Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, “US-Japan Relations, Status and Prospects,” June
5, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), pp. 278, 282.
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Japanese fears of abandonment only intensified after Nixon announced the Guam Doctrine in
July 1969, which proclaimed that allies would be expected to do more for their own self-defense.
Nixon and Kissinger saw the emergence of a “multipolar” era and sought to pass more of the costs
of regional defense onto allies and reduce U.S. involvement in future conflicts in Asia (Greene,
1975: 14-15; Cha, 1999: 69-72).21 The following year, the United States began to withdraw tens
of thousands of troops from Japan and South Korea, further alarming the Japanese. In response,
Japan and South Korea issued a joint communique in July 1970, in which they asserted that “U.S.
military presence is a key factor in safeguarding the security of the Far East” (Cha, 1999: 71). After
the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, the Japanese formally requested reassurance of U.S. protection
(Cha, 1999: 147).
Also causing great consternation in Japan was the United States’ rapprochement with the Com-
munist bloc – including its sudden, unilateral opening to China. Japan feared that improved rela-
tions between the United States and the Communist powers might be the precursor to a superpower
condominium in which Japanese interests would be sold out by U.S. policymakers seeking to re-
duce the possibility of war for the United States. In effect, Japanese officials feared a decoupling of
U.S. and Japanese security interests. As Ambassador Johnson put it, Japan feared being presented
with a “fait accompli in matters concerning Japanese interests.”22 State Department Director of
Policy Planning Winston Lord similarly noted in a memo to Kissinger that the Japanese had “ap-
prehensions that understandings between the U.S. and USSR may reduce the danger of Great
Power confrontations without removing the possibilities of local conflict.”23
Moreover, Japan feared that détente might encourage the Communist powers to move against
21As Nixon put it in Guam: “Asia is for Asians....We must avoid the kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so
dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one we have in Vietnam” (Cha, 1999: 61).
22Attachment to Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, March 1, 1967,
FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), p. 168.
23Memorandum from Lord to Kissinger, “Highlights of the 19th U.S.-Japan Planning Talks and My Trip to Korea,”
July 31, 1974, Folder “Japan (4),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files,
Box 4, GRFL.
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it. Johnson’s Special Assistant Walt Rostow summarized the Japanese position in March 1967:
“it doesn’t want us buddying up too close to either Communist China or the U.S.S.R.–especially
the latter, because of its greater relative strength.”24 As such, the opening to China shocked the
Japanese, who were not consulted and were barely notified prior to Nixon’s July 1971 speech
in which he announced his upcoming visit to China. Conservatives in the LDP felt particularly
betrayed in light of their loyalty to the United States, with Sato claiming the Americans “let me
down” and resenting being left out of the loop of U.S.-China negotiations during Nixon’s trip in
February 1972 (Greene, 1975: 11; Welfield, 1988: 295, 309-310; quote at p. 295; Cha, 1999: 104,
107).
Additionally, the Japanese feared that nuclear parity with the Soviet Union reduced the credi-
bility of the U.S. security guarantee.25 The Japanese suspected that the risk of nuclear retaliation
would make the United States reluctant to go to war on Japan’s behalf, as well as encourage it to
pursue détente. Indeed, agreements such as the US-Soviet Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement,
which provided for great power consultation in situations of elevated risk of nuclear war, raised
suspicions about a great power condominium and quetions about U.S. willingness to go to war on
its allies’ behalf.26
As a result, many in Japan began to consider pursuing a more independent foreign policy, one
less dependent on the United States. For one, Japan pursued better relations with China and the
Soviet Union (Greene, 1975: 8, 10-11, 19, 21).27 Even Japanese Conservatives, traditionally char-
24Attachment to Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, March 1, 1967,
FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), p. 166.
25Fred Greene, “US Relations with Japan,” October 1974, Folder “Japan - NSSM 172 (9),” National Security Adviser’s
Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 4, GRFL, pp. 5-6.
26Memo from Kissinger to Nixon, “Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka,” July 31, 1973, Folder
“Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan, July 31-August 1, 1975 (3),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East
Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 21, GRFL.
27“Japan Adjust to an Era of Multipolarity in Asia,” April 21, 1972, Folder “Japan, March 6 - June 6, 1972 [4 of 5],”
NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 102, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California
[hereafter RMNL]; Holdridge to Kissinger, “Your Meetings with Tanaka and Ohira,” August 10, 1972, Folder “Japan,
June 13, 1972 –,” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, Box 102, RMNL.
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acterized by intense anti-communism and loyalty to the United States, shifted to favor pursuing
rapprochement with the Communist bloc (Welfield, 1988: 296-298, 300, 314, 316-317, 318-319,
320, 323, 329, 334-336). This ultimately led to the September 1972 restoration of diplomatic ties
between Japan and China, as well as to numerous high-level visits between Soviet and Japanese
officials (Cha, 1999: 103-105; Komine, 2014: 116).28 Japanese threat perceptions, in turn, dimin-
ished due to the improvement in relations with the Communist bloc – though they increased in the
late 1970s after the fall of South Vietnam and plans were put on the table for U.S. withdrawal from
Korea (Greene, 1975: 8, 10; Cha, 1999: 108-109, 147, 152-154).
Additionally, the Japanese increased their military arming. The first Japanese Defense White
Paper in October 1970 argued that U.S. protection should “complement” rather than “substitute”
for Japanese defense, and Japan correspondingly increased its defense spending dramatically (Cha,
1999: 71-72; Komine, 2014: 98-101, 110-112, 116, 119-120). Of most concern to the United
States, this included increased consideration of pursuing nuclear weapons, with Japan launching an
initially covert centrifuge program – though not an overt nuclear weapons program – and refusing
to ratify the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) until June 1976 (Lanoszka, 2014: 169-172,
180-181, 183-184).
8.3.1 U.S. Reassurance
American policymakers saw Japan as a potentially dominant power and competitor in East Asia
(Zubok, 2013: 56). As such, the United States sought to avoid unleashing Japan and used reas-
surance to discourage it from re-militarizing. U.S. fears of Japanese nuclearization and neutralism
intensified during the 1970s, as Japan’s concern about the reliability of the United States grew.
Nixon and Kissinger worried that Japan might be tempted to reconsider its loyalty to the United
States in the wake of the Guam Doctrine, U.S. retrenchment from East Asia, the sudden U.S. open-
ing to China, and resource and political constraints in the United States more generally. The State
28Sonnenfeldt and Hyland to Kissinger, “Soviet-Japanese Relations,” April 7, 1972, Folder “HAK’s Japan Visit June
1972 Talking Points JUSEC Luncheon [6 of 7],” “NSC Files, HAK Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 21, RMNL.
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Department argued that the United States needed to “reassure” Japan in order to discourage it from
“acting independently” (Komine, 2014: 106). A 1974 State Department study similarly argued
that “alternative foreign policy orientations may become more attractive to Japan,” which included
“non-alignment, independent nationalism, or close political ties with China or the Soviet Union.”29
Indeed, American officials reassured Japan that the Guam Doctrine and the emergence of a
“multipolar” era in which the United States would expect more from its allies did not mean that
U.S. protection would diminish (Greene, 1975: 14; Welfield, 1988: 330-332; Cha, 1999: 69). Sec-
retary of State William Rogers reassured the Japanese in July 1973 that the United States would not
abandon South Korea and thus leave Japan exposed to attack (Cha, 1999: 106), and that same year
Nixon met with Prime Minister Tanaka and issued a joint communique in which the United States
promised to remain engaged and physically present in the Western Pacific (Greene, 1975: 105). In
the aftermath of the opening to China, the Nixon administration assured Japan that there had been
and would be no “secret deals” between China and the United States that affected Japanese inter-
ests (Cha, 1999: 108).30 Ford made his first overseas trip as President to Japan in November 1974,
during which he assured his hosts that the United States remained committed to Japan’s defense
and to the security of the Pacific region.31 After the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, which greatly
worried Japan, President Ford announced the “Pacific Doctrine,” in which he reaffirmed the U.S.
commitment to defending allies in the Pacific and promised to keep its presence in the Asia-Pacific
(Cha, 1999: 146-147; Komine, 2014: 122).32
29Memorandum from Richard Finn to Winston Lord, “Study on Forces at Work in Japan,” April 23, 1974, Folder
“Japan - NSSM 172 (5),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 4,
Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan [hereafter GRFL], pp. 7-18, quote at pp. 7-8.
30“Your Schedule and Talking Points for Your Meetings with the Japanese Leaders,” Folder “Henry A. Kissinger’s
Trip to Japan - Talking Points,” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 22, RMNL.
31Memorandum of Conversation, “President Ford -Prime Minister Tanaka First Meeting,” November 19, 1974, Box 7,
National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977, GRFL; Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford,
“Your Visit to Japan,” Folder “President Ford’s Trip to Tokyo, November 1974 (1),” National Security Adviser’s
Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 18, GRFL.
32Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, “Japanese Prime Minister Miki’s Visit to Washington August 5-6: Recom-
mended Basic Approach,” Folder “Prime Minister Miki of Japan, August 6-7, 1975 (3),” National Security Adviser’s
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The need to reduce Japan’s incentives for unilateral military arming or for reaching out to
the Soviet Union was a key justification American officials gave to the Chinese for the U.S. al-
liance with and continued presence in Japan (Welfield, 1988: 252-253, 289, 332; Zubok, 2013;
Komine, 2014: 105-108, 113, 118). Nixon told the Chinese that the United States was “opposed
to Japan moving in as the U.S. moves out, but we cannot guarantee that. And if we had no de-
fense arrangement with Japan, we would have no influence where that is concerned” (Komine,
2014: 108-109). Kissinger similarly called Japanese efforts to move closer to the Soviets “very
dangerous” (Komine, 2014: 118).
American officials also worried about the prospect of Japanese nuclearization. Such fears
were not only stoked by Japan’s reluctance to ratify the NPT, and U.S. officials’ awareness of
Japanese concerns about American reliability, but also by Japan’s economic and industrial capacity
(Greene, 1975: 95-98; Komine, 2014: 95, 115. American officials in both the Johnson and Nixon
administrations worked hard to secure Japan’s ratification of the NPT (Campbell and Sunohara,
2004: 222). The central component of this effort was reassurance, as Japan’s primary concern
was obtaining a guarantee of protection against nuclear attack.33 In contrast to cases such as
West Germany and South Korea, where the United States wielded frequent and blunt threats of
abandonment to discourage proliferation, U.S. officials put very little direct pressure on Japan.
This is as my theory would expect, as Japan was not only becoming an economic giant, unlike
South Korea, but its vulnerability to abandonment was also far less than either Germany or Korea.
During his trip to Japan in June 1972, Kissinger stressed the importance that the United States
placed on Japanese NPT ratification, and reassured Japanese officials of the U.S. commitment.34
In a conversation with the Japanese foreign minister in May 1974, Nixon claimed that although
Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 22, GRFL.
33Memorandum of Conversation, “Overall View of US-Japan Relations and Global Situation,” April 10, 1975, Folder
“Japan (5),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 4, GRFL.
34Johnson to Kissinger, June 7, 1972, Folder “Japan, March 6 - June 6, 1972 [2 of 5],” NSC Files, HAK Office Files,
Box 102, RMNL.
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the U.S. opposed proliferation, “I would not indicate what Japan should do.”35 In April 1975, the
Japanese minister of foreign affairs visited Washington and came away with a public statement
of three U.S. assurances: that the alliance would be maintained long-term, that the United States
would be willing to wage nuclear war on Japan’s behalf, and that the United States would “take
charge” if Japan was attacked (Lanoszka, 2014: 183-184).
Many who argued against troop withdrawals from Korea did so on the grounds that they would
make Japan less secure and lead it to pursue outside options – particularly nuclearization. Indeed,
Ford reassured Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki in August 1975 that the United States would
retain its troop presence in South Korea, while Kissinger similarly told his Japanese counterpart
in May 1975 that “the security of Japan is the principle reason for our commitment to defend
Korea.”36 When President Jimmy Carter proposed to withdraw U.S. forces in the late 1970s, the
Japanese were alarmed, and a number of officials in the State and Defense Departments moved
to undermine the plan in (Hayes, 1991: 59, 72, 74-76; Cha, 1999: 148, 152-154). As the House
Armed Services Committee (1978: 12) put it: “In the absence of the buffer currently provided by
the ROK, Japan, which is generally regarded as vital to U.S. interests...would be faced with the
choice of submission to Communist pressure or massive rearmament, probably including nuclear
weapons.” As such, Carter sent Vice President Walter Mondale to Tokyo – but notably not to Seoul
– to reassure the Japanese (Lee and Sato, 1982: 107-108).
35Memorandum of Conversation, May 21, 1974, Box 4, National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversations,
1973-1977, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. However, the United States’ relatively light
pressure was not the result of ambivalence about the goal of nonproliferation; Kissinger’s talking points for his
own meeting with the Japanese foreign minister included reaffirming that “U.S. interest in Japanese ratification [of
the NPT] remains high.” Briefing Memorandum from Robert Ingersoll to Kissinger, “Your Meeting with Foreign
Minister Ohira Monday, May 20, 1974,” May 1974, Folder “Japan (2),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East
Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 3, GRFL.
36Memorandum of Conversation, “President’s Second Meeting with Prime Minister Miki,” August 6, 1975, Box 14,
National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977, GRFL; Memorandum of Conversation, “Sec-
retary’s Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa,” May 27, 1975, Folder “Kissinger Memcons (4),” Na-
tional Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 14, GRFL.
209
8.3.2 Japanese Burden-Sharing
Japanese fears of abandonment led them to increase their military spending (Cha, 1999: 72;
Lanoszka, 2014: 166-167). U.S. policymakers particularly in the Nixon administration sought
to make Japan bear a greater defense burden; indeed, this was the hallmark of the Guam Doc-
trine (Greene, 1975: 78; Cha, 1999: 69-72; Komine, 2014: 88, 93). As Nixon put it to Tanaka
in May 1973, “an economic giant cannot remain a political pygmy” (Komine, 2014: 114). This
pressure for increased Japanese burden-sharing continued into the Ford administration (Komine,
2014: 117). Much of this pressure came from Congress (Greene, 1975: 80-81), and U.S. officials
used this pressure in order to impress upon the Japanese the need for increased burden-sharing,
making frequent reference to how Congress might react if Japan did not step up.37
However, there was a great deal of ambivalence about burden-sharing pressure on Japan, and
about the steps Japan was taking to boost its defense effort. American policymakers recognized
that the United States could not continue to shoulder the burden as it had previously but also feared
that Japanese re-armament and U.S. retrenchment could produce a nuclear, neutral Japan (Greene,
1975: 80-81, 87-91; Welfield, 1988: 447; Komine, 2014: 95-97, 102, 114, 116). Rogers wrote to
Nixon regarding U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea that “While some concern on the part of the
Japanese is healthy,” it was essential “not to cross over the line that would cause the Japanese to
have such doubts about our deterrent capabilities and intentions with respect to Japan and the rest
of the area.”38
As a result, Nixon only sought “moderate increases and qualitative improvements in Japan’s
defense efforts, while avoiding any pressure on her to develop substantially larger forces or to play
37Memorandum, Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, “Trip to Japan,” July 19, 1971, p. 3, Digital National
Security Archives; Rusk to Johnson, “United States-Japan Cabinet-Level Talks,” September 4, 1967, FRUS, 1964-
1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), pp. 206-207; Memorandum of Conversation, “Balance of Payments; Japanese Role in
Asia and Views Toward Vietnam; Sato’s Visits to Southeast Asia; China and Japan’s Security; Ryukyus Reversion,”
November 14, 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), pp. 227-232; Jenkins to Rostow, “Ambassador Johnson’s
Call on the President,” June 14, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), pp. 284-285.
38Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, September 22, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19
(Part 1), p. 185.
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a larger national security role” (Komine, 2014: 96, 112).39 During Kissinger’s visit in June 1972,
he spoke to the question of burden-sharing, declaring to the Japan-US Economic Council that “We
are not trying to push Japan into anything. We believe that what the Japanese do will be in terms of
their own judgment of their national interests.”40 He struck the same tone in private, telling Minister
of Foreign Affairs Takeo Fukuda that “we are not pushing Japan into rearmament,” and that the
United States did not “have any intention of pushing Japan into a military role.”41 Ultimately, while
Japanese military spending increased, it remained under one percent of gross domestic product.
Fears of renewed Japanese militarism did not come to fruition, in no small part due to a com-
bination of Japan’s geographic position, U.S. reassurance, and the United States’ reluctance to
push Japan too much for self-reliance (Komine, 2014: 126-127).42 U.S. policy was to encourage
“Japan to continue to improve gradually its conventional military capability for the defense of its
territory, but to avoid any regional security role.”43 More generally, Japanese perceptions of threat
were quite low as a result of the country’s separation from the Asian mainland.44. However, in the
39Memorandum, Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, “Trip to Japan,” July 19, 1971, p. 1, Digital National
Security Archives. This policy was also laid out in a May 28, 1969 National Security Decision Memorandum.
See National Security Decision Memorandum 13, “Policy Toward Japan,” Box H-208, National Security Council
Institutional Files, RMNL.
40“HAK Statement Before Japan-US Economic Council,” June 8, 1972, Folder “HAK’s Japan Visit June 1972 Talking
Points JUSEC Luncheon [1 of 7],” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 21, RMNL. See also Kissinger
to Nixon, “My Trip to Japan,” June 19, 1972, Folder “HAK’s Japan Visit June 1972 Talking Points JUSEC Luncheon
[2 of 7],” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 21, RMNL.
41Memorandum of Conversation, “Mr. Kissinger’s Discussion of U.S.-Japan Political and Economic Relations with
Mr. Fukuda,” June 11, 1972, Folder “Japan Trip Memcons – The President,” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, HAK
Trip Files, Box 22, RMNL.
42One reason Japan did not continuously protest proposed U.S. withdrawals from Korea in the late 1970s was Japanese
officials’ fears that doing so might lead the Americans to insist that Japan contribute to the defense of South Korea
(Lee and Sato, 1982: 107).
43Memorandum from W.R. Smyser to Robert Ingersoll, “List of Objectives for Japan NSSM,” April 4, 1974, Folder
“Japan - NSSM 172 (1),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 4,
GRFL.
44Memorandum from Richard Finn to Winston Lord, “Study on Forces at Work in Japan,” April 23, 1974, Folder
“Japan - NSSM 172 (5),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box
4, GRFL, pp. 4-6; Philip Habib to Brent Scowcroft, “Submission of Response to NSSM 210,” October 21, 1974,
Folder “Japan - NSSM 210,” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box
5, GRFL, pp. 66-70.
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next decade the Soviet Union’s growing strength in the Far East – including a large navy that could
allow to project power in the Pacific – became an increasingly large concern among the Japanese.45
8.4 Alternative Explanations
8.4.1 U.S. Domestic Politics
There is no evidence that lobbying played a significant role in U.S. reassurance or burden-sharing
pressure toward Japan, nor is there much evidence that Japan’s status as a democracy afforded it
significant advantages. While it was indeed the most democratic of the United States’ East Asian
allies, Japan was also the most strategically valuable, and it is this latter characteristic that U.S.
officials most often emphasized. In any case, Japan’s regime type did not insulate it from being
vilified by domestic audiences within the United States due to the large trade surplus it ran and to
its low level of defense effort relative to its gross domestic product. Domestic resentment within
the United States “that Japan was getting a free ride on defense from U.S. workers and taxpayers”
was common during the Cold War and contributed to pro-retrenchment sentiment (Stone, 1999:
254).
Indeed, there was considerable protectionist sentiment in Congress and among U.S. manu-
facturers and farmers who would have to compete with Japanese imports.46 The combination of
Japan’s economic resurgence, its subsequent competition with U.S. products, and its relatively low
defense burden also reduced Congress’s appetite for aid to Japan.47
45Memorandum of Conversation, “President Ford - Prime Minister Tanaka - Second Meeting,” November 20, 1974,
Folder “President Ford Memcons (1),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff
Files, Box 16, GRFL; “Japanese Perceptions of the Asian Military Balance,” June 23, 1976, Folder “Japan (11),”
National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific,” Box 6, GRFL.
46Memorandum of Conversation, “Liberalization of Trade and Payments,” June 20, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol.
22, pp. 685-687; Memorandum of Conversation, “International Economic Groupings and US-Japan Economic
Relationships,” June 21, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, pp. 693-696.
47Harriman to Johnson, “Negotiations with Japan Regarding the Ryukyus,” April 6, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol.
22, pp. 738-740; Memorandum of Conversation, “United States-Japan Relations,” November 25, 1963, FRUS,
1961-1963, Vol. 22, pp. 805-808.
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8.4.2 Japanese Domestic Politics
In Japanese politics, the dominant conservative party – the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – was
solidly pro-American during the 1960s (Welfield, 1988: 295-296, 299, 317, 335). By contrast, the
major left-wing parties – the Social Democratic Party (JSP) and the Japanese Communist Party
(JCP) – were far more skeptical of U.S. protection and more in favor of pursuing a more non-
aligned foreign policy. The JSP even favored having little to no armed forces, while the JCP
leaned toward armed neutrality in the Cold War (Greene, 1975: 7-9, 21, 23-24). Indeed, the
United States feared leftist influence in Japan, and on several occasions during the 1950s and 1960s
provided financial and other support to conservative Japanese politicians (Lanoszka, 2014: 162).48
A Department of State Guidelines Paper in early 1962 noted that “rule by the Socialists...would
not only completely reverse the present trend of U.S.-Japan relations but could also precipitate a
major and decisive power shift in Asia toward the Communist bloc with other Asian nations also
swinging to a Communist-oriented neutralism.”49
The Ambassador to Japan noted in a July 1965 letter to Secretary of State Rusk that “the
leadership of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party” kept Japan aligned with the United States, but
warned that a growth of left-wing influence could jeopardize this.50 A State Department study
in 1974 similarly concluded that “a left-wing government in Japan...would probably be inclined
to abrogate the Security Treaty.”51 Indeed, the left-wing parties vocally opposed the U.S. war in
Vietnam, despite the Japanese government’s support for the war.
American concerns about Japanese exit were indeed positively correlated with the strength of
left-wing influence in Japanese politics. During the early 1970s, the Socialists and Communists
48Editorial Note, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), p. 1.
49Department of State Guidelines Paper, undated [early 1962], FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, p. 731.
50Memorandum From the Ambassador to Japan (Reischauer) to Secretary of State Rusk, “Our Relations with Japan,”
FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), p. 105.
51Memorandum from Richard Finn to Winston Lord, “Study on Forces at Work in Japan,” April 23, 1974, Folder
“Japan - NSSM 172 (5),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 4,
GRFL, p. 41.
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gained a great deal of ground in local and national elections, forming the backbone of the “League
for Restoration of Ties with China” in the National Diet. In 1972, after Nixon visited Beijing,
Sato’s government fell, and opinion in the public and the Diet shifted more in favor toward rap-
prochement with China – which finally happened in September under Sato’s successor Tanaka.
The JSP and JCP gained more seats in December 1972 (Welfield, 1988: 283-284, 292, 311-314,
320, 323, 329).
However, the strength of left-wing parties was largely endogenous to Japanese concerns with
U.S. reliability. Socialist and Communist influence increased in large part because U.S. retrench-
ment from East Asia and its sudden, non-consultative opening to China made a more independent
foreign policy seem more attractive to the Japanese. Indeed, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan had
argued in late 1962 that troop withdrawals would “make the Japanese feel that we were abandoning
them” and “seriously damage the position of the present pro-American conservative leadership in
Japan.”52 Foreign Minister Kishi warned the United States in 1966 that withdrawals from Korea
would lead to Socialist gains in Japan.53 Even the LDP began to de-emphasize the importance
of the U.S. alliance in the late 1960s and early 1970s and increasingly favored an independent
foreign policy; conservatives felt that despite their loyalty they had been let down by the United
States (Greene, 1975: 11 Welfield, 1988: 329). During the 1969 election, for example, in the wake
of widespread concerns about American reliability, many LDP candidates indicated in campaign
speeches that the alliance with the United States was only “a temporary evil” (Curtis, 1970: 863).
In short, then, while left-wing parties did tend to be more in favor of exit than right-wing parties
in Japan, the relative influence of leftist parties was largely a function of perceived U.S. unrelia-
bility. Moreover, when the U.S. commitment seemed increasingly in doubt, even the conservatives
questioned the wisdom of remaining loyal to and dependent upon the United States.
52Reischauer to Harriman, October 22, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, p. 745.
53Memorandum of Conversation Between President Johnson and President Pak, November 1, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968,
Vol. 29 (Part 1), pp. 205-207.
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8.5 Conclusion
As I expect, concern about Japanese exit motivated the United States to provide considerable as-
surances that the U.S. commitment to protect Japan was credible and durable. The credibility
of this threat of exit grew during the 1970s, as pressure to retrench and reduce the costs of U.S.
commitments mounted, and as the United States pursued détente with its Communist rivals, in the
wake of the Vietnam War. This, in turn, generated significant worry that Japan might move closer
to China and the Soviet Union and also pursue an autonomous defense buildup that included ob-
taining nuclear weapons, thus leading the United States to reassure Japan even as it halfheartedly
encouraged increased Japanese burden-sharing. The United States’ ability to coerce Japan into
making a higher defense effort was thus undercut by its concern that too much devolution would
lead Japan to go its own way, as well as by Japan’s relatively secure geographic position – the
result of its being separated from the Asian mainland by water.
Additionally, the combination of Japan’s latent military potential and geography, and U.S. re-
trenchment pressure, provide more explanatory power for U.S. reassurance and burden-sharing
pressure than do alternative explanations. Japan was not able to profit good feeling in U.S. do-
mestic politics owing to either direct lobbying efforts or to its democratic status. Indeed, on the
contrary, Japan was often vilified by American domestic actors due to its comparatively low de-
fense burden and to the U.S.-Japan trade deficit. Moreover, even though left-wing influence in
Japanese politics raised concerns about Japan leaving the alliance, it was in fact concern with U.S.
unreliability – raised by U.S. retrenchment and détente with the Communist world – that made left-






This dissertation was motivated by one central puzzle: why do great powers go to great lengths to
reassure their allies of their protection, when doing so can have negative consequences that include
free-riding and moral hazard problems? In order to address this, I investigated two primary re-
search questions: 1) under what conditions do great powers reassure their allies; and 2) under what
conditions are great powers able to make their protection conditional on allied burden-sharing? I
argued that reassurance is the result of bargaining – whether tacit or explicit – and that it is largely
preventive in nature, designed to discourage allies from pursuing outside options and exiting the
alliance. Additionally, allies are most likely to increasing their burden-sharing contributions when
the patron has a credible threat of abandonment over them. Thus, reassurance and burden-sharing
need not be at odds as long as the patron can combine its assurances with threats of abandonment.
I argued that several key factors shape bargains over reassurance and burden-sharing. First, the
availability of outside options for both allies and the patron determines how easily they can find
alternative sources of support. The more outside options allies have, the greater incentive the patron
has to reassure them. Similarly, when the patron has outside options it can more credibly threaten
to abandon allies and thus coerce them into greater burden-sharing contributions. Second, allies
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with strategic value to the patron are both more capable of extracting reassurance and better able
to deflect burden-sharing pressure. Strategically valuable allies have more potent threats to exit the
alliance, while the patron’s threat to abandon them is less credible because they are intrinsically
important to its interests.
Third, when the patron faces resource constraints that bring its reliability into question, reassur-
ance and burden-sharing are both likely to rise in tandem. In such circumstances, the patron’s threat
of abandonment is more inherently credible, as maintaining its alliances becomes more costly. At
the same time, however, allies are likely to question the patron’s staying power, and are thus likely
to consider outside options if the patron does not reassure them.
Finally, the external threat environment can shape burden-sharing outcomes, but its effect de-
pends on whether it is allies or the patron that perceive the threat more severely. When allies’
perception of threat is elevated, the patron’s threat of abandonment carries more weight for them
as the consequences of being abandoned are more severe, and may include loss of territory or
independence. The patron is thus better positioned to make its protection conditional on their
burden-sharing efforts. By contrast, when the patron’s perception of threat increases, its threat
of abandonment becomes less credible, as abandoning allies means potentially ceding ground to
adversaries who might encroach upon them.
I tested the theory using a mixed-methods approach that combined econometric analysis with
historical case studies, using data on U.S. alliances since World War II. The quantitative results
showed that allies with stronger outside options receive more reassurance, while the United States
increased its reassurance during periods of resource constraints, when allies questioned its relia-
bility. As for burden-sharing, the results suggest that the United States has a more difficult time
pressuring strategically valuable allies into higher contributions, as the U.S. threat to abandon
these allies is not as credible. By contrast, allies that are geographically vulnerable tend to spend
more on defense. Additionally, while periods of resource constraints featured more reassurance,
they also featured more burden-sharing, with allies responding to the increased probability of U.S.
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abandonment.
As for the case studies, all four cases showed the deep concern U.S. policymakers had about
the possibility of allies pursuing nuclear weapons, seeking rapprochement with the Communist
bloc, and distancing themselves from their alliance with the United States. U.S. officials thus
used reassurance to maintain allies’ loyalty and discourage them from exploiting outside options.
Similarly, resource and political constraints during the late 1960s and early 1970s, brought about
by the costs of Vietnam and an ailing U.S. economy, raised concerns about U.S. reliability. This
facilitated U.S. efforts to encourage allied burden-sharing, but nevertheless led U.S. policymakers
to reassure their allies in an effort to discourage them from seeking nuclear weapons and unilateral
détente with the Communist bloc.
Third, the cases of South Korea and West Germany show the leverage the United States had
over allies that were geographically contiguous to adversary states. By contrast, the United States
proved unwilling or unable to coerce the United Kingdom and Japan into making higher burden-
sharing contributions. Fourth, evidence from the UK and West German cases suggest that the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was not associated with increased allied contributions.
By contrast, in the aftermath of the invasion, the elevated U.S. perception of threat reduced allies’
incentives for increased burden-sharing. Finally, the strategic value of West Germany, Japan, and
the United Kingdom provided these allies with bargaining leverage that they were able to convert
into high levels of U.S. support, as well as lower burden-sharing contributions than they might have
otherwise made. This was especially notable in the case of the UK, on which the United States
depended heavily for basing access – and, until the 1970s, for its presence “east of Suez.”
9.2 Avenues for Future Research
In addition to providing and empirically testing a theory of reassurance and burden-sharing, this
study suggests numerous avenues for future research. A number of scholars have argued that
the formal design of an alliance pact – for example, whether it contains provisions for economic
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linkage or joint military coordination – can greatly affect its perceived credibility (Morrow, 1994;
Leeds and Anac, 2005; Long and Leeds, 2006). Yet work seeking to explain variation in alliance
treaties is rare. Moreover, few studies focus on how bargaining leverage can shape alliance design,
and those that do implicitly assume that great powers can have their way (Kim, 2011a; Benson,
2012; Mattes, 2012). In focusing on how bargaining shapes informal commitments, this study
suggests avenues for further research on how bargaining might also shape formal alliance design.
Second, future research could shed light on the effectiveness of reassurance measures. This
dissertation has focused on explaining the causes and consequences of reassurance in asymmetric
alliances, but has been largely agnostic on the question of which forms of reassurance are the most
effective. Further work could identify the conditions under which assurances actually render allies
more confident in a patron’s protection.
Third, additional research could be done on the conditions under which burden-sharing is a
salient political issue to domestic actors, as well as how much burden-sharing is “enough” to deter
major calls for putting pressure on allies. Work here could be a useful blend of international rela-
tions scholarship with the subfields of comparative or American politics. Moreover, psychological
scholarship could provide micro-foundations to help understand demands for “fairness” (Kertzer
and Rathbun, 2015).1
Finally, more work remains to be done on how reassurance can be used – or withheld – as a
means of restraining allies. As many other authors have pointed out, alliance restraint is largely
understudied (Weitsman, 2004; Pressman, 2008; Cha, 2009). While this dissertation largely fo-
cuses on conditional reassurances in the context of burden-sharing, additional studies could focus
more directly on how patrons use threats and assurances to control their allies’ aggression. As I
argue here, reassurance can actually work as a means of discouraging allies from risky behavior
by making them more secure. However, as other scholars have pointed out, reassurance may in
some cases foster moral hazard (Fearon, 1997; Kim, 2011a; Benson, 2012; Posen, 2014). Future
1I thank Josh Kertzer for making this suggestion.
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research could shed light on the conditions under which reassurance leads to either outcome, par-
ticularly in the context of crisis diplomacy, as this dissertation is focused largely on reassurance
outside the context of immediate crises.
9.3 Policy Implications
The project also carries policy implications. In the wake of Donald Trump’s presidency, a number
of allies have expressed doubts about the credibility of U.S. commitments. My findings suggest that
withholding reassurance and deliberately casting doubt on U.S. protection makes allies prone to
reconsider their reliance on the United States and instead pursue outside options. Indeed, evidence
suggests that U.S. partners may be doing just that, with NATO allies increasingly debating the
merits of an independent European nuclear deterrent.2 Similarly, the credibility of the U.S. alliance
has come into question in South Korea and Japan, with a September 2017 poll showing that a
majority of South Koreans favored obtaining nuclear weapons.3
The United States’ network of alliances carries a number of purported benefits, including the
ability to project power, deter adversaries, and mitigate regional security dilemmas. Yet there is lit-
tle systematic understanding of how the United States maintains its alliances, or of how costly it is
to maintain them. These questions are even more pertinent in the era of the Trump administration,
in which many alliances are in doubt, allies are looking for reassurance, and burden-sharing is a
major U.S. foreign policy priority. This study provides insights into how bargains over reassurance
and burden-sharing have been made in the past, and therefore informs policymakers on how to
navigate this period of change.
Additionally, this study helps clarify the conditions under which burden-sharing pressure is
2Max Fisher, “Fearing U.S. Withdrawal, Europe Considers Its Own Nuclear Deterrent,” New York Times, March 6,
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/world/europe/european-union-nuclear-weapons.html (accessed March
25, 2017).
3Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “More than Ever, South Koreans Want Their Own Nuclear Weapons,” Washington Post,
September 13, 2017; Motoko Rich and Jane Perlez, “Seeing U.S. in Retreat Under Trump, Japan and China Move to
Mend Ties,” New York Times, November 16, 2017.
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more or less likely to achieve success. Reassurance need not be detrimental to burden-sharing;
rather, when used in tandem with threats of abandonment in the case of noncompliance, it plays
a central role in inducing allies to contribute more. This is especially the case during periods in
which patrons face pressure to retrench and reduce their commitments. In such circumstances, the
patron’s challenge is not one of convincing allies that it will reduce its commitment if the ally does
not comply, but rather one of convincing them that it will not reduce its level of commitment if
they do comply. Otherwise, allies may hedge and avoid increasing their share of the burden, in the
hope of exchanging burden-sharing effort for assurances of the patron’s continued commitment
rather than giving the patron an excuse to retrench. Henry Kissinger put the problem well in
his memoir: “The greater the pressures for troop withdrawals in the United States, the greater
the disinclination of our allies to augment their military establishments lest they justify further
American withdrawals” (Kissinger, 1979: 394).4
9.4 Broader Implications
Beyond contributions to the academic literature, this study carries a number of larger implications
for our understanding of international politics. For one, this dissertation contributes to why great
powers – and in particular the United States – have gone to great lengths to render allies confident in
their protection. Reassurance has been argued by some to be suboptimal and potentially irrational
(Walt, 2005, 2009; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007; Posen, 2014).5 But this analysis suggests that
both policy prescriptions for reassurance and policy prescriptions for disengagement are often in-
complete. Reassurance is not an unmitigated good; however, at the same time, arguments that treat
reassurance and free-riding as directly related, and which in turn portray reassurance as suboptimal
and prescribe disengagement as a recipe for increased allied burden-sharing, are misleading. The
patron’s level of assurance and allies’ level of burden-sharing should be considered the product of
4On the importance of combining threats and assurances, see Schelling (1966), Davis (2000), and Sechser (2007).
5Doug Bandow, “President Shouldn’t Reassure Europe,” CATO Institute, June 3, 2014; Justin Logan, “Japan: The
Ultimate Free Rider?” National Interest, April 29, 2015.
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strategic interaction and bargaining; neither should necessarily be considered as suboptimal, but
rather as a reflection of the bargaining power of both sides. Moreover, patrons can use reassurance
as a quid pro quo for allies to support them in ways that they might not otherwise – for example, in
assisting the patron’s foreign military interventions or fighting its local adversaries for it. Reduced
reassurance may reduce allies’ incentive to rely on the United States, and instead encourage them
to pursue more independent foreign policies which may not align with U.S. interests.
More broadly, the project contributes to understanding how great powers determine their al-
liance commitments, as well as how costly these commitments are. Classic works in the interna-
tional relations literature argue that free-riding is inherent in great powers’ alliances with weaker
partners, and that the costs of maintaining these asymmetric partnerships can even contribute to
overextension and long-term economic decline (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Gilpin, 1981). This
insight, in turn, has contributed to debate over the course of U.S. grand strategy. On the one hand
are scholars who prescribe retrenchment as a way to mitigate free-riding and rein in the costs of
U.S. commitments (Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky, 1997; MacDonald and Parent, 2011; Posen, 2014).
Others, by contrast, argue that the consequences of free-riding are overstated, and that the benefits
of alliances far outweigh their costs (Norrlof, 2010; Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, 2012). My
project adds to this debate by studying not only how great powers maintain cohesion and loyalty in




Akcinaroglu, Seden, Elizabeth Radziszewski, and Paul F. Diehl. 2014. “The Effects of Rivalry
on Rivalry: Accommodation and the Management of Threats.” Foreign Policy Analysis 10 (1):
81–100.
Allen, Michael A., Julie VanDusky-Allen, and Michael E. Flynn. 2016. “The Localized and Spatial
Effects of US Troop Deployments on Host-State Defense Spending.” Foreign Policy Analysis 12
(4): 674–694.
Ambrosio, Thomas. 2017. “Russia’s Ukraine Intervention and Changes to American Perceptions
of the Russian Threat: Executive Branch Testimony to the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees, 2008-2016.” Journal of Global Security Studies 2 (2): 104–122.
Art, Robert J. 2003. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov. 1980. “Alliance Strategy: US-Small Allies Relationships.” Journal of
Strategic Studies 3 (2): 202–216.
Barnett, Michael N. 1996. “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East.” In The Culture of National
Security, ed. Peter Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press.
Bearce, David H., Kristen M. Flanagan, and Katharine M. Floros. 2006. “Alliances, Internal
Information, and Military Conflict Among Member-States.” International Organization 60 (3):
595–625.
Beckley, Michael. 2015. “The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of
U.S. Defense Pacts.” International Security 39 (4): 7–48.
Bell, Mark S. 2015. “Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change
Foreign Policy.” International Security 40 (1): 87–119.
Bennett, Andrew, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger. 1994. “Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf
War.” International Organization 48 (1): 39–75.
Benson, Brett V. 2011. “Unpacking Alliances: Deterrent and Compellent Alliances and Their
Relationship with Conflict, 1816-2000.” Journal of Politics 73 (4): 1111–1127.
Benson, Brett V. 2012. Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral
Hazard. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Benson, Brett V., Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2014. “Inducing Deterrence
through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58 (2): 307–335.
Berinsky, Adam J. 2007. “Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Sup-
port for Military Conflict.” Journal of Politics 69 (4): 975–977.
Betts, Richard K. 1987. Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press.
Blackwill, Robert D., and Jeffrey W. Legro. 1989. “Constraining Ground Force Exercises of NATO
223
and the Warsaw Pact.” International Security 14 (3): 68–98.
Blechman, Barry M., and Stephen S. Kaplan. 1978. Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a
Political Instrument. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Bleek, Philipp C. 2010. “Why Do States Proliferate? Quantitative Analysis of the Exploration,
Pursuit, and Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons.” In Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st
Century, ed. William C. Potter, and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova. Vol. 1: The Role of Theory
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press pp. 159–192.
Bleek, Philipp C., and Eric B. Lorber. 2014. “Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Prolifera-
tion.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58 (3): 429–454.
Borghard, Erica D. 2014. “Friends with Benefits? Power and Influence in Proxy Warfare.” Ph.D
Dissertation, Columbia University.
Brady, Steven J. 2004. “The U.S. Congress and German-American Relations.” In The United States
and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1968. Vol. I New York: Cambridge University
Press pp. 133–140.
Brooks, Stephen G., G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth. 2012. “Don’t Come Home,
America: The Case against Retrenchment.” International Security 37 (3): 7–51.
Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. 2000. “Power, Globalization, and the End of the
Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas.” International Security 25 (3): 5–53.
Budge, Ian, and Richard I. Hofferbert. 1990. “Mandates and Policy Outputs: U.S. Party Platforms
and Federal Expenditures.” American Political Science Review 84 (1): 111–131.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2007. “Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2): 251–284.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 1999.
“An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace.” American Political Science Review 93
(4): 791–807.
Buteux, Paul. 1983. The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965-1980. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Cameron, A. Colin, and Pravin K. Trivedi. 1986. “Econometric Models Based on Count Data:
Comparisons and Applications of Some Estimators and Tests.” Journal of Applied Econometrics
1 (1): 29–53.
Campbell, Kurt M., and Tsuyoshi Sunohara. 2004. “Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable.” In Nuclear
Tipping Point : Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, ed. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert
Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press pp. 218–253.
Carnegie, Allison. 2015. Power Plays: How International Institutions Reshape Coercive Diplo-
macy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Carney, Stephen A. 2011. “Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Center of Military
History, United States Army Washington, D.C.
Carter, Jeff, and Glenn Palmer. 2015. “Keeping the Schools Open While the Troops are Away:
Regime Type, Interstate War, and Government Spending.” International Studies Quarterly 59
(1): 145–157.
Catalinac, Amy L. 2010. “Why New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS: Observing ‘Opposition
for Autonomy’ in Asymmetric Alliances.” Foreign Policy Analysis 6 (3): 317–338.
224
Cha, Victor D. 1999. Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security
Triangle. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Cha, Victor D. 2009. “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia.” International
Security 34 (3): 158–196.
Cha, Victor D. 2016. Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Chamberlain, Robert. 2014. “Security Exchange Theory: How Great Powers Trade Security with
Small States.” Ph.D Dissertation, Columbia University.
Chanley, Virginia A. 1999. “U.S. Public Views of International Involvement from 1964 to 1993:
Time-Series Analyses of General and Militant Internationalism.” Journal of Conflict Resolution
43 (1): 23–44.
Chapman, Terrence L., Patrick J. McDonald, and Scott Moser. 2015. “The Domestic Politics of
Strategic Retrenchment, Power Shifts, and Preventive War.” International Studies Quarterly 59
(1): 133–144.
Chiba, Daina, Jesse C. Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds. 2015. “Careful Commitments: Demo-
cratic States and Alliance Design.” Journal of Politics 77 (4): 968–982.
Chikte, Shirish D., and Sudhakar D. Deshmukh. 1987. “The Role of External Search in Bilateral
Bargaining.” Operations Research 35 (2): 198–205.
Christensen, Thomas J. 1999. “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East
Asia.” International Security 23 (4): 49–80.
Christensen, Thomas J. 2011. Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive
Diplomacy in Asia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Christensen, Thomas J., and Jack Snyder. 1990. “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting
Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity.” International Organization 44 (2): 137–168.
Clark, David H., Benjamin O. Fordham, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2011. “Preying on the Misfor-
tune of Others: When Do States Exploit Their Opponents’ Domestic Troubles?” The Journal of
Politics 73 (1): 248–264.
Clark, David H., Timothy Nordstrom, and William Reed. 2008. “Substitution is in the Variance:
Resources and Foreign Policy Choice.” American Journal of Political Science 52 (4): 763–773.
Clark, Ian. 1994. Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent and Amer-
ica, 1957-1962. New York: Clarendon Press.
Cleveland, Harlan. 1970. NATO: The Translatlantic Bargain. New York: Harper and Row.
Cohen, Avner. 1998. Israel and the Bomb. New York: Columbia University Press.
Cohen, Raymond. 1979. Threat Perception in International Crisis. Madison, WI: University of
Wisconsin Press.
Cooley, Alexander, and Hendrik Spruyt. 2009. Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in Inter-
national Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Crawford, Timothy W. 2003. Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Crawford, Timothy W. 2011. “Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power
Politics.” International Security 35 (4): 155–189.
Crescenzi, Mark J.C., Jacob D. Kathman, Katja B. Kleinberg, and Reed M. Wood. 2012. “Relia-
225
bility, Reputation, and Alliance Formation.” International Studies Quarterly 56 (2): 259–274.
Creswell, Michael H., and Dietrich H. Kollmer. 2013. “Power, Preferences, or Ideas?: Explaining
West Germany’s Armaments Strategy, 1955-1972.” Journal of Cold War Studies 15 (4): 55–103.
Crump, Lauren. 2015. The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: Internatonal Relations in Eastern Europe,
1955-1969. New York: Routledge.
Curran, James. 2014. “The Dilemmas of Divergence: The Crisis in American-Australian Relations,
1972-1975.” Diplomatic History 38 (2): 377–408.
Curtis, Gerald. 1970. “The 1969 General Election in Japan.” Asian Survey 10 (10): 859–871.
Danilovic, Vesna. 2002. When the Stakes are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers.
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Davis, James W. 2000. Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence. Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Desch, Michael C. 1989. “The Keys that Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in
the Periphery.” International Security 14 (1): 86–121.
Dittmer, Lowell. 1981. “The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis.”
World Politics 33 (4): 485–515.
Dixon, William J. 1994. “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict.” Amer-
ican Political Science Review 88 (1): 14–32.
D’Orazio, Vito. 2012. “War Games: North Korea’s Reaction to US and South Korean Military
Exercises.” Journal of East Asian Studies 12 (2): 275–294.
D’Orazio, Vito. 2013. “International Military Cooperation: From Concepts to Constructs.” Ph.D
Dissertation, Pennsylvania State University.
Dorussen, Han, Emil J. Kirchner, and James Sperling. 2009. “Sharing the Burden of Collective
Security in the European Union.” International Organization 63 (4): 789–810.
Doyle, Michael W. 1986. “Liberalism and World Politics.” American Political Science Review 80
(4): 1151–1169.
Dumbrell, John. 1996. “The Johnson Administration and the British Labour Government: Viet-
nam, the Pound and East of Suez.” Journal of American Studies 30 (2): 211–231.
Dumbrell, John. 2006. A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to
Iraq. 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Eichenberg, Richard. 1996. Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Einhorn, Robert. 2015. “Ukraine, Security Assurances, and Nonproliferation.” Washington Quar-
terly 38 (1).
Epstein, David, and Sharyn O’Halloran. 1999. Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics
Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Fang, Songying, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2010. “Outside Options and Burden Sharing in Non-
binding Alliances.” Political Research Quarterly 63 (1): 188–202.
Fearon, James D. 1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Dis-
putes.” American Political Science Review 88 (3): 577–592.
Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49 (3):
379–414.
226
Fearon, James D. 1997. “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1): 68–90.
Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P. Timmer. 2015. “The Next Generation of the
Penn World Table.” American Economic Review Forthcoming.
Fergusson, James. 2003. “The Coupling Paradox: Nuclear Weapons, Ballistic Missile Defense,
and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship.” In NATO and European Security: Alliance
Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism, ed. Alexander Moens, Lenard J.
Cohen, and Allen G. Sens. Westport, CT: Praeger pp. 153–172.
Flournoy, Michéle, and Jaime Davidson. 2012. “Obama’s New Global Posture: The Logic of U.S.
Foreign Deployments.” Foreign Affairs 91 (4): 54–63.
Fordham, Benjamin O., and Thomas C. Walker. 2005. “Kantian Liberalism, Regime Type, and
Military Resource Allocation: Do Democracies Spend Less?” International Studies Quarterly
49 (1): 141–157.
Fornasier, Roberto. 2012. The Dove and the Eagle. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars
Publishing.
Foster, Dennis M. 2008. “Comfort to Our Adversaries? Partisan Ideology, Domestic Vulnerability,
and Strategic Targeting.” Foreign Policy Analysis 4 (4): 419–436.
Freedman, Lawrence. 2003. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Third ed. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Friedberg, Aaron L. 1988. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline,
1895-1905. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Fuhrmann, Matthew, and Benjamin Tkach. 2015. “Almost Nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear La-
tency Dataset.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 32 (4): 443–461.
Fuhrmann, Matthew, and Sarah E. Kreps. 2010. “Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace: A
Quantitative Empirical Analysis, 1941-2000.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (6): 831–859.
Fuhrmann, Matthew, and Todd S. Sechser. 2014. “Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying
and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence.” American Journal of Political Science 58 (4):
919–935.
Garfinkel, Michelle R. 1994. “Domestic Politics and International Conflict.” American Economic
Review 84 (5): 1294–1309.
Gartzke, Erik, and Alex Weisiger. 2013. “Fading Friendships: Alliances, Affinities, and the Ac-
tiviation of International Identities.” British Journal of Political Science 43: 25–52.
Gartzke, Erik, and Kristian S. Gleditsch. 2004. “Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable
Allies.” Amerian Journal of Political Science 48 (4): 775–795.
Gaubatz, Kurt T. 1996. “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations.” Interna-
tional Organization 50 (1): 109–139.
Gavin, Francis J. 2004. Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Rela-
tions, 1958-1971. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
Gavin, Francis J. 2012. Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press.
Gavin, Francis J. 2015. “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution,
and Nonproliferation.” International Security 40 (1): 9–46.
227
Gelpi, Christopher. 1999. “Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control.” In Imperfect Unions:
Security Institutions Over Time and Space, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Robert O Keohane, and Ce-
leste A Wallander. New York: Clarendon Press pp. 107–139.
Gelpi, Christopher, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler. 2009. Paying the Human Costs of War:
American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the
Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gerzhoy, Eugene. 2015. “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States
Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear Ambitions.” International Security 39 (4): 91–129.
Gholz, Eugene, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky. 1997. “Come Home, America: The
Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation.” International Security 21 (4): 5–48.
Gibler, Douglas M. 2008. “The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation.” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 52 (3): 426–454.
Gibler, Douglas M. 2009. International Military Alliances, 1648-2008. Washington, DC: CQ
Press.
URL: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
Gibler, Douglas M., and Meredith Reid Sarkees. 2004. “Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of
War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000.” Journal of Peace Research 41 (2): 211–
222.
Gill, David. 2014. Britain and the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy, 1964-1970. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. First ed. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.
Glaser, Charles L. 2010. Rational Theory of International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Gleditsch, Kristian S. 2002. “Expanded Trade and GDP Data.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46
(5): 712–724.
Gleditsch, Kristian S., and Michael D. Ward. 2001. “Measuring Space: A Minimum-Distance
Database and Applications to International Studies.” Journal of Peace Research 38 (6): 739–
758.
Goldsmith, Benjamin E. 2003. “Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989: Why Spend More.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 47 (5): 551–573.
Goldstein, Avery. 1995. “Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World.”
International Organization 49 (1): 39–71.
Goldstein, Joshua S. 1992. “A Conflict-Cooperation Scale for WEIS Events Data.” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 36 (2): 369–385.
Gould, John A., and Matthew S. Winters. 2007. “An Obsolescing Bargain in Chad: Shifts in
Leverage between the Government and the World Bank.” Business and Politics 9 (2): 1–36.
Greene, Fred. 1975. Stresses in U.S.-Japanese Security Relations. Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press.
Guisinger, Alexandra, and Alastair Smith. 2002. “Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation
228
and Political Institutions in International Crises.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (2): 175–
200.
Gul Hong, Sung. 2011. “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option.” In The Park Chung
Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, ed. Pyong-guk Kim, and Ezra F. Vogel. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press pp. 483–510.
Haas, Mark L. 2005. The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Haas, Mark L. 2014. “Ideological Polarity and Balancing in Great Power Politics.” Security Studies
23 (4): 715–753.
Haftendorn, Helga. 1996. “The Nuclear Dilemmas of the Alliance: Revision of Strategy and the
Nuclear Dilemma of NATO.” In NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility,
1966-1967, ed. Helga Haftendorn. New York: Oxford University Press pp. 111–199.
Handel, Michael I. 1981. Weak States in the International System. Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass.
Harrison, Hope M. 2005. Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-
1961. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hausman, Jerry, Bronwyn H. Hall, and Zvi Griliches. 1984. “Econometric Models for Count Data
with an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship.” Econometrica 52 (4): 909–938.
Hayes, Peter. 1991. Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea. Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books.
Haynes, Kyle. 2015. “Decline and Devolution: The Sources of Strategic Military Retrenchment.”
International Studies Quarterly 59 (3): 490–502.
Healey, Denis. 1989. Time of My Life. London: Michael Joseph.
Henry, Ryan. 2006. “Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture.” Naval War College Review
59 (2): 13–28.
Hensel, Paul. 2014. “ICOW Colonial History Data Set.” Version 1.0.
URL: http://www.paulhensel.org/icowcol.html
Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organiza-
tions, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Holsti, Ole R., P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan. 1973. Unity and Disintegration in
International Alliances: Comparative Studies. New York: Wiley.
House Armed Services Committee. 1978. Review of the Policy Decision to Withdraw United States
Ground Forces from Korea: Report of the Investigations Subcomittee of the Committee on Armed
Services House of Representatives. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
Howard, Michael. 1982. “Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s.” Foreign
Affairs 61 (2): 309–324.
Howell, William G. 2013. Thinking about the Presidency: The Primacy of Power. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Howorth, Jolyon, and John T.S. Keeler, eds. 2003. Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the
Quest for European Autonomy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hughes, R. Gerald, and Thomas Robb. 2013. “Kissinger and the Diplomacy of Coercive Linkage in
the "Special Relationship" between the United States and Great Britain, 1969-1977.” Diplomatic
History 37 (4): 861–905.
229
Hunt, Richard A. 2015. Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military, 1969-1973.
Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Hurd, Ian. 1999. “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics.” International Organization
53 (2): 379–408.
Hynes, Catherine. 2009. The Year that Never Was: Heath, the Nixon Administration and the Year
of Europe. Dublin: University College Dublin Press.
Izumikawa, Yasuhiro. 2013. “To Coerce or Reward? Theorizing Wedge Strategies in Alliance
Politics.” Security Studies 22 (3): 498–531.
Jang, Se Young. 2016. “The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear
Ambitions.” Journal of Strategic Studies 39 (4): 502–520.
Jelavich, Barbara. 1991. Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Jervis, Robert L. 1970. The Logic of Images in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Jervis, Robert L. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Jervis, Robert L. 1989. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
Jervis, Robert L. 1991. “Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior.” In Dominoes and Bandwagons:
Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Robert L. Jervis,
and Jack Snyder. New York: Oxford University Press pp. 20–50.
Jervis, Robert L. 1997. System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Jervis, Robert L. 2002a. “Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Im-
ages.” In Political Psychology, ed. Kristen Monroe. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
pp. 293–312.
Jervis, Robert L. 2002b. “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace.” American Political
Science Review 96 (1): 1–14.
Jervis, Robert L. 2015. “The Cuban Missile Crisis: What Can We Know, Why Did It Start, and
How Did It End?” In The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal, ed. Len Scott, and
R. Gerald Hughes. New York: Routledge pp. 1–39.
Jo, Dong-Joon, and Erik Gartzke. 2007. “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation.” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 51 (1): 167–194.
Juneau, Jean-François. 2011. “The Limits of Linkage: The Nixon Administration and Willy
Brandt’s Ostpolitik, 1969-72.” The International History Review 33 (2): 277–297.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under
Risk.” Econometrica 47 (2): 263–292.
Kane, Tim. 2006. “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005.” Center for Data Analysis Report
06-02, The Heritage Foundation.
Kaplan, Lawrence. 1999. The Long Entanglement: NATO’s First Fifty Years. Westport, CT:
Praeger.
Kelleher, Catherine A. 1975. Germany & the Politics of Nuclear Weapons. New York: Columbia
230
University Press.
Kennedy, Paul M. 1987. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military
Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House.
Keohane, Robert O. 1971. “The Big Influence of Small Allies.” Foreign Policy 2: 161–182.
Kertzer, Joshua D., and Brian C. Rathbun. 2015. “Fair is Fair: Social Preferences and Reciprocity
in International Politics.” World Politics 64 (4): 613–655.
Kim, Seung-Young. 2001. “Security, Nationalism and the Pursuit Of Nuclear Weapons and Mis-
siles: The South Korean Case, 1970-82.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 12 (4): 53–80.
Kim, Tongfi. 2011a. “Why Alliances Entangle But Seldom Entrap States.” Security Studies 20 (3):
350–377.
Kim, Tongfi. 2016. The Supply Side of Security: A Market Theory of Military Alliances. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Kim, Yong-Jick. 2011b. “The Security, Political, and Human Rights Conundrum, 1974-1979.” In
The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, ed. Pyong-guk Kim, and Ezra F.
Vogel. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press pp. 457–482.
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
King, Gary, and Will Lowe. 2003a. “10 Million International Dyadic Events.”
UNF:3:dSE0bsQK2o6xXlxeaDEhcg== , IQSS Dataverse Network, V5.
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/FYXLAWZRIA
King, Gary, and Will Lowe. 2003b. “An Automated Information Extraction Tool for International
Conflict Data with Performance as Good as Human Coders: A Rare Events Evaluation Design.”
International Organization 57 (3): 617–642.
Kissinger, Henry. 1979. White House Years. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company.
Kissinger, Henry. 1982. Years of Upheaval. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company.
Kissinger, Henry. 1999. Years of Renewal. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Klein, James P., Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl. 2006. “The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and
Patterns.” Journal of Peace Research 43 (3): 331–348.
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Richard Hofferbert, and Ian Budge. 1994. Parties, Politics, and Democ-
racy. Westview.
Klitzing, Holger. 2009. “To Grin and Bear It: The Nixon Administration and Ostpolitik.” In
Ostpolitik, 1969-1974: European and Global Responses, ed. Carole Fink, and Bernd Schaefer.
Cambridge University Press pp. 80–110.
Knopf, Jeffrey, ed. 2012. Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation. Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford Security Studies.
Komine, Yukinori. 2014. “Whither a ‘Resurgent Japan’: The Nixon Doctrine and Japan’s Defense
Buildup, 1969-1976.” Journal of Cold War Studies 16 (3): 88–128.
Krause, Volker. 2004. “Hazardous Weapons? Effects of Arms Transfers and Defense Pacts on
Militarized Disputes, 1950-1995.” International Interactions 30 (4): 349–371.
Kreps, Sarah E. 2010. Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the
Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kroenig, Matthew. 2010. Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear
231
Weapons. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Kroenig, Matthew. 2013. “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear
Crisis Outcomes.” International Organization 67 (1): 141–171.
Kuo, Raymond. 2014. “Augmenting Order: The Diffusion of Dominant Alliance Forms.” Ph.D
Dissertation, Princeton University.
Kux, Dennis. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore,
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Kydd, Andrew H. 1997. “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each
Other.” Security Studies 7 (1): 114–155.
Kydd, Andrew H. 2005. Trust and Mistrust in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Labs, Eric J. 1992. “Do Weak States Bandwagon?” Security Studies 1 (3): 383–416.
Lai, Brian. 2003. “Examining the Goals of US Foreign Assistance in the Post-Cold War Period,
1991-96.” Journal of Peace Research 40 (1): 103–128.
Lake, David A. 1999. Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lake, David A. 2007. “Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Poli-
tics.” International Security 32 (1): 47–79.
Lake, David A. 2009. Hierarchy in International Relations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Lanoszka, Alexander. 2014. “Protection States Trust?: Major Power Patronage, Nuclear Behavior,
and Alliance Dynamics.” Ph.D Dissertation, Princeton University.
Lanoszka, Alexander. 2015. “Do Allies Really Free-Ride?” Survival 57 (3): 133–152.
Lanoszka, Alexander, and Michael A. Hunzeker. 2016. “Landpower and American Credibility.”
Parameters 45 (4): 17–26.
Lázár, Péter. 2003. “The Mansfield Amendments and the U.S.. Commitment In Europe, 1966-
1975.” M.A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School.
Lebovic, James H., and Elizabeth N. Saunders. 2016. “The Diplomatic Core: The Determinants
of High-Level US Diplomatic Visits, 1946U˝2010.” International Studies Quarterly 60 (2): 107–
123.
Lee, Chae-Jin, and Hideo Sato. 1982. U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea: A Changing Influence
Relationship. New York: Praeger.
Lee, Jong-Sup, and Uk Heo. 2002. The U.S.-South Korean Alliance, 1961-1988: Free-Riding or
Bargaining? Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003a. “Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to
Violate Treaties.” International Organization 57 (4): 801–827.
Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003b. “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances
on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes.” Amerian Journal of Political Science 47 (3):
427–439.
Leeds, Brett Ashley, and Burcu Savun. 2007. “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate
Agreements?” The Journal of Politics 69 (4): 1118–1132.
Leeds, Brett Ashley, Jeffrey Ritter, Sara Mitchell, and Andrew Long. 2002. “Alliance Treaty
Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944.” International Interactions 28 (3): 237–260.
232
Leeds, Brett Ashley, Michaela Mattes, and Jeremy S. Vogel. 2009. “Interests, Institutions, and
the Reliability of International Commitments.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (2):
461–476.
Leeds, Brett Ashley, and Sezi Anac. 2005. “Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Perfor-
mance.” International Interactions 31 (3): 183–202.
Lehmann, Pola, Theres Matthieu, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel, and Annika Werner. 2015. “Mani-
festo Corpus.” Version: 2015a. Berlin: WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
Lepgold, Joseph. 1990. The Declining Hegemon: The United States and European Defense, 1960-
1990. New York: Praeger.
Levite, Ariel. 2002. “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited.” International Security
27 (3): 59–88.
Levy, Jack S., and William R. Thompson. 2010. “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally
against the Leading Global Power?” International Security 35 (1): 7–43.
Lieberman, Evan S. 2005. “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Re-
search.” American Political Science Review 99 (3): 435–452.
Lippmann, Walter. 1943. U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. Boston, MA: Little, Brown
and Company.
Liska, George. 1962. Nations in Alliance. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Long, Andrew G., and Brett Ashley Leeds. 2006. “Trading for Security: Military Alliances and
Economic Agreements.” Journal of Peace Research 43 (4): 433–451.
Lundestad, Geir. 2003. The United States and Western Europe since 1945. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Macdonald, Douglas J. 1992. Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third
World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
MacDonald, Paul K., and Joseph M. Parent. 2011. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of
Great Power Retrenchment.” International Security 35 (4): 7–44.
Machain, Carla Martinez, and T. Clifton Morgan. 2013. “The Effect of US Troop Deployment on
Host States’ Foreign Policy.” Armed Forces & Society 39 (1): 102–123.
Mack, Andrew. 1975. “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict.”
World Politics 27 (2): 175–200.
Mackby, Jenifer, and Walter B. Slocombe. 2004. “Germany: The Model Case, A Historical Imper-
ative.” In Nuclear Tipping Point : Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, ed. Kurt M.
Campbell, Robert Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press
pp. 175–217.
Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. 2011. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics
and Transitions, 1800-2011.
URL: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
Marshall, Monty G., Ted R. Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. 2014. “POLITY IV PROJECT: Political
Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013: Dataset Users’ Manual.”.
Mattes, Michaela. 2012. “Reputation, Symmetry, and Alliance Design.” International Organiza-
tion 66 (4): 679–707.
McClelland, Charles. 1999. “World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) Project, 1966-1978.”
233
ICPSR05211-v3. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.
URL: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/05211
McCubbins, Matthew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms.” American Journal of Political Science 28 (1): 165–179.
McLaurin, Ronald D. 1988. “Security Relations: Burden-Sharing in a Changing Security Environ-
ment.” In Alliance under Tension: The Evolution of South Korean-U.S. Relations. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press pp. 157–190.
McMahon, Robert J. 1999. The Limits of Empire. New York: Columbia University Press.
McManus, Roseanne W. 2014. “Fighting Words: The Effectiveness of Statements of Resolve in
International Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 51 (6): 726–740.
McManus, Roseanne W. 2017. “Making It Personal:The Role of Leader-Specific Signals in Ex-
tended Deterrence.” Unpublished manuscript.
McManus, Roseanne W., and Keren Yarhi-Milo. 2017. “The Logic of ‘Offstage’ Signaling: Do-
mestic Politics, Regime Type, and Major Power-Protégé Relations.” International Organization
71 (4): 701–733.
Mearsheimer, John J. 1983. Conventional Deterrence. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Mearsheimer, John J. 1990. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.” Inter-
national Security 15 (1): 5–56.
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton.
Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephen M. Walt. 2007. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. New
York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
Mehta, Rupal N., and Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark. 2017. “The Benefits and Burdens of Nuclear
Latency.” International Studies Quarterly Forthcoming: doi: 10.1093/isq/sqx028.
Mercer, Jonathan. 1996. Reputation and International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
Meyer, Stephen M. 1984. The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Middeke, Michael. 2001. “Britain’s Global Military Role, Conventional Defence and Anglo-
American Interdependence after Nassau.” Journal of Strategic Studies 24 (1): 143–164.
Miller, Gregory D. 2003. “Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the
Past.” Security Studies 12 (3): 40–78.
Miller, Nicholas L. 2014a. “Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy?” Security Studies 23
(1): 33–73.
Miller, Nicholas L. 2014b. “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions.” International
Organization 68 (4): 913–944.
Milner, Helen V., and Dustin Tingley. 2015. Sailing the Water’s Edge: The Domestic Politics of
American Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Monteiro, Nuno P. 2014. Theory of Unipolar Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Monteiro, Nuno P., and Alexandre Debs. 2014. “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation.”
International Security 39 (2): 7–51.
Montgomery, Evan Braden. 2016. In the Hegemon’s Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of
Regional Powers. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
234
Moon, Chung-in. 1988. “Influencing Washington: An Analysis of the South Korean Lobby in
the United States.” In Alliance under Tension: The Evolution of South Korean-U.S. Relations.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press pp. 103–127.
Morgan, Patrick M. 1983. Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis. Second ed. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage Publications.
Morrow, James D. 1991. “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation
Model of Alliances.” American Journal of Political Science 35 (4): 904–933.
Morrow, James D. 1993. “Arms Versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security.” International
Organization 47 (2): 207–233.
Morrow, James D. 1994. “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs.” Journal of Conflict Reso-
lution 38 (2): 270–297.
Morrow, James D. 2000. “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of Political Science
3: 63–83.
Most, Benjmain A., and Harvey Starr. 1984. “International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy
Substitutability, and ‘Nice’ Laws.” World Politics 36 (3): 383–406.
Mueller, John E. 1973. War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. New York: Wiley.
Murdoch, James C., and Todd Sandler. 1984. “Complementarity, Free Riding, and the Military
Expenditures of NATO Allies.” Journal of Public Economics 25 (1): 83–101.
Murdock, Clark A., Jessica M. Yeats, Linton F. Brooks, M. Elaine Bunn, Franklin C. Miller,
James L. Schoff, Tara Murphy, L. Christian Pearson, and John K. Warden. 2009. Exploring the
Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance. Washington, DC: Center
for Strategic and International Studies.
Nam, Joo-Hong. 1986. America’s Commitment to South Korea: The First Decade of the Nixon
Doctrine. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Narizny, Kevin. 2003. “Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political Economy
of Rearmament.” American Political Science Review 97 (2): 203–220.
Nelson, Daniel N. 1986. Alliance Behavior in the Warsaw Pact. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Neustadt, Richard E. 1999. Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Nichter, Luke A. 2015. Richard Nixon and Europe: The Reshaping of the Postwar Atlantic World.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ninkovich, Frank A. 2004. “The United States and the German Question, 1949-1968.” In The
United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1968. Vol. I New York: Cambridge
University Press pp. 118–124.
Nixon, Richard. 1971. United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace. New York:
Harper and Row.
Norrlof, Carla. 2010. America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Oberdorfer, Don. 1997. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. New York: Basic Books.
O’Hara, Glen. 2003. “The Limits of US Power: Transatlantic Financial Diplomacy under the
Johnson and Wilson Administrations, October 1964-November 1968.” Contemporary European
History 12 (3): 257–278.
235
Olson, Jr., Mancur, and Richard Zeckhauser. 1966. “An Economic Theory of Alliances.” Review
of Economics and Statistics 48 (3): 266–279.
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Oneal, John R. 1990. “The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO.” Interna-
tional Organization 44 (3): 379–402.
Oneal, John R., and Mark A. Elrod. 1989. “NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change.”
International Studies Quarterly 33 (4): 435–456.
Osgood, Robert E. 1968. Alliances and American Foreign Policy. Baltimore, MD: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Owen, John, IV. 1997. Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Owsiak, Andrew P., and Derrick V. Frazier. 2014. “The Conflict Management Efforts of Allies in
Interstate Disputes.” Foreign Policy Analysis 10 (3): 243–264.
Palmer, Glenn. 1990a. “Alliance Politics and Issue Areas: Determinants of Defense Spending.”
American Journal of Political Science 34 (1): 190–211.
Palmer, Glenn. 1990b. “Corralling the Free Rider: Deterrence and the Western Alliance.” Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly 34 (2): 147–164.
Palmer, Glenn, Tamar London, and Patrick Regan. 2004. “What’s Stopping You?: The Sources of
Political Constraints on International Conflict Behavior in Parliamentary Democracies.” Inter-
national Interactions 30 (1): 1–24.
Palmer, Glenn, Vito D’Orazio, Michael Kenwick, and Matthew Lane. 2015. “The MID4 Data
Set, 2002-2010: Procedures, Coding Rules and Description.” Conflict Management and Peace
Science 32 (2): 222–242.
URL: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
Park, Chang Jin. 1975. “The Influence of Small States upon the Superpowers: United States-South
Korean Relations as a Case Study, 1950-53.” World Politics 28 (1): 97–117.
Pelt, Mogens. 2006. Tying Greece to the West: US-West German-Greek Relations 1949-1974.
Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press.
Peters, Gerhard, and John Woolley. 2016. “American Presidency Project.” University of California,
Santa Barbara.
URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu
Pettyjohn, Stacie L. 2012. U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783-2011. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
Pettyjohn, Stacie L., and Alan J. Vick. 2013. The Posture Triangle: A New Framework for U.S. Air
Force Global Presence. Washington, DC: RAND.
Plümper, Thomas, and Eric Neumayer. 2015. “Free-riding in Alliances: Testing an Old Theory
with a New Method.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 32 (2): 247–268.
Poast, Paul. 2013. “Can Issue Linkage Improve Treaty Credibility? Buffer State Alliances as a
‘Hard Case’.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57 (5): 739–764.
Posen, Barry R. 2003. “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony.”
International Security 28 (1): 5–46.
Posen, Barry R. 2006. “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?”
236
Security Studies 15 (2): 149–186.
Posen, Barry R. 2014. Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Powaski, Ronald E. 1994. The Entangling Alliance: The United States and European Security,
1950-1993. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Powell, Robert. 1999. In the Shadow of Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Pressman, Jeremy. 2008. Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press.
Priest, Andrew. 2006. Kennedy, Johnson, and NATO: Britain, America, and the Dynamics of
Alliance, 1962-68. New York: Routledge.
Putnam, Robert D. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.”
International Organization 42 (3): 427–460.
Quek, Kai. 2016. “Are Costly Signals More Credible? Evidence of Sender-Receiver Gaps.” Jour-
nal of Politics 78 (3): 925–940.
Rabinowitz, Or, and Nicholas L. Miller. 2015. “Keeping the Bombs in the Basement: U.S. Non-
proliferation Policy toward Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan.” International Security 40 (1):
47–86.
Ranft, Bryan, and Geoffrey Till. 1989. The Sea in Soviet Strategy. Second ed. London: Macmillan.
Rapp-Hooper, Mira. 2014. “Ambivalent Albion, Ambitious Ally: Britain’s Decision for No Sepa-
rate Peace in 1914.” Security Studies 23 (4): 814–844.
Rapp-Hooper, Mira. 2015. “Absolute Alliances: Extended Deterrence in International Politics.”
Ph.D Dissertation, Columbia University.
Rasler, Karen, William R. Thompson, and Sumit Ganguly. 2013. How Rivalries End. Philadelphia,
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Rector, Chad. 2009. Federations: The Political Dynamics of Cooperation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Reiss, Mitchell B. 1988. Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Reiter, Dan. 2014. “Security Commitments and Nuclear Proliferation.” Foreign Policy Analysis 10
(1): 61–80.
Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam. 2002. Democracies at War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Resnick, Evan N. 2010. “Strange Bedfellows: U.S Bargaining Behavior with Allies of Conve-
nience.” International Security 35 (3): 144–184.
Reynolds, David. 1994. The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Robb, Thomas. 2014. A Strained Partnership?: US-UK Relations in the Era of Detente, 1969-77.
Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
Rockoff, Hugh. 2012. America’s Economic Way of War: War and the U.S. Economy from the
Spanish-American War to the Persian Gulf War. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Rothstein, Robert L. 1968. Alliances and Small Powers. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rubinstein, Ariel. 1982. “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model.” Econometrica 50 (1): 97–
237
109.
Russett, Bruce. 1990. “Economic Decline, Electoral Pressure, and the Initiation of International
Conflict.” In Prisoners of War?, ed. Charles Gochman, and Ned Sabrosky. Lexington, MA: DC
Heath and Co.
Russett, Bruce. 1994. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Russett, Bruce M. 1970. What Price Vigilance? Burdens of National Defence. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Sagan, Scott D. 1995. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sagan, Scott D. 1996. “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a
Bomb.” International Security 21 (3): 54–86.
Samuels, Richard J., and James L. Schoff. 2015. “Japan’s Nuclear Hedge: Beyond “Allergy” and
Breakout.” Political Science Quarterly 130 (3): 475–503.
Sandler, Todd. 1977. “Impurity of Defense: An Application to the Economics of Alliances.” Kyklos
30 (3): 443–460.
Sandler, Todd. 1993. “The Economic Theory of Alliances: A Survey.” Journal of Conflict Resolu-
tion 37 (3): 446–483.
Sandler, Todd, and John F. Forbes. 1980. “Burden Sharing, Strategy, and the Design of NATO.”
Economic Inquiry 18 (3): 425–444.
Sartori, Anne. 2002. “The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in Inter-
national Disputes.” International Organization 56 (1): 1.
Sartori, Anne. 2005. Deterrence by Diplomacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Schelling, Thomas. 1966. Arms and Influence. 2008 ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Schmitz, David F. 1999. Thank God They’re on Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing
Dictatorships, 1921-1965. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
Schroeder, Paul W. 1976. “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management.”
In Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus Knorr. Lawrence, KS: Uni-
versity Press of Kansas pp. 247–286.
Schroeder, Paul W. 1994. “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory.” International Security 19
(1): 108–148.
Schultz, Kenneth A. 1998. “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises.” American
Political Science Review 92 (4): 829–844.
Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Schwartz, Thomas Alan. 2003. Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Schweller, Randall L. 1994. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.”
International Security 19 (1): 72–107.
Schweller, Randall L. 1998. Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Con-
flict. New York: Columbia University Press.
Schweller, Randall L., and William C. Wohlforth. 2000. “Power Test: Evaluating Realism in
238
Response to the End of the Cold War.” Security Studies 9 (3): 60–107.
Scott, Andrew. 2011. Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon, and the Anglo-American Relationship. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Seawright, Jason. 2016. Multi-Method Social Science: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative
Tools. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sechser, Todd S. 2007. “Winning without a Fight: Power, Reputation, and Compellant Threats in
International Crises.” Ph.D Dissertation, Stanford University.
Sechser, Todd S. 2010. “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power.” International
Organization 64 (4): 627–660.
Sechser, Todd S., and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2013. “Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail.”
International Organization 67 (1): 173–195.
Sechser, Todd S., and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2017. Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Selden, Zachary. 2013. “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and
the Endurance of American Hegemony.” Security Studies 22 (2): 330–364.
Sheetz, Mark S. 1999. “Exit Stratgies: American Grand Designs for Postwar European Security.”
Security Studies 8 (4): 1–43.
Signorino, Curtis S., and Jeffrey M. Ritter. 1999. “Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity
of Foreign Policy Positions.” International Studies Quarterly 43 (1): 115–144.
Simmons, Robert R. 1978. The Pueblo, EC-121 and Mayaguez Incidents: Some Continuities and
Changes. Baltimore, MD: Occasional Papers/Reprints in Contemporary Asian Studies.
Simon, Sheldon W. 1974. “The Japan-China-USSR Triangle.” Pacific Affairs 47 (2): 125–138.
Singer, J. David. 1987. “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of
States, 1816-1985.” International Interactions 14: 115–132.
URL: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
Singh, Sonali, and Christopher R. Way. 2004. “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation A Quanti-
tative Test.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (6): 859–885.
Siverson, Randolph M., and Joel King. 1980. “Attributes of National Alliance Membership and
War Participation, 1815-1965.” American Journal of Political Science 24 (1): 1–15.
Sloan, Stanely R. 2016. Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union, and the Transatlantic
Bargain. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
Snidal, Duncan. 1985. “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory.” International Organization
39 (4): 579–614.
Snyder, Glenn H. 1984. “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics.” World Politics 36 (4): 461–
495.
Snyder, Glenn H. 1997. Alliance Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Spindel, Jennifer. 2017. “Beyond Military Power: The Symbolic Politics of Conventional Weapons
Transfers.” Unpublished manuscript, University of Minnesota.
Starr, Harvey. 2000. “Substitutability in Foreign Policy: Theoretically Central, Empirically Elu-
sive.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (1): 128–138.
Stinnett, Douglas M., Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Gochman. 2002.
“The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3.” Conflict Management and
239
Peace Science 19 (2): 58–66.
Stone, Laura. 1999. “Whither Trade and Security? A Historical Perspective.” In The U.S.-Japan
Alliance: Past, Present, and Future, ed. Michael J. Green, and Patrick M. Cronin. New York:
Council on Foreign Relations Press pp. 247–267.
Sullivan, Patricia L., Brock F. Tessman, and Xiaojun Li. 2011. “US Military Aid and Recipient
State Cooperation.” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (3): 275–294.
Sungjoo, Han. 1980. “South Korea and the United States: The Alliance Survives.” Asian Survey
20 (11): 1075–1086.
Swenson-Wright, John. 2005. Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy Toward
Japan, 1945-1960. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Tomlinson, Rodney. 2001. “World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) Coding Manual.” Revision
8.2.
Trachtenberg, Marc. 1999. A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-
1963. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Trachtenberg, Marc. 2012. The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International
Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Treisman, Daniel. 2004. “Rational Appeasement.” International Organization 58 (2): 345–373.
Urpelainen, Johannes. 2012. “How Uncertainty about Outside Options Impedes International Co-
operation.” International Theory 4 (1): 133–163.
U.S. Department of State. 2017. “Presidents and Secretaries of State Foreign Travels.” Office of
the Historian.
URL: http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels
Uslu, Nasuh. 2003. The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of
a Distinctive Alliance. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers.
Vasconcelos, Alvaro. 1988. “Portuguese Defence Policy: Internal Politics and Defense Commit-
ments.” In NATO’s Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges, ed. John Chipman. New
York: Routledge.
Voeten, Erik. 2001. “Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action.” American Polit-
ical Science Review 95 (4): 845–858.
Wallander, Celeste A. 2000. “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War.”
International Organization 54 (4): 705–735.
Walt, Stephen M. 1987. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Walt, Stephen M. 2005. Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy. New
York: W.W. Norton.
Walt, Stephen M. 2009. “Alliances in a Unipolar World.” World Politics 61 (1): 86–120.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University Press.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1981. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better.” Adelphi Papers
171.
Weitsman, Patricia A. 2004. Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War. Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Welfield, John. 1988. An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Post-War American Alliance System.
240
Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press.
Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Whitten, Guy D., and Laron K. Williams. 2011. “Buttery Guns and Welfare Hawks: The Politics of
Defense Spending in Advanced Industrial Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science
55 (1): 117–134.
Williams, Phil. 1985. The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe. London: Macmillan.
Yarhi-Milo, Keren. 2013. “Tying Hands Behind Closed Doors: The Logic and Practice of Secret
Reassurance.” Security Studies 22 (3): 405–435.
Yarhi-Milo, Keren, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zachary Cooper. 2016. “To Arm or To Ally? The Pa-
tron’s Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances.” International Security
41 (2): 90–139.
Yong Lee, Min. 2011. “The Vietnam War: South Korea’s Search for National Security.” In The
Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, ed. Pyong-guk Kim, and Ezra F.
Vogel. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press pp. 403–429.
Yost, David S. 1985a. France’s Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe, Part I: Capabilities and
Doctrine. Adelphi Papers London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Yost, David S. 1985b. France’s Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe, Part II: Strategic and
Arms Control Implications. Adelphi Papers London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Zanchetta, Barbara. 2014. The Transformation of American International Power in the 1970s. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Zimmermann, Hubert. 1996. ““They have got to put something in the family pot!”: The Burden-
Sharing Problem in German-American Relations 1960-1967.” German History 14 (3): 325–346.
Zimmermann, Hubert. 2009. “The Improbable Permanence of a Commitment: America’s Troop
Presence in Europe during the Cold War.” Journal of Cold War Studies 11 (1): 3–27.
Zubok, Vladislav. 2013. “Lost in a Triangle: U.S.-Soviet Back-Channel Documents on the Japan
Factor in Tripartite Diplomacy, 1969-1972.” Journal of Cold War Studies 15 (2): 51–71.
Zyla, Benjamin. 2015. Sharing the Burden? NATO and Its Second-Tier Powers. Toronto: Univer-




A1.1 Data Description: Reassurance
• Table A1.1 contains various summary statistics for my variables.
• Tables A1.2 and A1.3 provide pairwise correlation coefficients between various measures of
reassurance during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, respectively.
• Figure A1.1 shows the over-time trend of annual U.S. statements and visits.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Statements+Visits 1.213 1.798 0 18 1383
Postwar 0.352 0.478 0 1 1479
US GDP growth 3.083 2.508 -3.588 7.754 1406
GDP (log) 25.632 1.818 19.495 29.039 1438
Nuclear latency 0.27 0.444 0 1 1479
Independent alliances (log) 1.054 0.516 0 3.497 1450
Independent alliances 2.437 2.984 0 32 1450
US-Adversary hostility 4.229 5.04 0 20 1469
Ally-Adversary hostility 0.523 1.45 0 9 1479
GDPpc (log) 9.24 1.075 4.889 10.996 1438
Land border w/ adversary 0.189 0.392 0 1 1479
Distance to adversary 2714.352 2226.39 367 10691 1464
Entente 0.087 0.282 0 1 1479
Table A1.1: Summary statistics.
Variables Statements+Visits Reassurance (WEIS) Troops (log) JMEs
Statements+Visits 1.000
Reassurance (WEIS) 0.421 1.000
Troops (log) 0.265 0.293 1.000
JMEs 0.145 0.046 0.414 1.000
Table A1.2: Correlations between measures of reassurance, Cold War period.
Variables Statements+Visits Reassurances (KingLowe) Troops (log) JMEs
Statements+Visits 1.000
Reassurances (KingLowe) 0.662 1.000
Troops (log) 0.413 0.507 1.000
JMEs 0.242 0.242 0.401 1.000




















1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Average U.S. Statements+Visits
Figure A1.1: U.S. statements and visits over time.
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A1.2 Robustness Checks: Reassurance
• Tables A1.4 and A1.5 add more control variables to the main results from Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
• Table A1.6 adds a lagged dependent variable to the main results from Table 4.2.1
• Tables A1.7 and A1.8 add decade fixed effects to the main results from Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
• Table A1.9 and uses alternative proxies for allied latent military potential: their logarith-
mized population and CINC scores. Data on population are from Gleditsch (2002), while
the CINC score comes from version 4.0 of the Correlates of War’s National Material Capa-
bilities dataset (Singer, 1987).
• Table A1.10 uses an alternative proxy for the aftermath of foreign wars: namely, a dummy
variable indicating whether a year was on in which the United States withdrew troops from
Korea (1953-1954), Vietnam (1969-1975), or Iraq (2008-2010).
• Table A1.11 runs the analysis using the logarithmized number of U.S. foreign-deployed
troops on allied territory as the dependent variable.
• Tables A1.12 and A1.13 run the analysis using joint military exercises (JMEs) as the de-
pendent variable. The results for H4 are somewhat weaker than when using statements and
visits, which is likely due to the smaller number of observations; these hypotheses rely on
annual variation, and thus reducing the number of years in the sample reduces the power of
the analysis.
• Tables A1.14 and A1.15 add variables that capture alternative explanations (presidential par-
tisanship; presidential election cycles; ally regime type; ally political ideology) to the main
results from Tables 4.1 and 4.2.





GDP (log) 0.345∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.052)
Nuclear latency 0.397∗ 0.415∗
(0.193) (0.202)
Independent alliances (log) 0.173 0.179
(0.160) (0.146)




Geostrategic location -0.209 -0.220
(0.206) (0.222)
Distance to adversary -0.000
(0.000)








Country FE No No
T,T2,T3 No No
Region FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 1357 1345
Log-likelihood -1817.394 -1784.829
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001


















Adversary CINC 2.077+ 2.422∗
(1.215) (1.086)
Country FE Yes Yes
T,T2,T3 Yes Yes
Region FE No No
Year FE No No
N 1373 1373
Log-likelihood -1759.596 -1755.695
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001














Statements+Visits (lag) 0.013 0.008
(0.018) (0.019)
Country FE Yes Yes
T,T2,T3 Yes Yes
Region FE No No
Year FE No No
N 1346 1346
Log-likelihood -1738.881 -1735.279
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001




GDP (log) 0.342∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.057)
Nuclear latency 0.441∗ 0.445∗
(0.210) (0.212)
Independent alliances (log) 0.199 0.212
(0.176) (0.160)
Common alliances (%) 0.061 0.107
(0.403) (0.320)




Distance to adversary -0.000
(0.000)






Country FE Yes Yes
T,T2,T3 No No
Region FE No No
Year FE No No
Decade FE Yes Yes
N 1357 1345
Log-likelihood -1866.015 -1830.884
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A1.7: Results for variation in reassurance across allies, including decade fixed effects instead














Country FE Yes Yes
T,T2,T3 No No
Region FE No No
Year FE No No
Decade FE Yes Yes
N 1373 1373
Log-likelihood -1769.677 -1765.037
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A1.8: Results for variation in reassurance over time, including decade fixed effects instead








Nuclear latency 0.445∗ 0.437∗
(0.208) (0.212)
Independent alliances (log) 0.272+ 0.254+
(0.153) (0.138)
Common alliances (%) 0.222 0.316
(0.319) (0.266)
Geostrategic location -0.174 -0.224
(0.230) (0.196)
GDPpc (log) 0.251+ -0.257
(0.133) (0.158)
Distance to adversary -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)




Ally-Adversary hostility 0.059∗ 0.059∗
(0.025) (0.023)
Country FE No No
T,T2,T3 No No
Region FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 1343 1343
Log-likelihood -1789.102 -1778.188
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001





War withdrawal (dummy) 0.184∗ 0.149
(0.093) (0.104)








Country FE Yes Yes
T,T2,T3 Yes Yes
Region FE No No
Year FE No No
N 1373 1373
Log-likelihood -1766.247 -1761.876
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A1.10: Results for variation in reassurance over time, using war withdrawal as a proxy for
the aftermath of costly foreign wars.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Troops (log) Troops (log) Troops (log) Troops (log)
GDP (log) 1.039∗ 0.964∗
(0.434) (0.460)
Nuclear latency 2.403∗∗ 0.843
(0.850) (0.682)
Independent alliances (log) 1.093 -0.790
(0.993) (1.135)
Common alliances (%) 1.557 -0.037
(2.380) (1.960)
Geostrategic location -0.066 0.722 0.605 -0.065
(0.821) (1.013) (1.235) (0.783)
GDPpc (log) -0.806+ -0.898 -0.132 -1.112∗
(0.446) (0.588) (0.681) (0.447)
Distance to adversary -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Land border w/ adversary 0.943 1.031 1.086 0.810
(0.647) (0.968) (1.220) (0.603)
Entente -0.917 -1.060 -0.490 -1.256+
(0.614) (0.935) (0.889) (0.740)
Ally-Adversary hostility 0.073 0.081 0.075 0.091
(0.081) (0.091) (0.092) (0.085)
Country FE No No No No
T,T2,T3 No No No No
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1422 1422 1405 1405
Log-likelihood -2967.157 -3144.654 -3214.369 -2910.805
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A1.11: Results for variation in reassurance across allies, using logarithmized foreign-
deployed U.S. troops as the dependent variable.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
JMEs JMEs JMEs JMEs JMEs
GDP (log) 0.350∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.068) (0.069)
Nuclear latency 0.772∗∗∗ 0.290 0.429+
(0.165) (0.219) (0.244)
Independent alliances (log) 0.656∗ 0.131 -0.178
(0.306) (0.310) (0.292)
Common alliances (%) 0.537 0.388 -0.267
(0.741) (0.668) (0.546)
Geostrategic location 0.120 0.380∗ 0.411 0.192 0.206
(0.195) (0.161) (0.301) (0.161) (0.159)
GDPpc (log) -0.157
(0.150)
Distance to adversary 0.000
(0.000)






Country FE No No No No No
T,T2,T3 No No No No No
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 612 612 611 611 605
Log-likelihood -934.442 -963.109 -1002.139 -928.588 -898.459
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A1.12: Main results for variation in reassurance across allies, using joint military exercises












Country FE Yes Yes
T,T2,T3 Yes Yes
Region FE No No
Year FE No No
N 612 612
Log-likelihood -936.580 -931.352
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001





GDP (log) 0.344∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.068)
Nuclear latency 0.431∗ 0.417∗
(0.214) (0.206)
Independent alliances (log) 0.265 0.298∗
(0.171) (0.149)
Common alliances (%) 0.252 0.303
(0.405) (0.301)




Distance to adversary -0.000
(0.000)








Left-wing seats -0.791+ -0.579
(0.479) (0.473)
Country FE No No
T,T2,T3 No No
Region FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 1296 1284
Log-likelihood -1781.876 -1745.992
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001

















Re-election year -0.227∗∗∗ -0.240∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.068)




Left-wing seats -0.531∗ -0.581∗
(0.250) (0.238)
Country FE Yes Yes
T,T2,T3 Yes Yes
Region FE No No
Year FE No No
N 1311 1311
Log-likelihood -1719.452 -1715.359
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A1.15: Main results for variation in reassurance over time, controlling for alternative expla-
nations.
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A1.3 Data Description: Burden-Sharing
• Table A1.16 contains various summary statistics for my variables. Table A1.17 provides
pairwise correlation coefficients between my independent and dependent variables.
• Table A1.18 shows the correlation between my independent variables and control variables.
• Figure A1.2 shows the over-time trends of the average annual value of allied military spend-
ing.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
∆ Milex (%) 0.051 0.189 -0.959 1.989 1197
Milex (log) 21.18 4.375 0 24.852 1242
Milex 10167.822 14416.196 0 62073.395 1242
GDP growth 3.853 7.38 -51.651 139.259 1226
Adversary aggression 0.18 0.384 0 1 1289
Postwar 0.289 0.454 0 1 1289
US GDP growth 3.018 2.396 -3.588 7.654 1226
US-Adversary conflict 4.567 4.999 0 20 1194
Ally-adversary hostility 0.547 1.477 0 9 1289
Rivalries (lag) 1.333 1.501 0 8 957
Ally MIDs 1.966 3.378 0 23 1226
Adversary CINC 0.125 0.059 0.039 0.218 1289
Geostrategic location 0.312 0.463 0 1 1289
Entente 0.088 0.283 0 1 1289
GDP (log) 25.774 1.82 19.495 29.039 1258
GDPpc (log) 9.343 1.057 4.889 10.996 1258
Vulnerability 0.538 0.563 0 2 1289
Colonial power 0.048 0.214 0 1 1289
Polity 6.722 5.966 -10 10 1236
Table A1.16: Summary statistics.
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Variables ∆ Milex (%) Milex (log) Adversary aggression Postwar US GDP growth Geostrategic location GDP (log) Vulnerability
∆ Milex (%) 1.000
Milex (log) -0.027 1.000
Adversary aggression -0.099 0.005 1.000
Postwar -0.013 -0.013 0.445 1.000
US GDP growth 0.030 -0.055 -0.437 -0.205 1.000
Geostrategic location 0.014 0.215 -0.019 -0.038 -0.007 1.000
GDP (log) -0.078 0.713 -0.005 -0.041 -0.078 0.313 1.000
Vulnerability 0.044 0.160 0.025 0.045 0.009 0.191 0.134 1.000
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Figure A1.2: Allied military spending over time.
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A1.4 Robustness Checks: Burden-Sharing
• Table A1.19 uses a variety of different model specifications. Models 1-2 use a dummy
variable to indicate years in which the United States withdrew troops from a protracted
foreign war (Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan) in place of postwar U.S. presidencies to measure
the aftermath of foreign wars. Models 3-4 cluster standard errors by year instead of by
country. Models 5-6 add a linear time trend to account for any secular temporal trends.
Models 7-8 control for the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance, measured using the ratio of Soviet-
to-U.S. nuclear weapons.
• Table A1.20 controls for a key alternative explanation: allies’ political ideology. I do so
by adding a variable to the models which captures the percentage of legislative seats held
by left-wing parties. To measure left-wing influence in government, I use the percentage
of parliamentary seats controlled by left-wing parties. Data come from the Comparative
Manifestos Project (Lehmann et al., 2015). For non-democratic allies, this variable takes the
value of 0.
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Cold War Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ Milex (%) ∆ Milex (%) ∆ Milex (%) ∆ Milex (%) ∆ Milex (%) ∆ Milex (%) ∆ Milex (%) ∆ Milex (%)
War withdrawal 0.065∗ 0.050∗
(0.025) (0.021)
Postwar 0.039 0.027 0.046+ 0.024 0.043+ 0.008
(0.029) (0.027) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
US GDP growth -0.009∗ -0.005∗ -0.009+ -0.006 -0.010∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.010∗ -0.006∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
GDP growth 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Adversary aggression -0.078∗∗ -0.091∗∗ -0.068+ -0.081∗ -0.072∗∗ -0.079∗∗ -0.070∗∗ -0.073∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.034) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025)
US-Adversary conflict 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Ally-adversary hostility -0.003 -0.007∗∗ -0.002 -0.007+ -0.002 -0.007∗ -0.002 -0.007∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Rivalries (lag)
Ally MIDs
Milex (lag) -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ Milex (%, lag) 0.139∗∗ 0.074+ 0.146∗ 0.080+ 0.146∗∗ 0.079+ 0.146∗∗ 0.075+
(0.038) (0.040) (0.060) (0.045) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040)
Adversary CINC 0.374∗∗∗ 0.354+ 0.289∗∗ 0.340∗∗
(0.093) (0.190) (0.101) (0.098)
Soviet/US nuclear balance 0.006 -0.029∗
(0.015) (0.012)
N 653 1133 653 1133 653 1133 653 1133
R2 0.075 0.066 0.065 0.060 0.066 0.060 0.066 0.064
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
+p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A1.19: Results for change in military expenditures.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Milex (%) ∆ Milex (%) Milex (log) Milex (log)
Milex (lag) -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
∆ Milex (%, lag) 0.130∗∗ 0.073+
(0.038) (0.039)
GDP growth 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.012∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.004)




US GDP growth -0.009∗ -0.006∗∗
(0.004) (0.002)
US-Adversary conflict 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Ally-adversary hostility -0.004 -0.008∗ -0.003 0.011
(0.003) (0.003) (0.032) (0.022)




GDP (log) 1.064∗∗∗ 1.096∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.073)








Left-wing seats -0.113∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗ 0.178 0.389
(0.026) (0.022) (0.427) (0.325)
Adversary CINC 0.300∗∗
(0.103)
Region FE No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes
N 653 1133 653 1168
R2 0.080 0.066 0.928 0.930
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
+p < 0.10,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A1.20: Controlling for alternative explanation.
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A1.5 Regional Classifications
In this paper I follow the Correlates of War’s regional classifications – but with two changes.
First, COW codes Pakistan as being in the same region as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the
Philippines, but for my purposes Pakistan has a significantly different threat environment. Thus, I
create a separate region for the countries of Central and South Asia (including Pakistan). Second,
COW codes Oceania as being a separate region from East Asia, but for my purposes their security
environments were similar. Thus, I code Australia and New Zealand as being in the same region
as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines.
As robustness checks, I also code Pakistan as being in the Middle East (along with Turkey,
Israel, Iraq, and Iran) and Australia and New Zealand as being a separate region. I also use COW’s
regional classifications as given without any changes. The results are not sensitive to the regional
codings.
A1.6 Coding
• Promises and visits
– Source: World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) (McClelland, 1999; Tomlinson, 2001)
∗ Years: 1965-1989
∗ Events included in the measurement: Promise Own Policy Support (PRM1) +
Promise Material Support (PRM2) + Promise Other Future Support (PRM3) +
Assure/Reassure (PRM4) + Visit (CNS2)
– Sources: American Presidency Project for statements (Peters and Woolley, 2016)2; and
U.S. Department of State (2017) for visits
∗ Years: 1950-2010
2John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ (accessed March
8, 2017).
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∗ Statements are coded as reassurance if they focus on:3
· Strength of U.S. commitment/protection/presence
· Strength of the relationship
· The need to strengthen U.S. commitment or the relationship
· U.S.’s willingness, ability, resolve to protect the ally
· A reaffirmation of U.S. commitment/protection/presence
· Reassurance of the U.S. commitment/protection/presence
· Importance of the alliance or of common/mutual defense
· Not generic statements of warmness, friendship, or positive relations. Para-
graphs indicating U.S. “support” for the ally only coded as reassurance if they
take place alongside discussions of the alliance commitment or treaty.
∗ Visits include all foreign trips made by the President and Secretary of State
• Congressional retrenchment bills
– Source: Policy Agendas Project4
– Years: 1950-2014
– Sample of bills limited to bills related to alliances. Using this sub-sample, I hand-code
bills, coding bills as retrenchment bills if they fit any of the following criteria:
∗ Bills calling for troop reductions from an ally
∗ Bills asserting congressional authority over the use of force on allied territory
∗ Bills calling for putting pressure on allies for burden-sharing
3See supplementary codebook for additional details.
4http://www.comparativeagendas.net/ (accessed August 15, 2016). The data used here were originally collected by
Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR
9320922 and 0111611, and are distributed through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at
Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here.
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A1.7 Proofs for Formal Model
A1.7.1 Pairwise payoff comparisons for the ally, given R or ∼R
(R,B) > (R,SQ) if: (1− α)P − CA > (1− α)P − αF => CA < αF
(∼R,B) > (∼R,SQ) if: (1− γ)P − CA > (1− γ)P − γF => CA < γF
(R,B) > (R,E) if: (1− α)P − CA > 0 => (1− α)P > CA
(∼R,B) > (∼R,E) if: (1− γ)P − CA > 0 => (1− γ)P > CA
(R,SQ) > (R,E) if: (1− α)P − αF > 0 => (1− α)P > αF
(∼R,SQ) > (∼R,E) if: (1− γ)P − γF > 0 => (1− γ)P > γF
A1.7.2 When do allies burden-share even when the patron reassures?
(R,B) > (R,SQ) and (R,B) > (R,E) if:
1. CA < αF
and
2. (1− α)P > CA
For a fixed level of burden-sharing (CA), these two conditions can hold in four possible com-
binations of F , P , and α. First, a high F , low α, and high P – a high level of vulnerability, low
risk of abandonment, and low availability of outside options. Second, a high F , high P , and high
α – a high level of vulnerability, low availability of outside options, and high risk of abandonment.
Third, a high F , low α, and low P – a high level of vulnerability, low risk of abandonment, and
high availability of outside options. Fourth, a low F , high α, and high P – low vulnerability, high





Using two undergraduate research assistants from Columbia University, I coded paragraphs taken
from presidential speeches in which the President mentions a foreign country.1 The paragraphs are
organized by country and year; there is a separate text file for each country in every year between
1950-2010. Taking these paragraphs, we then ascertained whether they contained a statement
of reassurance, which is defined in the project as “acts that are intended to have the effect of
convincing an ally that U.S. assistance will be forthcoming in the event of an attack on the ally by
an external actor.”
A2.2 Coding rules
In order to be coded as reassurance, a paragraph must contain strong emphasis on at least one of
the following:
1. Strength of U.S. commitment/protection/presence
2. Strength of the relationship
1I had the RAs overlap over a number of country-years – 613, or nearly half of statement country-years – and inter-
coder reliability was quite high, with a correlation of 0.69 and Krippendorf’s alpha of 0.67. RAs were given full
discretion in their coding, and in cases where they could not make a determination, I made a judgment.
269
3. The need to strengthen U.S. commitment or the relationship
4. U.S.’s willingness, ability, resolve to protect the ally
5. A reaffirmation of U.S. commitment/protection/presence
6. Reassurance of the U.S. commitment/protection/presence
7. Importance of the alliance or of common/mutual defense
Not included are paragraphs that are generic statements of warmness, friendship, or positive
relations. Paragraphs indicating U.S. “support” for the ally are only be coded as reassurance if they
take place alongside discussions of the alliance commitment or treaty.
A2.3 Examples of reassurance
“Australia is especially close to the hearts of Americans throughout our country...We sincerely ap-
preciate Australia’s support for our foreign policy. We assure you that the United States will remain
a strong and faithful ally, worthy of Australia’s trust.” – President Ford, July 27, 1976 (courtesy of
the appendix from McManus, 2017)
“The two Presidents agreed that the Republic of Korea forces and American forces stationed in
Korea must maintain a high degree of strength and readiness in order to deter aggression. President
Ford reaffirmed the determination of the United States to render prompt and effective assistance to
repel armed attack against the Republic of Korea in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty
of 1954 between the Republic of Korea and the United States. In this connection, President Ford
assured President Park that the United States has no plan to reduce the present level of United
States forces in Korea.” – President Ford, November 22, 1974
“We welcome this success of our postwar policies. This Administration does not view our
allies as pieces in an American Grand Design. We have accepted, for example, France’s desire to
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maintain an independent posture in world affairs, and have strengthened our bilateral relations. In
1970, two other allies were vigorously taking the initiative in diplomacy. Chancellor Brandt pur-
sued West Germany’s Eastern Policy, seeking reconciliation with Germany’s neighbors in Central
and Eastern Europe, Prime Minister Heath, in his Guildhall address on November 16, declared his
intention to see that British policies are determined by British interests.” – President Nixon, 1971
“Turkey has continued her steady progress toward self-sustaining growth, and has remained a
staunch NATO ally. She deserves our continued support.” – President Johnson, 1966
A2.4 Not examples of reassurance
“There’s an old saying that when North Americans meet Argentines, they look into a mirror. I’ve
felt that. Much here seems familiar: the cattle, the seas of grass, the love of liberty, the shared
belief in the dignity of the individual, our common European roots and shared colonial past, the
warm energy and the spirit of the people.”– President Bush, December 5, 1990 (courtesy of the
appendix from McManus, 2017)
“The President and the Prime Minister expressed gratification at the opportunity presented by
the Prime Minister’s visit for furthering their personal as well as official friendship symbolizing the
cordiality of relations between the American and Australian people.” – President Kennedy, 1962
(courtesy of the appendix from McManus, 2017)
“Because New Zealand and the United States of America and other peace-loving nations all
over the world have recognized that nations just must help each other, the peoples of the world
tonight have made great progress in their struggle for a better life for all human beings.” – Presi-
dent Johnson, 1968
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“We are very proud of our staunch and our farsighted and our courageous friends in New
Zealand. You have never wavered. You have never grown soft. You have never feared.” – Presi-
dent Johnson, 1968
“I know that our meetings, Mr. President, will reinforce the traditional bonds of affection and
cooperation between our two countries, thus contributing to our goals of peace and prosperity for
Italy, for the United States, and for all nations.” – President Ford, 1975
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